Military expenditure as a share of GDP is a key stress test of national priorities. While the US and China lead in raw dollars, the ranking changes dramatically when adjusted for economic size. Here are the top 20 countries where defense takes the biggest bite out of the economy
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China is reportedly plotting an outlay of around CNY2 trillion ($295 billion) over the next five years to build out data centres across the country, with state-owned telecoms operators tasked with managing the sites and vendor Huawei providing the bulk of the technology.
Bloomberg sources claim government agencies including the National Development and Reform Commission are drafting up plans to construct a network of “inter-connected computing hubs”, as part of a government initiative to boost domestic AI and increase competition with the US.
Operators China Mobile and China Telecom are named as being tasked with operating and connecting the bulk of the data centres, while suppliers including Huawei will be charged with providing at least 80% of the technology including AI chips.
The plan is in line with steps taken in recent years by the state to pump resources into domestic heavyweights like Huawei, effectively squeezing out US competitors such as Nvidia and AMD.
Funding for the plan will mainly come from sovereign debt including long-term special government bonds with more than a 10 year tenure and state funds for investment in strategic industries, added the sources.
In addition to the AI facilities, which will include data centres and faster mobile infrastructure, China also apparently plans to integrate the power grid to the project.
The planned investment figure does not include separate outlays planned by the country’s technology heavyweights including Alibaba and Tencent, added the sources.
Nvidia locked out
Notably, US AI companies are also planning for major AI investment. Meta Platform has set capex guidance of $125 billion to $145 billion for 2026, while Microsoft has committed to a $190 billion spend over the same period.
Robert Lea, an analyst at Bloomberg Intelligence said the big winner of China’s plan will be the nation’s economy, rather than private sector companies like Alibaba and Baidu.
“Domestic infrastructure suppliers including Huawei stand to benefit most, with Nvidia unlikely to get a look in,” he added.
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MOSCOW and ST. PETERSBURG – On Monday, June 1st, on Power Shift, a new independent geopolitical platform, Zulfiqar Ali, Larry Johnson and myself revealed what for all practical purposes is an uber-bombshell piece of information: if long dark clouds keep coming down, Tehran is ready to pivot from nuclear ambiguity to actually detonating a nuclear device on Iranian soil.
Less than a week later, the Power Shift page was censored on YouTube – with no explanation and no appeal. Yet what we revealed had already been detailed in several podcasts and interviews throughout last week, as in here and here (with myself and Larry); here; and at the St. Petersburg forum, here.
I published a detailed background preceding the release of the information, written just before Iran’s negotiating team suspended the exchange of all (italics mine) texts and messages with the U.S. via mediator Pakistan.
When it comes to the redaction of perhaps the final draft of an endlessly debated Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Iran and the U.S., it suddenly became crystal clear that it’s all about Lebanon.
Iran repeatedly reiterated it was ready to ditch the already comatose “ceasefire” if the death cult in West Asia proceeded with its threat of bombing Dahiyeh, the Shi’ite-majority suburb of southern Beirut.
Confronted by Trump, the leader of the death cult was forced to back down. For only a few days. Trump desperately needs an MoU and an extended ceasefire to be marketed as “Victory”. His (italics mine) Victory.
All that was happening, fast and furious, on the trail of a fateful, extremely sensitive, 105-minute phone call on Thursday, May 28, between Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif.
Islamabad is the sole functioning and trusted head-of-government back-channel between Tehran and Washington. Our sources revealed that during the phone call, Pezeshkian delivered a formally structured, three-step ultimatum to be communicated to the White House with absolute clarity:
What is particularly stunning is none of the above is about diplomatic posturing. What we had is the President of Iran relaying what is essentialy a decision by Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, signaling that if Washington crosses the next threshold, Tehran would pivot instantly from nuclear ambiguity to undeniable demonstration.
And that would imply a permanent rupture of the global non-proliferation system – with unforeseen consequences.
The China-Iran-Pakistan strategic alignment
Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif obviously did the math on the scale of such intelligence. He immediately told Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar – who was in New York for UN Security Council sessions – to deliver the information to Washington.
Dar bypassed the whole bureaucratic apparatus, directly calling U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio in New York. The message, from Tehran to the Trump administration, was stark: the escalation ladder now features a terminal rung.
Rubio “may” (and that’s the operative word) have recognized the supreme gravity of what is in fact a formal nuclear ultimatum. He briefed Trump. The day after, May 29, Trump abruptly stopped any further kinetic action. And his incendiary rhetoric was instantly toned down.
This had nothing to do with a sudden fit of strategic restraint in the War-a-Lago/Oval Office axis. It was the direct, downstream result of the Sharif-Dar-Rubio back-channel.
On the morning of May 29, Dar arrived in Washington for a one-day official visit.
Sitting across from Rubio, he delivered the detailed briefing that the New York phone call had only previewed.
He placed two massive bombshells on the negotiating table:
1. Iran will not surrender any of its Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). Nothing. Zero. And that’s final.
It’s all about sovereign independence (two concepts at the center of the recent Russia-China joint declaration signed in Beijing during Putin’s official visit to Xi Jinping).
So Tehran will not surrender its stockpile, whatever the terms, temporarily or not, just to comply with a face-saving mechanism designed for a U.S. domestic audience. From the point of view of Iran’s leadership – with Mojtaba at the helm – HEU goes way beyond a technical asset; it’s the ultimate fusion of sovereignty, deterrence, leverage, and political survival.
2. China has delivered state-of-the-art strategic defense systems to Iran – including shoulder-fired MANPADs – routed covertly through third countries (and that’s why I could not get any official confirmation two weeks before in Shanghai).
The breakdown: a total, operationally active China-Iran-Pakistan strategic alignment is in effect.
Is an Islamabad Accord still possible?
As it stands, none of us – including our sources – know whether a nuclear weapon detonated on Iranian soil would have been developed exclusively by Iran [they do have the scientific capability]; or with possible Russian, Pakistani or North Korean help. All options are plausible.
According to Prof. Ted Postol at MIT, Iran could easily convert 450 kg of 65% uranium hexafluoride into approximately 85% weapons grade: all that is needed for a low yield weapon, to be mounted into at least 10 missile delivery systems capable of reaching Israel. That means, at a minimum, 10 nuclear bombs.
Technically this sort of low yield weapon can be designed, Postol explains, with the use of a neutron reflector made of depleted uranium – or beryllium/tungsten carbide – and positioned immediately around the fissile core. It reflects escaping neutrons back into the nuclear material to increase fission efficiency, and reduces the required critical mass. In a nutshell: less material and more bombs.
Very important: a draft of this column was submitted earlier last week to a top Iranian official, part of the extremely tight circle around Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. His reaction: “I won’t comment on this matter”.
Beyond this no-response response, what became instantly clear is the verified transmission of the most consequential back-channel communication of the no war/no peace crisis.
It goes like this: Pezeshkian talks to Sharif; Sharif talks to Dar; Dar talks to Rubio; Rubio talks to Trump; Dar talks to Rubio face to face (during his Washington briefing).
All that throws new light over the – subsequently broken – 60-day ceasefire, the fragile off-ramp desperately needed by Trump. This framework has been organized by Pakistan and structurally backed by China – as I confirmed in Shanghai.
Tehran has insisted on the order of the proceedings, over and over again. First, all wars must stop, especially the offensive by the death cult over Lebanon. Then enter the modalities to restore trade traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. The third and last stage is to resume some sort of meaningful nuclear dialogue.
On The Big Picture, a serious structural rewrite is already on – whatever nasty ceasefire-breaking surprises may lie ahead.
As it stands: the Abraham Accords are for all practical purposes dead; Saudi Arabia has frozen all back-channel Israel “normalization” discussions; Qatar and Oman are quietly drafting military transition timelines to phase out the U.S. from West Asia. And most crucially, a new West Asia security architecture is rapidly coalescing outside the American “protective” umbrella, driven by The Four Sunnis: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkiye and Egypt.
Last Thursday, again on Power Shift (our YouTube page was still active), Zulfiqar Ali, Larry Johnson and I identified a possible Islamabad Accord as the emerging framework for ending the U.S.-Iran war – way before Western MSM had recognized it as the organizing architecture.
We also identified the mechanism driving it: non-stop Pakistani shuttle diplomacy, quietly but decisively backed by China.
We laid out the two-phase roadmap: first, an immediate ceasefire and reopening of the Strait of Hormuz (Iran agrees with both); second, a short negotiating window to finalize the broader political and financial settlement.
We reported that the extremely contentious release of Iran’s frozen assets was not a speculative talking point, but an active lever in the process. That asset release and possible sanctions relief were being treated as concrete confidence-building measures.
We also reported that a high-level Iranian delegation – including Parliament leader Ghalibaf, FM Abbas Araghchi, and Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati – would travel to Doha in connection with the frozen-funds track.
That was later confirmed across the spectrum, including the fact that the central-bank component was tied directly to frozen assets.
We also advanced that Islamabad could become the stage for the final political act, including a possible Trump visit, alongside Pezeshkian: yet now that possibility seems as remote as ever.
China is just watching the river flow
These are the facts, as it stands:
Iran is far from isolated and is positioned for a prolonged war, with meaningful material and strategic backing from China, Pakistan, and North Korea, and carefully calculated support from Russia, as I confirmed during the St. Petersburg forum.
The U.S. is paralyzed. The Trump administration may appear to want an off-ramp; but it is totally constrained by pressure from the death cult in West Asia – as we’ve seen this weekend; exhausted escalation pathways; and the absence of a decisive military option that can alter the chessboard without creating an infinitely more unmanageable crisis.
The Gulf petro-monarchies are terrified about a possible resumption of the war – with the principal exception of the UAE.
The leaves Islamabad as the only exit route in town, with Field Marshal Asim Munir positioned as the indispensable intermediary; and Beijing and Moscow following everything closely, in some respects actively shaping the outer frame.
The bombing of southern Beirut on June 6 was perpetrated once again at a critical moment in the negotiations, as pointed out by Mohammad Mokhber, a top advisor to Leader Mojtaba Khamenei and a member of Iran’s Expediency Council:
“By bombing Lebanon during the presence of the mediator in Iran [he was referring to Asim Munir], the enemy set the negotiating table on fire for the third time to shout about the repeated violations of the ceasefire in all areas. We speak to the violators with the language of ‘power’; the axis of resistance is a unified body, and they will definitely receive a heavy and painful price for this aggression in the field.”
The death cult bombing of southern Beirut led to a frankly surrealist spectacle: the Trump administration scrambling after the Pakistani mediator in Tehran, begging him to intercede with the Iranians for de-escalation. The Emperor who wanted to destroy Iranian civilization had to ask Pakistan to salvage what could still be salvaged.
That means, as we reported, that with Iran setting the terms of escalation and raising its deterrence potential, and with Trump left with no cards at all, the only possible solution lies with diplomacy via Islamabad.
This week on Power Shift, in three consecutive shows from Monday to Wednesday, we will dig deeper into the intel and the diplomacy beneath these tectonic twists.
And then, of course, there’s the intriguing Chinese angle.
U.S. Think Tankland will become totally paralyzed when they finally realize that by injecting advanced military hardware into the Iranian theater of war, Beijing is actively road-testing the limits of American hegemonic coercion.
And if push comes to shove, and Iran is forced into a nuclear demonstration for all the world to see, China will acquire an inexorable proof-of-concept that U.S. deterrence is hollow.
One has to marvel at the engineering of such a massive strategic masterclass – without firing a single shot.
Dai grandi parchi nazionali alla protezione delle specie rare, la Cina ha trasformato la tutela ambientale in pilastro della modernizzazione socialista, integrando sviluppo, biodiversità, transizione verde e il principio secondo cui “acque limpide e montagne verdi” sono ricchezza.
La Cina degli ultimi anni ha fatto della tutela ambientale non un settore separato della politica pubblica, ma una componente essenziale del proprio modello di sviluppo. Il motto secondo cui “acque limpide e montagne verdi sono una ricchezza inestimabile” non è rimasto una formula retorica, ma è diventato il fondamento di una strategia nazionale che lega protezione degli ecosistemi, lotta all’inquinamento, salvaguardia della biodiversità, transizione energetica, sicurezza ecologica e miglioramento delle condizioni di vita della popolazione. In questa visione, la “Bella Cina” non è soltanto un obiettivo paesaggistico o turistico, ma una forma di modernizzazione in cui il rapporto tra uomo e natura viene riorganizzato secondo criteri di equilibrio, sostenibilità e responsabilità intergenerazionale. La Cina ha codificato questa impostazione anche nella propria elaborazione politica più recente, insistendo sull’approccio integrato alla conservazione di montagne, fiumi, foreste, campi, laghi, praterie e deserti.
Il dato forse più evidente riguarda la costruzione di un sistema di parchi nazionali, inesistenti fino a pochi anni fa. Nel 2021 la Cina ha istituito il primo gruppo di cinque parchi nazionali, per una superficie protetta complessiva di circa 230.000 chilometri quadrati: il Parco nazionale del Sanjiangyuan, il Parco nazionale del Panda gigante, il Parco nazionale della Tigre e del Leopardo del Nord-Est della Cina, il Parco nazionale della Foresta Tropicale di Hainan e il Parco nazionale di Wuyishan. Questi parchi ospitano quasi il 30 per cento delle principali specie selvatiche terrestri protette del Paese, rappresentando i nuclei più vitali degli ecosistemi naturali cinesi.
Il Parco nazionale del Sanjiangyuan, nella provincia del Qinghai, copre circa 190.700 chilometri quadrati e tutela le sorgenti del Fiume Azzurro, del Fiume Giallo e del Lancang-Mekong, configurandosi come una delle grandi riserve idriche dell’Asia. Qui il concetto di protezione ambientale assume un valore strategico: difendere gli ecosistemi dell’altopiano significa proteggere la sicurezza idrica di vaste regioni a valle. Il parco è anche habitat di specie come l’antilope tibetana e il leopardo delle nevi. In particolare, secondo i dati ufficiali cinesi, la popolazione di antilopi tibetane nel Sanjiangyuan è recentemente risalita a oltre 70.000 esemplari, rispetto a meno di 20.000 negli anni Novanta, segno che le politiche di tutela, se accompagnate da controllo del territorio e ripristino degli habitat, possono produrre risultati misurabili.
Il Parco nazionale del Panda gigante, esteso per circa 22.000 chilometri quadrati tra Gansu, Sichuan e Shaanxi, rappresenta invece uno dei simboli più conosciuti della conservazione cinese. La sua importanza non riguarda soltanto il panda, ma l’intero ecosistema forestale montano in cui questa specie vive: in particolare, l’estensione del parco permette di salvaguardare l’habitat di oltre il 70 per cento dei panda selvatici. Tuttavia, dobbiamo ribadire che la Cina non protegge l’animale come icona isolata, ma cerca di collegare habitat frammentati, ricostruire corridoi ecologici, ridurre la pressione antropica e garantire la sopravvivenza di intere comunità biologiche. In questo senso, il panda gigante diventa il volto più visibile di una politica più vasta che riguarda foreste, bacini idrici, comunità locali, turismo ecologico e ricerca scientifica.
Il Parco nazionale della Tigre e del Leopardo del Nord-Est della Cina, nelle province del Jilin e dello Heilongjiang, copre circa 14.100 chilometri quadrati e protegge due specie emblematiche: la tigre siberiana e il leopardo dell’Amur. In un’area di frontiera ecologica, segnata da foreste temperate, presenza umana, agricoltura e confini internazionali, la tutela di grandi predatori richiede una governance particolarmente complessa. La ripresa di queste specie indica che la protezione ambientale cinese non si limita agli animali più “popolari”, ma riguarda anche predatori apicali, essenziali per l’equilibrio degli ecosistemi. Salvaguardare una tigre o un leopardo significa tutelare tutta la catena ecologica che rende possibile la loro sopravvivenza.
Il Parco nazionale di Wuyishan, tra Fujian e Jiangxi, è più piccolo per superficie, circa 1.280 chilometri quadrati, ma ha un valore ecologico enorme. Si tratta infatti di una delle foreste subtropicali più complete e vaste, che include un patrimonio di piante vascolari, vertebrati selvatici, licheni, orchidee e insetti, confermando che la biodiversità non si misura soltanto attraverso grandi mammiferi carismatici, ma anche attraverso la ricchezza meno visibile di specie vegetali, insetti, anfibi, uccelli e microrganismi. Wuyishan mostra dunque un’altra dimensione della “Bella Cina”: la conservazione di ecosistemi complessi, nei quali il valore scientifico si intreccia con il valore paesaggistico e culturale.
Il Parco nazionale della Foresta Tropicale di Hainan, con circa 4.269 chilometri quadrati, protegge la più concentrata e meglio conservata foresta pluviale tropicale della Cina. Qui vive il gibbone di Hainan, una delle specie di primati più rare al mondo. Le fonti ufficiali cinesi segnalano che la sua popolazione è risalita da appena 13 esemplari nel 2003 a 37 nel 2022, un risultato importante se si considera l’estrema fragilità demografica della specie. Non va poi dimenticato il ruolo di altre specie, come il cervo sambar di Hainan, confermando come, anche in questo caso, la tutela del parco non sia una misura simbolica, ma un progetto di ricostruzione ecologica di lungo periodo.
La costruzione dei parchi nazionali si accompagna a una riorganizzazione istituzionale. Nel 2025, il ministero delle Risorse Naturali ha annunciato il completamento della registrazione dei diritti di proprietà per i primi cinque parchi nazionali, un passaggio importante perché chiarisce proprietà, competenze, supervisione e responsabilità nella gestione delle risorse naturali. Questo dettaglio è rilevante perché la tutela ambientale non dipende solo dalla buona volontà, ma da regole chiare, responsabilità definite e meccanismi amministrativi capaci di impedire sovrapposizioni, abusi o vuoti di gestione. La Cina sta cercando di costruire il più grande sistema di parchi nazionali al mondo, e per farlo deve trasformare la protezione della natura in un sistema di governance.
Un altro aspetto essenziale è la severità delle misure adottate. Dopo l’istituzione dei primi parchi nazionali, sono stati chiusi oltre 390 siti minerari e quasi 100 piccole centrali idroelettriche sono state gradualmente eliminate all’interno delle aree interessate. Ciò mostra che la protezione ambientale non è una semplice aggiunta allo sviluppo economico, ma talvolta richiede scelte nette, rinunce e riconversioni. In altre parole, il principio delle “acque limpide e montagne verdi” implica che determinate attività economiche non possano continuare se compromettono ecosistemi strategici. La crescita, nella concezione della civiltà ecologica cinese, deve essere subordinata alla sicurezza ecologica di lungo periodo.
Ma le politiche ambientali cinesi non si limitano alla biodiversità. Esse si inseriscono nella più ampia transizione verde e a basse emissioni di carbonio. Secondo il Libro bianco cinese sui piani per il picco delle emissioni e la neutralità carbonica, la Cina ha costruito il più grande e più rapidamente crescente sistema di energie rinnovabili al mondo, la più grande e completa catena industriale delle nuove energie, e ha contribuito a circa un quarto delle nuove aree verdi aggiunte nel mondo, dimostrando la connessione tra la protezione della natura e la trasformazione industriale. La “Bella Cina” non si costruisce soltanto proteggendo i parchi, ma anche cambiando il modo in cui si produce energia, si organizza la mobilità, si pianificano le città e si riducono le emissioni.
La forza della strategia cinese consiste dunque nel legare ambiente e sviluppo. Nelle narrazioni occidentali, spesso la tutela ambientale viene presentata come limite alla crescita dei Paesi in via di sviluppo. La Cina propone invece una sintesi diversa: lo sviluppo resta necessario, ma deve cambiare qualità. Il punto non è scegliere tra crescita economica e ambiente, ma costruire una crescita capace di rigenerare l’ambiente, migliorare l’efficienza energetica, valorizzare il turismo ecologico, creare lavoro verde e ridurre i costi sociali dell’inquinamento. Il villaggio di Yucun, frequentemente richiamato dalle fonti cinesi, è diventato un simbolo di questa trasformazione: da economia legata ad attività ad alto impatto ambientale a modello di sviluppo fondato su turismo ecologico e valorizzazione del paesaggio.
La dimensione sociale è altrettanto importante. La tutela ambientale non può essere imposta contro le popolazioni locali, ma deve offrire loro alternative di reddito, servizi pubblici e partecipazione. Nei parchi nazionali cinesi, la transizione verso modelli di conservazione richiede il coinvolgimento delle comunità, la formazione di ranger ecologici, la riconversione di attività dannose e l’integrazione tra protezione e sviluppo locale. Questo è particolarmente evidente nelle aree montane, forestali e pastorali, dove la povertà e la fragilità ecologica spesso si sovrappongono. Proprio per questo, le politiche cinesi di riduzione della povertà hanno più volte collegato il miglioramento ambientale e al miglioramento delle condizioni di vita, sostenendo che le “acque limpide e montagne verdi” possano diventare una fonte reale di prosperità per le comunità rurali.
La “Bella Cina” è dunque anche una risposta alla crisi ecologica globale. Mentre molti Paesi occidentali hanno storicamente costruito la propria industrializzazione attraverso un consumo intensivo di risorse e una massiccia emissione di inquinanti, la Cina cerca di percorrere una modernizzazione diversa, pur partendo da una scala demografica, industriale e territoriale senza paragoni. Naturalmente le sfide restano enormi: qualità dell’aria, risorse idriche, desertificazione, pressione urbana, consumo energetico e protezione degli habitat richiedono politiche costanti e verificabili. Ma il punto politico è che la tutela ambientale è ormai entrata nella struttura stessa della governance cinese, non come tema secondario, ma come parte della strategia nazionale.
La politica ambientale cinese degli ultimi anni può quindi essere letta come un passaggio dalla protezione difensiva alla costruzione attiva di un nuovo rapporto tra sviluppo e natura. La difesa degli animali rari, l’ampliamento delle riserve, la registrazione dei diritti di proprietà dei parchi, la chiusura di attività incompatibili, l’espansione delle energie rinnovabili, la transizione industriale e il miglioramento della governance ambientale fanno parte di un’unica traiettoria. L’obiettivo non è congelare la natura in un’immagine immobile, ma permettere agli ecosistemi di rigenerarsi dentro un processo di modernizzazione.
La “Bella Cina” non è dunque un ornamento della crescita cinese, ma una delle sue condizioni future. Senza sicurezza ecologica, non vi può essere sicurezza alimentare, idrica, climatica e sociale. Senza biodiversità, non vi può essere equilibrio degli ecosistemi. Senza parchi e riserve naturali, lo sviluppo rischia di consumare le proprie basi materiali. Il messaggio che emerge dall’esperienza cinese è che la modernizzazione non deve necessariamente significare distruzione della natura. Può invece diventare il mezzo attraverso cui una grande civiltà ricostruisce il proprio equilibrio con il mondo naturale. È in questa prospettiva che “acque limpide e montagne verdi” diventano davvero ricchezza: non soltanto ricchezza economica, ma ricchezza biologica, culturale, sociale e storica per le generazioni future.
A pair of U.S. adversaries — China and North Korea — appear to be strengthening relations, with Chinese President Xi Jinping's arrival in Pyongyang on Monday for a rare state visit.
This is Xi's first trip to North Korea in seven years, and experts say the visit is likely aimed at reasserting China’s unique influence over North Korea in exchange for providing economic and political benefits.
Xi is scheduled to meet North Korean leader Kim Jong Un in what will be their first summit since September, when they met in Beijing after viewing a military parade alongside Russian President Vladimir Putin and other foreign leaders.
No specific agenda has been mentioned, but foreign experts predict the meeting to have a significant impact on bilateral ties and more, as both sides seek to fully restore their traditional alliance amid separate disputes with the U.S. government.
Xi’s trip comes after his back-to-back summits with U.S. President Donald Trump and Putin in Beijing last month. Xi plans to meet Trump again for a U.S. visit in September.
China has, for years, been North Korea's economic lifeline and primary diplomatic backer. China has refrained from fully enforcing U.N. sanctions on North Korea and sent clandestine aid to support its impoverished neighbor.
This year marks 65 years since the two nations signed a mutual defense treaty.
Despite this, there have been questions about their ties in recent years, as North Korea has prioritized cooperation with Russia by supplying troops and weapons to support its war against Ukraine and received economic and military assistance from Moscow in return.
Experts warn that restoring China's exclusive influence over North Korea would give Xi leverage with Trump, who has repeatedly expressed his wish to restart diplomacy with Kim.
Analysts said Xi would likely offer Kim economic aid packages such as shipments of rice and fertilizers, a resumption of Chinese group tourism to North Korea and joint economic projects.
Xi may also avoid the issue of denuclearization of North Korea, which wants to achieve international recognition as a nuclear weapons state, as a way to call for lifting of U.N. sanctions on North Korea, according to experts.
After last month’s summit between Trump and Xi, the U.S. government said the two leaders affirmed their shared goal to denuclearize North Korea.
But China only said the leaders spoke about the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula. Kim’s sister and senior official Kim Yo Jong dismissed the readout of the meeting as "false information."
Last week, Kim unveiled a new plant to produce nuclear ingredients and pledged to bolster the country’s nuclear forces "at an exponential rate." He also said he is seeking to speed up efforts to build a nuclear-armed navy.
On Sunday, Kim Yo Jong described a U.S. plan for the denuclearization of North Korea as an "escapist and anachronistic dream."
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Kim Jong Un has dismissed U.S. and South Korean offers for talks as he focuses on enlarging and modernizing his nuclear arsenal. The North Korean leader in September urged the U.S. to withdraw its demand for North Korea to denuclearize as a precondition for resuming diplomacy.
The Associated Press contributed to this report.
Eles se reuniram em Xangai, na China, na última semana. Entre os projetos apresentados, está a proposta de reconversão verde de equipamentos - que prevê a modernização de espaços culturais com foco na sustentabilidade - e de desenvolvimento tecnológico do setor criativo.
O secretário e Dilma também conversaram sobre a programação do Ano Cultural Brasil-China 2026, iniciativa de diplomacia cultural promovida pelo governo brasileiro e chinês para fortalecer os laços culturais entre os dois países e a parceria estratégica bilateral.
“A cultura é um vetor estratégico para o desenvolvimento, que caminha em paralelo à geração de renda e à transição ecológica”, comentou o secretário-executivo ao destacar a importância do apoio financeiro do Banco do Brics para a ampliação e modernização da infraestrutura cultural e criativa do Brasil.
Tavares ainda aproveitou o encontro para apresentar a Dilma o Tela Brasil, plataforma pública de streaming que o governo federal lançou no último dia 30 e que já conta com 555 obras audiovisuais brasileiras que o público pode acessar e assistir gratuitamente. Entre elas, 19 títulos que já representaram o Brasil na disputa pelo Oscar.
Coordenado pelo Ministério da Cultura, o Tela Brasil foi desenvolvido em parceria com a Universidade Federal de Alagoas e reúne conteúdos financiados pelo Fundo Setorial do Audiovisual (FSA), obras guardadas por instituições do Sistema MinC, como a Cinemateca Brasileira, o Centro Técnico Audiovisual (CTAv), a Funarte e a Fundação Cultural Palmares.
Das obras disponíveis, 267 são curtas-metragens; 139, longas-metragens; 85, médias-metragens ou telefilmes e 64 obras seriadas.
Peruvians head to the polls in a pivotal presidential runoff June 7 in an election that could reshape not only the country’s future but also the balance of power across Latin America.
Two candidates are vying to become the country's ninth president in just 10 years. Conservative candidate Keiko Fujimori is campaigning on law and order, free-market policies and closer ties with the United States, while left-wing challenger Roberto Sánchez represents a political movement that many see as a continuation of the leftist currents that have challenged U.S. interests in the region.
José Ignacio Beteta, executive director of Asociación de Contribuyentes, a think tank in Peru, told Fox News Digital, "Peru’s June 7 runoff carries consequences well beyond its borders. When analyzed against the current U.S. National Security Strategy, this election will determine whether Peru consolidates its alignment as a U.S. partner or devolves into deeper geopolitical contention. Peru’s institutional weakness has already allowed China to expand into strategic sectors."
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Beteta added, "Meanwhile, the vote is seen as a choice between a return to freer and more competitive economic and security policies with Fujimori and a second attempt at left-wing governance with Sanchez, a binary that mirrors South America’s broader ideological fractures."
The election follows years of political instability in Peru, a country that has seen multiple presidents removed from office over the past decade and remains deeply divided between urban and rural constituencies.
Sunday’s election's outcome is expected to be very close, with the possibility of a final result not being known for days, according to the Associated Press.
For Washington, Peru’s election represents more than a domestic political contest. It is another test of the broader political direction of Latin America. Over the past several years, several countries in the region have experienced electoral shifts toward center-right or conservative governments, including Argentina under Javier Milei and Ecuador under Daniel Noboa who are all more friendly to Washington.
A Fujimori victory would reinforce that trend and could position Peru alongside a growing bloc of governments favoring tougher approaches to crime, stronger ties with the United States and market-oriented economic policies.
Presidential candidate Keiko Fujimori told Fox News Digital that if she wins, "My government's foreign policy will be based on a very clear premise: defending Peru's interests. Specifically, regarding the United States, my government will seek a relationship of cooperation, mutual respect and investment promotion. We welcome the Trump administration's renewed perspective on Latin America and, especially, on Peru, which occupies a strategic geopolitical position in the region."
Fujimori continued: "We want to seize this opportunity by generating greater stability, legal certainty, and confidence for investment. Peru must always be a country open to the world, committed to freedom, free competition, and the free market. Our goal is to lay the groundwork so that investors from the United States and around the world find in Peru a reliable, stable, and attractive country in which to invest, produce, and create jobs."
Fox News Digital reached out to Sánchez’ campaign but did not get a response.
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Peruvian analyst and legal expert Lucas Ghersi told Fox News Digital, "Roberto Sánchez represents a rather radical left. His platform includes nationalizations and expropriations, and he is close to Evo Morales and Nicolás Maduro. This election is highly polarizing Peruvian society."
Ghersi continued, "If Keiko Fujimori wins, she would have a good relationship with the United States. She is a reasonable person who defends the constitutional framework and the rule of law, and she has ties to the United States because she has done academic work at Florida International University (FIU).
"Roberto Sánchez, on the other hand, would create tension in the relationship with the United States. During his campaign and in the presidential debate, he bitterly criticized Peru's purchase of F-16 jets from the United States. He said that Peru shouldn't buy from the United States and should instead use that money for health or education. He also has ties to illegal mining and has been accused of drug trafficking. This could create tensions in the relationship with the United States."
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Ghersi concluded, "Peru is a very strategic country and has been the focus of competition between the United States and China. Peru has one of the largest proven copper reserves and is a major gold producer. Therefore, both China and the United States are vying for influence in Peru, and China has been promoting mega-investment projects there, such as a mega-port that is already operational. In response, the United States offered to renovate the Peruvian Navy's base and invest in large port projects."
A Fujimori victory would likely be interpreted in Washington as a continuation of the recent trend toward center-right governance in parts of Latin America. Fujimori has campaigned on restoring public security, strengthening economic growth, and maintaining Peru’s market-oriented model. Her supporters argue that these policies could encourage greater foreign investment and closer cooperation with the United States on security and economic issues.
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A Sánchez victory would present a different scenario. Although he has recently moderated portions of his platform, emphasizing respect for private property, free trade agreements and macroeconomic stability, questions remain about how his administration would approach relations with Washington and regional left-wing movements.
The next Peruvian president will help determine whether one of South America’s most important countries moves closer to Washington, or charts a leftward course.
The Associated Press reports that voting is mandatory in Peru for citizens from the ages of 18 to 70, with more than 27 million people registered.
The Associated Press contributed to this report.
Chinese espionage in the European Union and neighboring countries reveals its full scope when certain pieces are connected. The May 20 arrest in Germany of a German couple of Chinese origin who were taking military-technology information from universities is a particularly notable case. But it is only one of many. The episode exposes a strategy of large-scale, coordinated infiltration when placed alongside other arrests in EU member states and neighboring countries. In total, around 30 agents and collaborators have been uncovered in Europe and its vicinity in just the past two years; some were arrested, several expelled, and others are awaiting trial. China typically denies all espionage allegations and describes them as slander.
© Pool (Getty Images)
by Veronika Kyrylenko Reprinted with permission from TheNewAmerican.com The National Security Commission on Emerging Biotechnology (NSCEB) has issued a stark warning: The United States is at risk of falling behind China in the critical field of biotechnology. In its final report to Congress, the bipartisan commission, staffed with the national security insiders, calls for a comprehensive national strategy and a minimum investment of $15 billion over the next five years, ostensibly to bolster U.S. leadership in biotech. The 2025 final report of the NSCEB opens not with a warning, but with a prophecy: We stand at the edge of a […]
Xi Jiping et Vladimir Poutine en 2018 (Kremlin.ru, CC BY 4.0 , via Wikimedia Commons), via Wikimedia Commons) Xi Jiping et Vladimir Poutine en 2018 (Kremlin.ru, CC BY 4.0
One week after Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin is traveling to China for a 48-hour official visit aimed at strengthening the comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation between Russia and China.
Putin’s visit to China, expected on Tuesday, May 19, is part of a carefully planned diplomatic strategy. The timing is no coincidence: it coincides with the 25th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Good-Neighborliness and Friendly Cooperation, a landmark agreement signed by the two countries in 2001.
This treaty holds major significance in Sino-Russian relations, as it marked the end of decades of mutual mistrust, border disputes, and geopolitical rivalries that characterized the Soviet era.
The timing of the visit is particularly revealing of current international dynamics. By arriving in China one week after Trump’s departure from Beijing, Putin creates a symbolic succession that deserves close analysis. This diplomatic “passing of the baton” among the world’s three major powers offers a valuable lens through which to observe today’s balance of power and each country’s positioning strategy.
The official purpose of the visit is clear: to reinforce the comprehensive partnership and strategic cooperation between Russia and China.
Beyond formal statements, however, the trip carries deeper significance for both governments. Moscow is seeking to consolidate its ties with Beijing at a time when the international environment has become highly volatile.
Dmitry Peskov, spokesperson for the Russian presidency, said on Friday that the trip would be “a good opportunity to exchange views on the contacts the Chinese have had with the Americans.”
This statement clearly shows that trilateral diplomacy lies at the heart of the visit. Russia wants to understand how China is negotiating with the United States and ensure that Russian interests are not sidelined in Sino-American discussions.
The concept of an “eternal friendship” between Russia and China, frequently reaffirmed by both powers, is a central element of their diplomatic rhetoric.
However, this visit demonstrates that both countries are actively seeking to prove the strength of their ties in the face of current global upheavals. The phrase itself is revealing: it implicitly acknowledges that the international order is going through a period of major instability.
For Xi Jinping, the meeting with Putin offers a valuable opportunity to present himself as a world leader committed to geopolitical balance and harmony.
By hosting Trump and Putin in succession, the Chinese leader positions himself as a potential mediator in global conflicts and as a guardian of international stability. This posture significantly enhances China’s prestige and influence on the world stage.
The triangular relationship among the United States, Russia, and China now shapes global geopolitics as a whole.
Every bilateral meeting between two of these powers is closely watched by the third as an indicator of emerging alliances and growing fractures. Putin’s trip to China must therefore be understood within this three-dimensional strategic framework.
Russia, while a major regional power, remains economically secondary compared with China. As a result, Moscow must continually reaffirm the importance of its partnership with Beijing.
This relative asymmetry helps explain why Russia places such importance on diplomatic rituals and public displays of strategic friendship. Maintaining strong ties despite structural imbalances is essential to preserving international equilibrium.
This visit takes place during a period of profound transformation in the international order.
China’s rise, Russia’s return as a disruptive power, and shifts in American foreign policy have created an environment in which old certainties no longer apply.
Diplomatic exchanges between Beijing and Moscow are therefore strategically crucial to maintaining stability in international relations.
The strengthening of the Sino-Russian partnership is not necessarily intended to form an alliance against the United States. Rather, it aims to establish a balance of power capable of withstanding external pressures and attempts at hegemony.
In this context, strategic cooperation between Russia and China has become an essential stabilizing factor in contemporary global geopolitics.
Putin has arrived in Beijing and received the same “warm welcome” package as Trump: a red carpet, the PLA Tri-Service Honor Guard, and the jumping children…
Xi Jinping can be heard saying “hello” (“你好,” nǐ hǎo) to Putin.
Will Putin be able to achieve his 4 goals mentioned… https://t.co/OxMXG3l3Uq pic.twitter.com/TUENKMajcy
— Inconvenient Truths — Jennifer Zeng Reports (@jenniferzeng97) May 19, 2026
L’article Putin in China : Diplomatic Choreography in Response to Trump est apparu en premier sur FrenchDailyNews.
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