Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

MOSCOW and ST. PETERSBURG – On Monday, June 1^st, on Power Shift, a new independent geopolitical platform, Zulfiqar Ali, Larry Johnson and myself revealed what for all practical purposes is an uber-bombshell piece of information: if long dark clouds keep coming down, Tehran is ready to pivot from nuclear ambiguity to actually detonating a nuclear device on Iranian soil.

Less than a week later, the Power Shift page was censored on YouTube – with no explanation and no appeal. Yet what we revealed had already been detailed in several podcasts and interviews throughout last week, as in here and here (with myself and Larry); here; and at the St. Petersburg forum, here.

I published a detailed background preceding the release of the information, written just before Iran’s negotiating team suspended the exchange of all (italics mine) texts and messages with the U.S. via mediator Pakistan.

When it comes to the redaction of perhaps the final draft of an endlessly debated Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Iran and the U.S., it suddenly became crystal clear that it’s all about Lebanon.

Iran repeatedly reiterated it was ready to ditch the already comatose “ceasefire” if the death cult in West Asia proceeded with its threat of bombing Dahiyeh, the Shi’ite-majority suburb of southern Beirut.

Confronted by Trump, the leader of the death cult was forced to back down. For only a few days. Trump desperately needs an MoU and an extended ceasefire to be marketed as “Victory”. His (italics mine) Victory.

All that was happening, fast and furious, on the trail of a fateful, extremely sensitive, 105-minute phone call on Thursday, May 28, between Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif.

Islamabad is the sole functioning and trusted head-of-government back-channel between Tehran and Washington. Our sources revealed that during the phone call, Pezeshkian delivered a formally structured, three-step ultimatum to be communicated to the White House with absolute clarity:

1. No more nuclear talks. As in the priority is the end of all wars, against Iran and the Axis of Resistance.
2. No more prospective nuclear treaty framework. As in no discussions leading to a possible, diluted JCPOA 2.0; only after settling the end of the wars and the status of the Strait of Hormuz.
3. If U.S. threats persist, Pezeshkian said, that would lead to the “detonation of a nuclear device on Iranian soil” – executed not as an act of war, but as an irreversible, sovereign demonstration of capability to control escalation dominance.

What is particularly stunning is none of the above is about diplomatic posturing. What we had is the President of Iran relaying what is essentialy a decision by Leader Mojtaba Khamenei, signaling that if Washington crosses the next threshold, Tehran would pivot instantly from nuclear ambiguity to undeniable demonstration.

And that would imply a permanent rupture of the global non-proliferation system – with unforeseen consequences.

The China-Iran-Pakistan strategic alignment

Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif obviously did the math on the scale of such intelligence. He immediately told Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar – who was in New York for UN Security Council sessions – to deliver the information to Washington.

Dar bypassed the whole bureaucratic apparatus, directly calling U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio in New York. The message, from Tehran to the Trump administration, was stark: the escalation ladder now features a terminal rung.

Rubio “may” (and that’s the operative word) have recognized the supreme gravity of what is in fact a formal nuclear ultimatum. He briefed Trump. The day after, May 29, Trump abruptly stopped any further kinetic action. And his incendiary rhetoric was instantly toned down.

This had nothing to do with a sudden fit of strategic restraint in the War-a-Lago/Oval Office axis. It was the direct, downstream result of the Sharif-Dar-Rubio back-channel.

On the morning of May 29, Dar arrived in Washington for a one-day official visit.

Sitting across from Rubio, he delivered the detailed briefing that the New York phone call had only previewed.

He placed two massive bombshells on the negotiating table:

1. Iran will not surrender any of its Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU). Nothing. Zero. And that’s final.

It’s all about sovereign independence (two concepts at the center of the recent Russia-China joint declaration signed in Beijing during Putin’s official visit to Xi Jinping).

So Tehran will not surrender its stockpile, whatever the terms, temporarily or not, just to comply with a face-saving mechanism designed for a U.S. domestic audience. From the point of view of Iran’s leadership – with Mojtaba at the helm – HEU goes way beyond a technical asset; it’s the ultimate fusion of sovereignty, deterrence, leverage, and political survival.

2. China has delivered state-of-the-art strategic defense systems to Iran – including shoulder-fired MANPADs – routed covertly through third countries (and that’s why I could not get any official confirmation two weeks before in Shanghai).

The breakdown: a total, operationally active China-Iran-Pakistan strategic alignment is in effect.

Is an Islamabad Accord still possible?

As it stands, none of us – including our sources – know whether a nuclear weapon detonated on Iranian soil would have been developed exclusively by Iran [they do have the scientific capability]; or with possible Russian, Pakistani or North Korean help. All options are plausible.

According to Prof. Ted Postol at MIT, Iran could easily convert 450 kg of 65% uranium hexafluoride into approximately 85% weapons grade: all that is needed for a low yield weapon, to be mounted into at least 10 missile delivery systems capable of reaching Israel. That means, at a minimum, 10 nuclear bombs.

Technically this sort of low yield weapon can be designed, Postol explains, with the use of a neutron reflector made of depleted uranium – or beryllium/tungsten carbide – and positioned immediately around the fissile core. It reflects escaping neutrons back into the nuclear material to increase fission efficiency, and reduces the required critical mass. In a nutshell: less material and more bombs.

Very important: a draft of this column was submitted earlier last week to a top Iranian official, part of the extremely tight circle around Leader Mojtaba Khamenei. His reaction: “I won’t comment on this matter”.

Beyond this no-response response, what became instantly clear is the verified transmission of the most consequential back-channel communication of the no war/no peace crisis.

It goes like this: Pezeshkian talks to Sharif; Sharif talks to Dar; Dar talks to Rubio; Rubio talks to Trump; Dar talks to Rubio face to face (during his Washington briefing).

All that throws new light over the – subsequently broken – 60-day ceasefire, the fragile off-ramp desperately needed by Trump. This framework has been organized by Pakistan and structurally backed by China – as I confirmed in Shanghai.

Tehran has insisted on the order of the proceedings, over and over again. First, all wars must stop, especially the offensive by the death cult over Lebanon. Then enter the modalities to restore trade traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. The third and last stage is to resume some sort of meaningful nuclear dialogue.

On The Big Picture, a serious structural rewrite is already on – whatever nasty ceasefire-breaking surprises may lie ahead.

As it stands: the Abraham Accords are for all practical purposes dead; Saudi Arabia has frozen all back-channel Israel “normalization” discussions; Qatar and Oman are quietly drafting military transition timelines to phase out the U.S. from West Asia. And most crucially, a new West Asia security architecture is rapidly coalescing outside the American “protective” umbrella, driven by The Four Sunnis: Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Turkiye and Egypt.

Last Thursday, again on Power Shift (our YouTube page was still active), Zulfiqar Ali, Larry Johnson and I identified a possible Islamabad Accord as the emerging framework for ending the U.S.-Iran war – way before Western MSM had recognized it as the organizing architecture.

We also identified the mechanism driving it: non-stop Pakistani shuttle diplomacy, quietly but decisively backed by China.

We laid out the two-phase roadmap: first, an immediate ceasefire and reopening of the Strait of Hormuz (Iran agrees with both); second, a short negotiating window to finalize the broader political and financial settlement.

We reported that the extremely contentious release of Iran’s frozen assets was not a speculative talking point, but an active lever in the process. That asset release and possible sanctions relief were being treated as concrete confidence-building measures.

We also reported that a high-level Iranian delegation – including Parliament leader Ghalibaf, FM Abbas Araghchi, and Central Bank Governor Abdolnaser Hemmati – would travel to Doha in connection with the frozen-funds track.

That was later confirmed across the spectrum, including the fact that the central-bank component was tied directly to frozen assets.

We also advanced that Islamabad could become the stage for the final political act, including a possible Trump visit, alongside Pezeshkian: yet now that possibility seems as remote as ever.

China is just watching the river flow

These are the facts, as it stands:

Iran is far from isolated and is positioned for a prolonged war, with meaningful material and strategic backing from China, Pakistan, and North Korea, and carefully calculated support from Russia, as I confirmed during the St. Petersburg forum.

The U.S. is paralyzed. The Trump administration may appear to want an off-ramp; but it is totally constrained by pressure from the death cult in West Asia – as we’ve seen this weekend; exhausted escalation pathways; and the absence of a decisive military option that can alter the chessboard without creating an infinitely more unmanageable crisis.

The Gulf petro-monarchies are terrified about a possible resumption of the war – with the principal exception of the UAE.

The leaves Islamabad as the only exit route in town, with Field Marshal Asim Munir positioned as the indispensable intermediary; and Beijing and Moscow following everything closely, in some respects actively shaping the outer frame.

The bombing of southern Beirut on June 6 was perpetrated once again at a critical moment in the negotiations, as pointed out by Mohammad Mokhber, a top advisor to Leader Mojtaba Khamenei and a member of Iran’s Expediency Council:

“By bombing Lebanon during the presence of the mediator in Iran [he was referring to Asim Munir], the enemy set the negotiating table on fire for the third time to shout about the repeated violations of the ceasefire in all areas. We speak to the violators with the language of ‘power’; the axis of resistance is a unified body, and they will definitely receive a heavy and painful price for this aggression in the field.”

The death cult bombing of southern Beirut led to a frankly surrealist spectacle: the Trump administration scrambling after the Pakistani mediator in Tehran, begging him to intercede with the Iranians for de-escalation. The Emperor who wanted to destroy Iranian civilization had to ask Pakistan to salvage what could still be salvaged.

That means, as we reported, that with Iran setting the terms of escalation and raising its deterrence potential, and with Trump left with no cards at all, the only possible solution lies with diplomacy via Islamabad.

This week on Power Shift, in three consecutive shows from Monday to Wednesday, we will dig deeper into the intel and the diplomacy beneath these tectonic twists.

And then, of course, there’s the intriguing Chinese angle.

U.S. Think Tankland will become totally paralyzed when they finally realize that by injecting advanced military hardware into the Iranian theater of war, Beijing is actively road-testing the limits of American hegemonic coercion.

And if push comes to shove, and Iran is forced into a nuclear demonstration for all the world to see, China will acquire an inexorable proof-of-concept that U.S. deterrence is hollow.

One has to marvel at the engineering of such a massive strategic masterclass – without firing a single shot.

"June and July this year may determine a lot," President Volodymyr Zelensky said.

By Philip GIRALDI 

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Israel will benefit enormously and Americans will bear the burden

There is near certainty that Section 224 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2027 will pass through the House of Representatives to become law this coming week after a failed attempt last Thursday in the House Armed Services Committee to pass an amendment to delete it led by Democratic Party Congressman Ro Khanna and Republican Thomas Massie. The NDAA will now be awaiting only the fully expected signature of Israel’s servant President Donald Trump on the Act to become part of the nation’s legislative package that will set the rules and regulations that the nation’s defense will operate under. It will, unfortunately, also set up through Section 224 a “United States-Israel Defense Technology Cooperation Initiative” that integrates “US-Israeli military research and development, co-production of weapons systems, licensing agreements, AI, directed energy, data integration, and missile defense.” It also creates the framework for “bilateral research and development, co-production of weapons, joint ventures, licensing agreements, and seemingly every manner of US-Israeli military-industrial complex cooperation.” The Director of the “Initiative” will be responsible for the coordination of the work and it is already being suggested that he will be an Israeli. And the funding will come 100% from the US Treasury by way of the budgeted allocation of $1.5 trillion that has been requested for the US military in 2027.

The result is to completely connect the functionality of the US military with that of the Israeli military in what has been described as an equal partnership that will include the government of Israel and its Israeli Defense Force as full participants. There will be full intelligence sharing and a planning process that will determine many aspects of how the American Department of War (sic) procures its weapons and equipment and establishes its strategic goals. This is plausibly the hidden story behind why Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been slyly suggesting that Israel might in future forego the $3.8 billion in annual automatic “aid” (which some refer to as “tribute”) from the US Treasury, a process begun by President Barack Obama. Netanyahu, working through his accomplices in the White House and the US Congress, clearly would have known in advance that a much larger slice of the pie was on its way via Section 224.

Those politicians who have sponsored and promoted 224 inevitably cite how the Jewish state is a major “ally and best friend” even though it is neither, but they ignore the dark side fact that it is also a genocidal state whose leaders have been condemned by international courts for multiple war crimes that is hated by most of the world. And this hatred has rubbed off on the United States, which is Israel’s principal source of arms, money and political cover. The slaughter in Gaza and now in Lebanon would not occur without the support of Presidents Joe Biden and Donald Trump.

And there’s more, coming from the Senate which is doing something similar via the FY27 Intel Authorization bill which will make US intelligence sharing with Israel mandatory. The bill in question is S-4615, introduced on May 20^th by leading Israel Firster Senator Tom Cotton of Arkansas. The full text is here. S-4615 includes Section 622, entitled “US-Israel intelligence sharing enhancement.” This new section would establish as law (where it would apply forever, unless repealed by Congress) new US national security-related obligations with respect to Israel. It includes a Statement of Policy: “(1) To maintain and strengthen the strategic security partnership with Israel as a means of advancing the national defense of the United States… (2) To enhance intelligence collaboration through robust intelligence sharing and analytic partnership with Israel… (4) To ensure that security assistance and defense cooperation are structured to help Israel maintain its qualitative military edge…”

When the Intel Authorization Bill comes up for a vote in the Senate it will no doubt pass due to the Republican Majority supplemented by the usual Israel Firsters among the Democrats. And to complete the takeover by Israel there is a bill moving through Congress that will give US military benefits to American citizens, often Israeli dual nationals, who serve in the Israeli military, to include educational and medical benefits unavailable to other Americans who have not served in the US armed forces. Ironically, Israel’s new status as America’s partner in national security and warfare coming from both parts of Congress is not shared with any of Washington’s actual allies in NATO, making the relationship with Israel both unique and, in the opinion of many, uniquely dangerous as an empowered Israel will inevitably work to advance its security perceptions and Middle East “Eretz Israel” ambitions at the expense of genuine concerns that the United States might have intrinsic to its much broader worldwide exposure to global threats. In other words, pandering to Israeli concerns will actually make the United States much weaker and more vulnerable.

Astonishingly, the danger that Israel poses to US national security through its insertion as something like an equal into the planning process has been little remarked in the mainstream US media, possibly due to increased federal and state government pursuit of “antisemites” which includes criminalization of criticism of Israel. And it is certainly once again suggesting the power of the Israel Lobby, its “bought” media and its stable of supporting Jewish billionaires. But there has been considerable concern being expressed across much of the alternative media, some of which has even reached the front pages, suggesting that there is some leakage going on to feed official reservations about 224. The New York Times, which sometimes serves as a go-to leaked resource for the intelligence and defense communities had an interesting article on Israeli spying on the United States sourced to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) which appeared just after 224 was being debated in Congress.

The Times article is entitled “Pentagon Sees Growing Espionage Threat From Israel” and is summarized as “The Defense Department has increased the counterintelligence threat assessment to its highest level, and Israel is believed to have eavesdropped on American negotiations with Iran.” The story details how “Israel is now at the Pentagon’s highest counterintelligence threat level.” It includes how American officers working with their Israeli counterparts both in the US and overseas have had their phones and other messaging systems tapped through the insertion of surreptitious listening devices by the Israelis. Negotiations to end the Iran War have also been particularly targeted, both through phones being used by the negotiators as well as from the Washington end where the calls and messages are received.

The reality is, of course, that Israel has been a major source of spying and even worse against the United States since the 1950s, always ranking in FBI and Department of Defense assessments as one of the top three foreign espionage offenders, frequently as number one. And Israeli clandestine covert actions and false flag attacks have not hesitated to kill Americans as part of their efforts to cover-up their more disreputable activities. Notably, the Israeli false flag attack on the US Navy’s USS Liberty in international waters on June 8^th 1967 in which 34 crewmen were killed stands out, particularly due to the subsequent cover-up conveniently arranged by Presidents Lyndon B Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.

Israeli spies, which might have included Netanyahu himself when he resided in the US, arranged the illegal removal of enriched uranium from a Zionist-Jewish-owned metallurgical company in Pennsylvania and also obtained the special triggers in California that enabled Tel Aviv to create a nuclear arsenal. When President John F Kennedy sought to stop that development he was assassinated, quite possibly with help from Mossad. And then there was the most damaging spy in the history of the US, Jonathan Pollard, who stole for Israel the most sensitive intelligence ever obtained by a foreign power. He is now running for the Knesset in Israel and is speaking of the next two likely targets for the Israeli army once the Palestinians, Lebanese and Syrians are disposed of, neighbors Egypt and Turkey!

The appearance of the Times article is suspicious and it might have been a shot across the Israeli-Israel Firster bow from the intelligence community coming as it apparently did from what was once called the Department of Defense. But Israel appears to have won this round and will be entering into a new relationship with the United States national security, intelligence and defense systems. Given the utter ruthlessness of Israel and the willingness of its sponsors in Washington to let it get away with mass murder, literally, this is a disaster for the United States and will only produce excruciatingly bad results.

Original article:  www.unz.com

Le crisi mediorientali del 2026 segnano un momento di discontinuità strutturale nella politica estera indiana.

Segue nostro Telegram.

Attore strategico nella regione

In vista della sessione plenaria dei BRCS+ a Delhi, occorre inquadrare più nel dettaglio il ruolo dell’India, che quest’anno ricopre la presidenza, negli scenari più caldi di questo periodo.

Negli ultimi tre decenni, l’India ha progressivamente e profondamente trasformato il proprio ruolo nel sistema mediorientale, transitando da semplice partner commerciale ed energetico a protagonista geopolitico e geoeconomico di crescente rilevanza. Questo processo, avviato contestualmente alla fine della Guerra Fredda e alle riforme economiche degli anni Novanta, ha condotto Nuova Delhi a ridefinire i fondamenti epistemologici della propria politica estera: da un modello ispirato ai principi del Movimento dei Non Allineati a un approccio pragmatico, multilaterale e selettivamente assertivo verso una regione percepita come strutturalmente indispensabile alla proiezione internazionale indiana.

Dal punto di vista geoeconomico, il Medio Oriente si è consolidato come il principale bacino di approvvigionamento energetico dell’India. La rapida crescita industriale e demografica ha generato una domanda di idrocarburi senza precedenti, rendendo di interesse strategico prioritario le relazioni con Arabia Saudita, Emirati Arabi Uniti, Iran, Qatar e Iraq. Parallelamente, le monarchie del Golfo hanno assunto la funzione di partner finanziari strutturali: i fondi sovrani hanno convogliato miliardi di dollari nei settori delle infrastrutture, della logistica, della transizione energetica e delle tecnologie avanzate dell’economia indiana.

La dimensione umana costituisce un ulteriore elemento di primaria rilevanza analitica. A partire dagli anni Novanta, milioni di lavoratori indiani si sono stabiliti nei Paesi del Golfo, dando origine a una delle più estese diaspore del mondo contemporaneo. Gli espatriati indiani rappresentano oggi una componente essenziale delle economie del Golfo, mentre le rimesse da essi inviate in patria costituiscono una fonte cruciale di stabilità macrofinanziaria per l’India. Tale interdipendenza strutturale ha progressivamente orientato la diplomazia di Nuova Delhi verso una crescente attenzione alla sicurezza regionale e alla protezione consolare dei propri cittadini.

Sul piano geopolitico, l’India ha perseguito una strategia di bilanciamento tra attori spesso antagonisti. Storicamente vicina ai Paesi arabi e sostenitrice della causa palestinese nel quadro del Non Allineamento, Nuova Delhi ha gradualmente intensificato le relazioni con Israele dopo la normalizzazione diplomatica del 1992. Nel corso degli anni Duemila, Israele è diventato uno dei principali fornitori di tecnologia militare e sistemi di difesa, dando vita a una cooperazione strategica progressivamente approfondita nei settori della sicurezza, dell’intelligence e dell’innovazione tecnologica duale.

Contestualmente, l’India ha mantenuto relazioni funzionali con l’Iran, identificato come partner geostrategico per l’accesso all’Asia Centrale e all’Afghanistan, in alternativa alle rotte terrestri pakistane. Il progetto del porto di Chabahar, sostenuto da Nuova Delhi, rappresenta l’espressione più emblematica di questa visione: un corridoio logistico pensato per aggirare il Pakistan e per contrastare l’espansione dell’influenza cinese nella regione, nell’ambito della Belt and Road Initiative.

Negli anni più recenti, l’India ha ulteriormente rafforzato la cooperazione con le monarchie del Golfo anche sul piano politico-securitario. Accordi bilaterali in materia di difesa, lotta al terrorismo, cybersicurezza, investimenti infrastrutturali e transizione energetica hanno consolidato il profilo di Nuova Delhi come interlocutore affidabile e autonomo. Un indicatore significativo di questa evoluzione è l’ingresso dell’India in nuove architetture multilaterali regionali, tra cui il formato I2U2 — India, Israele, Emirati Arabi Uniti e Stati Uniti — concepito per promuovere integrazione economica, tecnologica e strategica tra i suoi membri.

È all’interno di questo contesto di lungo periodo che deve essere compresa la trasformazione della politica indiana nel Medio Oriente contemporaneo e la sua crescente assertività diplomatica negli scenari di crisi del 2026.

Multi-allineamento e tentativi di posizionamento bilanciato

Prima di procedere all’analisi empirica, dobbiamo inquadrare teoricamente la strategia adottata da Nuova Delhi. Il concetto di multi-allineamento, già impiegato fra le medie potenze emergenti, comporta una postura internazionale che rifiuta sia il non-allineamento passivo sia l’integrazione esclusiva in blocchi di alleanza, optando invece per una rete flessibile e contestuale di relazioni privilegiate con attori diversi e talvolta antagonisti.

Nel caso indiano, tale approccio affonda le proprie radici nella tradizione nehruviana dell’autonomia strategica, reinterpretata in chiave pragmatica dalle successive amministrazioni. Mentre la dottrina originaria privilegiava la distanza equidistante dai blocchi, il multi-allineamento contemporaneo implica un coinvolgimento selettivo e simultaneo con più poli di potere, calibrato in funzione degli interessi nazionali settoriali. L’India intrattiene pertanto relazioni di difesa approfondite con gli Stati Uniti attraverso il Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), mantiene partenariati energetici e commerciali significativi con la Russia, coltiva relazioni economiche strutturali con la Cina e, contestualmente, proietta influenza nel Medio Oriente attraverso molteplici canali bilaterali e multilaterali. Più posizioni in contemporanea, talvolta non facili da gestire.

Le crisi mediorientali del 2026 hanno sottoposto questo modello a una pressione senza precedenti. L’escalation simultanea su più fronti ha reso sempre più difficile la tradizionale neutralità tattica, obbligando Nuova Delhi ad assumere posizioni più esplicite pur cercando di preservare la propria autonomia decisionale. L’esito di questa tensione strutturale è una forma di multi-allineamento dinamico, in cui le priorità relative tra i diversi assi di partenariato vengono ridefinite in funzione dell’evoluzione congiunturale.

Un passaggio importante è stato sicuramente il cambiamento di relazioni con Arabia Saudita ed Emirati Arabi Uniti. Una virata dalla intesa alla competizione. L’intesa tra Riyadh e Abu Dhabi, per anni considerata il pilastro portante della stabilità del Consiglio di Cooperazione del Golfo (GCC), si è progressivamente trasformata in una competizione strategica aperta, con implicazioni destabilizzanti per l’intero sistema regionale. La frattura, latente da anni in ragione di divergenti visioni geopolitiche e ambizioni egemoniche, è emersa in modo inequivocabile nel dicembre 2025, quando il Consiglio di Transizione del Sud (STC), sostenuto dagli Emirati, ha avviato un’offensiva nelle province yemenite di Hadhramaut e al-Mahra. L’Arabia Saudita ha interpretato tale espansione come una minaccia diretta alla propria sicurezza meridionale e come la manifestazione di un disegno emiratino volto alla creazione di un’entità separatista filo-Abu Dhabi nello spazio yemenita.

Questa tensione si è rapidamente estesa ad altri teatri regionali, assumendo i caratteri di una rivalità sistemica. In Sudan, la competizione tra le due monarchie ha contribuito ad alimentare la guerra civile: gli Emirati Arabi Uniti hanno sostenuto le Forze di Supporto Rapido (RSF) per il controllo di rotte commerciali strategiche e risorse aurifere, mentre Riyadh ha appoggiato le Forze Armate Sudanesi (SAF). Divergenze profonde sono emerse anche rispetto al dossier israeliano: Abu Dhabi ha progressivamente intensificato la cooperazione militare e di intelligence con Tel Aviv nell’ambito degli Accordi di Abramo, mentre l’Arabia Saudita ha interpretato tale avvicinamento come una minaccia alla propria preminenza regionale, rafforzando di conseguenza i legami con Pakistan e Turchia.

Per l’India, questa dinamica ha richiesto l’elaborazione di una strategia di gestione estremamente sofisticata. Nuova Delhi si è trovata nella necessità di preservare relazioni economiche e securitarie con entrambe le monarchie del Golfo, evitando al contempo di essere percepita come allineata con l’una o con l’altra. Un passaggio di particolare rilievo analitico è rappresentato dal ritiro formale degli Emirati Arabi Uniti dall’OPEC, avvenuto nel maggio 2026, dopo quasi sessant’anni di adesione al cartello petrolifero. La decisione di Abu Dhabi, motivata dall’insofferenza verso le quote produttive determinate in prevalenza dall’influenza saudita, ha ridimensionato il peso collettivo del cartello e ha rafforzato la posizione negoziale dei grandi Paesi importatori, tra i quali l’India occupa un ruolo di primo piano.

Il governo indiano ha colto con prontezza questa finestra di opportunità geopolitica. Nell’aprile 2026 ha importato circa 620.000 barili giornalieri di petrolio emiratino, non soggetto ai vincoli delle quote OPEC, una quantità corrispondente a circa il 10-14% delle importazioni petrolifere totali del Paese. Le transazioni sono state inoltre facilitate attraverso meccanismi di pagamento in rupie e dirham, riducendo la dipendenza dal dollaro statunitense e limitando l’esposizione dell’India alla volatilità dei mercati finanziari occidentali. Tale scelta riflette non soltanto una logica di diversificazione dei fornitori, ma anche una strategia di de-dollarizzazione progressiva degli scambi energetici, coerente con le tendenze più ampie dell’economia politica internazionale.

Parallelamente, al fine di evitare che Riyadh interpretasse l’intensificazione dei rapporti con Abu Dhabi come un segnale ostile, l’India ha contestualmente rafforzato la cooperazione economica con l’Arabia Saudita, ottenendo impegni di investimento pari a 10 miliardi di dollari destinati a progetti di idrogeno verde sul territorio indiano. Questa duplice strategia di engagement selettivo illustra con efficacia i meccanismi operativi del multi-allineamento dinamico: Nuova Delhi non sceglie tra i propri partner, ma calibra l’intensità relazionale in funzione degli interessi contingenti, mantenendo aperti tutti i canali diplomatici ed economici.

Tentativi di diplomazia geoeconomica nella crisi iraniana

L’ampliamento dell’intervento militare israelo-statunitense contro l’Iran ha prodotto shock di vasta portata anche per l’economia indiana. Per l’India, che dipende da fonti esterne per circa l’88% del proprio fabbisogno di petrolio greggio e per il 90% del GPL, la situazione ha richiesto l’adozione di misure di risposta tempestive e articolate. La crisi ha inoltre minacciato uno dei progetti infrastrutturali più significativi della strategia geoeconomica indiana: il porto iraniano di Chabahar, concepito come corridoio logistico alternativo per collegare l’India all’Afghanistan e all’Asia Centrale senza transitare attraverso il territorio pakistano, e al contempo per ridimensionare la rilevanza del porto cinese di Gwadar nell’ambito della Belt and Road Initiative. Il 26 aprile 2026, alla scadenza della deroga alle sanzioni statunitensi che proteggeva le attività indiane a Chabahar, Nuova Delhi ha adottato una soluzione di carattere pragmatico che merita una riflessione analitica approfondita. Per evitare l’esposizione a sanzioni secondarie da parte di Washington, l’India ha formalmente ridotto la propria partecipazione diretta nel porto, trasferendo parte delle quote operative a soggetti giuridici iraniani locali. Attraverso questa soluzione strutturale, Nuova Delhi ha mantenuto il ruolo operativo e gestionale della struttura portuale senza apparire come proprietaria diretta delle infrastrutture soggette a restrizioni, riuscendo così a preservare il valore strategico dell’asset pur accettandone una temporanea contrazione delle attività commerciali. Questa soluzione illustra con chiarezza la capacità indiana di operare nell’ambito di vincoli normativi internazionali attraverso soluzioni giuridicamente creative, senza rinunciare ai propri obiettivi strategici di fondo.

Per capirci meglio, l’approccio adottato da Nuova Delhi rispetto alla crisi iraniana riflette più in generale una visione geoeconomica della politica estera: la difesa degli interessi nazionali avviene primariamente attraverso strumenti economici, logistici e commerciali, piuttosto che mediante prese di posizione diplomatiche formali che rischierebbero di compromettere equilibri relazionali faticosamente costruiti nel tempo. E questo principio è coerente nel corso degli anni, con qualsiasi attore dello scenario.

Il problema chiamato “Israele”

C’è però una nota dolente, che spesso il grande pubblico imputa come un peccato originale dell’India contemporanea: il sostegno a Israele. Con il progressivo deterioramento dell’ordine regionale mediorientale, l’India ha operato una ridefinizione profonda della propria posizione diplomatica nel Levante e la transizione da una neutralità prudente a una collaborazione strategica più esplicita con Israele è divenuta manifesta durante la visita ufficiale del Primo Ministro Narendra Modi in Israele, svoltasi il 25-26 febbraio 2026. Si è trattato del primo intervento di un capo di governo indiano alla Knesset nel pieno di un conflitto regionale attivo, un gesto di rottura rispetto alla tradizionale riservatezza indiana sullo scacchiere levantino, carico di significato simbolico e politico.

La partnership indo-israeliana copre oggi un ampio spettro di domini: dalla cooperazione tecnologica avanzata alla condivisione di intelligence, dalla produzione congiunta di sistemi militari alla collaborazione in materia di cybersicurezza e difesa missilistica. Israele interpreta questa collaborazione come parte di una più ampia architettura di relazioni con democrazie non occidentali orientate a condividere capacità di deterrenza contro attori revisionisti. Per l’India, il valore aggiunto del partenariato con Tel Aviv risiede soprattutto nell’accesso privilegiato a tecnologie militari avanzate che contribuiscono ad alimentare la strategia di modernizzazione delle Forze Armate e di riduzione della dipendenza dalla tradizionale catena di fornitura russa.

Tuttavia, questo avvicinamento comporta significativi rischi diplomatici che la leadership indiana è chiamata a gestire con estrema cautela. L’Iran considera con crescente sospetto l’asse tra Nuova Delhi e Tel Aviv, interpretandolo come una forma di endorsement implicito delle strategie occidentali volte all’isolamento della Repubblica Islamica. Tale percezione potrebbe erodere progressivamente il tradizionale ruolo dell’India come interlocutore equilibrato nella regione e favorire un maggiore avvicinamento tra Teheran e Islamabad, con potenziali ripercussioni sulla stabilità del confine nord-occidentale indiano. Parallelamente, il legame sempre più visibile con Israele obbliga Nuova Delhi a gestire con accuratezza le relazioni con le monarchie del Golfo. In questi Paesi risiedono oltre 10 milioni di lavoratori indiani, che inviano annualmente in patria circa 45 miliardi di dollari in rimesse: una componente di assoluto rilievo per la stabilità finanziaria e la coesione sociale di intere regioni dell’India. Le opinioni pubbliche dei Paesi del Golfo mostrano una sensibilità elevata rispetto alla questione palestinese, il che rende politicamente delicato per le monarchie della penisola arabica mantenere relazioni di piena normalità con un’India che appaia eccessivamente allineata con la posizione israeliana.

La protezione dei cittadini indiani all’estero rappresenta una priorità strategica che ha assunto crescente rilevanza nel quadro della politica estera di Nuova Delhi. Un caso di studio particolarmente significativo è offerto dall’Operazione Sindhu, condotta tra il 18 e il 27 giugno 2025: nelle prime fasi dell’escalation militare nella regione, con la chiusura dei principali spazi aerei, il Ministero degli Esteri indiano ha coordinato l’evacuazione di 4.429 cittadini dall’Iran. Attraverso percorsi terrestri che conducevano in Armenia, seguiti da voli charter da Yerevan a Nuova Delhi, l’operazione si è conclusa senza vittime, dimostrando le considerevoli capacità logistiche e operative della macchina diplomatico-consolare indiana. Permane, però, il rischio che un conflitto prolungato possa destabilizzare i mercati del lavoro del Golfo, con conseguenze economiche severe per le regioni indiane storicamente dipendenti dalle rimesse degli emigrati. La tutela della diaspora non è dunque soltanto una questione di protezione consolare, ma una variabile strutturale della politica estera indiana, intrecciata con la stabilità finanziaria interna e con i calcoli geostrategici di lungo periodo.

Quale ruolo nel Medioriente multipolare?

Le crisi mediorientali del 2026 segnano un momento di discontinuità strutturale nella politica estera indiana. Di fronte al deterioramento della coesione intra-GCC, alle conseguenze geopolitiche della guerra in Iran e alla ridefinizione dell’architettura di sicurezza regionale, l’India ha progressivamente abbandonato la tradizionale neutralità passiva, optando per una strategia di multi-allineamento più dinamica, assertiva e articolata. La gestione simultanea della frattura saudita-emiratina, dell’escalation iraniana e del rafforzamento del partenariato con Israele configura un approccio di politica estera di crescente sofisticazione, che combina strumenti economici, diplomatici e securitari in una logica integrata.

Lo sfruttamento delle nuove dinamiche energetiche conseguenti al ritiro emiratino dall’OPEC, la soluzione pragmatica adottata per preservare le attività nel porto di Chabahar nonostante le pressioni sanzionatorie statunitensi, e il consolidamento della cooperazione militare e tecnologica con Israele illustrano concretamente come Nuova Delhi stia cercando di proteggere la propria crescita economica dall’instabilità strutturale della regione, senza tuttavia rinunciare alla propria autonomia strategica.

Il successo di lungo termine di questa strategia dipenderà dalla capacità indiana di navigare le contraddizioni del nuovo ordine multipolare senza compromettere gli equilibri diplomatici necessari a tutelare i propri interessi fondamentali: la sicurezza energetica, la protezione della diaspora, l’accesso ai mercati e alle tecnologie avanzate. In questo senso, la trasformazione della politica indiana nel Medio Oriente non è soltanto la risposta contingente a una stagione di crisi, ma la manifestazione di un progetto strategico più ampio: quello di un’India che aspira a essere riconosciuta come potenza globale responsabile e indispensabile, capace di proiettare influenza nei teatri più complessi del sistema internazionale contemporaneo.

In prospettiva, la ricerca futura dovrà approfondire in particolare le dinamiche di interazione tra la proiezione mediorientale dell’India e le sue relazioni con le altre grandi potenze — Stati Uniti, Cina e Russia — nel tentativo di valutare se il multi-allineamento dinamico possa costituire un modello replicabile e sostenibile nel lungo periodo, o se piuttosto le pressioni sistemiche dell’ordine bipolare emergente tenderanno a ridurre progressivamente i margini di manovra di cui i politici di Nuova Delhi hanno finora saputo avvalersi con notevole abilità.

The leaders of the United Kingdom, France, and Germany, and Ukraine issued a joint statement on June 7 setting out five conditions that must be met between Kyiv and Moscow to bring a resolution to Russia's war in Ukraine.

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Greece has issued a formal diplomatic demarche to Ukraine after fishermen discovered an armed naval drone off the island of Lefkada on May 7. Athens warned that the incident endangered maritime traffic, civilians, the environment, and national security.

Greek Foreign Ministry spokesperson Lana Zochiou said during the regular briefing of diplomatic correspondents that Athens formally raised the issue with Kyiv after authorities found the unmanned surface vessel inside Greek territorial waters.

According to Zochiou, Greece’s protest note stressed that the naval drone posed a serious threat to maritime navigation and could have cost innocent lives. Athens also warned that the presence of an armed unmanned vessel in Greek waters could have caused major environmental damage.

Greece warns against moving war operations to the Mediterranean

The Greek government said the incident raised broader security concerns, as it appeared to bring military activity linked to the war in Ukraine into the Mediterranean, far from the actual battlefield.

“The transfer of war operations to the Mediterranean, at a great distance from the real front of the war, puts our national security at risk and deals a decisive blow to our national economy,” the protest note stated, according to Zochiou.

For Greece, the presence of an armed naval drone in its waters carries particular sensitivity because the country relies heavily on shipping, tourism, fishing, and maritime security. Athens made clear that it would view any expansion of war-related activity into the Mediterranean as a direct threat to Greek interests.

Greece’s demarche to Ukraine says self-defense doesn’t justify drone incident

Greece also told Ukraine that Kyiv’s right to defend itself against Russia cannot justify actions that endanger Greek territory, civilians, or maritime activity.

“The right of Ukraine to self-defense cannot justify such actions,” Athens stated in the diplomatic demarche.

The Greek government strongly objected to the illegal presence of the armed unmanned surface vessel in Greek territorial waters and called on Ukraine to avoid similar actions in the future.

Athens also urged Kyiv to refrain from what it described as the unjustified transfer of military operations to the Mediterranean.

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