The U.S. failed to "take Vienna" in the Iran conflict, resulting in an undeterred and belligerent Iran that has been awarded a vote in deciding the control of the most strategically important commercial chokepoint in the world.
The U.S. failed to "take Vienna" in the Iran conflict, resulting in an undeterred and belligerent Iran that has been awarded a vote in deciding the control of the most strategically important commercial chokepoint in the world.
The United States secretary of state Marco Rubio has sent “warm greetings” to Portugal today, describing the country as one of America’s “earliest and most steadfast partners”. In a message
El Cáucaso Meridional se está convirtiendo en una prueba de fuego para ver hasta dónde puede llegar Washington en el perímetro compartido por Rusia e Irán antes de que se produzca una reacción violenta.
En vísperas de las cruciales elecciones parlamentarias de Armenia del 7 de junio, el secretario de Estado de EE. UU., Marco Rubio, durante una breve visita a Ereván el 26 de mayo, firmó tres acuerdos de gran importancia en una reunión con el ministro de Asuntos Exteriores armenio, Ararat Mirzoyan.
Entre ellos se incluían el «Acuerdo Marco entre la República de Armenia y los Estados Unidos de América sobre Cooperación Estratégica en relación con la Ruta Trump para la Paz y la Prosperidad Internacionales (TRIPP)», la «Carta sobre la Asociación Estratégica Integral entre la República de Armenia y los Estados Unidos» y el «Marco entre la República de Armenia y los Estados Unidos de América para garantizar el suministro en la extracción y el procesamiento de minerales críticos y tierras raras».
El respaldo de Washington en época de elecciones
La breve visita de Rubio, que duró solo una hora aproximadamente en el aeropuerto de Ereván, fue una clara señal del apoyo de EE. UU. al Gobierno de Nikol Pashinyan de cara a las cruciales elecciones parlamentarias de Armenia del 7 de junio.
En los últimos años, la administración de Pashinyan se ha distanciado gradualmente de la Federación Rusa y de las instituciones regionales lideradas por Moscú, incluida la Organización del Tratado de Seguridad Colectiva (OTSC) y, más recientemente, la Unión Económica Euroasiática (UEE), al tiempo que ha buscado estrechar lazos con la UE, la OTAN y los EE. UU.
En este contexto, el secretario de Estado de EE. UU., que viajó a Ereván dos semanas antes de las elecciones, expresó su firme apoyo a Pashinyan y a su equipo, afirmando: «Tú (Ararat Mirzoyan), el primer ministro y tu equipo estáis allanando el camino hacia un futuro más brillante y más independiente para Armenia».
El presidente de EE. UU., Donald Trump, también escribió en una publicación en Truth Social:
«¡El primer ministro Nikol Pashinyan, de Armenia, un gran amigo y líder, está haciendo que su país sea fuerte, próspero y muy seguro! Nikol comparte plenamente mi visión de PAZ y PROSPERIDAD para Armenia y toda la región del Cáucaso Meridional… Nikol cuenta con mi APOYO TOTAL y ABSOLUTO para su reelección el 7 de junio de 2026».
Armenia también acogió la Octava Cumbre de la Comunidad Política Europea el 23 de mayo, lo que constituyó otra muestra del apoyo occidental al Gobierno de Pashinyan.
No obstante, sigue sin estar claro si dicho apoyo se traducirá en última instancia en una victoria electoral del Partido del Contrato Civil de Pashinyan frente a sus oponentes nacionalistas y conservadores. Un ejemplo reciente es Hungría, donde la visita del vicepresidente estadounidense J.D. Vance a Budapest y su participación en un mitin electoral junto al primer ministro Viktor Orbán no lograron evitar la derrota de Orbán en las elecciones parlamentarias tras 16 años en el poder.
La Ruta de Trump toma forma
Los tres acuerdos firmados durante la visita de Rubio a Ereván —en particular el Acuerdo TRIPP— deben considerarse una continuación y un complemento del acuerdo de paz firmado por el presidente azerbaiyano Ilham Aliyev y Pashinyan en la Casa Blanca el 8 de agosto de 2025, bajo la mediación de Trump.
En virtud de dicho acuerdo, la conectividad directa entre Azerbaiyán y su República Autónoma de Najicheván a través del territorio armenio se refrendó no bajo la denominación preferida por Bakú de «Corredor de Zangezur», ni bajo el concepto preferido por Ereván de «Encrucijada de la Paz», sino bajo un nuevo título: la «Ruta Trump para la Paz y la Prosperidad Internacionales» (TRIPP), o simplemente la «Ruta Trump».
El Acuerdo TRIPP, compuesto por 11 artículos, establece el marco jurídico y operativo que rige esta ruta de tránsito. De conformidad con los artículos 1 a 4, se creará una empresa conjunta denominada TRIPP Development Company (TDC).
En virtud del acuerdo, el 74 % de las acciones y la participación mayoritaria en la empresa estarán en manos de entidades estadounidenses que operan bajo la Corporación Financiera Internacional para el Desarrollo de los Estados Unidos (DFC), mientras que Armenia conservará una participación del 26 %.
Además, en virtud del artículo 6, Armenia se compromete a conceder a la empresa conjunta derechos exclusivos de uso del suelo y desarrollo a lo largo de las zonas designadas para la ejecución del TRIPP durante un período inicial de 49 años. El acuerdo también prevé una posible prórroga de 50 años adicionales por mutuo acuerdo, en cuyo caso la participación de Armenia en la TDC aumentaría al 49 %.
Armenia se ha comprometido además a asumir todos los costes financieros asociados a la adquisición de terrenos y a la eliminación de cualquier gravamen o reclamación de terceros que afecte a las zonas del proyecto. Al mismo tiempo, el acuerdo afirma explícitamente que la República de Armenia conserva la plena soberanía, integridad territorial y jurisdicción legal y ejecutiva sobre todas las zonas y proyectos asociados al TRIPP dentro de su territorio soberano.
La aplicación de este acuerdo —al igual que el acuerdo de paz entre Armenia y Azerbaiyán y el proceso en curso de normalización entre Armenia y Turquía— dependerá en gran medida de la reelección del Partido del Contrato Civil de Pashinyan en las elecciones parlamentarias del 7 de junio. Si las fuerzas políticas nacionalistas y conservadoras de Armenia salieran victoriosas, el panorama político podría cambiar significativamente.
Fuertemente críticos con las políticas de Pashinyan respecto a Nagorno-Karabaj, estos grupos nacionalistas y conservadores mantienen posiciones de línea dura tanto hacia Azerbaiyán como hacia Turquía. Tradicionalmente han mantenido relaciones más estrechas con Irán y Rusia, al tiempo que han conservado una distancia cautelosa y cuidadosamente calibrada con respecto a Occidente.
En consecuencia, un cambio de gobierno podría tener profundas implicaciones para el futuro del proceso de paz entre Armenia y Azerbaiyán, la normalización de las relaciones entre Armenia y Turquía y la aplicación del TRIPP.
Teherán ve más que un corredor
Por lo tanto, no fue de extrañar que, en medio de la atmósfera altamente polarizada y políticamente cargada de Armenia en vísperas de las cruciales elecciones parlamentarias, la inesperada y breve visita de Rubio a Ereván fuera recibida con fuertes críticas por parte de las fuerzas de la oposición.
Los partidos de la oposición y los grupos políticos de Armenia sostienen que el proyecto a gran escala de la «Ruta Trump» es, en esencia, el mismo corredor de tránsito que Azerbaiyán lleva tanto tiempo buscando bajo el nombre de «Corredor de Zangezur» y que cuenta con el firme apoyo de Ankara.
El expresidente armenio Robert Kocharyan, líder de la influyente Alianza Armenia, expresó su profunda preocupación por las implicaciones estratégicas del acuerdo, afirmando:
«Creo que el proyecto «TRIPP» es una maniobra propagandística muy fuerte por parte de EE. UU., cuyo objetivo es crear tensión entre Irán y Armenia, porque después de eso, Teherán sin duda sentirá desconfianza… Esto también es un «golpe» para Rusia».
En Irán, el portavoz del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Hamid Baghaei, también reaccionó a la visita de Rubio y a la firma del Acuerdo Trump, afirmando:
«La posición de la República Islámica de Irán con respecto a la seguridad en el Cáucaso Meridional es clara y no deja lugar a ambigüedades. Irán acoge con satisfacción la expansión de los intercambios económicos y la reapertura de las rutas de transporte y tránsito. Sin embargo, dado el largo historial de conducta hostil e intervención de Estados Unidos en diversas regiones del mundo, Irán alberga serias sospechas sobre las intenciones de Washington y ha expresado explícitamente su oposición a cualquier presencia desestabilizadora de este tipo en la región».
Aunque los funcionarios iraníes parecen haberse abstenido de adoptar una postura más explícita en esta fase —probablemente debido a su comprensión del delicado entorno electoral de Armenia y al deseo de evitar verse directamente involucrados en las rivalidades políticas internas del país—, Irán, en términos estratégicos, ve poca diferencia entre la «Ruta Trump» y el «Corredor de Zangezur» defendido por Azerbaiyán y apoyado por Turquía.
Desde la perspectiva de Teherán, ambas iniciativas persiguen objetivos que van mucho más allá del establecimiento de un mero enlace de transporte y tránsito entre el territorio continental de Azerbaiyán y Najicheván a través del territorio armenio adyacente a la frontera de Irán.
Los responsables políticos iraníes creen que tales proyectos podrían generar una serie de importantes retos de seguridady geopolíticos, incluidos riesgos potenciales para los 40 kilómetros de frontera entre Irán y Armenia, los pasos fronterizos y las instalaciones aduaneras de Norduz (Irán) y Meghri (Armenia), así como para la red bilateral de comercio y tránsito por la que pasan más de 80.000 camiones al año.
Además, no cabe duda de que la puesta en marcha de la Ruta Trump, como parte del Corredor Central más amplio y de una ruta emergente de energía y transporte que une Asia Central, el mar Caspio y el Cáucaso Meridional con Europa, aceleraría aún más la orientación hacia Occidente de Ereván.
Tal evolución podría tener consecuencias de gran alcance, incluida la eventual retirada de Armenia de la OTSC y la UEEA. El efecto acumulativo de estos acontecimientos podría ser un cambio más profundo en el equilibrio geopolítico del Cáucaso Meridional en detrimento tanto de Irán como de Rusia —un proceso que, en muchos aspectos, comenzó con la Segunda Guerra de Nagorno-Karabaj en 2020.
La guerra de 12 días entre Estados Unidos e Israel contra Irán en junio de 2025 y la más reciente guerra de 40 días en la que participaron Israel y Estados Unidos contra Irán, del 28 de febrero al 7 de abril de 2026, han agudizado la sensibilidad de Teherán hacia el proyecto de la Ruta Trump y la posible presencia de empresas estadounidenses cerca de la frontera norte de Irán.
Esta preocupación es especialmente acusada dado que, en virtud del acuerdo recientemente firmado, dicha presencia no está pensada para ser temporal. Más bien, el acuerdo prevé un periodo de concesión inicial de 49 años, con la posibilidad de una prórroga adicional de 50 años por mutuo acuerdo, lo que podría dar lugar a una duración total de 99 años.
Desde la perspectiva de Irán, esto no equivaldría simplemente a un proyecto de transporte o de infraestructura, sino al establecimiento de una huella económica y estratégica estadounidense a largo plazo en una zona geopolítica altamente sensible adyacente a sus fronteras.
Por esta razón, Kocharyan declaró durante su campaña electoral:
«Hoy en día, Estados Unidos se encuentra en un estado de confrontación con Irán. En tales circunstancias, ¿cómo puede alguien creer razonablemente que ceder el control de la sensible zona fronteriza entre Armenia e Irán a una empresa estadounidense es una decisión racional? ¿De verdad consideran que tal medida es normal y aceptable? ¿Cómo se espera que Teherán perciba y tolere tal acuerdo? Insto a las autoridades de Ereván a que se pongan, aunque sea por un momento, en la posición de Irán y vean este desafío de seguridad desde la perspectiva de Teherán».
Moscú sube la apuesta
La respuesta de Rusia hacia Armenia, sin embargo, ha sido notablemente más dura, al menos en la etapa actual. Solo unos días después de la visita de Rubio, Moscú retiró a su embajador de Ereván para consultas, citando las políticas cada vez más prooccidentales del Gobierno de Pashinyan.
En las últimas semanas, funcionarios rusos han advertido abiertamente a Armenia, especialmente en relación con la posibilidad de su retirada de la UEEA, sobre las posibles consecuencias, entre las que se incluyen el aumento de los precios del gas o la suspensión de los acuerdos energéticos preferenciales, restricciones a las importaciones de productos armenios, limitaciones al comercio de diamantes y energía, e incluso una reevaluación de ciertos ámbitos de la cooperación económica.
En esencia, a Moscú le preocupa que su participación actual en la guerra de Ucrania pueda animar a Armenia —el único Estado del Cáucaso Meridional que sigue siendo miembro tanto de la UEEA como de la OTSC— a abandonar estas instituciones lideradas por Rusia.
Dado que ni Georgia ni Azerbaiyán son miembros de ninguna de las dos organizaciones, tal desarrollo reduciría significativamente la influencia económica, geopolítica y militar de Rusia en el Cáucaso Meridional.
La aplicación del Acuerdo TRIPP y la construcción de la Ruta Trump entre Azerbaiyán y Najicheván se enfrentan a importantes obstáculos políticos y dependerán en gran medida del resultado de las elecciones parlamentarias de Armenia del 7 de junio.
Si prevalecen las fuerzas políticas nacionalistas y conservadoras de Armenia, la probabilidad de que el proyecto se suspenda o se abandone sería considerable.
Incluso si Pashinyan consigue la reelección, es probable que la puesta en marcha del proyecto provoque una fuerte oposición por parte de Irán y exponga a Armenia a posibles medidas de represalia por parte de Rusia, especialmente en los ámbitos de las exportaciones de gas natural y las restricciones a las importaciones armenias.
Franco-German combat aircraft programme collapses after years of disputes, showcasing the difficulty with military cooperation within the EU.
Rumours had been circulating for many months, but it was confirmed on Monday, June 8th: France and Germany have decided to abandon the core joint fighter plane component of their joint Future Combat Aircraft System (FCAS) project. With it goes a project that symbolised ambitions for deeper military cooperation between the two countries.
The project was launched in 2017 on the initiative of French President Emmanuel Macron and then-German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Its aim was to replace, by 2040, the French Rafale and the German-Spanish Eurofighter. After months of stalled progress, Chancellor Friedrich Merz and President Macron agreed that the main industrial partners involved in the project—Dassault Aviation on the French side and Airbus Defence and Space on the German-Spanish side—were clearly unable to work together because of diverging interests.
It was one of Europe’s largest military programmes, with an estimated total cost of €100 billion. The technological ambition was highly advanced: more than just a fighter jet, the system was to integrate combat drones, connected sensors and a next-generation digital network, thereby forming what was described as a ‘combat cloud.’
Disagreements between the industrial parties have multiplied in recent months, centring on the sharing of industrial responsibilities, intellectual property, and the governance of the project. In the spring, Macron was still insisting he believed in it, but progress remained elusive.
For defence expert Jean-Dominique Merchet, the programme had in fact been “on life support” for several months, and the German decision to formalise the end merely confirmed a shared recognition of irreconcilable industry positions rather than a unilateral move. The fact that the announcement came from Berlin—without a joint statement from partner countries France and Spain—confirms the major political setback for Macron, who has been the project’s main champion since its launch in 2017. According to Merchet, the announcement definitively confirms the now insurmountable disagreements between Dassault Aviation and Airbus over the development of the fighter plane intended to form the core of the programme. The analyst is now questioning the future of the other components of the FCAS, notably the combat cloud, the engines, and the support drones. This failure could undermine another major Franco-German project, the future European battle tank, which is itself already facing numerous difficulties.
For both countries, the failure tests their ability to advance next-generation capabilities.
For France, the failure of the FCAS will test the national defence industry’s ability to bounce back. France must now consider the possibility of a new-generation programme that it would lead alone or in cooperation with other potential partners such as Sweden, Italy, India or the United Arab Emirates. Germany is expected to consider options including additional F-35 acquisitions or interest in alternative collaborative frameworks.
The failure of the FCAS is highly symbolic at a time when, under American pressure, Europe was seeking to assert its strategic autonomy. The programme, which symbolised Europe’s ability to carry out its major armaments projects autonomously in the face of the United States and China, illustrates above all the persistent difficulties European states face in effectively coordinating their industrial, strategic, and national interests.
Leaked documents reviewed by The Grayzone expose how the Soros-run Open Society Foundations plotted to “prevent the continuation” of Indonesia’s elected government by bankrolling opposition media, youth activists groups and lawfare operations to remove President Prabowo Subianto.
Ever since the election of Prabowo Subianto as Indonesia’s President in February 2024, Jakarta has faced continuous waves of anti-government protests. Activists enraged by harsh economic conditions and elite corruption have taken to the streets in vast numbers, often engaging in fiery clashes with police and the military. A series of leaks obtained by The Grayzone indicate this upheaval has unfolded according to a well-honed plan to take down Prabowo, which drew on organic grievances but which depended heavily on funding the Open Society Foundations.
Founded by anti-communist billionaire George Soros in 1993, OSF has been described by The New York Times as “a sprawling political and philanthropic empire,” which “seeks to advance a liberal, democratic agenda.” The Washington Post described Soros as part of a network of “overt operators” carrying out “spyless coups” that were once the purview of the CIA during the Cold War. OSF has acknowledged its central role in numerous insurrections throughout the Global South.
The leaked files reveal how from 2019 onwards, OSF began pumping large sums into projects designed to promote “resistance and dissent” against Prabowo’s predecessor, Joko “Jokowi” Widodo. Much of this money has been distributed by the Jakarta-based Kurawal Foundation, the single largest recipient of OSF contributions between 2019 and 2024. Founded in 2019, Kurawal describes itself as “a social justice philanthropy…[endeavouring] to promote dignified and benevolent democracy in Indonesia and Southeast Asia.”
The organization sponsors “individuals and agents,” who can be relied upon to advance Western liberal values locally. In the leaks, Kurawal described its efforts to develop an ideal voter who would be impervious to the scourge of Prabowo-associated disinformation. This meant “cultivating a wise and virtuous democrat – as political subject – who adheres to the essential principles of democracy.” The leaks show the intended subject was anything but.
Kurawal’s OSF-funded activities intensified in late 2023, as Indonesia geared up for the Presidential election in February the next year. Prabowo, Joko’s chosen successor, won by landslide in a vote international observers judged legitimate. However, the leaks show Kurawal used its local assets to whip up a frenzy over supposedly “massive” fraud by Prabowo, fomenting so much public pressure that authorities changed electoral rules to allow more parties to run for office in 2029. (Kurawal did not respond to a request for comment from The Grayzone).
In order to topple Prabowo, OSF has financed the grooming of prospective future politicians, outreach to existing political parties, and the creation of new movements and factions that could field candidates for office locally. Simultaneously, OSF bankrolled a range of self-proclaimed ‘independent’ media outlets and activist groups, who they sought to train “to become agents of change.” In leaked documents, Kurawal boasts that its “youth political engagement” activities mean young Indonesians are “at the forefront of most social and political movements… shaping conversations on national policies.”
Kurawal’s meddling in Indonesia has global implications. Mass “Gen Z” protests that erupted in July 2025 and raged for weeks have been hailed by Western corporate media as a revolutionary inspiration for anti-government activists elsewhere. It was in Jakarta where protesters first waved cartoon Jolly Roger flags inspired by Japanese manga One Piece. A map found in the tranche of leaks notes that Kurawal is active in several countries where these flags have appeared, including in protests which have produced regime change, such as in Nepal.
Kurawal encourages ‘agitation and pushback’ against Joko
A leaked February 2025 Kurawal document called “Building Bridges, Filling Gaps,” charts a clear “strategic plan” for regime change in Indonesia and beyond, 2024 – 2029. The file was produced after five years of systematically undermining President Joko’s administration, “by providing support to civil society groups, social movement actors, and thought leaders as well as change makers who do not shy away from politically sensitive issues.” This was motivated by “Indonesia’s growing political and economic clout”, and regional influence, under his rule.
The document describes Joko scathingly, as a “pilferer” and “opportunist”, while slamming his supposedly “inward looking foreign policy.” In reality, Joko prioritized protecting Indonesia’s sovereignty, irritating Western powers by rubbishing bogus CIA-disseminated claims of “genocide” in Xinjiang, refusing to recognize Israel, and pushing for peace in Ukraine.
By “promoting dissent” during his last term in office, Kurawal sought to lay foundations for even greater attacks against Prabowo. As a leaked file explains, “the agitation and pushback was needed to show that dissent is both necessary and possible.” Resultantly, “vibrant citizen movements” that could “challenge power” and “organize and influence change” sprouted locally, with OSF help.
Kurawal’s “program taxonomy” between 2019 and 2024 focused heavily on driving “youth political engagement,” encouraging young Indonesians to attend protests, join civil society campaigns and hone social media skills. As such, the organization’s students “actively set a higher standard of accountability of political leaders,” while “shaping conversations on national policies,” and “challenging traditional political organizing.” These efforts were to be enhanced by what Kurawal called “networks or alliances among social justice groups,” legal advocacy and a new lobbying machine.
Kurawal also financed local media outlets to promote stories of purported malfeasance and other abuses of power by authorities. For example, the organization sponsored a “series of in-depth reporting on police corruption and brutality cases in prominent public interest media,” combined with “social media campaigns” while “forming a national coalition for police reform” to “ramp up public pressure.” This was cited as “one of the bright spots” in Kurawal’s work in Indonesia, during the pre-Prabowo period.
For example, in 2021, Kurawal launched TempoWitness, an online portal which claimed to connect “citizen journalists at community level with mainstream local and national media.” By contrast, Tempo has been a vehicle for slanderous attacks on independent journalists raising questions about Western financing of anti-government media outlets and NGOs in Indonesia. Among its top targets is Brian Berletic, a US citizen who resides in Thailand and specializes in exposing covert Western funding of opposition political forces in the region.
Kurawal has also sponsored documentary films, photography, and experimental art in Indonesia. The purpose is to “elicit action from citizens and community.” This included the Jakarta International Photo Festival, the region’s largest. The events attracted tens of thousands of visitors, enabling Kurawal to shepherd them into a “side event” on the subject of democracy. During these sessions, attendees were given instruction on how to use “photography and visual storytelling” in the pursuit of “democracy and human rights.”
National ‘roadshow’ to ‘radicalize’ Indonesians
When Joko left office, he enjoyed record-high approval ratings. In its “Building Bridges, Filling Gaps” document, Kurawal reluctantly acknowledged the outgoing president was “able to maintain popular public support” in an organic fashion through what they described as “populist social welfare policies.”
The leaked document notes Prabowo would continue his predecessor’s legacy, “emphasizing policies to enhance social welfare, reduce poverty, and eliminate hunger.” A dedicated section called “Bracing for the Prabowo years” outlines the new president’s likely stances and strategy over his first term in office, and how his rule can be undermined.
The leaks reveal how Kurawal released a documentary called “Dirty Vote” immediately upon Prabowo’s election claiming to expose “how instruments of power are used to manipulate elections, undermine democratic order, and maintain the status quo,” and calling “for collective action to safeguard democracy.” The video racked up over 20 million views on YouTube as Kurawal screened it across Indonesia’s university campuses throughout February and March 2024. The dedicated “roadshow” was promoted as “a moral call to protect democracy’s future from systemic abuse and electoral fraud.”
The “Dirty Vote” documentary’s narrative tracked closely with claims of fraud in the February 2024 Indonesian elections by opposition elements. While Jakarta’s Constitutional Court rejected all formal legal challenges to the vote’s results in April that year, Kurawal boasted that its propaganda efforts cemented “widespread voter grievance” over what it called “massive election fraud.” The outcry successfully triggered reforms to Indonesian electoral laws, which previously required parties receive 20% of parliamentary votes to field presidential candidates.
When authorities caved to the opposition’s pressure in January 2025, Kurawal declared, “this means that at the next election, for the first time in the country’s history, political parties big and small will be free to nominate candidates on their own.”
The newly leaked documents echoed the contents of leaked files revealing that in June 2023, the US Embassy in Jakarta privately expressed concern about Prabowo’s almost inevitably impending victory, and planned to overturn the 20% threshold in response.
If the threshold were removed, “there will be more candidates in the election,” US embassy officials noted. In such a scenario, they concluded “the US will have more options” within the field of local candidates.
After the 20% rule was changed, Kurawal said it was well-placed to “set up alternative political groupings among civil society actors,” placing special emphasis on “women, youth, environmental rights defenders.” If successful, Kurawal would oversee “their possible transformation [into] new political parties.” The group wrote that it sought to use “infiltration or pressure” to “transform and radicalize” existing parties and “mobilize the masses against the established party system.”
The document concludes by fretting that the Global South is moving “from the periphery of the international political and economic arena towards the centre,” with countries such as Brazil, India and Indonesia cultivating “enough economic and political clout to emerge as regional or global powers,” and “active agents” in the international order. In turn, this has precipitated a global shift towards “multipolarity at a faster speed.” Kurawal lamented that many of these emerging powers do not subscribe to neoliberal Western governance models.
However, the organization expressed optimism about the prospects for insurrectionary change in troublesome countries, noting how Asia “witnessed some extraordinary demonstrations of ‘people power’ in 2024,” courtesy of “civil society leaders and pro-democracy activists.” Cited examples included the removal of South Korean President Yoon Suk Yeol, and the August student-led military coup in Bangladesh.
The Grayzone has exposed how the latter was the handiwork of individuals and organizations sponsored by the National Endowment for Democracy, a known CIA cutout.
Exploiting ‘Gen-Z’ to block Prabowo’s re-election
Other leaks show how in August 2025, Ekspedisi Indonesia Baru was awarded tens of thousands of dollars by Kurawal for a project titled “Expedition to Discover New Voices”. The purpose is to transform “younger generations” of Indonesians “to become agents of change.” This is to be achieved by “[mainstreaming] alternative ideas about a ‘New Indonesia’ by distributing public knowledge through documentary films, books, and community discussions that are widely accessible to the public, especially young people.”
Among the initiative’s explicitly stated “desired outcomes” is “stronger engagement from younger generations (Gen Z and Gen Alpha) in public discourse, along with greater courage to dream, speak up, and take action for Indonesia’s future.” This will hopefully precipitate “rising interest in alternative political actors” among the public, prior to Jakarta’s 2029 general election, “with an aim to elect political leaders dedicated to democracy and social equity,” so as to “prevent the continuation” of Prabowo’s rule.
“Key activities” to be conducted include “producing a documentary series” for YouTube channel Indonesia Baru “and other digital platforms,” a “public presentation roadshow” throughout the country to “spread ideas”, and “developing factual short-form content (TikTok, Reels, YouTube Shorts) on violent suppression by military and police forces, government corruption, forced land acquisition, and youth resistance to undemocratic policies.” For the latter initiative, Ekspedisi Indonesia Baru seeks to enlist “young creatives who can bring fresh perspectives and formats aligned with their peers’ digital behavior and preferences.”
Another key programming strand was publication of a book, Restart Indonesia, released in October 2025 under the revised title Reset Indonesia. A local media report on the forthcoming work quoted its lead author: “Reset is a more fitting description of the book’s content, which indeed proposes a reprogramming of Indonesia, not just a restart.” While only 2,000 copies have been printed to date, another contributor hoped many more would read the book.
“If a horror film in theaters can attract four million viewers, here’s a book that’s just as horrific,” they explained.
In July 2025, Sophia Nusantara Association was also furnished with tens of thousands of dollars in Soros financing through Kurawal, for a project titled “Guardian of Ecological Democracy” in Papua. Leaked documents described this student group as part of “the vanguard of resistance” against Indonesia’s government. Leaked documents related to the project boast how OSF’s local campus-based proxies have access to media, national networks, and modern documentation tools that can mobilize broad support.”
Kurawal foresaw its student footsoldiers “using art, research, and technology as tools of creative resistance,” managing “online campaigns and offline campaigns,” and convening “cultural festivals as a symbol of resistance.” In particular, Indonesian environmental protection issues were to be exploited as an “intellectual weapon,” to stoke public anger and “policy pressures” within Indonesia’s Presidential palace. Predicting such activity would create a potentially dangerous environment for students, Kurawal pledged to provide them with “security training” and to establish “safe houses on campus.”
‘Fighting authoritarianism with legal weapons’
In late August 2025, large-scale student-led demonstrators erupted across Indonesia. After days of extraordinary clashes, the government pledged concessions in response to protesters’ demands. The upheaval was one of Jakarta’s largest since the ousting of the CIA-installed dictator Suharto in 1998. Unrest quickly turned violent, with rioters attacking police, torching multiple government building, and looting the homes of elected parliamentarians. Local security forces initiated a heavy crackdown on the violent riots which claimed lives, leading to condemnations from groups including the OSF-funded Human Rights Watch.
At the forefront of the campaign to prosecute officials – whether nationally or internationally – was the Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI). Perhaps unsurprisingly, the organization has received enormous sums from OSF, via Kurawal Foundation. The leaks show YLBHI received a substantial grant from Kurawal just one month prior to the protests, to provide “critical legal education” to civil society groups, student organizations and indigenous communities to document purported abuses by authorities, and launch litigation “at the national level and through international human rights law mechanisms.”
Moreover, YLBHI’s OSF-bankrolled lawfare operations are explicitly intended to undermine the National Strategic Project instituted under President Joko in 2016. The project’s aim is to finance local infrastructure in order to generate economic growth and regional development. The effort has ignited controversy, however, due to concerns over land rights, potential environmental damage, and displacement of indigenous communities. With OSF financing, YLBHI aims to “raise critical awareness” of issues related to the National Strategic Project’s implementation.
Another target of the grant is “fighting authoritarianism with the use of legal weapons.” YLBHI is to “collaborate with local [and international] legal teams and legal experts to establish a legal aid team that can provide a rapid response, aiming to provide necessary legal assistance to social activists experiencing pressure” from authorities. These efforts will be “continuously” promoted, in order “to gain support and response from the Global South, thereby protecting the legitimate rights and interests of indigenous peoples and activists.”
With millions pumped into Kurawal over the years, it is evident Soros’ foundation is determined to stymie Prabowo in the next election. While he may not remain in office to face his opponents at the ballot box, one thing is clear: his replacement will be owe a debt of gratitude to some powerful forces overseas.
Some fans and participants hoping to enter the United States for the World Cup have complained that restrictive immigration rules have presented a roadblock.
The Iraqi soccer player Aymen Hussein, pictured in a mural near Baghdad wearing his No. 18 jersey, was temporarily detained by U.S. immigration officials before being allowed to enter the country for the World Cup.
Lo scorso dicembre, Israele è diventato il primo Paese a riconoscere formalmente il Somaliland, una regione autonoma separatasi dalla Somalia decenni fa. Il Somaliland, nella Somalia nordoccidentale, è da tempo in conflitto con il governo di Mogadiscio, avendo dichiarato l’indipendenza nel 1991 mentre la Somalia sprofondava nella guerra civile e nel caos. Da allora, il Somaliland ha governato la maggior parte del territorio che rivendica senza ricevere il riconoscimento internazionale.
Il primo ministro Netanyahu ha dichiarato che Israele moltiplicherà gli sforzi per istituire una cooperazione immediata con il Somaliland in settori quali agricoltura, sanità, tecnologia ed economia. Si è inoltre si è congratulato con il presidente del Somaliland, Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, elogiandone la leadership e invitandolo a visitare Israele.
Il premier israeliano ha affermato che la dichiarazione «rientra nello spirito degli Accordi di Abramo, firmati su iniziativa del presidente Trump» nel 2020 per normalizzare le relazioni diplomatiche di Israele con gli Emirati Arabi Uniti e il Bahrein, a cui si sono aggiunti successivamente altri Paesi.
Netanyahu, il ministro degli Esteri Saar e il presidente Abdullahi hanno firmato una dichiarazione congiunta di reciproco riconoscimento. Abdullahi ha dichiarato in una nota che il Somaliland avrebbe aderito agli Accordi di Abramo, definendoli un passo avanti verso la pace regionale e globale, e annunciato che il Somaliland si impegna a costruire partenariati, a rafforzare la prosperità reciproca e a promuovere la stabilità in Medio Oriente e Africa.
Senonché, rivela un’inchiesta della «Cnn», il Somaliland ha fornito a Israele una base logistica sistematicamente impiegata come scalo per i bombardamenti strategici sull’Iran condotti nel contesto dell’Operazione Roaring Lion. In tali condizioni, il riconoscimento diplomatico accordato al Somaliland viene a configurarsi come una sorta di contropartita per la concessione di un avamposto strategico situato all’imboccatura del Mar Rosso.
La “relazione speciale” istituita con il Somaliland rappresenta tuttavia una singola tessera di un mosaico molto più ampio, in cui rientrano Paesi parimenti cruciali come Iraq ed Emirati Arabi Uniti.
Sempre nel corso della guerra contro l’Iran, l’Israeli Defense Force si è avvalsa di due basi segrete in territorio iracheno che fungevano da basi avanzate per il supporto logistico e l’espletamento di operazioni di ricerca e soccorso. L’esistenza di queste due basi in Iraq era già stata segnalata dal «Wall Street Journal» e dal «New York Times», che smentivano seccamente le rassicurazioni fornite dal governo iracheno sul punto.
Le strutture sono andate a rafforzare l’influenza israeliana sul Paese, che storicamente si esercita attraverso il Kurdistan. I legami tra Israele e i rappresentanti kurdi risalgono infatti agli anni ’50 , quando il Mossad avvicinò il potente Mustafà Barzani per minare le aspirazioni nazionalistiche del Baath iracheno che era salito al potere a Baghdad, identificato fin da allora come il più temibile nemico regionale dello Stato ebraico.
L’intesa ha aperto progressivamente le porte all’addestramento dei peshmerga kurdi da parte di istruttori militari israeliani e agli investimenti dello Stato ebraico, cresciuti in maniera esponenziale in seguito alla guerra contro l’Iraq sferrata dagli Usa nel 2003. Molti sono stati infatti gli appalti ottenuti da società israeliane per la ricostruzione e l’ammodernamento delle infrastrutture nelle regioni settentrionali dell’Iraq, tra cui anche quello, ottenuto grazie anche all’intercessione del ministro per le Infrastrutture Yosef Paritzky, per la rimessa in sesto dell’oleodotto Kirkuk-Haifa, rimasto chiuso fin dal 1948. «Non passerà molto prima che il greggio iracheno fluisca verso Haifa. È solo una questione di tempo e il petrolio iracheno inonderà il Mediterraneo», dichiarò nel 2003 un raggiante Netanyahu (allora ministro degli Esteri).
Sempre nell’area kurda, imprese israeliane hanno acquistato terreni per costruire case, fabbriche e capannoni, alimentando la crescita economica della regione, e consolidando la profondità strategica israeliana nel nord dell’Iraq, come spiega Seymour Hersh: «in una serie di interviste in Europa, in Medio Oriente e negli Stati Uniti, svariati funzionari mi hanno confidato che alla fine dello scorso anno Israele era giunto alla conclusione che l’amministrazione Bush non sarebbe stata in grado di stabilizzare l’Iraq, e che Israele aveva bisogno di altre opzioni». Il governo di Ariel Sharon aveva quindi «deciso di rafforzare la posizione strategica di Israele intensificando i legami stretti molto tempo prima con i kurdi iracheni e stabilendo una presenza significativa sul terreno della regione semi-autonoma del Kurdistan. Molti funzionari hanno descritto la decisione di Sharon – che prevede un notevole impegno finanziario – come una mossa potenzialmente spregiudicata che potrà creare persino più caos e violenza, mentre la ribellione in Iraq continua ad allargarsi». L’intelligence di Tel Aviv «è silenziosamente al lavoro nella regione nord-irachena, fornendo addestramento ad unità kurde e, cosa più importante per Israele, guidando covert-operation all’interno del Kurdistan siriano ed iraniano. Israele si sente particolarmente minacciato dall’Iran, la cui posizione nell’area è stata rafforzata dalla guerra».
Durante gli anni precedenti, le autorità israeliane avevano evitato che i rapporti con il Kurdistan raggiungessero una dimensione strategica per evitare di guastare la relazione che stavano costruendo con Ankara. Eppure, nemmeno l’importanza capitale rivestita dalla Turchia si è rivelata capace di spezzare i contatti israelo-kurdi. Non stupisce quindi che all’indomani della rottura diplomatica con Ankara, il legame con i kurdi abbia assunto un accresciuto valore geopolitico.
Allo sfruttamento del territorio iracheno come trampolino di lancio per le operazioni contro l’Iran, Israele ha affiancato un netto avvicinamento agli Emirati Arabi Uniti. Nelle scorse settimane, il governo Netanyahu ha autorizzato lo schieramento negli Emirati di sistemi Iron Dome e Iron Beam, unitamente al personale preposto alla loro gestione.
Il principale snodo cruciale di cui Israele ha beneficiato per condurre operazioni militari contro l’Iran è tuttavia costituito dall’Azerbaijan, uno dei pochissimi alleati di Israele tra i Paesi musulmani che copre qualcosa come il 40% del fabbisogno petrolifero dello Stato ebraico. A loro volta, le aziende belliche israeliane hanno rifornito nel corso degli anni l’Azerbaijan di droni, sistemi radar, apparati di intelligence ed equipaggiamenti militari, e sono anche entrate a far parte di un consorzio costituito per fornire a Baku la collaborazione necessaria a realizzare un satellite di osservazione dal costo stimato di circa 200 milioni di dollari.
Il volume dell’interscambio tra i due Paesi raggiunge ogni anno cifre alquanto ragguardevoli, ma molte operazioni commerciali rimangono coperte da segreto, come confermato da un cablogramma classificato reso pubblico da «WikiLeaks» in cui l’ambasciata statunitense paragonava le relazioni bilaterali fra Azerbaijan e Israele a «un iceberg, visto che come questi grandi blocchi di ghiaccio nasconde i nove decimi della sua consistenza sotto la superficie».
Secondo Joshua Kucera, analista senior del Crisis Group, la relazione altamente collaborativa instaurata con Tel Aviv garantisce per di più a Baku la possibilità di trarre indirettamente beneficio dall’incessante attività di condizionamento su Casa Bianca e Congresso svolta dalla potente Israel Lobby.
Nel corso dei due più recenti conflitti del Nagorno-Karabakh, le forze azere hanno messo in campo contro l’esercito armeno tecnologie e sistemi d’arma israeliani e beneficiato dell’assistenza militare e di intelligence di Tel Aviv. Già nel 2016, lo specialista israeliano Yossi Melman sottolineava che la penetrazione israeliana nel sistema di difesa azero si era spinta molto più in profondità di quanto i numeri disponibili non potessero acclarare: «apparentemente, Israele e Azerbaijan sono una strana e male assortita coppia, ma d’altra parte Israele non è mai troppo selettivo nella scelta degli amici quando si tratta di vendita di armi ed interessi nazionali. Un rapido sguardo alla mappa mostra che l’Azerbaijan confina con l’Iran, nemico giurato di Israele».
Durante l’Operazione Roaring Lion, sostiene la «Cnn» sulla base di confidenze rese da ben quattro fonti di alto livello, unità speciali israeliane di commando e intelligence avrebbero portato avanti azioni in territorio iraniano coordinandosi con una serie di basi operative impiantate nelle zone di territorio azero limitrofe al confine settentrionale dell’Iran.
Le sortite in Iran partite dalle basi azere hanno registrato il coinvolgimento di diverse decine di soldati, tra cui membri delle forze speciali israeliane, delle forze d’élite di elisoccorso e personale del Mossad.
Secondo una delle fonti sentite dalla «Cnn», è dall’Azerbaijan che sarebbe stato pianificato l’assassinio, consumato il 4 marzo, di Rahman Moghaddam, direttore della divisione intelligence del Corpo delle Guardie Rivoluzionarie Islamiche.
Dal quadro dipinto dalla «Cnn» emerge una vasta rete di collusione fondata su specifiche convergenze di interessi, che pone Israele nelle condizioni di espandere la propria presenza militare e di intelligence fino alle frontiere dei Paesi nemici.
La mappa che ne risulta «è inedita nella storia di Israele: basi avanzate in Iraq — paese con cui Israele è tecnicamente in stato di belligeranza — operazioni da territorio azero, Iron Dome negli Emirati, scali nel Corno d’Africa, coordinamento con gli Stati Uniti che usavano la stessa rete come infrastruttura logistica per i propri attacchi. Netanyahu ha visitato segretamente gli Emirati con il capo del Mossad e il capo di stato maggiore. Gli Emirati hanno detto di non averlo mai visto. L’Iraq ha detto che non c’erano basi straniere. Il Somaliland ha incassato il riconoscimento e non ha commentato. È la diplomazia del silenzio conveniente: ognuno nega quello che tutti sanno, e nel frattempo le operazioni continuano».
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