Normal view

Here's what Candace Owens gets wrong on Russia

8 June 2026 at 20:16

Candace Owens billed her trip to Russia last week as a family vacation. It turned into something far more useful for the Kremlin.

The U.S. far-right conspiracy theorist — boasting 35 million followers across all social media platforms — ended up appearing at Russia's flagship economic forum

«Interferência em assuntos internos» quando convém aos EUA

By: A A
8 June 2026 at 17:46

EUA atacam relatores da ONU que denunciam racismo, pobreza ou sanções. Defendem “interferência” quando convém e arruínam quem investiga seus crimes.

Junte-se a nós no Telegram Twitter e VK.

Escreva para nós: info@strategic-culture.su

As tensões entre Washington e os relatores especiais da ONU não se limitaram à política externa ou à “guerra ao terror”. Em diferentes momentos, especialistas internacionais que voltaram os olhos para problemas internos dos Estados Unidos — racismo estatal, pobreza extrema e impactos humanitários de sanções econômicas — também passaram a enfrentar pressão política, ataques públicos e campanhas de deslegitimação.

A questão racial foi um dos temas mais sensíveis.

Muito antes do assassinato de George Floyd, mecanismos da ONU já vinham denunciando padrões persistentes de discriminação racial, violência policial e encarceramento em massa nos EUA. Um dos nomes mais associados a esse debate foi o sociólogo senegalês Doudou Diène, relator especial da ONU sobre formas contemporâneas de racismo entre 2002 e 2008.

Após visitas aos Estados Unidos e investigações sobre discriminação racial, Diène alertou para a persistência de estruturas históricas de desigualdade profundamente ligadas ao legado da escravidão e da segregação racial. Seus relatórios chamavam atenção para disparidades econômicas, tratamento desigual no sistema de justiça criminal e violência policial contra negros.

Em certos momentos, diplomatas americanos trabalharam para reduzir o impacto político de relatórios considerados excessivamente críticos dentro dos fóruns multilaterais.

A tensão se intensificou após os protestos de 2020 contra a violência policial. Países africanos chegaram a defender, no Conselho de Direitos Humanos da ONU, mecanismos internacionais mais robustos de investigação sobre racismo sistêmico nos Estados Unidos. Washington resistiu à ideia de qualquer instrumento de monitoramento direcionado especificamente ao país, e a proposta acabou diluída em uma investigação mais ampla sobre racismo no mundo.

Outro caso emblemático de atrito ocorreu com o professor australiano Philip Alston, relator especial da ONU sobre pobreza extrema e direitos humanos entre 2014 e 2020.

Após uma missão aos EUA em 2017, Alston publicou um relatório devastador sobre desigualdade, desproteção social e precarização econômica no país mais rico do mundo. O especialista afirmou que o chamado “American Dream” corria o risco de transformar-se numa “American illusion”, denunciando o contraste entre extrema riqueza e pobreza disseminada.

Durante visitas a estados como Alabama, Califórnia e Porto Rico, Alston descreveu comunidades sem saneamento adequado, pessoas vivendo em trailers degradados, crescimento do número de sem-teto e erosão de programas sociais.

Suas conclusões provocaram reações irritadas entre políticos conservadores e setores da imprensa americana. Ao contrário do que sempre fazem quando as críticas são aos inimigos dos EUA, eles acusaram o relator de ideologização e de ignorar a prosperidade média do país. Em certos círculos políticos, sua missão foi retratada como interferência indevida em assuntos internos dos EUA – uma grande ironia, vindo de quem veio.

A relação conflituosa reapareceria ainda no debate sobre sanções econômicas internacionais.

A jurista bielorrussa Alena Douhan, relatora especial sobre o impacto negativo de medidas coercitivas unilaterais, tornou-se alvo frequente de críticas após publicar relatórios apontando os efeitos humanitários das sanções impostas por Washington contra países como Venezuela, Síria e Irã.

Douhan argumentava que restrições econômicas amplas frequentemente agravavam crises humanitárias ao afetar acesso a medicamentos, alimentos, infraestrutura energética e sistemas de saúde. Em visitas e relatórios, sustentou que sanções unilaterais podiam violar direitos humanos fundamentais quando produziam sofrimento generalizado da população civil.

Nos EUA e em países aliados, críticos passaram a acusá-la de reproduzir narrativas de governos “autoritários” e minimizar responsabilidades internas por crises econômicas. Organizações políticas e think tanks ocidentais frequentemente tentaram desqualificar seu mandato, questionando a credibilidade de suas conclusões e denunciando suposta proximidade excessiva com governos sancionados.

Durante décadas, os Estados Unidos responderam a especialistas da ONU com métodos relativamente previsíveis: ataques políticos, campanhas diplomáticas, recusa de acesso, tentativas de esvaziar mandatos, pressão sobre o Conselho de Direitos Humanos ou esforços para deslegitimar publicamente relatores considerados hostis. No caso Albanese, Washington lançou mão do aparato coercitivo do próprio Estado americano — especialmente seu poder financeiro global.

Em todos os casos, o preço de se desafiar os EUA é muito alto. Não apenas para os relatores, que não podem realizar plenamente o seu trabalho. Mas, sobretudo, para os futuros relatores e especialistas – o recado é: não mexam com os interesses dos EUA e de seus aliados (sobretudo Israel), caso contrário sua carreira será arruinada.

Basta ver que, comparativamente aos países do chamado “Sul Global”, a abordagem dos funcionários independentes da ONU é muito mais amistosa com os EUA e seus aliados e os casos expostos nesta série são exceções da regra número um das Nações Unidas: atue contra os países alvo da cobiça imperialista.

Aqueles, que são a maioria, que seguiram perfeitamente o roteiro da ONU e investiram contra a Rússia, China, Belarus, Coreia do Norte, Venezuela, Irã, Nicarágua (ou seja, contra os alvos do imperialismo) tiveram sua carreira garantida, com premiações, sucesso, prestígio, forte apoio diplomático ocidental, ampla repercussão nos grandes jornais, intensa circulação de seus relatórios em ONGs e governos e audiências parlamentares, sanções e resoluções baseadas em suas acusações.

Por sua vez, os que desafiaram as estruturas e os chefes imperialistas da ONU são basicamente censurados, invisibilizados, descredibilizados, caem no ostracismo, sofrem intensa pressão psicológica, ameaças, sanções econômicas e proibição de entrada em eventos internacionais – inclusive os da própria ONU, pois sua sede central é justamente nos Estados Unidos.

Tenhamos um pouco de empatia com os burocratas a serviço da ONU: quem que deseje subir na vida e receber amplo prestígio mundial irá arriscar sua carreira colocando o dedo nas feridas dos seus patrões? Praticamente ninguém. E é assim que a ONU permanece quase absolutamente instrumentalizada pelas potências imperialistas, desde o primeiro momento de sua criação.

Irán se arriesga a entrar en guerra

By: A A
8 June 2026 at 17:35

Es probable que esta fase del conflicto iraní solo termine cuando Occidente caiga por el precipicio económico que se avecina…

Únete a nosotros en Telegram Twitter  y VK .

Escríbenos: info@strategic-culture.su

La guerra de Estados Unidos con Irán ha traspasado su fase inicial para entrar en una nueva etapa emergente, en la que Irán apuesta implícitamente por que la siguiente fase sea la guerra.

Lo más probable es que se trate de episodios breves de guerra limitada, pero que, no obstante, encierran el potencial de extenderse a nivel regional, en caso de que Estados Unidos (e Israel) decidan intensificar drásticamente el conflicto.

La nueva fase conlleva riesgos, por supuesto, pero Irán tiene las cartas ganadoras: la capacidad de infligir daños desproporcionadamente mayores a la infraestructura del Golfo como represalia por cualquier daño que se le cause, y la conciencia de que Occidente se está acercando cada vez más al «precipicio» energético.

Los tres pilares que sustentan este cambio son, en primer lugar, la confianza en que Irán no será (ni puede ser) desplazado de su control sobre Ormuz, y que, al consolidar allí sus estructuras administrativas, la realidad del control iraní sobre Ormuz será asimilada cada vez más por los Estados, y se reflejará en su aceptación del control iraní-omaní.

Asociada a este principio fundamental está la aplicación por parte de Irán de una disuasión escalada frente al bloqueo naval estadounidense. Cualquier intento de interceptar o atacar buques iraníes o de interferir en la administración del estrecho se enfrentará a represalias cada vez más duras.

En última instancia, esta política puede llevar a que Irán inflinja daños cada vez mayores a los buques de guerra estadounidenses —otro punto de fricción—.

El 3 de junio, por ejemplo, Estados Unidos disparó un misil Hellfire contra un petrolero iraní cerca del estrecho de Ormuz. En respuesta, un buque de propiedad estadounidense (o parcialmente estadounidense), el Panaya, fue alcanzado por misiles.

Además, Irán lanzó tres oleadas de misiles de crucero contra la base aérea y de helicópteros estadounidense en Kuwait desde donde se había originado el ataque. También han surgido imágenes de graves daños en el aeropuerto internacional de Kuwait (aunque la causa de los daños sigue siendo objeto de controversia).

El segundo principio subyacente que influye en este cambio refleja simplemente el desdén iraní ante el continuo aumento de las exigencias de Trump, sus amenazas exageradas (que claramente no están a la altura de las capacidades de EE. UU.), junto con sus continuos giros y su retórica despectiva hacia Irán.

Al parecer, los dirigentes iraníes han llegado a la conclusión de que probablemente no habrá compromiso, y de que es mejor poner fin a las «negociaciones» «antes que continuar con las inútiles negociaciones de mala fe con un régimen estadounidense engañoso y decrépito», como el New York Times ha calificado las «negociaciones» con Irán — lo que sugiere que el «caos del acuerdo» no es un fallo puntual de Trump limitado a la cuestión de Irán, sino más bien un patrón constante de disfuncionalidad que se repite en prácticamente todas las iniciativas de «paz» de Trump.

Sin embargo, detrás de la decisión de Irán de suspender las conversaciones se esconde probablemente la claridad que va surgiendo gradualmente, filtrándose a través de las declaraciones y análisis israelíes y estadounidenses, de que el verdadero objetivo del ataque por sorpresa estadounidense-israelí del 28 de febrero nunca fue el cambio de régimen per se —con el fin de sustituir a los «radicales» iraníes por un líder más moderado al estilo de «Delcy Rodrigues»—; sino que pretendía, más bien, provocar la completa destrucción y fractura de Irán —una perspectiva que estaba destinada a cambiar los cálculos de Irán.

Esta perspectiva ha consolidado enormemente el apoyo público a la República Islámica y, al mismo tiempo, ha convertido la guerra en una lucha existencial por preservar los valores éticos de la Revolución. Desde esta perspectiva, Irán tiene poco que discutir con Trump, salvo algún futuro modus vivendi —en el momento en que Washington comprenda que se encuentra acorralado y que el nuevo realismo se imponga.

El tercer principio que sustenta esta nueva fase del conflicto es el enunciado por Irán desde el inicio de las conversaciones de Islamabad: «Alto el fuego para todos; o alto el fuego para nadie». Esto se volvió a subrayar en el último ultimátum de Irán a Trump: «Si se hubieran llevado a cabo las amenazas israelíes de la semana pasada de arrasar el barrio de Dahiyeh, en el sur de Beirut, Irán habría golpeado duramente el norte de Israel con sus misiles. “Era un alto el fuego para todos, o ningún alto el fuego”.

Trump optó por el alto el fuego y, tras su conversación con Netanyahu, anunció que estaba en vigor. Le dijo a Netanyahu que cancelara el bombardeo previsto sobre Dahiyeh, en el sur de Beirut. En Israel, una oleada masiva de indignación procedente de todos los sectores del espectro político arremetió contra Netanyahu ante la mera idea de frenar cualquier ataque israelí en el Líbano.

El ex primer ministro Naftali Bennett acusó a Netanyahu de «perder el control sobre la soberanía israelí». Y el ex primer ministro Yair Lapid afirmó que Israel se había visto reducido a un «Estado vasallo» tras la suspensión de los ataques.

Desde hace algunos meses, Estados Unidos e Israel han estado intentando que un sector de los líderes libaneses acepte la tarea de desarmar a Hezbolá, tal y como explicó Rubio, «para que Israel no tenga que hacerlo», algo que los líderes libaneses claramente no pueden hacer.

Israel carece de una estrategia coherente para el Líbano. El exalto cargo de la inteligencia militar israelí, Danny Citrinowicz, esboza un nuevo «logro iraní» estratégico:

Teherán ha logrado efectivamente vincular el frente libanés al ámbito más amplio de las relaciones entre Irán e Israel. Cualquier escalada en el Líbano se percibe ahora cada vez más a través del prisma de la dinámica entre Estados Unidos e Irán.

No obstante, observa:

La situación en el Líbano sigue siendo muy inestable. Israel y Hezbolá continúan interpretando los acuerdos actuales de formas fundamentalmente diferentes. [Mientras que] Israel sostiene que conserva libertad de acción en todo el Líbano, excepto en Beirut, Hezbolá [por su parte] insiste en que cualquier actividad militar israelí —cualquiera que sea— viola el marco del alto el fuego. Estas interpretaciones contrapuestas crean un potencial significativo para una renovada fricción y escalada sobre el terreno.

En Israel, la situación en las localidades del norte sigue siendo un punto neurálgico para casi todos los israelíes. Muchas localidades a lo largo de la frontera con el Líbano y hacia el sur, en Galilea, están medio vacías —«franjas enteras de territorio abandonadas por [el] Gobierno», escribe Ben Caspit. Los políticos locales afirman que «ellos también son israelíes» y que el Gobierno debe responder.

Es seguro que el Líbano seguirá siendo un punto de discordia. No se trata de si se producirá la próxima crisis, sino de cuándo. Israel no dejará que el asunto quede así: incluso los líderes de la oposición liberal exigen la destrucción de Hezbolá y protestan por el hecho de que Trump haya atado las manos de Netanyahu en el Líbano.

Irán tampoco dejará pasar el asunto. Los mediadores han informado a los estadounidenses de que Irán considera que el fin de la guerra en el Líbano, la retirada de las fuerzas israelíes y la retirada de Ormuz son condiciones vinculantes —antes de discutir otras cuestiones—.

Así pues, aquí estamos. Continúan las escaramuzas militares —en la práctica, una serie abreviada de ataques de las fuerzas estadounidenses contra el transporte marítimo iraní y la infraestructura del estrecho, surgidas del deseo de Trump de reafirmar su bloqueo naval ante la opinión pública estadounidense—. Esta situación es claramente inflamable, al igual que lo es el contexto libanés.

Irán está reconociendo de hecho la realidad de que, en esta nueva fase —con tantos puntos álgidos inherentes—, la escalada militar estadounidense probablemente se convertirá en algún momento en una necesidad política para satisfacer las necesidades de Trump y de sus financiadores judíos nacionales.

¿Y las negociaciones? No llegarán a ninguna parte mientras Israel y los donantes multimillonarios judíos de EE. UU. rechacen cualquier resultado con Irán que deje a este país intacto y más fuerte y —pari passu en este pensamiento binario— debilite en consecuencia el proyecto «Israel First» dentro de EE. UU. y de la región.

Un acuerdo que no vea a Irán irremediablemente debilitado será condenado por estas últimas fuerzas como una «negligencia traicionera» por parte de Trump. Será atacado sin piedad. Sin embargo, debe darse cuenta de que Irán está, de todos modos, a punto de liberarse de las ataduras de EE. UU.

Es probable que esta fase del conflicto iraní solo termine cuando Occidente caiga por el precipicio económico que se avecina…

Traducción: Observatorio de trabajador@s en lucha

Why Iran Risked an Attack on Israel

8 June 2026 at 18:41
Iran’s leaders want to show they are serious about defending their Hezbollah allies in Lebanon and maintaining the regional balance of power, analysts say.

© Shir Torem/Reuters

Part of a projectile that landed in northern Israel, early Monday morning.

If this is winning, America can’t afford much more of it

By: A A
8 June 2026 at 16:17

By John WHITEHEAD’S

Join us on TelegramTwitter, and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

“We’re gonna win so much, you may even get tired of winning.”—Donald Trump

Donald Trump promised Americans they would get tired of winning.

If this is what winning looks like, America can’t afford much more of it.

We are losing ground economically. We are losing credibility abroad. We are losing tourists, workers, stability, trust, constitutional guardrails, and whatever remained of the illusion that the government answers to “we the people.”

The tourism economy is taking a hit, with international visitors increasingly reluctant to come to the United States. Even migration—the lifeblood of America’s economic growth, innovation, labor force and national renewal—is now moving in the wrong direction. Fewer people are coming in, more Americans are leaving, and by some estimates the country has already crossed into negative net migration.

That is not the mark of a nation “winning.” It is the mark of a nation people are increasingly choosing to escape.

Even the looming World Cup—normally an economic windfall for tourism, travel and hospitality—is being shadowed by the administration’s immigration crackdown, detention protests and threats to disrupt international travel at key airports.

That is what happens when a nation treats visitors, immigrants and dissenters as threats first and human beings second: people stop coming, businesses suffer, and fear becomes official policy.

The economy, despite the administration’s relentless victory laps, is flashing warning signs: downgraded growth, strained consumers, rising costs, depleted savings, and policy chaos that leaves families, small businesses and entire industries guessing what fresh disruption tomorrow will bring.

We are being worn down by the losses.

Meanwhile, the man who promised to end wars has presided over their continuation and expansion. The man who promised to bring prices down has helped drive uncertainty up. The man who promised to drain the swamp has turned government into a spoils system for loyalists, cronies, contractors, oligarchs and power brokers. The man who promised law and order has treated the law as something to be weaponized against enemies and waived for friends.

This is not winning.

This is the slow-motion defeat of a constitutional republic by spectacle, grievance, greed and brute force.

The losses are piling up.

Americans were told they would get prosperity. What they got was an economy in which corporate profits and stock market gains mask the fact that ordinary households are stretched thin, savings are shrinking, debt is mounting, and the cost of basic necessities keeps eating away at wages.

They were told tariffs would punish foreign governments and bring jobs home. What they got were higher costs passed down to consumers, retaliation, supply disruptions, and a trade policy built less on strategy than on political theater. Even the courts have begun treating the tariff agenda as what it is: economic policy by executive improvisation, with judges striking down or narrowing tariff maneuvers while the administration keeps looking for new legal workarounds.

They were told immigration crackdowns would make America stronger. What they got was a nation frightening away the workers, students, tourists, entrepreneurs and families who have long helped power its economy.

They were told America would be respected again. What they got was a country increasingly viewed as unstable, hostile, unpredictable and unsafe—not merely by adversaries, but by allies, visitors, investors and would-be partners.

They were told the wars would end. What they got was more war talk, more military escalation, more blank checks for the war machine, and more excuses for expanding executive power in the name of national security.

They were told the Constitution would be restored. What they got was a president who declared, “He who saves his Country does not violate any Law.”

Listen carefully when any ruler says something like that.

That is not constitutionalism. That is the language of kings, dictators and strongmen who believe their intentions place them above the law.

The Constitution was written precisely to prevent that kind of thinking from taking root in America.

The problem with Trump’s brand of winning is that it requires Americans to lose.

For the police state to win, the Fourth Amendment must lose.

For the surveillance state to win, privacy must lose.

For the war machine to win, peace must lose.

For the executive branch to win, the separation of powers must lose.

For the oligarchs to win, working families must lose.

For the propaganda machine to win, truth must lose.

For a strongman to win, the Constitution must lose.

Trump’s “winning” is simply the latest branding campaign for an old con: convince the people they are winning while stripping them of the power to govern themselves.

Call it what you will—national security, border security, economic nationalism, law and order, anti-corruption, emergency authority, America First—but when the end result is more government power and less individual freedom, we should know by now who is really winning.

The winners are the same as always: the defense contractors, data brokers, private prison operators, surveillance companies, lobbyists, political insiders, Wall Street speculators, government contractors, partisan enforcers, donors with access, loyalists seeking payouts, and bureaucratic power centers that thrive on fear, crisis and control.

The losers are “we the people.”

This is the hard truth Americans must face: a government that promises to make you “win” by taking power away from someone else will eventually take power away from you, too.

Rights are not partisan. Due process is not partisan. Free speech is not partisan. Privacy is not partisan. Limits on executive power are not partisan. The Constitution is not supposed to be a campaign prop, a legal technicality or a speed bump on the road to political victory.

The Constitution is the contract that binds the government down.

Without it, all we have are rulers and subjects.

That is why the real measure of any administration is not how loudly it boasts, how many enemies it punishes, how many executive orders it signs, how many troops it deploys, how many agencies it purges, or how many headlines it dominates.

The real measure is whether the people are freer, safer in their rights, more secure in their property, more protected from government abuse, and more capable of holding power accountable.

By that measure, we are not winning.

We are losing in all the ways that matter.

A president can call it winning. A party can call it winning. The media can package it as winning. The crowds can chant along.

But as I make clear in my book Battlefield America: The War on the American People and in its fictional counterpart The Erik Blair Diaries, if the price is the Constitution, then we all lose.

Original article:  www.rutherford.org

Congress moves to institutionalize U.S.-Israeli relationship

By: A A
8 June 2026 at 16:11

By Philip GIRALDI 

Join us on TelegramTwitter, and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Israel will benefit enormously and Americans will bear the burden

There is near certainty that Section 224 of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2027 will pass through the House of Representatives to become law this coming week after a failed attempt last Thursday in the House Armed Services Committee to pass an amendment to delete it led by Democratic Party Congressman Ro Khanna and Republican Thomas Massie. The NDAA will now be awaiting only the fully expected signature of Israel’s servant President Donald Trump on the Act to become part of the nation’s legislative package that will set the rules and regulations that the nation’s defense will operate under. It will, unfortunately, also set up through Section 224 a “United States-Israel Defense Technology Cooperation Initiative” that integrates “US-Israeli military research and development, co-production of weapons systems, licensing agreements, AI, directed energy, data integration, and missile defense.” It also creates the framework for “bilateral research and development, co-production of weapons, joint ventures, licensing agreements, and seemingly every manner of US-Israeli military-industrial complex cooperation.” The Director of the “Initiative” will be responsible for the coordination of the work and it is already being suggested that he will be an Israeli. And the funding will come 100% from the US Treasury by way of the budgeted allocation of $1.5 trillion that has been requested for the US military in 2027.

The result is to completely connect the functionality of the US military with that of the Israeli military in what has been described as an equal partnership that will include the government of Israel and its Israeli Defense Force as full participants. There will be full intelligence sharing and a planning process that will determine many aspects of how the American Department of War (sic) procures its weapons and equipment and establishes its strategic goals. This is plausibly the hidden story behind why Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has been slyly suggesting that Israel might in future forego the $3.8 billion in annual automatic “aid” (which some refer to as “tribute”) from the US Treasury, a process begun by President Barack Obama. Netanyahu, working through his accomplices in the White House and the US Congress, clearly would have known in advance that a much larger slice of the pie was on its way via Section 224.

Those politicians who have sponsored and promoted 224 inevitably cite how the Jewish state is a major “ally and best friend” even though it is neither, but they ignore the dark side fact that it is also a genocidal state whose leaders have been condemned by international courts for multiple war crimes that is hated by most of the world. And this hatred has rubbed off on the United States, which is Israel’s principal source of arms, money and political cover. The slaughter in Gaza and now in Lebanon would not occur without the support of Presidents Joe Biden and Donald Trump.

And there’s more, coming from the Senate which is doing something similar via the FY27 Intel Authorization bill which will make US intelligence sharing with Israel mandatory. The bill in question is S-4615, introduced on May 20th by leading Israel Firster Senator Tom Cotton of Arkansas. The full text is here. S-4615 includes Section 622, entitled “US-Israel intelligence sharing enhancement.” This new section would establish as law (where it would apply forever, unless repealed by Congress) new US national security-related obligations with respect to Israel. It includes a Statement of Policy: “(1) To maintain and strengthen the strategic security partnership with Israel as a means of advancing the national defense of the United States… (2) To enhance intelligence collaboration through robust intelligence sharing and analytic partnership with Israel… (4) To ensure that security assistance and defense cooperation are structured to help Israel maintain its qualitative military edge…”

When the Intel Authorization Bill comes up for a vote in the Senate it will no doubt pass due to the Republican Majority supplemented by the usual Israel Firsters among the Democrats. And to complete the takeover by Israel there is a bill moving through Congress that will give US military benefits to American citizens, often Israeli dual nationals, who serve in the Israeli military, to include educational and medical benefits unavailable to other Americans who have not served in the US armed forces. Ironically, Israel’s new status as America’s partner in national security and warfare coming from both parts of Congress is not shared with any of Washington’s actual allies in NATO, making the relationship with Israel both unique and, in the opinion of many, uniquely dangerous as an empowered Israel will inevitably work to advance its security perceptions and Middle East “Eretz Israel” ambitions at the expense of genuine concerns that the United States might have intrinsic to its much broader worldwide exposure to global threats. In other words, pandering to Israeli concerns will actually make the United States much weaker and more vulnerable.

Astonishingly, the danger that Israel poses to US national security through its insertion as something like an equal into the planning process has been little remarked in the mainstream US media, possibly due to increased federal and state government pursuit of “antisemites” which includes criminalization of criticism of Israel. And it is certainly once again suggesting the power of the Israel Lobby, its “bought” media and its stable of supporting Jewish billionaires. But there has been considerable concern being expressed across much of the alternative media, some of which has even reached the front pages, suggesting that there is some leakage going on to feed official reservations about 224. The New York Times, which sometimes serves as a go-to leaked resource for the intelligence and defense communities had an interesting article on Israeli spying on the United States sourced to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) which appeared just after 224 was being debated in Congress.

The Times article is entitled “Pentagon Sees Growing Espionage Threat From Israel” and is summarized as “The Defense Department has increased the counterintelligence threat assessment to its highest level, and Israel is believed to have eavesdropped on American negotiations with Iran.” The story details how “Israel is now at the Pentagon’s highest counterintelligence threat level.” It includes how American officers working with their Israeli counterparts both in the US and overseas have had their phones and other messaging systems tapped through the insertion of surreptitious listening devices by the Israelis. Negotiations to end the Iran War have also been particularly targeted, both through phones being used by the negotiators as well as from the Washington end where the calls and messages are received.

The reality is, of course, that Israel has been a major source of spying and even worse against the United States since the 1950s, always ranking in FBI and Department of Defense assessments as one of the top three foreign espionage offenders, frequently as number one. And Israeli clandestine covert actions and false flag attacks have not hesitated to kill Americans as part of their efforts to cover-up their more disreputable activities. Notably, the Israeli false flag attack on the US Navy’s USS Liberty in international waters on June 8th 1967 in which 34 crewmen were killed stands out, particularly due to the subsequent cover-up conveniently arranged by Presidents Lyndon B Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara.

Israeli spies, which might have included Netanyahu himself when he resided in the US, arranged the illegal removal of enriched uranium from a Zionist-Jewish-owned metallurgical company in Pennsylvania and also obtained the special triggers in California that enabled Tel Aviv to create a nuclear arsenal. When President John F Kennedy sought to stop that development he was assassinated, quite possibly with help from Mossad. And then there was the most damaging spy in the history of the US, Jonathan Pollard, who stole for Israel the most sensitive intelligence ever obtained by a foreign power. He is now running for the Knesset in Israel and is speaking of the next two likely targets for the Israeli army once the Palestinians, Lebanese and Syrians are disposed of, neighbors Egypt and Turkey!

The appearance of the Times article is suspicious and it might have been a shot across the Israeli-Israel Firster bow from the intelligence community coming as it apparently did from what was once called the Department of Defense. But Israel appears to have won this round and will be entering into a new relationship with the United States national security, intelligence and defense systems. Given the utter ruthlessness of Israel and the willingness of its sponsors in Washington to let it get away with mass murder, literally, this is a disaster for the United States and will only produce excruciatingly bad results.

Original article:  www.unz.com

Hezbollah is now the centre of Trump’s Iran ceasefire. So now what?

By: A A
8 June 2026 at 16:05

Lebanon is now playing a key role in any ceasefire deal that Trump might think he has nailed with Iran. But can Hezbollah go rogue on all the main players?

Join us on TelegramTwitter, and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

Lebanon is now playing a key role in any ceasefire deal that Trump might think he has nailed with Iran. But can Hezbollah go rogue on all the main players?

Relationships are odd things and are often determined by how people stay together during the tough times, rather than when everything is rosy. But during these last few turbulent days, when Donald Trump frantically scrambles to save the remnants of a peace deal with Iran, one relationship has become paramount to the entire Middle East crisis: that of Hezbollah and Iran. Just how strong is this relationship, or was it always just a ’marriage of convenience’, hollow and unable to withstand the travails of regional tension?

While the Iranians walked away from talks with the U.S. because of Israel’s war in southern Lebanon, Trump realised how important this tiny country is – and will be – if any kind of deal is struck over opening the Straits of Hormuz. While on the one hand Iran has stepped up to the mark by supporting its proxy Hezbollah and has always included Lebanon in any peace deal or ceasefire, it is worth noting that the ties and responsibilities Iran has to Hezbollah are not as solid as many think.

Indeed, in the region, when you talk to geopolitical analysts, they always pontificate over how the West – and in particular Israel – places too much emphasis on Iran’s links to its regional proxies in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Lebanon. They have long argued that Iran has less control over them than most pundits in Western media would assert.

In his most recent speech, the Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem denounced the deal as a “farce,” saying it would effectively divide southern Lebanon from the rest of the country, giving Israel an advantage to “kill in Lebanon.”

“We have given no commitment to anyone,” Naim said, as he urged the Lebanese government to call off talks with Israel and demanded Israel’s full withdrawal from Lebanese territory. “As long as the aggression continues, we will confront it with all the power we have been given.”

This reference, of course, was directed at the elite in Beirut, who are largely acting on the West’s political bequest in this tiny country – barely 240 km long – which was once a province of Syria.

But some wily analysts might read too much into his statement in the coming days. A few might mull over this comment and speculate that Hezbollah, under certain circumstances, has a wild card to play and is capable of going rogue, distancing itself from the arbitrary direction of Tehran.

Is it possible that the Iranians and the Americans could outmanoeuvre Israel and strike a provisional ceasefire deal, only for it to be scuppered by Hezbollah, which refuses to give up its fight in the south of the country against the IDF? Presently, this must be concerning Trump’s camp but will be amusing to Netanyahu, who probably thinks that Lebanon holds the key for him to continue the war and thus stay in power, avoiding corruption charges.

Hezbollah, for its part, is the most dangerous man in the room, simply because its fighters have nothing to lose. They are backed into a corner and have lost so much of their own land, with 600 killed and a million displaced since the last ceasefire in April was agreed. Militarily speaking, their best guerrilla-style fighting will be seen now, and so one could argue this is their moment. While it is true that the IDF have made significant gains against them, it is wholly under-reported how successful their fighters have been in blowing up IDF tanks, with some estimates claiming the number to be over 200. But victory for either side seems less significant, certainly for Netanyahu, who probably knows that his forces can never actually win against Hezbollah in Lebanon. That is not the point. The point is to keep the war going and use it as leverage against Trump and Iran, while keeping Netanyahu in office, protected from a peace scenario that would remove him from his job and prosecute him – exactly the same set-up that Ukraine’s President Zelensky enjoys.

Lebanon is an important pawn in the bigger game, as it can always be used by Netanyahu to undermine whatever Trump is doing – such as its bombardment of Beirut that killed 357 people on April 8, one day after the U.S. and Iran announced their own ceasefire deal.

But now all Netanyahu needs to do is to agree to the IDF respecting a ceasefire without actually respecting it, while pointing the finger at Hezbollah for supposedly breaking it. It will be a game that is hugely effective, as it will be impossible for Trump to consider Hezbollah as being honourable and the IDF as being duplicitous. Even from a PR perspective, it’s genius.

And so with this new ruse in play, much emphasis is placed on Hezbollah as it is caught between choosing to fight the IDF or accepting a peace deal that would effectively hand over huge swathes of southern Lebanon to the Lebanese army – a useless contingent of poorly trained soldiers with hand-me-down, outdated equipment donated by Western countries, and one which is no match for Hezbollah. Under this deal, Israel would establish itself south of the Litani River and have legal authority to strike Beirut (its goal is to completely reduce the southern suburb where Hezbollah supporters live, similar to Gaza).

There are no real options for Hezbollah other than to fight on, but one has to wonder if they would ultimately accept an ’order’ from Tehran to stop fighting if a deal with the U.S. could be struck. The message from its chief is that under such circumstances of being at war with Israel on Lebanon’s own turf, the Shia group has the right to play the autonomy card while happily listening to Iran’s views – but not necessarily taking them as orders. Suddenly the whole world is watching Lebanon. Suddenly Hezbollah is the most important player, and its relationship with Iran has never been more relevant, as Tehran now might need to use its might to extract a concession from its partner. Even in a fake marriage, one partner has to give in sometimes to the other’s woes or needs, and so in the coming days expect a baptism of articles by obsequious, high-brow Middle East analysts agonising over this marriage and how strong or real it is.

Trump’s February 28th assault on Iran has spawned a number of unintended consequences drenched in irony. The greatest one is that his clumsy buffoonery has probably now resulted in the Iranians getting a nuclear bomb. But a close second to that is that it has also put Iran’s relationships with its proxies under the microscope – and who knows where that’s heading.

Iran takes its chances with war

By: A A
8 June 2026 at 14:46

This phase of the Iranian conflict likely will only end when the West falls off the approaching economic cliff

Join us on TelegramTwitter, and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

The U.S. war with Iran has moved beyond its initial phase to an emerging new one — one in which Iran implicitly stakes its chances on the next phase being war. Most likely this will be in abbreviated episodes of limited war, but possessing nevertheless a potential to widen regionally, should the U.S. (and Israel) elect to sharply escalate.

The new phase involves risk of course, yet Iran holds the high cards of an ability to impose disproportionately heavier damage upon Gulf infrastructure as retaliation for any hurt inflicted upon it — and the awareness that the West is edging ever closer to dropping off the energy ‘cliff’.

The three pillars underlying this shift are firstly, confidence that Iran will not (and cannot) be shifted from its hold over Hormuz, and that in consolidating its administrative structures there, the reality of Iran’s hold over Hormuz will increasingly be assimilated by states, and reflected in their coming to terms with Iranian-Omani control.

Associated with this core principle is Iran’s implementation of escalated deterrence vis á vis the American naval blockade. Any attempt to intercept or attack Iranian vessels or interfere with the Strait’s administration will be met with increasingly harsher ripostes. Ultimately this policy may lead to Iran imposing increasing levels of damage to U.S. naval vessels – another friction point.

On 3 June, for example, the U.S. fired a hellfire missile at an Iranian oil tanker near the Strait of Hormuz. In response, a U.S.-owned (or partly-owned) ship, The Panaya, was struck with missiles. Additionally Iran launched three waves of cruise missiles at the U.S. air and helicopter base in Kuwait from where the attack had originated. Images have emerged of serious damage at Kuwait international airport too (although the cause of the damage remains disputed).

The second underlying principle affecting this shift simply reflects Iranian disdain for Trump’s continuous inflating of demands, exaggerated threats (which palpably fall short of U.S. capacities), together with his continual zigzagging and contemptuous rhetoric towards Iran.

The Iranian leadership has concluded, it seems, that compromise will likely not be forthcoming, and that it is better to cut the ‘negotiations’ rather “than continue the pointless bad-faith negotiations with a deceitful and decrepit American regime”, as the New York Times has termed the Iran ‘negotiations’ — suggesting that the ‘deal chaos’ is not a singular glitch by Trump confined to the Iran issue, but rather is a consistent pattern of dysfunctionality repeating itself across virtually all of Trump’s ‘peace’ initiatives.

Behind Iran’s decision to suspend talks however, likely lies the gradually dawning clarity, seeping out from Israeli and American statements and analysis, that the true objective of the 28 February U.S.-Israeli sneak attack was never regime change per se — aiming to swap out Iranian ‘hardliners’ for a ‘Delcy Rodrigues’-style more moderate leader; but was intended rather, to bring about Iran’s complete destruction and fracturing — an insight that was bound to shift Iran’s calculus.

This insight has consolidated public support for the Islamic Republic hugely, and at the same time has turned the war into an existential struggle to preserve the ethical values of the Revolution. Seen from this optic, there is little for Iran to discuss with Trump, bar some future modus vivendi — as and when, Washington understands that it is boxed in, and that new realism takes a hold.

The third principle undergirding this new phase of conflict is the one enunciated by Iran from the outset of the Islamabad talks: ‘Ceasefire for all; or ceasefire for no one’. This was again re-emphasised in Iran’s latest ultimatum to Trump: ‘If the Israeli threats from last week to flatten the Beirut southern suburb of Dahiyeh had been executed, then Iran would have stricken northern Israel hard with its missiles. ‘It was a ceasefire for all – or no ceasefire’.

Trump chose the ceasefire, and subsequent to his call with Netanyahu, announced that it was in effect. He told Netanyahu to cancel his planned bombing of Dahiyeh in south Beirut. In Israel, a massive wave of anger from all sides of the political spectrum attacked Netanyahu at the very notion of curbing any Israeli attacks in Lebanon. Former PM Naftali Bennett accused Netanyahu of ‘losing control over Israeli sovereignty’. And former PM Yair Lapid said Israel had been reduced to a “vassal state” after the strikes were called off.

The U.S. and Israel for some months have been attempting to bring a segment of leaders in Lebanon to accept the task of disarming Hizbullah, as Rubio explained, “so Israel doesn’t have to do it” — something Lebanese leaders clearly cannot do.

Israel has no coherent Lebanon strategy. Former senior Israeli military intelligence officer, Danny Citrinowicz, outlines a new strategic “Iranian achievement”:

“Tehran has effectively succeeded in linking the Lebanese front to the broader Iranian-Israeli arena. Any escalation in Lebanon is now increasingly viewed through the prism of the U.S.-Iran dynamic”.

Nevertheless, he observes:

“The situation in Lebanon remains highly unstable. Israel and Hezbollah continue to interpret the current understandings in fundamentally different ways. [Whilst] Israel maintains that it retains freedom of action across Lebanon except Beirut, Hezbollah [on the other hand] insists that any Israeli military activity – at all – violates the ceasefire framework. These competing interpretations create significant potential for renewed friction and escalation on the ground”.

In Israel, the situation in northern towns remains neuralgic for nearly all Israelis. Many towns along the Lebanon border and down into the Galilee are half-empty — “entire swaths of land abandoned by [the] government”, writes Ben Caspit. Local politicians claim that they ‘are Israelis too’ and that the government must respond.

Lebanon is certain to remain a point of contention. It is not a matter of if, but when, the next crisis will strike. Israel will not let the matter stand — even Liberal opposition leaders demand Hizbullah’s destruction and protest Trump’s tying of Netanyahu’s hands in Lebanon.

Iran will not let matters stand either. Mediators have informed the Americans that Iran considers an end to the war on Lebanon, withdrawal of Israeli forces, and a withdrawal from Hormuz, to be binding conditions — before discussing other issues.

So, here we are. The military skirmishes — effectively an abbreviated series of strikes by U.S. forces on Iranian shipping and Strait infrastructure, arising from Trump’s desire to assert its naval blockade to U.S. public opinion — continue. This situation is clearly flammable – just as is the Lebanon context.

Iran effectively is acknowledging the reality that in this new phase — with so many inherent flash points to it — American military escalation at some point likely will become a political necessity for Trump’s domestic and Jewish financers’ needs.

And the negotiations? They will go nowhere so long as Israel and the U.S. Jewish billionaire donors reject any Iran outcome that leaves Iran both intact and stronger and — pari passu in this binary thinking — the ‘Israel First’ project within the U.S. and the region correspondingly weakened.

A deal that doesn’t see Iran irretrievably weakened will be condemned by these latter forces as a ‘treasonous dereliction’ by Trump. He will be attacked mercilessly. Yet, he must see that Iran is anyway on the cusp of throwing off the U.S. shackles.

This phase of the Iranian conflict likely will only end when the West falls off the approaching economic cliff …

‘Narcoterrorism’ and the possibility of U.S. interference in Brazil

By: A A
7 June 2026 at 21:26

The reality is that this is not, in Brazil, a dispute between an anti-U.S. political camp and a pro-U.S. political camp, but a dispute between two political sectors that both want U.S. support to govern Brazil.

Join us on TelegramTwitter, and VK.

Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su

On June 5, 2026, the U.S. State Department confirmed the inclusion of Brazil’s two largest drug trafficking organizations – Comando Vermelho (CV) and Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) – on the list of organizations considered terrorist by the U.S.. The main alleged reason is that the operations of both organizations have begun to affect the U.S. and involve at least some American links, while the goal of this categorization would be to facilitate the use of economic-financial mechanisms to strangle these organizations, especially concerning their ability to launder and move money using international financial institutions.

Officially, with this measure, all U.S. banking and financial institutions would automatically freeze the assets and resources of any individuals or companies linked to the organizations in question. Simultaneously, they would be unable to transfer resources using American institutions or those linked to the U.S.. Furthermore, the U.S. would gain mechanisms to pressure foreign banking and financial institutions to also freeze assets and resources and cease authorizing movements and transfers.

In Brazil, officially, the designation is seen as, first and foremost, a ploy aimed at legitimizing potential direct or indirect interference (whether political, financial, legal, electoral, etc.) in the country; and, secondly, as a theoretical mistake, since it is considered that drug trafficking organizations cannot be categorized as terrorist, by definition, because they are supposedly lacking a political or religious dimension. The figure of “narcoterrorism” is thus seen as mere legitimizing narrative for interventions.

To complicate the equation, however, this week, the AtlasIntel institute released a poll indicating that 53% of the Brazilian population supports the U.S. decision, a share even higher than that of Bolsonaro supporters (41.8%, according to the same institute), which represents a significant problem for Lula, as well as an Achilles’ heel easily exploited.

Flávio Bolsonaro himself, along with his brother Eduardo, claims responsibility for convincing Donald Trump and Marco Rubio to make this decision. If true, it is a smart move. Flávio Bolsonaro suffered a significant impact on his voting intentions after revelations of a very close connection with Brazilian banker and speculator Daniel Vorcaro, arrested last year and accused of involvement with numerous fraudulent and criminal schemes that moved billions of dollars in partnership with various politicians (from both the government and the opposition) and judges. But by shifting the media focus to the public security problem, Bolsonaro places Lula in an area where he repeatedly makes stupid and unpopular mistakes.

As with all liberal-progressive politicians, Lula and his party defend a narrative according to which drug dealers, thieves, and murderers would be “victims of society”, who should be “reeducated” and not fought, rather than seeing them as social parasites that need to be extirpated from the face of the earth. Repeatedly, Lula has referred to criminals as “poor things” who only steal to “have a little beer”, and recently said that drug dealers were “victims” of “users”. Unsurprisingly, as soon as he learned of the U.S. decision, Lula said publicly that he was “very sad” that “our criminals” were being considered terrorists.

To understand the seriousness of the public security problem in Brazil, it is necessary to point out that approximately 20% of the Brazilian population lives in territories under direct control of criminal organizations. Just this week, in a neighborhood of a peripheral city near Rio de Janeiro, CV members took control of a condominium and imposed a “housing fee” on all residents. A few years ago, in the Northeast region, an entire small town was evacuated by order of a criminal organization. Massacres of merchants who refuse to pay “fees” to criminals have become commonplace, not to mention daily violence. Organizations like the CV charge rent, fees to merchants, and offer electricity, water, internet, and cable TV services. In some cases, they are also responsible for evangelical churches. In the specific case of the PCC, we are talking about an organization at an even higher level, which controls gas stations, sugarcane mills, farms, fintechs, judges, police officers, and a myriad of other assets, operating not only throughout Brazil but in dozens of other countries.

Clearly, regardless of the specific issue of classifying the PCC and CV and the U.S. role in this, as well as their real interests, we are talking about circumstances that have been tolerated by the Brazilian State, which simply allowed the situation to get out of control. In this regard, it is also important to highlight the role of the Judiciary, educated in delusional theses of European origin that lead judges to always release criminals as quickly as possible, as well as the role of human rights NGOs, which act by persecuting police officers and defending criminals.

Now, in what ways can the U.S. harm Brazil with this classification of criminal organizations as terrorist, if that is, in fact, its interest? There are several possibilities.

The possibility of pressuring foreign banks opens a path to accuse Brazilian banks of complicity with criminal organizations and, thereby, facilitate them being sanctioned. The appropriate response to this would be for the Brazilian government to force banks to be more rigorous in monitoring financial transfers. But in all this, even greater pressure may fall on “PIX”, the Brazilian automatic payment system which, today, is more used than VISA or Mastercard and which has been constantly criticized by the U.S.. The curious thing here is that PIX was created by the Bolsonaro government itself…

Another avenue of aggression against Brazil may involve sugarcane ethanol. There is a rivalry of more than 20 years with the U.S. in this sector, since the U.S. also has a large biofuel production, but based on corn. Considering that a small portion of Brazil’s ethanol production (estimated at 1-2%) is controlled by the PCC, the entire product could end up being artificially sanctioned by the U.S., thus securing new markets for corn ethanol.

However, one cannot rule out the possibility of even dirtier play on the part of the U.S.. Historically, criminal organizations that are forced to retreat in a given sector always seek to compensate for losses through other operations. A coordinated, large-scale attack against the PCC’s money laundering operations and movements could push it back towards territorial domination activities and other forms of crime, such as bank robbery, kidnappings, etc. Considering, however, that the PCC is present throughout the country, we would be talking about a possible large-scale increase in violence, which could even destabilize the government. This could be not only a hypothesis, but the very design of this U.S. government move.

Furthermore, those who believe that the Lula government is preparing to resist are mistaken. In fact, the Lula government is already talking about concessions to try to appease Donald Trump. The reality is that this is not, in Brazil, a dispute between an anti-U.S. political camp (Lula) and a pro-U.S. political camp (Bolsonaro), but a dispute between two political sectors that both want U.S. support to govern Brazil.

Two New Studies Ask: Did the iPhone Cause Birthrates to Decline?

8 June 2026 at 10:01
Modern smartphones rolled out in 2007, the year that fertility rates began falling. Two studies say that is not a coincidence.

© Colin Clark for The New York Times

Fertility is not just dropping in the United States. The mystery is now a near-global phenomenon.
❌