By Hélène de LAUNZUN
Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su
Franco-German combat aircraft programme collapses after years of disputes, showcasing the difficulty with military cooperation within the EU.
Rumours had been circulating for many months, but it was confirmed on Monday, June 8th: France and Germany have decided to abandon the core joint fighter plane component of their joint Future Combat Aircraft System (FCAS) project. With it goes a project that symbolised ambitions for deeper military cooperation between the two countries.
The project was launched in 2017 on the initiative of French President Emmanuel Macron and then-German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Its aim was to replace, by 2040, the French Rafale and the German-Spanish Eurofighter. After months of stalled progress, Chancellor Friedrich Merz and President Macron agreed that the main industrial partners involved in the project—Dassault Aviation on the French side and Airbus Defence and Space on the German-Spanish side—were clearly unable to work together because of diverging interests.
It was one of Europe’s largest military programmes, with an estimated total cost of €100 billion. The technological ambition was highly advanced: more than just a fighter jet, the system was to integrate combat drones, connected sensors and a next-generation digital network, thereby forming what was described as a ‘combat cloud.’
Disagreements between the industrial parties have multiplied in recent months, centring on the sharing of industrial responsibilities, intellectual property, and the governance of the project. In the spring, Macron was still insisting he believed in it, but progress remained elusive.
For defence expert Jean-Dominique Merchet, the programme had in fact been “on life support” for several months, and the German decision to formalise the end merely confirmed a shared recognition of irreconcilable industry positions rather than a unilateral move. The fact that the announcement came from Berlin—without a joint statement from partner countries France and Spain—confirms the major political setback for Macron, who has been the project’s main champion since its launch in 2017. According to Merchet, the announcement definitively confirms the now insurmountable disagreements between Dassault Aviation and Airbus over the development of the fighter plane intended to form the core of the programme. The analyst is now questioning the future of the other components of the FCAS, notably the combat cloud, the engines, and the support drones. This failure could undermine another major Franco-German project, the future European battle tank, which is itself already facing numerous difficulties.
Similar frictions have affected other joint efforts in recent years. In some cases, one side has withdrawn or scaled back its commitment—as in the case of the Tiger helicopter, where Germany backed out, or the Eurodrone, where France is currently discussing exit terms; in others, like the MAWS maritime patrol programme and the CIFS future artillery system, it’s due to delays, differing priorities, and mutual strain.
For both countries, the failure tests their ability to advance next-generation capabilities.
For France, the failure of the FCAS will test the national defence industry’s ability to bounce back. France must now consider the possibility of a new-generation programme that it would lead alone or in cooperation with other potential partners such as Sweden, Italy, India or the United Arab Emirates. Germany is expected to consider options including additional F-35 acquisitions or interest in alternative collaborative frameworks.
The failure of the FCAS is highly symbolic at a time when, under American pressure, Europe was seeking to assert its strategic autonomy. The programme, which symbolised Europe’s ability to carry out its major armaments projects autonomously in the face of the United States and China, illustrates above all the persistent difficulties European states face in effectively coordinating their industrial, strategic, and national interests.
Original article: europeanconservative.com
Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su
The recent developments in the Middle East indicate that the dynamics of the regional conflict are entering a new phase. Although the ceasefire reached in recent months has reduced the intensity of direct confrontations, recent events demonstrate that the structural factors fueling the war remain in place. The exchange of attacks between Iran and Israel reveals not only the fragility of existing agreements but also an important shift in Tehran’s strategic posture.
For years, Iranian military policy was characterized primarily by responses to actions it considered hostile. Since 2024, every case of direct confrontation between Iran and Israel occurred with an Iranian response to a previous Israeli attack. However, the events of the past weekend suggest a significant change in this behavior. By launching an offensive against Israeli targets following military operations conducted in Lebanon, Iran demonstrated a willingness to act before additional threats materialize, presenting its actions as part of the right to collective self-defense, expressed through the protection of regional partners.
The Iranian justification is based on the interpretation that Israeli attacks on Lebanese territory constitute violations of previously established understandings. According to this view, the continuation of military operations in urban areas and the expansion of actions against different regions of Lebanon create a scenario that legitimizes a proportional response. In addition, Tehran also links its reaction to incidents involving what it describes as American piracy on strategic maritime routes.
The most significant aspect of this escalation lies not merely in the launching of missiles or drones, but in the political message it conveys. Iran appears to be signaling that it no longer intends to limit its actions to the direct defense of its own territory. Instead, it is showing a willingness to respond to military operations targeting actors considered part of its regional alliance network. This represents a shift with the potential to profoundly alter the strategic calculations of all parties involved.
At the same time, the international response highlights the difficulties faced by powers attempting to manage the crisis. Fears of an uncontrolled expansion of the conflict come at a particularly sensitive moment for the global economy. Military tensions in one of the world’s most important regions for energy production and transportation tend to generate immediate impacts on financial markets, logistics chains, and investor expectations.
Israel’s response to the Iranian attacks, followed by further military actions by Tehran and the involvement of regional allies, demonstrates that the cycle of retaliation remains active. The involvement of Yemen, which has moved to restrict access to the Red Sea for vessels linked to Israel, adds an additional factor of insecurity for the Zionist regime, creating a supporting front for Iran.
In light of this scenario, it becomes evident that the current ceasefire has significant limitations. Although it has temporarily reduced the level of violence, it has not resolved the principal elements sustaining regional rivalry. Issues related to the American military presence and Israeli territorial expansionism remain unresolved, prolonging the atmosphere of tension.
However, perhaps the main consequence of recent events is the emergence of a new strategic precedent. By demonstrating a willingness to respond to actions carried out against third parties, Iran is establishing a broader deterrence logic than previously observed. This means that future military operations conducted by Israel or the United States against Tehran’s partners could trigger direct responses, even when Iranian territory itself is not the immediate target.
Just as Iran is now responding to Israeli attacks against Lebanon, in the future such retaliatory measures could be launched to punish Tel Aviv for its actions in Gaza, Iraq, Yemen, and other countries in the region. In practical terms, this means that the regional balance of power has changed substantially: Iran is now making it clear to Israel that its actions will not go unanswered.
Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su
Russia’s flagship international business summit in St Petersburg was targeted with Ukrainian drones that used Estonian territorial waters to evade Russian air defenses. Other Baltic states are also implicated in carrying out the large-scale attack last week.
According to the well-informed Borzikkman channel, scores of kamikaze drones were launched from ships in the Baltic Sea. They flew at low altitude over Estonian territorial waters before striking St Petersburg. The flight path was designed to take Russian defenses by surprise.
Most of the drones were shot down by Russian defenses, but a few managed to hit their targets. The biggest hit was on the St Petersburg oil terminal. That had the desired propaganda effect of creating a pall of black smoke visible to delegates on the opening day, June 3, of the St Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF).
Western media outlets like the BBC were delighted to report on the embarrassing vista in the skies over Russia’s second city and a forum that President Putin would address.
The BBC’s Steve Rosenberg was positively gleeful, writing: “The abiding image of SPIEF 2026 will be the huge plume of thick black smoke which dominated the St Petersburg skyline on Wednesday… All the delegates saw the smoke as they arrived at the expo centre on the edge of the city.”
Drones from ships in the Baltic Sea with flights through Estonian territorial waters means that NATO states were involved in the execution of the air strikes. On the same day, NATO chief Mark Rutte was in Kiev on an unannounced visit to meet the Ukrainian leader, Vladimir Zelensky.
The level of NATO participation in waging war on Russia with its Ukrainian proxy has become absurdly obvious. In recent weeks, hundreds of Ukrainian drones have crashed in Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, and Romania. The Kiev regime has repeatedly apologized to European capitals for the infringements that have resulted in injuries to civilians. Still, the European Union and NATO take no action to sanction or reprimand Kiev. They indulge in the claims that the drones are being redirected by Russian electronic jamming. Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson has even urged that NATO states should help Ukraine in targeting Russia to avoid “misakes”.
The duplicity is contemptible. Russian military intelligence has pinpointed drone manufacturing sites in the Baltic states and other NATO nations that are participating in Ukrainian attacks.
Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia’s National Security Council, commented: “The Russian Defence Ministry’s statement should be understood extremely literally: the publication of production sites for drones and other military equipment in Europe is a register of potential legitimate targets for the Russian armed forces.”
Evidently, the NATO states are providing targeting data and permitting the use of their territory to maximize the attacks on Russia. Hundreds of Russian civilians have been killed in these NATO-assisted drone operations, the most dreadful being the murder of 21 students at a college dormitory in Starobelsk, Lugansk, on May 22. Last week, on the same day as the drone attack on St Petersburg, eight civilians were killed, and 10 were injured when their bus was blown up in an air strike while traveling through the Donetsk region towards Crimea.
Anger across Russia is growing, analyst Stas Krapivnik told Danny Haiphong’s channel. Russia has retaliated with heavy strikes on military sites and decision-making centers across Ukraine. But, as Krapivnik points out, Moscow is under pressure to take action against NATO culprits from where the Ukrainian offensives are stemming. He says that Russia should do like Iran is doing, hitting back hard where it hurts.
Since the U.S. and Israel launched their aggression against Iran 100 days ago, on February 28, the Iranians have destroyed dozens of American installations across the Persian Gulf and Israeli bases with their formidable arsenal of hypersonic and ballistic missiles, as well as drones.
When Israel violated a shaky truce by bombing Beirut’s southern district of Dahiyeh at the weekend, Iran struck back immediately, as it had warned it would do, to hit airbases in Israel and a U.S. base in Saudi Arabia.
Iran’s defiance has put manners on Washington. Israel is a slow learner, but it will come round to realizing that Iran is not going to take any aggression lying down. It’s hitting back hard and fast in the places that hurt. The days of U.S. and Israeli aggression with impunity are over.
The other thing is that Tehran has called Trump’s bluff about his “madman threats” to escalate the war and obliterate Iran. The Iranians have demonstrated to Washington and the Israelis that the aggressors have much more to lose if they persist in their belligerence.
Russia might want to take note, as Krapivnik, Borzikkman, Sergey Karaganov, and other analysts have advised. The EU and NATO are acting with impunity and a delusional sense that they can escalate attacks on Russia, killing civilians and damaging Russia’s economy, all because of some cynical charade that Ukraine is alone in carrying out the attacks.
Of course, the risk is that if Russian hypersonics were to take out a NATO drone-launching ship in the Baltic Sea, then that would trigger the U.S.-led military alliance’s joint defense commitments. In that case, we are potentially in a situation of World War Three.
But hold on a moment. Are we not already in that situation, given that, despite the charade, NATO states are directly involved in attacking Russia, its capital, Moscow, and St Petersburg, and killing hundreds of civilians?
The NATO and EU leaders are so imbued with Russophobia and arrogance that they are beyond rational thinking. The only language they understand is direct threat and force. Unless they pay a price, the deranged Russophobic leaders will keep escalating as they are doing.
Iran has shown a viable self-defense policy. The enemy is hit hard for daring to aggress against the Iranian people.
A kick in the Baltics might be what it takes to concentrate Russophobic minds. Before it’s too late.
© Daniel Berehulak/The New York Times
© Ronen Zvulun/Reuters
Ferdinando BOERO
Ho fatto un sogno rivelatore, mi sono svegliato e ho scritto questo neologismo. Una parola volutamente sgraziata, che rende evidente la deformazione del benessere in qualcosa d’altro
Molte parole inglesi sono diventate italiane. Nessuno si preoccupa di sostituire computer, weekend, marketing, smartphone o welfare con equivalenti italiani. Sono parole che, a un certo punto, hanno smesso di apparire straniere. Anche welfare è ormai una parola italiana. Eppure la traduzione esiste: significa benessere, oppure stato sociale. Deriva da well-fare, “andare bene”, prosperare, vivere bene, in condizioni favorevoli. Da qualche tempo si sta affermando un’altra parola inglese: warfare. E si parla apertamente del passaggio dal welfare state al warfare state. Un cambiamento politico, economico e culturale in via di programmazione.
Le parole conducono messaggi e modellano la percezione della realtà. Il New Green Deal europeo proponeva una transizione ecologica fondata su investimenti pubblici, innovazione, protezione ambientale e sociale, trasformazione energetica. Un’idea di futuro legata al welfare. Oggi, invece, il linguaggio dominante è sempre più quello della sicurezza, della deterrenza, della preparazione strategica e del riarmo. Il programma inizialmente chiamato ReArm Europe, però, è stato ribattezzato Readiness 2030. L’obiettivo non cambia: aumento delle spese militari, rafforzamento dell’industria bellica, mobilitazione di centinaia di miliardi di euro per prepararsi a possibili conflitti. Ma il messaggio cambia eccome. “Riarmare l’Europa” suona aggressivo. “Prontezza 2030” sembra prudente, responsabile, quasi rassicurante. È il potere delle parole. “Preparazione” attenua ciò che “riarmo” rende evidente. Le parole inglesi, inoltre, hanno spesso un effetto anestetico: suonano tecniche, neutre. Warfare state suona quasi come una formula da think tank. “Società organizzata attorno alla guerra” suonerebbe molto più inquietante.
Scrivendo del passaggio da welfare a warfare, nel mio libro Le piume di Darwin, sentivo la necessità di rendere evidente il significato di quella transizione, e una notte ho sognato la parola. In sogno elaboriamo quel che pensiamo durante la veglia. Ho un taccuino accanto al letto e quando ho fatto il sogno rivelatore mi sono svegliato e ho scritto il neologismo: guerressere.
Una parola volutamente sgraziata, quasi fastidiosa, perché deve rompere la neutralizzazione linguistica. Deve rendere evidente la deformazione del benessere in qualcosa d’altro. Basta cambiare poche lettere: da well a war. Dal benessere al guerressere. Dal bene di benessere alla guerra di guerressere. Si può essere favorevoli al warfare senza comprenderne davvero il significato. Ma chi direbbe apertamente di essere favorevole alla guerra? Chi direbbe: voglio che la mia società si organizzi preventivamente attorno al conflitto permanente? Eppure è questo che sta accadendo. I politici lo hanno capito quando hanno cambiato Rearm in Readiness.
Gli Stati Uniti non sono mai stati un welfare state di tipo europeo. Non esiste una sanità pubblica universale. L’istruzione universitaria ha costi proibitivi per gran parte della popolazione. I senzatetto sono una componente strutturale delle città americane. In compenso gli Stati Uniti investono enormi risorse nella difesa, nell’apparato militare e nell’industria della sicurezza. Sono, in questo senso, un warfare state. Dopo aver conosciuto sulla propria pelle le devastazioni della guerra, l’ Unione Europea aveva costruito sistemi sanitari pubblici, istruzione accessibile, protezione sociale, diritti del lavoro. Il benessere collettivo era l’infrastruttura della stabilità politica. Ora vogliamo diventare altro.
E il cambiamento avviene anche attraverso il linguaggio. Le parole non descrivono soltanto la realtà: contribuiscono a costruirla. Se dici Readiness 2030 stai già rendendo più accettabile ciò che ReArm Europe rendeva troppo evidente. Se dici warfare invece di guerra, attenui il significato del termine. E quindi ecco una parola nuova, persino sgradevole, per capire meglio cosa stiamo programmando. Guerressere. Non è accattivante, come petaloso, nasce per essere disturbante.
La società progressivamente si organizza mentalmente, economicamente e culturalmente attorno all’idea permanente del conflitto. Una società che sposta risorse dalla salute, dall’istruzione, dalla ricerca, dagli ecosistemi, verso la sicurezza e la preparazione militare. Come se gli arsenali potessero proteggerci dal collasso climatico, dalla degradazione degli ecosistemi, dalla perdita delle condizioni biofisiche che rendono possibile il benessere stesso. Il Green Deal riconosceva che non può esistere welfare senza gli ecosistemi che lo rendono possibile.
Nel welfare il cittadino è qualcuno da proteggere. Nel guerressere è qualcuno da mobilitare; è inquietante che il passaggio dal welfare, dal benessere, al guerressere sia presentato come inevitabile, quasi naturale. Non lo è. È una scelta politica, economica e culturale gigantesca. E le parole che scegliamo servono anche a decidere se vogliamo davvero accorgercene. Nel Green Deal il nemico da battere erano sistemi produttivi che minano le nostre prospettive di benessere, e l’Unione Europea si metteva all’avanguardia in questa decisione di responsabilità, spronando tutta l’umanità a contribuire. Col passaggio al guerressere i nemici sono gli “altri” e la soluzione è armarci fino ai denti. Siamo sicuri che sia questo quello che vogliamo?
Articolo originale ilfattoquotidiano.it
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