Ukraine confirms strike on Crimea's Armiansk bridge that hit 50 Russian military vehicles




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Ukrainian drones struck four vehicular bridges at Crimea's northwestern entrance overnight on 11 June 2026, quisling official Vladimir Saldo claimed. The strikes are part of Ukraine's most recent mid-range strike push—now at its fourth day—reaching every road corridor between Crimea and mainland Ukraine. The same night, drone attacks also rolled across Sevastopol, Bakhchysarai, Saky, and other Crimean sites.
Saldo, the Russian-installed head of occupied Kherson Oblast, named the four targets on his Telegram. They include the automobile bridge in the Perekop-Armiansk area and a bridge near Stavky, Kherson Oblast. Two more bridges near Myrne and Preobrazhenka span the North Crimean Canal. Saldo stated all four spans sustained damage.

Ukraine struck the Chonhar bridge on 7 and 9 June, closing Russia's main road link to occupied Crimea, yet the Russians reportedly installed a pontoon bridge next to the severely damaged crossing. On 10 June, Ukrainian drones hit the bridge from Henichesk to Arabat Spit. With both routes fully or partially shut, Russia had rerouted traffic through Armiansk and Perekop — the very corridor struck overnight. DeepState analysts noted that Ukrainian strikes on the bridges are an important part of the blockade of occupied southern Ukraine.

Russia's occupation governor, Mikhail Razvozhayev, claimed 32 drones were shot down over Sevastopol between 22:00 and midnight. He claimed the drones fell near Sevastopol Bay, Cape Fiolent, and Balaklava. The city declared two air alerts during the night and the morning.
Monitoring Telegram channel Krymsky Veter reported machine-gun fire in Pishchane at 21:40 and in Andriivka shortly after, citing subscribers.
"At 21:40 a machine gun started firing in Pishchane, at 21:48 a machine gun started in Andriivka, after which an anti-aircraft gun fired a couple of bursts," the channel wrote.
Detonations followed near Cape Fiolent, in Sevastopol, and later in Bakhchysarai. By morning, Krymsky Veter reported explosions and shooting in Saky.
Russia's Defense Ministry claimed the destruction of 330 drones over Russia and the occupied territories in the same overnight period.
The First Assault Brigade shared the footage of the strikes:
Videos emerged of some of the Ukrainian strikes on bridges linking occupied Crimea to occupied Kherson Oblast
— Euromaidan Press (@EuromaidanPress) June 11, 2026
Ukraine's 1st Assault Brigade, 475th Assault Regiment, and SBU's Alfa reportedly took part.1st Assault Brigade
More on the strikes: https://t.co/xkKf15akux https://t.co/7FhAOJbWl0 pic.twitter.com/WFXUcKjfWm
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Ukrainian drones struck the Afipsky oil refinery in Russia's Krasnodar Krai overnight on 11 June, sparking a fire later extinguished, according to the Krasnodar Krai operational headquarters. The southern Russian plant, repeatedly targeted by Ukrainian strikes, supplies fuel to the Russian military.
The Ukrainian Telegram channel Exilenova+ posted footage from local witnesses showing air defense fire and a blaze. The attack started after midnight, with residents reporting drone overflights and explosions at intervals of a few minutes.
Krasnodar Krai authorities claimed drone "debris" fell in the village of Afipsky and set the refinery on fire — Moscow's standard framing for Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy targets. The fire was out by 07:32 Moscow time, the operational headquarters later stated. Russian authorities reported no casualties at the plant itself.
The plant runs two primary oil distillation units with capacities of 9,786 and 8,829 tons per day. It is export-oriented and does not currently produce gasoline or diesel for Russia's domestic market. Combined throughput at the Afipsky plant and the affiliated Krasnodar refinery reached 7.2 million tons in 2024. Another 3 million tons were processed in the first half of 2025.

Russia's Defense Ministry claimed its air defenses intercepted and destroyed 330 Ukrainian drones over Russian territory overnight, the Moscow Times reported. According to the ministry, drones were spotted over Bryansk, Kursk, Belgorod, Oryol, Smolensk, Kaluga, Tula, Tver, Vladimir, and Moscow oblasts, as well as Krasnodar Krai and occupied Crimea. Russian aviation regulator Rosaviatsia restricted operations at airports in Tambov, Krasnodar, Sochi, Gelendzhik, and Zhukovsky outside Moscow.

The 11 June raid was the third attack on the Afipsky refinery this year, following hits on 21 January and 14 March. During the March hit, drones damaged the AT-22/4 primary oil processing unit at Afipsky — the plant's refining starting point. Satellite imagery had previously confirmed structural damage from a November 2025 drone attack.

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Russian logisticians are desperately scrambling to save their truck convoys from Ukrainian drones. Besides rerouting convoys away from the most vulnerable highways, some commanders are also deploying mobile gun teams to escort the cargo trucks.
Whether those gun teams can shoot down enough drones to turn the tide of the escalating logistics war remains to be seen. How high the drones fly before they strike could make all the difference.
This spring, Ukrainian drone units launched an intensive campaign of strikes targeting the thousands of Russian trucks that, every day, shuttle supplies and reinforcements from depots deep in the rear area to front-line field armies. The aim: to weaken Russian regiments before they can launch an assault across the gray zone.
"We are launching a 'logistics lockdown' for the Russian army," Ukrainian defense minister Mykhailo Fedorov announced. "We are scaling middle-strike operations to systematically destroy enemy logistics and supply lines, stripping them of their capacity to mount offensive actions."
The counterlogistics campaign, mostly carried out by Ukrainian drone units flying jam-resistant middle-strike drones with AI-assisted targeting—the $5,000 Swift Beat Hornet is one of the most common—initially targeted convoys traveling along the most obvious routes, including the west-to-east M-14 highway connecting southern Russia to occupied Crimea. The M-14 is the Ukrainian portion of the wider European E-58 highway.
By late May, the Ukrainian defense ministry was tallying hits on nearly 500 Russian trucks every day, a ninefold increase on the overall average of daily truck strikes since Russia widened its war on Ukraine in February 2022. Just 3,500 Russian cargo trucks plied the M-14 every day, so the losses were significant. For now, the Kremlin is able to make good its truck losses by redeploying vehicles from the active fleet.
But soon, it may have to tap the tens of thousands of older trucks sitting in long-term storage. And those decades-old trucks are in pretty bad shape. "Most of them are scrap metal husk, utterly impossible to reactivate," analyst Jompy noted.

Clearly realizing they can't sustain the loss of 500 trucks a day, Russian commanders are getting creative. They've begun rerouting trucks away from the M-14 and sending them along back roads instead in order to spread them out and complicate the Ukrainians' drone sortie planning. Military traffic along the M-14 has dropped by 71% since late May as trucks follow alternate routes to forward bases, according to Robert Brovdi, commander of the Ukrainian Unmanned Systems Forces.

But the Russians are also arming the truck convoys, which previously traveled without any defensive weapons. Observer Kim Hovik claimed they recently saw videos depicting Russian convoys that included as many as four trucks and utility vehicles carrying gunners.
Guns aren't the best defenses against drones, but the Russians don't have many other options. Electronic warfare systems that scramble drones' control signals don't work against drones with self-contained AI targeting systems that can spot and home in on trucks without any input from a remote operation.
And Russia's longer-range air defense systems, its fixed and mobile surface-to-air missile systems, have been ravaged by a parallel Ukrainian drone campaign specifically targeting air defenses. Between June 2025 and March 2026, Ukrainian drones blew up more than 400 radars and SAM systems: far more than Russia can replace in just nine months.
How well the gunners work against Hornets and other Ukrainian drones might depend on how high the drones fly while patrolling for trucks. Ukraine's own mobile gun teams were effective against Russian Shahed drones until the Shaheds began flying thousands of feet in the air. Now the Ukrainian gunners are "largely ineffective," according to a Ukrainian electronic warfare officer who goes by "Alchemist."
It's unclear how high a Hornet drone can cruise while still effectively scanning for trucks. Higher flights might be necessary, however. Ukrainian drone forces must adapt to Russian adaptation as the counterlogistics drone war grinds on.
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One-way attack drones from Ukraine's Unmanned Systems Forces struck five Russian cargo ships on the Sea of Azov on 5 June.
The strikes, which left at least one ship a burned-out hulk, are a kind of corollary to Ukraine's escalating campaign of middle-distance strikes on Russian supply lines on land in occupied territories. Aiming to weaken Russian regiments before they can attack across the disputed gray zone, Kyiv's drone units aren't only hitting trucks and vans on land—they're also hitting ships at sea.
"There's a method to the madness here," Ukraine Control Map explained. "Take out the ships, force Russia to use more trucks, more logistic bottlenecks." Then hammer the bottlenecks with drones.
The ultimate goal is to make it more difficult for the Kremlin to resupply and reinforce its 700,000 troops in occupied Ukraine. It's cheaper and easier to defeat an attack before it even begins by starving the attacking troops of food, fuel, batteries, ammunition and other vital supplies.
The ships the USF hit with Fire Point FP-1 drones on 5 June were spread out across a wide area. They were in occupied Mariupol and Berdiansk and along the coast of occupied Ukraine — the same Berdiansk port where Ukrainian drones struck a Russian munitions cargo ship on consecutive nights at the start of June.
What they had in common was their disguise. Civilian-owned but allegedly illegally working on behalf of sanctioned Russian entities, the ships sail without obvious markings or easily tracked radio transponders. There could be scores of such ships plying the Black Sea on Russia's behalf every day.
Two of the ships hit on 5 June, the dry cargo vessels Natra and Zirkon, were inbound from Türkiye to Rostov-on-Don when Ukrainian drones struck them in Taganrog Bay—empty, heading to load grain at a port Western governments and Ukraine identify as a transit hub for grain looted from occupied Ukrainian territory. Five Azerbaijani crew members on private contracts were killed and three wounded, Azerbaijan's foreign ministry said. Brovdi didn't address the deaths.
Telling apart a ship hauling Russian military fuel from a ship empty and heading to pick up looted grain is the kind of distinction that's hard to make from a drone's-eye view.
Ships that can haul thousands of tons of supplies every trip are much more efficient than trucks that can haul just a few tons apiece. Cargo ships can't deliver supplies to inland forces, of course, but they can move cargo between ports in southern Russia and ports in occupied Ukraine, bringing that cargo as close as possible to the gray zone before trucks must take over the shipping effort.

A thick-skinned ship is a tougher target than a thin-skinned truck, of course. But Ukraine's FP-1 drones carry a 100-kg blast-fragmentation warhead, with a TNT main charge boosted by the more powerful OKFOL explosive. The combination throws fragments outward and starts fires inside the target—the same mechanism that left the corvette Boikiy burning for hours at Kronstadt on 3 June.
— Special Kherson Cat
The destroyed cargo ship CIRCON (IMO 8887519), targeted by Ukraine’s Unmanned Systems Forces in the Sea of Azov several days ago. https://t.co/0Xpc3K9XXf pic.twitter.com/KI1PCzsjKf
(@bayraktar_1love) June 8, 2026
Russia's thousands of military supply trucks are already squarely in the crosshairs of Ukrainian drone units. Since launching their coordinated counterlogistics campaign this spring, the Ukrainians have increased their monthly truck strikes nearly tenfold, from around 60 per month to nearly 500, as per the Ukrainian general staff.
But a comprehensive assault on Russian logistics requires raids on sea traffic, as well. That effort may have begun in earnest on 5 June. "Cargo ships and tankers with their names painted over by Black Sea looters and their transponders switched off, used for the quiet theft of Ukrainian grain and the transport of military cargo and fuel, can no longer count on either long service lives or uninterrupted schedules," the 414th Unmanned Strike Aviation Brigade crowed.
If they can disable enough ships, the Ukrainian drone teams may compel Russian logisticians to shift more supplies by land. To reach Russian regiments in southern and eastern Ukraine, those supplies normally travel east to west along the M-14 highway that runs close and parallel to the Black Sea coast.
That highway and connecting roads have become a kill zone for Russian trucks as more FP-1, FP-2, Hornet and Bulava drones take to the sky, increasingly unbothered by Russia's collapsing air defense network. Ukrainian industry now churns out tens of thousands of middle-strike drones every month, some for as cheaply as a few thousand dollars apiece.
The Russians are trying to find alternate routes that avoid the most heavily droned roads, but once a truck gets close to its destination, it has no choice but to follow a dwindling number of paths. Ukrainian intelligence knows where the Russians' main divisional bases are; they know the trucks must eventually turn into these bases. The near approaches are now becoming kill zones alongside the M-14 and other main roads.
It'll take many more strikes on Russian ships to seriously dent the sea logistics and force more supplies onto land routes. But the effort is underway. "The occupier's smuggling logistics must be stopped," the 414th Unmanned Strike Aviation Brigade explained.
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Russia has begun moving gasoline to its frontline units in occupied Ukraine in convoys of civilian cars, the Ukrainian defense outlet Militarnyi reported. Soldiers filmed themselves loading jerrycans into ordinary trunks, an improvised workaround after Ukrainian drone strikes made fuel tankers too risky to run. Russian forces are also disguising army trucks as civilian vehicles along the supply route to occupied Crimea.
A video on the Exilenova+ Telegram channel showed Russians describing a convoy of passenger cars assembled to carry one metric ton of gasoline, Militarnyi reported. A man off-camera says the cars left the city of Kizilyurt in Dagestan, Russia, on the local head's orders, with the fuel destined for Russian units in occupied Tokmak, Zaporizhzhia Oblast. The footage shows jerrycans filling the trunks:
Besides the fuel, the drivers carried 1.5 million rubles ($20,900) to buy another batch of gasoline. Fuel keeps Russian frontline positions running: generators power electronic-warfare systems, charge batteries for reconnaissance and strike drones, and run communications gear in dugouts and observation posts.
Russian forces have also begun disguising army trucks as civilian transport because of Ukrainian drone attacks deep in the rear. In northern Crimea, monitors spotted a freshly painted blue Ural truck driven by a man in civilian clothes, still carrying military plates, its oversized body posing as a dump truck.
Ukraine's Defense Forces have intensified drone strikes on logistics trucks and fuel tankers on the roads from Russia to occupied Crimea. The attacks have already forced the occupiers to limit cargo traffic through the occupied part of Kherson Oblast toward the peninsula, and Russia has closed stretches of its own land corridor to keep them clear of strike drones.

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Ukraine's drone strikes on the highways that feed Russian forces in occupied southern and eastern Ukraine are disrupting Russian logistics and will likely bite deeper in the near future, according to the Institute for the Study of War (ISW). The campaign is also rattling Russia's pro-war online community, where bloggers have begun turning their anger on the Kremlin's own military leadership. Russian forces are already rerouting and disguising convoys to keep supplies moving.
Ukraine's 3rd Army Corps said on 31 May that its drones had won "fire control" over five occupied cities. All five sit on or near the M-04 highway: Luhansk City, Starobilsk, Alchevsk, Bryanka, and Kadiivka. In plain terms, Ukrainian crews can now strike traffic on that road.

A Ukrainian drone operator argued the M-04 matters more to Russia than the better-known M-14. The M-14 links Rostov Oblast to occupied Crimea. The M-04 begins near Moscow and reaches Rostov-on-Don before carrying on to Russia's Black Sea coast and into the Caucasus. It feeds occupied Crimea, southern Ukraine, and Luhansk Oblast through the Russian towns of Millerovo and Kamensk-Shakhtinsky. It also supplies Donetsk Oblast through Novoshakhtinsk in Rostov Oblast.
The two highways connect, and Ukrainian forces are also hitting the H-20 road that joins them through Donetsk City. ISW assessed that the strikes will likely generate "even more profound cascading effects" across Russia's rear. The effort extends Ukraine's wider push to drive deep strikes further behind the front.
The strikes are already forcing changes on the ground. Leonid Pasechnik, the Russian-installed head of occupied Luhansk Oblast, issued a decree on 6 June. It bars regular bus and coach services on the section of the highway crossing occupied Luhansk.
Ukrainian Mariupol mayoral adviser Petro Andriushchenko reported on 7 June that Russian forces had changed their Mariupol–Berdiansk route. They now use local coastal roads instead of the M-14. ndriushchenko said the troops are passing army vehicles off as civilian, recoloring the tarpaulins over each cargo bed and spraying the trucks white. ISW assessed the detours will likely slow Russian supply runs as Ukraine keeps hunting vehicles.
Ukraine's strikes are landing in Russia's information space too. Russia's pro-war military bloggers are voicing discontent and panic over the campaign.
A pro-war blogger and former Storm-Z assault-unit instructor complained on 7 June that Ukraine is now striking factories and defense plants deep inside Russia while degrading Russian air-defense radars and systems. He blamed bureaucracy and state-corporate infighting for Moscow's failure to respond, and separately complained that Russia cannot read Ukraine's battlefield trends and underrates its capabilities. Other bloggers piled on: one claimed fuel shortages were stoking panic in occupied Crimea, while others faulted the Russian Defense Ministry and top general Valery Gerasimov for not striking Ukrainian logistics, especially the Dnipro River bridges.
ISW found the complaints are escalating, and that the strike campaigns are becoming "points of neuralgia" in Russia's ultranationalist crowd. It noted the discontent feeds on Russia's poor battlefield results, rising casualties, and economic strain. Even before this, Russia's war bloggers had turned on the Kremlin's commanders over inflated victory claims.

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Ukraine has built 822 kilometers of anti-drone protection along frontline logistics routes since the start of 2026 and has restored more than 170 kilometers of damaged regular roads in frontline oblasts, Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov says. In May alone, Ukraine's State Special Transport Service built 211 km of new anti-drone protection.
Russian FPVs and reconnaissance UAVs hunting Ukrainian vehicles within 15-30 km of the front have forced Ukraine to build a permanent national infrastructure for drone-protected movement on its own side.
Anti-drone protection on Ukrainian frontline roads typically takes the form of overhead netting tunnels, wire-mesh canopies, and reinforced barriers along sections of road within reach of Russian FPV drone operators.
The structures intercept FPVs before they strike vehicles, allowing supply trucks, casualty-evacuation vehicles, and personnel rotations to move along otherwise lethal stretches of road.
In May 2026, Ukraine restored 38 km of previously damaged protected segments and rebuilt 115.5 km of standard frontline roads.
The combination of new construction, maintenance, and regular road repair reflects the operational reality that Russian strikes constantly attrit the network even as Ukraine extends it.
"Each protected kilometer means safer logistics, faster supply, casualty evacuation, and safer military movement even under constant threat of drone attacks," Fedorov said.
Meanwhile, Ukraine's offensive logistics campaign has driven Russia to restrict civilian transport on its main occupied-territory highways. Russia is reportedly banning regular bus services on the R-280 "Novorossiya" route and the R-150 Belgorod-Mariupol highway after Ukrainian drones.
Ukraine, on its own side, is building physical infrastructure, such as netting, wire, and barriers, to keep its own logistics moving under the same drone pressure that Russia is failing to manage on the other side of the line.
Meanwhile, Russia has installed anti-drone nets at its facilities, such as the Velikolukskaya oil depot in Velikiye Luki, Pskov Oblast.

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Ukrainian Special Operations Forces drone operators have established aerial control over part of the Russian land supply route from occupied Melitopol to Chonhar. The path is the entry point to Crimea, and they are destroying Russian equipment and disrupting Russian military logistics on the road, the 3rd Separate Special Purpose Regiment announces.
Russian forces on the peninsula already depend on a constrained set of supply lines: the Kerch Bridge (under sustained Ukrainian threat since 2022), the rail and road corridor through occupied Donetsk Oblast, and the Melitopol-Chonhar bottleneck. Ukrainian aerial denial of any one of these links compounds pressure on the others.
The new operation puts pressure on the land corridor's western end. On 31 May, Mariupol residents reported in local group chats that Russia shut down part of its land corridor from Crimea to occupied Donetsk because of Ukrainian drones.
The Melitopol-Chonhar segment crosses flat steppe with limited cover and funnels Russian convoys through narrow bridge crossings over the Syvash to reach the peninsula, the terrain optimal for drone operators to deny the air with persistent surveillance and strike capability.
The 3rd Separate Special Purpose Regiment is one of Ukraine's veteran Special Operations Forces units, named after the tenth-century Kyivan Rus prince.
The regiment's deployment of drone operators against Russian logistics on the Melitopol-Chonhar route fits within Ukraine's broader "logistics lockdown" approach to occupied territory. Ukraine's Defense Ministry has recently committed $113 million to medium-strike drones designed to target Russian rear logistics.
"Drones of the Special Operations Forces unit are destroying equipment and breaking the enemy's logistics routes on the Melitopol-Chonhar route," the 3rd Regiment said.
Russia's military presence in Crimea depends on a continuous supply of fuel, ammunition, and food, as well as on personnel rotation.
"As a result, the already-difficult logistics for supplying the Russian army and fuel to the peninsula have grown harder," the SSO said.

