Estimados lectores, en la gran traducción del día les traemos un artículo del analista político Vali Kaleji en The Cradle.
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El Cáucaso Meridional se está convirtiendo en una prueba de fuego para ver hasta dónde puede llegar Washington en el perímetro compartido por Rusia e Irán antes de que se produzca una reacción violenta.
En vísperas de las cruciales elecciones parlamentarias de Armenia del 7 de junio, el secretario de Estado de EE. UU., Marco Rubio, durante una breve visita a Ereván el 26 de mayo, firmó tres acuerdos de gran importancia en una reunión con el ministro de Asuntos Exteriores armenio, Ararat Mirzoyan.
Entre ellos se incluían el «Acuerdo Marco entre la República de Armenia y los Estados Unidos de América sobre Cooperación Estratégica en relación con la Ruta Trump para la Paz y la Prosperidad Internacionales (TRIPP)», la «Carta sobre la Asociación Estratégica Integral entre la República de Armenia y los Estados Unidos» y el «Marco entre la República de Armenia y los Estados Unidos de América para garantizar el suministro en la extracción y el procesamiento de minerales críticos y tierras raras».
El respaldo de Washington en época de elecciones
La breve visita de Rubio, que duró solo una hora aproximadamente en el aeropuerto de Ereván, fue una clara señal del apoyo de EE. UU. al Gobierno de Nikol Pashinyan de cara a las cruciales elecciones parlamentarias de Armenia del 7 de junio.
En los últimos años, la administración de Pashinyan se ha distanciado gradualmente de la Federación Rusa y de las instituciones regionales lideradas por Moscú, incluida la Organización del Tratado de Seguridad Colectiva (OTSC) y, más recientemente, la Unión Económica Euroasiática (UEE), al tiempo que ha buscado estrechar lazos con la UE, la OTAN y los EE. UU.
En este contexto, el secretario de Estado de EE. UU., que viajó a Ereván dos semanas antes de las elecciones, expresó su firme apoyo a Pashinyan y a su equipo, afirmando: «Tú (Ararat Mirzoyan), el primer ministro y tu equipo estáis allanando el camino hacia un futuro más brillante y más independiente para Armenia».
El presidente de EE. UU., Donald Trump, también escribió en una publicación en Truth Social:
«¡El primer ministro Nikol Pashinyan, de Armenia, un gran amigo y líder, está haciendo que su país sea fuerte, próspero y muy seguro! Nikol comparte plenamente mi visión de PAZ y PROSPERIDAD para Armenia y toda la región del Cáucaso Meridional… Nikol cuenta con mi APOYO TOTAL y ABSOLUTO para su reelección el 7 de junio de 2026».
Armenia también acogió la Octava Cumbre de la Comunidad Política Europea el 23 de mayo, lo que constituyó otra muestra del apoyo occidental al Gobierno de Pashinyan.
No obstante, sigue sin estar claro si dicho apoyo se traducirá en última instancia en una victoria electoral del Partido del Contrato Civil de Pashinyan frente a sus oponentes nacionalistas y conservadores. Un ejemplo reciente es Hungría, donde la visita del vicepresidente estadounidense J.D. Vance a Budapest y su participación en un mitin electoral junto al primer ministro Viktor Orbán no lograron evitar la derrota de Orbán en las elecciones parlamentarias tras 16 años en el poder.
La Ruta de Trump toma forma
Los tres acuerdos firmados durante la visita de Rubio a Ereván —en particular el Acuerdo TRIPP— deben considerarse una continuación y un complemento del acuerdo de paz firmado por el presidente azerbaiyano Ilham Aliyev y Pashinyan en la Casa Blanca el 8 de agosto de 2025, bajo la mediación de Trump.
En virtud de dicho acuerdo, la conectividad directa entre Azerbaiyán y su República Autónoma de Najicheván a través del territorio armenio se refrendó no bajo la denominación preferida por Bakú de «Corredor de Zangezur», ni bajo el concepto preferido por Ereván de «Encrucijada de la Paz», sino bajo un nuevo título: la «Ruta Trump para la Paz y la Prosperidad Internacionales» (TRIPP), o simplemente la «Ruta Trump».
El Acuerdo TRIPP, compuesto por 11 artículos, establece el marco jurídico y operativo que rige esta ruta de tránsito. De conformidad con los artículos 1 a 4, se creará una empresa conjunta denominada TRIPP Development Company (TDC).
En virtud del acuerdo, el 74 % de las acciones y la participación mayoritaria en la empresa estarán en manos de entidades estadounidenses que operan bajo la Corporación Financiera Internacional para el Desarrollo de los Estados Unidos (DFC), mientras que Armenia conservará una participación del 26 %.
Además, en virtud del artículo 6, Armenia se compromete a conceder a la empresa conjunta derechos exclusivos de uso del suelo y desarrollo a lo largo de las zonas designadas para la ejecución del TRIPP durante un período inicial de 49 años. El acuerdo también prevé una posible prórroga de 50 años adicionales por mutuo acuerdo, en cuyo caso la participación de Armenia en la TDC aumentaría al 49 %.
Armenia se ha comprometido además a asumir todos los costes financieros asociados a la adquisición de terrenos y a la eliminación de cualquier gravamen o reclamación de terceros que afecte a las zonas del proyecto. Al mismo tiempo, el acuerdo afirma explícitamente que la República de Armenia conserva la plena soberanía, integridad territorial y jurisdicción legal y ejecutiva sobre todas las zonas y proyectos asociados al TRIPP dentro de su territorio soberano.
La aplicación de este acuerdo —al igual que el acuerdo de paz entre Armenia y Azerbaiyán y el proceso en curso de normalización entre Armenia y Turquía— dependerá en gran medida de la reelección del Partido del Contrato Civil de Pashinyan en las elecciones parlamentarias del 7 de junio. Si las fuerzas políticas nacionalistas y conservadoras de Armenia salieran victoriosas, el panorama político podría cambiar significativamente.
Fuertemente críticos con las políticas de Pashinyan respecto a Nagorno-Karabaj, estos grupos nacionalistas y conservadores mantienen posiciones de línea dura tanto hacia Azerbaiyán como hacia Turquía. Tradicionalmente han mantenido relaciones más estrechas con Irán y Rusia, al tiempo que han conservado una distancia cautelosa y cuidadosamente calibrada con respecto a Occidente.
En consecuencia, un cambio de gobierno podría tener profundas implicaciones para el futuro del proceso de paz entre Armenia y Azerbaiyán, la normalización de las relaciones entre Armenia y Turquía y la aplicación del TRIPP.
Teherán ve más que un corredor
Por lo tanto, no fue de extrañar que, en medio de la atmósfera altamente polarizada y políticamente cargada de Armenia en vísperas de las cruciales elecciones parlamentarias, la inesperada y breve visita de Rubio a Ereván fuera recibida con fuertes críticas por parte de las fuerzas de la oposición.
Los partidos de la oposición y los grupos políticos de Armenia sostienen que el proyecto a gran escala de la «Ruta Trump» es, en esencia, el mismo corredor de tránsito que Azerbaiyán lleva tanto tiempo buscando bajo el nombre de «Corredor de Zangezur» y que cuenta con el firme apoyo de Ankara.
El expresidente armenio Robert Kocharyan, líder de la influyente Alianza Armenia, expresó su profunda preocupación por las implicaciones estratégicas del acuerdo, afirmando:
«Creo que el proyecto «TRIPP» es una maniobra propagandística muy fuerte por parte de EE. UU., cuyo objetivo es crear tensión entre Irán y Armenia, porque después de eso, Teherán sin duda sentirá desconfianza… Esto también es un «golpe» para Rusia».
En Irán, el portavoz del Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores, Hamid Baghaei, también reaccionó a la visita de Rubio y a la firma del Acuerdo Trump, afirmando:
«La posición de la República Islámica de Irán con respecto a la seguridad en el Cáucaso Meridional es clara y no deja lugar a ambigüedades. Irán acoge con satisfacción la expansión de los intercambios económicos y la reapertura de las rutas de transporte y tránsito. Sin embargo, dado el largo historial de conducta hostil e intervención de Estados Unidos en diversas regiones del mundo, Irán alberga serias sospechas sobre las intenciones de Washington y ha expresado explícitamente su oposición a cualquier presencia desestabilizadora de este tipo en la región».
Aunque los funcionarios iraníes parecen haberse abstenido de adoptar una postura más explícita en esta fase —probablemente debido a su comprensión del delicado entorno electoral de Armenia y al deseo de evitar verse directamente involucrados en las rivalidades políticas internas del país—, Irán, en términos estratégicos, ve poca diferencia entre la «Ruta Trump» y el «Corredor de Zangezur» defendido por Azerbaiyán y apoyado por Turquía.
Desde la perspectiva de Teherán, ambas iniciativas persiguen objetivos que van mucho más allá del establecimiento de un mero enlace de transporte y tránsito entre el territorio continental de Azerbaiyán y Najicheván a través del territorio armenio adyacente a la frontera de Irán.
Los responsables políticos iraníes creen que tales proyectos podrían generar una serie de importantes retos de seguridady geopolíticos, incluidos riesgos potenciales para los 40 kilómetros de frontera entre Irán y Armenia, los pasos fronterizos y las instalaciones aduaneras de Norduz (Irán) y Meghri (Armenia), así como para la red bilateral de comercio y tránsito por la que pasan más de 80.000 camiones al año.
Además, no cabe duda de que la puesta en marcha de la Ruta Trump, como parte del Corredor Central más amplio y de una ruta emergente de energía y transporte que une Asia Central, el mar Caspio y el Cáucaso Meridional con Europa, aceleraría aún más la orientación hacia Occidente de Ereván.
Tal evolución podría tener consecuencias de gran alcance, incluida la eventual retirada de Armenia de la OTSC y la UEEA. El efecto acumulativo de estos acontecimientos podría ser un cambio más profundo en el equilibrio geopolítico del Cáucaso Meridional en detrimento tanto de Irán como de Rusia —un proceso que, en muchos aspectos, comenzó con la Segunda Guerra de Nagorno-Karabaj en 2020.
La guerra de 12 días entre Estados Unidos e Israel contra Irán en junio de 2025 y la más reciente guerra de 40 días en la que participaron Israel y Estados Unidos contra Irán, del 28 de febrero al 7 de abril de 2026, han agudizado la sensibilidad de Teherán hacia el proyecto de la Ruta Trump y la posible presencia de empresas estadounidenses cerca de la frontera norte de Irán.
Esta preocupación es especialmente acusada dado que, en virtud del acuerdo recientemente firmado, dicha presencia no está pensada para ser temporal. Más bien, el acuerdo prevé un periodo de concesión inicial de 49 años, con la posibilidad de una prórroga adicional de 50 años por mutuo acuerdo, lo que podría dar lugar a una duración total de 99 años.
Desde la perspectiva de Irán, esto no equivaldría simplemente a un proyecto de transporte o de infraestructura, sino al establecimiento de una huella económica y estratégica estadounidense a largo plazo en una zona geopolítica altamente sensible adyacente a sus fronteras.
Por esta razón, Kocharyan declaró durante su campaña electoral:
«Hoy en día, Estados Unidos se encuentra en un estado de confrontación con Irán. En tales circunstancias, ¿cómo puede alguien creer razonablemente que ceder el control de la sensible zona fronteriza entre Armenia e Irán a una empresa estadounidense es una decisión racional? ¿De verdad consideran que tal medida es normal y aceptable? ¿Cómo se espera que Teherán perciba y tolere tal acuerdo? Insto a las autoridades de Ereván a que se pongan, aunque sea por un momento, en la posición de Irán y vean este desafío de seguridad desde la perspectiva de Teherán».
Moscú sube la apuesta
La respuesta de Rusia hacia Armenia, sin embargo, ha sido notablemente más dura, al menos en la etapa actual. Solo unos días después de la visita de Rubio, Moscú retiró a su embajador de Ereván para consultas, citando las políticas cada vez más prooccidentales del Gobierno de Pashinyan.
En las últimas semanas, funcionarios rusos han advertido abiertamente a Armenia, especialmente en relación con la posibilidad de su retirada de la UEEA, sobre las posibles consecuencias, entre las que se incluyen el aumento de los precios del gas o la suspensión de los acuerdos energéticos preferenciales, restricciones a las importaciones de productos armenios, limitaciones al comercio de diamantes y energía, e incluso una reevaluación de ciertos ámbitos de la cooperación económica.
En esencia, a Moscú le preocupa que su participación actual en la guerra de Ucrania pueda animar a Armenia —el único Estado del Cáucaso Meridional que sigue siendo miembro tanto de la UEEA como de la OTSC— a abandonar estas instituciones lideradas por Rusia.
Dado que ni Georgia ni Azerbaiyán son miembros de ninguna de las dos organizaciones, tal desarrollo reduciría significativamente la influencia económica, geopolítica y militar de Rusia en el Cáucaso Meridional.
La aplicación del Acuerdo TRIPP y la construcción de la Ruta Trump entre Azerbaiyán y Najicheván se enfrentan a importantes obstáculos políticos y dependerán en gran medida del resultado de las elecciones parlamentarias de Armenia del 7 de junio.
Si prevalecen las fuerzas políticas nacionalistas y conservadoras de Armenia, la probabilidad de que el proyecto se suspenda o se abandone sería considerable.
Incluso si Pashinyan consigue la reelección, es probable que la puesta en marcha del proyecto provoque una fuerte oposición por parte de Irán y exponga a Armenia a posibles medidas de represalia por parte de Rusia, especialmente en los ámbitos de las exportaciones de gas natural y las restricciones a las importaciones armenias.
Publicado originalmente por The Cradle
Traducción: Geopolítica rugiente
Ukraine at war; weapons from all over the world (Flickr)
Half way through the fifth year of the war in Ukraine it is reasonable to ask why it has lasted so long. Why has Russia not crushed Ukraine quickly as expected, it is after all a much bigger country with a far greater population and industry to call on?
By Robert Harneis
It is standard for the Western Media to talk of deadlock and to say that the Russians are not advancing because their armies are incompetent, when they are not drunk or poorly equipped. At regular intervals Western media announces that the Russian side is running out of ammunition, missiles, drones, tanks or even men. In short they are not advancing in overwhelming force to capture Kiev because they are incapable of doing so. The latest fantasy in the US, UK and European media, is that the Russian economy is crumbling in the face of the problems created by the war and sanctions.
President Putin imposed severe constraints on his generals from the start. They are, to an extent, fighting with one hand tied behind their backs. Contrary to the endless claims by the Western media, the Russian forces do everything they can to avoid civilian casualties. This in borne out by their low level throughout the war. In a recent massive attack involving 1500 missiles and drones right across Ukraine, only six civilians were reported killed. It is only natural that this should be so. Russia regards Ukrainians as brother Slavs. Approximately one fifth of Russian families have close relatives in Ukraine. The brother of the Ukrainian Commander in Chief is a colonel in the Russian army. They have no interest in killing them, if it can be avoided, especially as they will have to live with them after the war.
The second restriction is the requirement to avoid heavy casualties amongst their own forces. Wars are lost on the home front when the body bags start coming home in big numbers. The constant allegations in the Western media that Russians launch human wave attacks and suffer heavy casualties doing so, are false. This desire to restrict losses is reinforced by Russia’s demographic problems. Lives are precious.
The third restriction that Putin has imposed on his generals and ministers is that the war will not stop Russian economic progress, vital for political stability. Of course it goes without saying that it is not possible to fight a major war without financial and budgetary stress. An example is the necessity of delaying the naval building program as a result of which only sixteen corvettes have been built out of the forty planned. This has made it more difficult for Russia to protect its merchant fleet and stop the current harassment of oil tankers. On the other hand the management of the economy has been a classic case of successful military Keynesianism as with the United States in World War II. Throughout the war real wages have risen and economic growth has been maintained. Unemployment is at record low levels.
There are other less obvious reasons for hastening slowly. If Moscow’s war aims are denazification and demilitarization then the longer the fighting goes on the more of the Ukrainian military is eliminated, especially the elite ultra-nationalists who are Ukraine’s most committed soldiers. The effect of the manpower attrition is obvious from the many videos appearing on social media showing Ukrainian press gangs snatching citizens from the street, often with violent resistance.
Further by keeping the fighting in the Donbass, the invading Russians have short lines of communications, whilst Kiev’s main bases are over a thousand kilometers away in Poland, with supplies at risk of constant air attack on their way to the front. Paradoxically then, the invading force has better lines of communications than the defenders in their own country.
The wish to avoid destruction is another explanation for Russian circumspection. It is obvious that the retreating Ukrainian army is indifferent to the damage it causes to the cities it loses. The greater the area of the fighting the greater the destruction that Russia will likely have to rebuild after the war. Better to ground away the Ukrainian ability to resist and if an advance into the rest of the country is needed, to wait until effective military resistance has collapsed.
However an undoubted factor in the slow Russian progress is the nature of the great Donbas urban area, which was massively fortified with NATO assistance over eight years after the 2014 coup d’état when Ukraine moved definitively into the Western camp. Whatever plans the Russian government may have for the rest of Ukraine, especially the Black Sea Coast, the source of many missile attacks on Russia, they will not wish to make any major moves until the Donbass is firmly in their hands. Two important fortified towns remain to be captured Kramatorsk and Slavyansk. Russian forces are already approaching them. It remains to be seen how long it will take to break their resistance.
We cannot know what President Putin and the Russian High Command are thinking but it is also obvious that by not committing to a major offensive Russia not only avoids casualties but retains the strategic initiative. Hundreds of thousands of Russian troops are held in reserve. Uncommitted forces are a potential threat as well as being available for defense elsewhere if needed.
The Russians will also have learnt the bitter lessons of the US army that quickly smashed its way into Afghanistan and Iraq but was unable hold the territory conquered in the face of tough local resistance. Already, at the beginning of the war in March 2022, the Washington Post published an article that assumed a quick Russian advance and talked about the planned guerilla resistance. There is every reason for Russia to move gradually and consolidate as it goes.
There is also the diplomatic aspect, which is of vital importance to Russia. Moscow views the struggle in Ukraine as part of a world confrontation. It has been clear from the start of the war that whilst the West and Kiev worry about public opinion to get support for the war, Russia is concerned about what he world’s diplomats think. Good relations with India and BRICS countries and especially China dictate moderation at all times. A shock and awe approach, whilst it might get quicker results, would have offended much international opinion and unfavorably reminded the world’s diplomats of the Soviet Union, something Putin wishes to avoid at all costs. Similarly Russia is very patient with small countries on its borders that indulge in vexatious provocations, notably the Baltic States… so far. The contrast with the brazen bullying of Venezuela, Cuba, Greenland and Iran by the United States is striking and has had an effect on world public opinion. The recent humiliation of Merz’s new militaristic Germany in the recent United Nations General Assembly vote is a striking example of the success of this softly softly approach, as is Russia’ success in expanding its influence in Africa from Mali to Madagascar.
Also on the diplomatic front, with a long war, the Black Sea remains closed to the warships of outside countries under the Montreux Convention of 1936, which governs traffic through the Dardanelles strait. The convention allows Turkey to close the straits to all warships in times of war and to permit merchant ships free passage. This suits the Russians as NATO likes to flex its muscles by bringing warships into the Black Sea in times of international tension. For four and a half years they have not been able to do this. Once the war ends, Turkey will have to let them through again. Another reason why the Russian forces have taken their time.
Every war is different and brings its surprises. The drone revolution has transformed this one. The omnipresence of drones is all the more deadly, given the absolute impossibility for both sides, of hiding concentrations of troops, thanks to satellites that see pretty much everything happening on the ground. So now advances are made by small groups of infantry that infiltrate defenses that are then taken out by artillery, drones and missiles. Slow work if casualties are to be kept to a minimum.
NATO intervention, with a huge supply of arms, finance and electronic intelligence, after sabotaging the peace talks, has increased Russian difficulties in defeating the Ukrainian army,. It is this that definitively imposed the choice of a long slow war of attrition on the Russians – a war that Russia is clearly winning. Not only have Ukraine’s forces been degraded in this process but NATO’s as well. One reason the United States has reduced arms supplies to Kiev is that they are running short. This became very obvious when Washington’s priority turned to the defense of Israel. The Pentagon has had to search the globe, asking allies as far apart as South Korea and Germany to hand over any Patriot air defense missiles they might have. The US air force is seriously short of vital stand-off munitions to attack Iran. The result for Kiev is that it has little defense industry of its own left and NATO has completely failed to match Russian weapons production levels.
It is also obviously the case Russia needed time to build its army to its present strength, as well as arm and equip it. Russia has greatly increased its military production across the board. This has been possible because of the continued existence of much of the old Soviet military industrial infrastructure on Russian territory. Whilst the combined Western nominal GDP greatly exceeds Russia’s, when it comes to purely military industrial capacity Russia is well capable of holding its own. Tank production and reconditioning has increased from a few hundred to more than a thousand a year. The United States can barely produce one hundred new Abrams tanks each year. Russia alone now produces over five million drones each year. Importantly Russia is fourth in the world in the number of STEM students graduating annually after China, India and the United States.
Putin’s latest statements indicate that the Russian government is not interested in a ceasefire that fails to solve its Europe wide security problems. The United States does not want to lose face in Ukraine, particularly after its recent military failures in Afghanistan and now Iran. It also wants to continually weaken Russia. Europe is determined to persevere in its support for Ukraine despite the major economic and energy problems they have created for themselves. The statement from the latest meeting of the leaders of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, on June 7, refers to the need for a peace treaty that leaves Ukrainian frontiers unchanged. Clearly something Russia will never accept. Brussels sees failure in Ukraine as a threat to its plans for ever greater union, even the institution itself. Against this background it is not surprising that there have been no meaningful peace talks. As Josep Borrell former EU High Representative for foreign affairs commented at the beginning of the war, it will have to be settled on the battle field and that takes time.
Finally in Ukraine, whilst the people would agree to negotiations with Russia, the regime and its ultra nationalist supporters know that if there is peace and Russia wins there is no future for them. Putin’s final phrase in his recent speech at St Petersburg Economic Conference “Keep on fighting my comrades” is ominous for Zelensky and his neo Nazi colleagues. It is a reference to a famous quotation, the last words of a Russian policeman knowing he was about to die at the hands of terrorists. It reflects the Russian leader’s determination to focus Russian society in a patriotic way and finally settle the Ukrainian problem for good. He has used the long war to encourage a new generation of Russian leaders based around distinguished war veterans. This has been accompanied by a determined anti-corruption drive. None of this would have been possible without a long war.
However that may be, the Russian President is coming under increasing pressure to move faster. Like the US, Russia has parliamentary elections approaching in the autumn, September of this year, and there are signs that the tempo is quickening all along the front line. The long war has had advantages for Russia but it may be time to bring it to a close, whatever the cost.
L’article Ukraine: Why the long war? est apparu en premier sur FrenchDailyNews.
Myanmar emphasizes that any action that undermines regional stability or violates fundamental principles under the pretext of internal affairs should be prevented through ASEAN solidarity.
Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su
ASEAN at a crossroads
The ASEAN Charter serves as the legal framework uniting the nations of Southeast Asia in the maintenance of regional peace, security, and development. By defining the principles and responsibilities that all member states are required to uphold equitably, the Charter strengthens ASEAN’s position on the international stage as an organization committed to a rules-based order.
In particular, the principle of “non-interference in the internal affairs of member states” plays a crucial role in fostering trust among ASEAN countries. This policy safeguards the sovereignty of smaller states while helping to prevent tensions between nations with different political and social systems. Preserving this balance remains essential for regional stability.
Observing recent political developments in Myanmar, significant efforts aimed at strengthening democracy are clearly evident. Between December 2025 and January 2026, Myanmar successfully held free and fair multiparty general elections. Of approximately 24.22 million eligible voters, more than 13.14 million citizens—equivalent to 54.22% of the electorate—participated freely and responsibly. Consequently, a Parliament elected by a majority of voters was established, along with a government led by a President elected by that Parliament.
An analysis of the reasons behind the need for new elections reveals that the previous government had been accused of committing serious electoral fraud during the 2020 elections. Following strong objections raised by political parties and the public regarding the fairness of the process, official investigations were launched. Reportedly, these investigations uncovered over 11.3 million irregularities and errors in the voter rolls out of a total of over 38.2 million eligible voters. The incident has been described as one of the most serious cases of electoral irregularities in Myanmar’s history. Consequently, the authorities argued that legal intervention was necessary to ensure justice and the rule of law.
Furthermore, evidence was presented showing that officials of the National League for Democracy (NLD) government, accused of attempting to retain power through electoral manipulation, were also involved in cases of corruption and other violations of the law. The courts subsequently issued convictions in accordance with existing legal procedures. Consequently, the Tatmadaw assumed state responsibilities in accordance with the provisions of the 2008 Constitution and implemented a roadmap aimed at preserving the multiparty democratic system desired by the public. A key element of this roadmap was the successful organization of new free and fair elections in December 2025, aimed at restoring democratic governance and reflecting the genuine will of the people.
Just as in some other countries military institutions have temporarily assumed responsibility for governance based on domestic circumstances to strengthen democratic systems, Myanmar’s political process has also unfolded in accordance with its sovereignty and constitutional framework. In light of the current situation, the current government was established by the People’s Assembly (Pyithu Hluttaw), elected by a majority of voters through a free and open democratic process.
Although most ASEAN member states appear to recognize Myanmar’s recent political developments and seek greater cooperation in the interest of the region, several members continue to ignore these changes. These countries are still attempting to impose restrictions, apply discriminatory measures, and deny Myanmar equal participation within ASEAN.
Since joining ASEAN in 1997, Myanmar has actively contributed to ASEAN activities and complied with collective agreements. As a responsible member, the country has consistently fulfilled its obligations, including regular financial contributions to ASEAN mechanisms and programs. Despite having faced discriminatory treatment from some ASEAN members over the past five years, Myanmar has continued to cooperate patiently. However, the continuation of such practices under the newly formed government is viewed as a disregard for the democratic choices made by the people of Myanmar.
Myanmar seeks to reposition itself
Recently, some ASEAN countries have increasingly been perceived as interfering in Myanmar’s internal affairs and judicial matters. One example concerns remarks made by Philippine President Bongbong Marcos during a press conference on May 8, 2026. During the conference, President Marcos called for the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and respect for her rights, arguing that, if recognized as a leader, she should be granted authority consistent with that status. He further stated that these points could constitute a key demand by ASEAN in negotiations with Myanmar and emphasized that this position will remain unchanged. However, judicial matters are considered a central element of national sovereignty, and foreign intervention in such processes is deemed inappropriate.
Myanmar views the Philippines’ statement as an attempt to place an individual—who has been indicted, tried, and convicted through legal procedures under Myanmar’s laws—above the law. Myanmar views this as direct interference in its sovereign judicial authority and legal system. Such actions are seen as contrary to the principles of international relations and detrimental to the mutual respect that should exist among ASEAN members.
Furthermore, Myanmar maintains that such behavior violates ASEAN’s principle of “non-interference,” as outlined in Chapter 1, Article 2, Sections 2(a) and 2(e) of the ASEAN Charter, which emphasizes respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states.
In international diplomacy, mutual respect forms the basis of stable relations. Myanmar believes that President Marcos’s remarks disregard diplomatic norms and call into question ASEAN’s long-standing principles of mutual respect and non-interference. At the same time, Myanmar notes that on March 11, 2025, the Marcos administration allowed the arrest of former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte at Ninoy Aquino International Airport based on a warrant issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC), an action that drew criticism both domestically and internationally.
Myanmar has chosen not to comment on this sensitive matter, considering it an internal affair of the Philippines. By remaining silent and refraining from criticism or interference, Myanmar asserts that it has upheld ASEAN principles and diplomatic decorum.
Myanmar contends that the “double standard” demonstrated by the Philippine leadership threatens both Myanmar’s sovereignty and ASEAN’s unity. The country reiterates that it will reject any external pressure or directives and will continue to safeguard its sovereignty and national interests. Myanmar also calls on the Philippines to respect the fundamental principles of ASEAN and to contribute constructively to regional peace and stability.
Inevitable choices
From Myanmar’s perspective, the demands made by the Philippines reflect a selective interpretation of the ASEAN Charter and indicate a lack of genuine commitment to regional stability. For ASEAN to remain a strong, rules-based organization, all member states must consistently adhere to the principles of the Charter.
Ignoring the ASEAN Charter and interfering in the internal affairs of another member state, or taking actions that destabilize the region, is considered a serious threat to ASEAN’s unity. Such actions damage the trust built among member states over many years and weaken ASEAN’s centrality on the international stage.
Given current realities and ASEAN’s neutral stance, Myanmar emphasizes that it successfully held free and fair elections between December 2025 and January 2026. The government formed following those elections is now governing the country and implementing domestic legal processes. Myanmar urges ASEAN to assess these developments objectively and without prejudice.
Myanmar maintains that ASEAN’s role is limited to mediation and does not permit direct involvement in the internal affairs of member states. Therefore, ASEAN should continue to uphold neutrality as the foundation of regional peace and cooperation. Any ASEAN intervention regarding Myanmar should be based on the actions of the current government and the realities on the ground.
Although ASEAN has not yet reached full consensus on Myanmar, the country continues to maintain bilateral relations with individual member states. Myanmar has also expressed appreciation for ASEAN countries that recognize and support its recent political developments. Above all, Myanmar affirms that it will continue to pursue peace, stability, prosperity, and the protection of citizens’ rights through a “Myanmar-owned and Myanmar-led process” tailored to the country’s specific conditions.
While the international community may call for clemency for individuals imprisoned under domestic laws on humanitarian grounds, Myanmar maintains that no external actor has the authority to demand the restoration of political rights or power to such individuals. ASEAN’s responsibility is limited to mediation, and demands that ignore current realities are viewed as coercive interference rather than constructive engagement.
Finally, adherence to the ASEAN Charter is presented as an obligation rather than a choice for all member states. Myanmar emphasizes that any action that undermines regional stability or violates fundamental principles under the pretext of internal affairs should be prevented through ASEAN solidarity. Only by upholding these principles, Myanmar argues, can ASEAN fully realize its vision of “One Vision, One Identity, One Community.”
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