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A new strategic reality in the Middle East

Considerations on Iran’s new posture and the transformation of the strategic balance in the Middle East.

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The recent developments in the Middle East indicate that the dynamics of the regional conflict are entering a new phase. Although the ceasefire reached in recent months has reduced the intensity of direct confrontations, recent events demonstrate that the structural factors fueling the war remain in place. The exchange of attacks between Iran and Israel reveals not only the fragility of existing agreements but also an important shift in Tehran’s strategic posture.

For years, Iranian military policy was characterized primarily by responses to actions it considered hostile. Since 2024, every case of direct confrontation between Iran and Israel occurred with an Iranian response to a previous Israeli attack. However, the events of the past weekend suggest a significant change in this behavior. By launching an offensive against Israeli targets following military operations conducted in Lebanon, Iran demonstrated a willingness to act before additional threats materialize, presenting its actions as part of the right to collective self-defense, expressed through the protection of regional partners.

The Iranian justification is based on the interpretation that Israeli attacks on Lebanese territory constitute violations of previously established understandings. According to this view, the continuation of military operations in urban areas and the expansion of actions against different regions of Lebanon create a scenario that legitimizes a proportional response. In addition, Tehran also links its reaction to incidents involving what it describes as American piracy on strategic maritime routes.

The most significant aspect of this escalation lies not merely in the launching of missiles or drones, but in the political message it conveys. Iran appears to be signaling that it no longer intends to limit its actions to the direct defense of its own territory. Instead, it is showing a willingness to respond to military operations targeting actors considered part of its regional alliance network. This represents a shift with the potential to profoundly alter the strategic calculations of all parties involved.

At the same time, the international response highlights the difficulties faced by powers attempting to manage the crisis. Fears of an uncontrolled expansion of the conflict come at a particularly sensitive moment for the global economy. Military tensions in one of the world’s most important regions for energy production and transportation tend to generate immediate impacts on financial markets, logistics chains, and investor expectations.

Israel’s response to the Iranian attacks, followed by further military actions by Tehran and the involvement of regional allies, demonstrates that the cycle of retaliation remains active. The involvement of Yemen, which has moved to restrict access to the Red Sea for vessels linked to Israel, adds an additional factor of insecurity for the Zionist regime, creating a supporting front for Iran.

In light of this scenario, it becomes evident that the current ceasefire has significant limitations. Although it has temporarily reduced the level of violence, it has not resolved the principal elements sustaining regional rivalry. Issues related to the American military presence and Israeli territorial expansionism remain unresolved, prolonging the atmosphere of tension.

However, perhaps the main consequence of recent events is the emergence of a new strategic precedent. By demonstrating a willingness to respond to actions carried out against third parties, Iran is establishing a broader deterrence logic than previously observed. This means that future military operations conducted by Israel or the United States against Tehran’s partners could trigger direct responses, even when Iranian territory itself is not the immediate target.

Just as Iran is now responding to Israeli attacks against Lebanon, in the future such retaliatory measures could be launched to punish Tel Aviv for its actions in Gaza, Iraq, Yemen, and other countries in the region. In practical terms, this means that the regional balance of power has changed substantially: Iran is now making it clear to Israel that its actions will not go unanswered.

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A kick in the Baltics… Will Russia hit back like Iran?

A kick in the Baltics might be what it takes to concentrate Russophobic minds. Before it’s too late.

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Russia’s flagship international business summit in St Petersburg was targeted with Ukrainian drones that used Estonian territorial waters to evade Russian air defenses. Other Baltic states are also implicated in carrying out the large-scale attack last week.

According to the well-informed Borzikkman channel, scores of kamikaze drones were launched from ships in the Baltic Sea. They flew at low altitude over Estonian territorial waters before striking St Petersburg. The flight path was designed to take Russian defenses by surprise.

Most of the drones were shot down by Russian defenses, but a few managed to hit their targets. The biggest hit was on the St Petersburg oil terminal. That had the desired propaganda effect of creating a pall of black smoke visible to delegates on the opening day, June 3, of the St Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF).

Western media outlets like the BBC were delighted to report on the embarrassing vista in the skies over Russia’s second city and a forum that President Putin would address.

The BBC’s Steve Rosenberg was positively gleeful, writing: “The abiding image of SPIEF 2026 will be the huge plume of thick black smoke which dominated the St Petersburg skyline on Wednesday… All the delegates saw the smoke as they arrived at the expo centre on the edge of the city.”

Drones from ships in the Baltic Sea with flights through Estonian territorial waters means that NATO states were involved in the execution of the air strikes. On the same day, NATO chief Mark Rutte was in Kiev on an unannounced visit to meet the Ukrainian leader, Vladimir Zelensky.

The level of NATO participation in waging war on Russia with its Ukrainian proxy has become absurdly obvious. In recent weeks, hundreds of Ukrainian drones have crashed in Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, and Romania. The Kiev regime has repeatedly apologized to European capitals for the infringements that have resulted in injuries to civilians. Still, the European Union and NATO take no action to sanction or reprimand Kiev. They indulge in the claims that the drones are being redirected by Russian electronic jamming. Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson has even urged that NATO states should help Ukraine in targeting Russia to avoid “misakes”.

The duplicity is contemptible. Russian military intelligence has pinpointed drone manufacturing sites in the Baltic states and other NATO nations that are participating in Ukrainian attacks.

Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia’s National Security Council, commented: “The Russian Defence Ministry’s statement should be understood extremely literally: the publication of production sites for drones and other military equipment in Europe is a register of potential legitimate targets for the Russian armed forces.”

Evidently, the NATO states are providing targeting data and permitting the use of their territory to maximize the attacks on Russia. Hundreds of Russian civilians have been killed in these NATO-assisted drone operations, the most dreadful being the murder of 21 students at a college dormitory in Starobelsk, Lugansk, on May 22. Last week, on the same day as the drone attack on St Petersburg, eight civilians were killed, and 10 were injured when their bus was blown up in an air strike while traveling through the Donetsk region towards Crimea.

Anger across Russia is growing, analyst Stas Krapivnik told Danny Haiphong’s channel. Russia has retaliated with heavy strikes on military sites and decision-making centers across Ukraine. But, as Krapivnik points out, Moscow is under pressure to take action against NATO culprits from where the Ukrainian offensives are stemming. He says that Russia should do like Iran is doing, hitting back hard where it hurts.

Since the U.S. and Israel launched their aggression against Iran 100 days ago, on February 28, the Iranians have destroyed dozens of American installations across the Persian Gulf and Israeli bases with their formidable arsenal of hypersonic and ballistic missiles, as well as drones.

When Israel violated a shaky truce by bombing Beirut’s southern district of Dahiyeh at the weekend, Iran struck back immediately, as it had warned it would do, to hit airbases in Israel and a U.S. base in Saudi Arabia.

Iran’s defiance has put manners on Washington. Israel is a slow learner, but it will come round to realizing that Iran is not going to take any aggression lying down. It’s hitting back hard and fast in the places that hurt. The days of U.S. and Israeli aggression with impunity are over.

The other thing is that Tehran has called Trump’s bluff about his “madman threats” to escalate the war and obliterate Iran. The Iranians have demonstrated to Washington and the Israelis that the aggressors have much more to lose if they persist in their belligerence.

Russia might want to take note, as Krapivnik, Borzikkman, Sergey Karaganov, and other analysts have advised. The EU and NATO are acting with impunity and a delusional sense that they can escalate attacks on Russia, killing civilians and damaging Russia’s economy, all because of some cynical charade that Ukraine is alone in carrying out the attacks.

Of course, the risk is that if Russian hypersonics were to take out a NATO drone-launching ship in the Baltic Sea, then that would trigger the U.S.-led military alliance’s joint defense commitments. In that case, we are potentially in a situation of World War Three.

But hold on a moment. Are we not already in that situation, given that, despite the charade, NATO states are directly involved in attacking Russia, its capital, Moscow, and St Petersburg, and killing hundreds of civilians?

The NATO and EU leaders are so imbued with Russophobia and arrogance that they are beyond rational thinking. The only language they understand is direct threat and force. Unless they pay a price, the deranged Russophobic leaders will keep escalating as they are doing.

Iran has shown a viable self-defense policy. The enemy is hit hard for daring to aggress against the Iranian people.

A kick in the Baltics might be what it takes to concentrate Russophobic minds. Before it’s too late.

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Hezbollah is now the centre of Trump’s Iran ceasefire. So now what?

Lebanon is now playing a key role in any ceasefire deal that Trump might think he has nailed with Iran. But can Hezbollah go rogue on all the main players?

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Lebanon is now playing a key role in any ceasefire deal that Trump might think he has nailed with Iran. But can Hezbollah go rogue on all the main players?

Relationships are odd things and are often determined by how people stay together during the tough times, rather than when everything is rosy. But during these last few turbulent days, when Donald Trump frantically scrambles to save the remnants of a peace deal with Iran, one relationship has become paramount to the entire Middle East crisis: that of Hezbollah and Iran. Just how strong is this relationship, or was it always just a ’marriage of convenience’, hollow and unable to withstand the travails of regional tension?

While the Iranians walked away from talks with the U.S. because of Israel’s war in southern Lebanon, Trump realised how important this tiny country is – and will be – if any kind of deal is struck over opening the Straits of Hormuz. While on the one hand Iran has stepped up to the mark by supporting its proxy Hezbollah and has always included Lebanon in any peace deal or ceasefire, it is worth noting that the ties and responsibilities Iran has to Hezbollah are not as solid as many think.

Indeed, in the region, when you talk to geopolitical analysts, they always pontificate over how the West – and in particular Israel – places too much emphasis on Iran’s links to its regional proxies in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Lebanon. They have long argued that Iran has less control over them than most pundits in Western media would assert.

In his most recent speech, the Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem denounced the deal as a “farce,” saying it would effectively divide southern Lebanon from the rest of the country, giving Israel an advantage to “kill in Lebanon.”

“We have given no commitment to anyone,” Naim said, as he urged the Lebanese government to call off talks with Israel and demanded Israel’s full withdrawal from Lebanese territory. “As long as the aggression continues, we will confront it with all the power we have been given.”

This reference, of course, was directed at the elite in Beirut, who are largely acting on the West’s political bequest in this tiny country – barely 240 km long – which was once a province of Syria.

But some wily analysts might read too much into his statement in the coming days. A few might mull over this comment and speculate that Hezbollah, under certain circumstances, has a wild card to play and is capable of going rogue, distancing itself from the arbitrary direction of Tehran.

Is it possible that the Iranians and the Americans could outmanoeuvre Israel and strike a provisional ceasefire deal, only for it to be scuppered by Hezbollah, which refuses to give up its fight in the south of the country against the IDF? Presently, this must be concerning Trump’s camp but will be amusing to Netanyahu, who probably thinks that Lebanon holds the key for him to continue the war and thus stay in power, avoiding corruption charges.

Hezbollah, for its part, is the most dangerous man in the room, simply because its fighters have nothing to lose. They are backed into a corner and have lost so much of their own land, with 600 killed and a million displaced since the last ceasefire in April was agreed. Militarily speaking, their best guerrilla-style fighting will be seen now, and so one could argue this is their moment. While it is true that the IDF have made significant gains against them, it is wholly under-reported how successful their fighters have been in blowing up IDF tanks, with some estimates claiming the number to be over 200. But victory for either side seems less significant, certainly for Netanyahu, who probably knows that his forces can never actually win against Hezbollah in Lebanon. That is not the point. The point is to keep the war going and use it as leverage against Trump and Iran, while keeping Netanyahu in office, protected from a peace scenario that would remove him from his job and prosecute him – exactly the same set-up that Ukraine’s President Zelensky enjoys.

Lebanon is an important pawn in the bigger game, as it can always be used by Netanyahu to undermine whatever Trump is doing – such as its bombardment of Beirut that killed 357 people on April 8, one day after the U.S. and Iran announced their own ceasefire deal.

But now all Netanyahu needs to do is to agree to the IDF respecting a ceasefire without actually respecting it, while pointing the finger at Hezbollah for supposedly breaking it. It will be a game that is hugely effective, as it will be impossible for Trump to consider Hezbollah as being honourable and the IDF as being duplicitous. Even from a PR perspective, it’s genius.

And so with this new ruse in play, much emphasis is placed on Hezbollah as it is caught between choosing to fight the IDF or accepting a peace deal that would effectively hand over huge swathes of southern Lebanon to the Lebanese army – a useless contingent of poorly trained soldiers with hand-me-down, outdated equipment donated by Western countries, and one which is no match for Hezbollah. Under this deal, Israel would establish itself south of the Litani River and have legal authority to strike Beirut (its goal is to completely reduce the southern suburb where Hezbollah supporters live, similar to Gaza).

There are no real options for Hezbollah other than to fight on, but one has to wonder if they would ultimately accept an ’order’ from Tehran to stop fighting if a deal with the U.S. could be struck. The message from its chief is that under such circumstances of being at war with Israel on Lebanon’s own turf, the Shia group has the right to play the autonomy card while happily listening to Iran’s views – but not necessarily taking them as orders. Suddenly the whole world is watching Lebanon. Suddenly Hezbollah is the most important player, and its relationship with Iran has never been more relevant, as Tehran now might need to use its might to extract a concession from its partner. Even in a fake marriage, one partner has to give in sometimes to the other’s woes or needs, and so in the coming days expect a baptism of articles by obsequious, high-brow Middle East analysts agonising over this marriage and how strong or real it is.

Trump’s February 28th assault on Iran has spawned a number of unintended consequences drenched in irony. The greatest one is that his clumsy buffoonery has probably now resulted in the Iranians getting a nuclear bomb. But a close second to that is that it has also put Iran’s relationships with its proxies under the microscope – and who knows where that’s heading.

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