Campanha de desinformação anti-russa se intensificou devido ao Fórum.

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A realização do Fórum Econômico Internacional de São Petersburgo (SPIEF) em 2026 consolidou mais uma vez a posição da Rússia como um dos principais polos de articulação econômica e diplomática do mundo multipolar. Apesar das previsões reiteradas de setores políticos e midiáticos ocidentais sobre um suposto isolamento internacional de Moscou, o evento reuniu delegações de mais de uma centena de países, além de representantes de governos, empresas e instituições financeiras interessados em ampliar sua participação nos novos fluxos econômicos da Eurásia.

O sucesso do fórum, entretanto, não foi recebido com entusiasmo em determinados círculos políticos do Ocidente. Pelo contrário, a crescente relevância do SPIEF parece ter sido acompanhada por uma intensa campanha midiática destinada a minimizar seus resultados e questionar sua legitimidade. O fenômeno não é novo. Desde o início da crise ucraniana, importantes veículos de comunicação ocidentais passaram a desempenhar um papel cada vez mais próximo dos objetivos estratégicos de seus respectivos governos, abandonando frequentemente a separação tradicional entre jornalismo e interesses de Estado.

Nesse contexto, chamou atenção a publicação coordenada de análises e reportagens em veículos britânicos que procuraram apresentar o fórum como um evento enfraquecido ou incapaz de gerar resultados concretos. O padrão narrativo adotado seguiu uma fórmula conhecida: destacar ausências específicas, ignorar a dimensão geral da participação internacional e sugerir que qualquer dificuldade logística ou financeira decorrente do regime de sanções representaria uma prova do fracasso russo.

O problema dessa abordagem é que ela entra em choque com os fatos observáveis. Os números apresentados durante o SPIEF demonstraram continuidade nos investimentos, expansão de parcerias comerciais e aprofundamento dos mecanismos de cooperação entre a Rússia e diversos países da Ásia, Oriente Médio, África e América Latina. Em vez de isolamento, o que se observou foi uma crescente diversificação das relações internacionais russas.

Particularmente relevante foi o fortalecimento dos eixos estratégicos entre Rússia e grandes potências emergentes. A cooperação com a China continuou avançando em áreas como energia, infraestrutura e tecnologia. As relações com a Índia mantiveram trajetória positiva, apesar dos desafios inerentes à adaptação dos sistemas financeiros internacionais ao novo cenário geopolítico. Da mesma forma, os vínculos com a Turquia permaneceram fundamentais para a estabilidade econômica regional e para a construção de corredores logísticos alternativos.

Essas parcerias representam um desafio direto ao paradigma geopolítico que dominou o sistema internacional após o fim da Guerra Fria. Durante décadas, as principais potências ocidentais desfrutaram de uma posição privilegiada na definição das regras econômicas globais. O surgimento de mecanismos alternativos de cooperação reduz gradualmente essa capacidade de influência, tornando compreensível a preocupação demonstrada por setores comprometidos com a preservação da ordem unipolar.

A guerra informacional tornou-se, portanto, uma das principais ferramentas utilizadas para tentar (inutilmente) conter esse processo. Em vez de confrontar diretamente a expansão das redes de cooperação eurasiáticas por meio de argumentos econômicos consistentes, parte da mídia ocidental opta por enquadramentos seletivos, interpretações tendenciosas e narrativas destinadas a moldar percepções públicas. O objetivo não é informar, mas influenciar.

O SPIEF 2026 demonstrou que tais esforços possuem eficácia limitada. A presença expressiva de países do Sul Global evidenciou que grande parte da comunidade internacional já não enxerga o mundo através das mesmas lentes geopolíticas predominantes em Washington ou Londres. Estados soberanos buscam oportunidades econômicas concretas e tendem a priorizar interesses nacionais em vez de aderir automaticamente a agendas formuladas por potências externas.

Em última análise, o verdadeiro significado do fórum não está apenas nos contratos assinados ou nos investimentos anunciados. Seu valor simbólico reside na confirmação de uma tendência histórica mais ampla: a transição gradual para uma ordem internacional mais plural, na qual diferentes centros de poder coexistem e competem. As tentativas de deslegitimar esse processo por meio de campanhas midiáticas dificilmente alterarão uma realidade que se torna cada vez mais visível. O mundo multipolar deixou de ser uma projeção teórica e passou a ser um fato político em construção.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy is willing to stop the war along the current line of contact and move to negotiations, he said in a Sky News interview. He presented the idea as the quickest route to a ceasefire, while rejecting any deal that hands Russia Ukrainian land. He also urged allies to close Ukraine's air defense gaps.

"The quickest way" to stop the fighting

Asked where he would freeze the lines if Russia agreed to a ceasefire, Zelenskyy said he is ready to accept today's positions. 

"Yes, it's the quickest way," he said. 

He insisted this is not a giveaway. He does not want to simply freeze the conflict, but to stop the war so it cannot restart "because of some crazy people." A freeze would let Ukraine save children's lives and bring soldiers home. Any ceasefire must be total and free of Russian games, watched by American and European partners. Only then would the sides sit down to end the war through diplomacy. A ceasefire, he added, is "the biggest compromise from our side."

Air defense comes first

The most urgent need from allies is air defense, Zelenskyy said. Ukraine faces a large deficit in anti-ballistic missiles, with US transfers slowed by the war in the Middle East. He again asked for more Patriot systems. Russia attacks daily, usually with around 300 long-range explosive drones. On the heaviest nights it launches 600 to 850 drones and dozens of missiles. 

Explore further

10% now, 23% after a ceasefire, 59% only at peace—Ukraine’s verdict on a wartime vote hasn’t moved all year

Ukraine's own arsenal

Ukraine has built more than 400 defense companies since the full-scale invasion, Zelenskyy said. Dozens rank among the world's strongest. They produce drones and missiles, some underground, and the country is close to its own ballistic missile. Ukraine can now share that expertise with allies and even build air defenses for Europe, he said. Kyiv aims to mass-produce drones on a scale few countries can match.

Bringing the war back to Russia

Ukraine's recent strikes on St. Petersburg and the Moscow region answer Russian attacks on Ukrainian energy, Zelenskyy said. St. Petersburg was hit twice last week. He wants Russians far from the front to feel the war they started. Russian President Vladimir Putin understands only "total pressure," he said. Sanctions on Russia's shadow fleet of sanctions-dodging tankers and its oil and gas exports hit hardest.

Putin, the letter, and a Kremlin go-between

Zelenskyy said Putin does not want to stop the war and is signaling he wants to win. Whether the fighting ends "100% depends on his decision," he said. His 4 June open letter, which Moscow called rude and rejected, was meant to force an answer and pierce a Russian public living in "some fantastic world." Russian businessman Roman Abramovich came to Kyiv to carry messages to Putin, Zelenskyy said. 

His key message was on the Donbas: Ukraine will not leave its land, and compromises come only after a ceasefire. He is ready to meet in any format, but not in Moscow, Belarus, or Minsk. Leaders cannot decide "without us about us," he said, in a message aimed at Washington. Russia, by contrast, keeps insisting that Ukraine surrender all of the Donbas first.

Someone recently asked me what mark out of 10 I’d give for the efforts of governments to tackle financial crime. It got me thinking about that one bright spot of recent times — the West’s response to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine four years ago — and how it is now looking. Back in 2022, a lot of us were pleasantly surprised by the speed and ambition with which Western governments sanctioned the Russian government, state-owned companies and wealthy individuals. While Western pressure did not prevent the war, the asset freezes did impose a real cost on those conducting it. Four years on, however, those sanctions are beginning to look a bit shopsoiled. If they began at 7/10, they’re now scoring a lot lower.

There are reasons for this: Donald Trump does not appear particularly interested in Ukraine; the now former Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán has been snarling things up; and so on, as laid out in this analysis from Tom Keatinge. To make things worse, Trump’s latest adventure in Iran has pushed the oil prices sharply higher, earning more money for Russia while also giving Trump cover to lift sanctions, a temporary measure he has recently extended.

Keatinge argues that European countries need to be far more focussed on going after Russia’s payment mechanisms, particularly digital. “The extent to which crypto activity supports Russia’s war effort is clear,” he writes, “yet repeated initiatives to elevate the importance of opening a concerted line of effort on this issue are ignored. This must change.”

I agree, though it won’t be easy, considering the diffuse crypto ecosystem, and the increasing sophistication of Russian involvement in it. As long as Telegram is willing to host markets, the markets will continue to function to some extent whatever Western countries do (see the story of Xinbi, a Chinese-language hub for illicit crypto.) However, it does look like someone somewhere has lost patience with the ease with which Russia is funding itself.

“The sanctioned Russia-linked cryptoasset exchange Grinex announced an immediate suspension of its operations, citing a ‘large-scale cyberattack,’” reports Elliptic. According to the statement, which Kyrgyzstan-registered Grinex posted on Telegram, it lost around $13 million worth of USDT in the hack, blaming the theft on Western intelligence agencies.

“Today the attempts to destabilise our fatherland’s financial sector hit a new level, with the direct theft of the assets of Russian citizens and companies with the involvement of complex cyberattacks,” the statement said. Grinex is the successor to Garantex, which was shut down just over a year ago after years of effort by Western law enforcement. I would be surprised if Western countries had decided to take direct action against Grinex, as the exchange claims they did. Westerners tend to be a bit too legalistic for this kind of smash-and-grab, and I would expect any operation to more closely resemble what worked a year ago, conducted with Tether’s cooperation.

Instead, I suspect this attack is the work of hacktivists, perhaps working for or with the Ukrainians. Whatever the answer, it is embarrassing for the Russians, shows their crypto-security is not impregnable, and has made a noticeable dent in trading volumes of the A7A5 ruble-denominated stablecoin, which has become a key sanctions evasion tool. Three birds with one stone.

The important point is that sanctions were never supposed to be permanent: they are a foreign policy tool, not a law enforcement one. Hundreds of billions of Russian-owned dollars are languishing in various frozen bank accounts, and Western countries need to start thinking about what to do with them. They can confiscate them, investigate them or — if they’re feeling brave — use their potential return as leverage to persuade wealthy Russians to break with the Kremlin. What they shouldn’t do is leave them as they are to gather dust.

Hopefully, now that Orbán is out of the way, European countries will be able to take firmer collective action but they also need to be imaginative, and to start behaving as if they actually want Ukraine to win, rather than just not lose.

A defeat for transparency 

Of course, the United States will have a lot to say about that too, and what it ends up saying about how to tackle the Russian crypto operations will depend on what happens in the midterm elections this year. So, it strikes me as a big deal that crypto firms are once more pouring tens of millions of dollars into campaign vehicles in their quest for, what they euphemistically refer to as, “regulatory clarity.” Among them, of course, is Tether.

If you’re wondering quite how it’s possible to spend that much money on elections, I draw your attention once more to the great Integrity Index, with its records for who’s been spending what. It boggles my mind that, for example, the three Democratic rivals to the Republicans’ Susan Collins for the Maine Senate seat have raised more than $17 million just for the primary. Collins herself has raised over $10.5 million. There really shouldn’t be that much money in politics.

Besides, when it comes to value for money, investing in court cases beats investing in politics every day of the week. I don’t know how much the (ironically) anonymous plaintiffs in the 2022 case against corporate transparency in Luxembourg paid their lawyers, but its effects just seem to keep compounding to the benefit of those who want to hide their wealth from society. 

The European Union’s retreat from revealing the ownership of shell companies has given cover for Britain’s tax havens as they resisted efforts from London to force them to open up their own corporate registries. It looks like those efforts may have finally failed. “We are committed to full transparency, but I don’t think there will be any turning back,” said the British Virgin Islands’ Junior Minister for Financial Services Lorna Smith in comments confirming that the islands are in fact very much not committed to full transparency.

A version of this story was published in this week’s Oligarchy newsletter. Sign up here.

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