Footage has emerged showing the destruction of a drone by a French Rafale fighter over Latvia earlier today. The engagement underscores how the drone war unleashed by the Russian invasion of Ukraine is increasingly spilling over borders, as well as the growing reality of the drone threat to NATO.

The French Air and Space Force confirmed that its Rafales, currently deployed in neighboring Lithuania, were scrambled in response to the drone incursion. The drone was identified before one of the fighters shot it down over an uninhabited area. The incident was a “demonstration of the French Armed Forces’ commitment to contributing to the security of Europe’s eastern flank,” the service said in a statement on X.

Lettonie | Destruction d’un drone par les Rafale

Survol d’un drone au dessus du territoire letton
Décollage sur alerte des chasseurs engagés dans la mission de l’OTAN Baltic Air Policing depuis la base aérienne de Šiauliai
Identification et destruction… pic.twitter.com/NFIMSP7Ibl

— Armée française – Opérations militaires (@EtatMajorFR) June 8, 2026

A detachment of French Air and Space Force Rafale jets is currently engaged in the NATO Baltic Air Policing mission from Šiauliai Air Base, Lithuania.

This morning, French fighter jets deployed to NATO Air Policing at Šiauliai Air Base shot down a drone that entered Latvian airspace.

Lithuania thanks our French allies for their swift and professional action in safeguarding the security of our region.

— Lithuanian MOD (@Lithuanian_MoD) June 8, 2026

This is not the first time that a NATO fighter has shot down a drone in the Baltic region as part of the Baltic Air Policing mission. On May 19 of this year, a Romanian F-16 shot down a Ukrainian drone over Estonia after it strayed into NATO airspace, reportedly due to Russian electronic warfare interference. Last September, NATO fighters shot down at least three, and likely four, Russian drones, after 19 reported violations of Polish airspace. Polish authorities assessed that the drones “did not veer off course but were deliberately targeted.”

However, this is the first time that an incident of this kind has been captured on camera.

At least two videos are now circulating on social media showing the engagement playing out.

One shows the moment that a Rafale launches an air-to-air missile, leaving a prominent trail of smoke, before detonating seconds later.

NATO airpower in action this morning, safeguarding Latvian airspace. pic.twitter.com/Ugzbx8aaZS

— Marko Mihkelson (@markomihkelson) June 8, 2026

Another video, from a different angle, shows the immediate aftermath of the shootdown. Another trail is seen in the background of both videos, but it’s unclear if this is evidence of a previous missile launch, or a contrail from another aircraft that previously transited the airspace at a different altitude.

Rogovkā, Rēzeknes novadā notriekts lidrobots. NBS apstiprina.#Rogovka #Rēzekne #Latvija pic.twitter.com/kBdojUHanB

— BreakingLV (@breakinglv) June 8, 2026

In a typical Baltic Air Policing configuration, the Rafale is armed with MICA air-to-air missiles. These beyond-visual-range weapons can be fitted with either an active radar seeker or an infrared seeker head, with a mix normally being loaded. The MICA uses a thrust-vectoring motor for improved agility and has a reported maximum range of around 37 miles.

Lituanie | Le succès des vols conjoints commence au sol
 
Préparation d'un vol d'entraînement avec des avions de chasse et :

Montage d'armements entre mécaniciens des deux pays alliés

Échanges sur les procédures, matériel et méthodes des équipes… pic.twitter.com/LPYygu0P5r

— Armée française – Opérations militaires (@EtatMajorFR) June 6, 2026

The Latvian Armed Forces provided more details of the shootdown, noting that a yellow alert was originally issued for the Ludza, Balvi, and Aluksne districts this morning at 9:20 a.m. local time. This led to NATO fighters being launched.

At 9:40 a.m., this alert level was increased to orange for the Ludza and Rēzekne districts. At this point, it was confirmed that some kind of drone was entering Latvian airspace. A military spokesperson told the Reuters news agency that the drone entered Latvian airspace from Russia.

NATO iznīcinātāji šorīt neitralizēja ārvalstu dronu, kas krievijas elektromagnētiskās karadarbības rezultātā bija ielidojis Latvijas teritorijā #WeAreNATO #StrongerTogether pic.twitter.com/07blbd7TUw

— NBS (@Latvijas_armija) June 8, 2026

Izsludināts gaisa telpas apdraudējums Krāslavas un Ludzas novados, informē Nacionālie bruņotie spēki.

Brīdinājums par iespējamu gaisa telpas apdraudējumu izsludināts Rēzeknes un Balvu novados. pic.twitter.com/PFcMZmhhga

— LTV Panorāma (@ltvpanorama) June 8, 2026

The Latvian Armed Forces warned residents in these areas to “Seek shelter indoors, close windows and doors — follow the two-wall principle.” It added: “If you notice a low-flying, suspicious, or dangerous object, do not approach it and call 112.”

At 10:05 a.m., the Latvian Armed Forces confirmed that NATO fighters were over the Rēzekne district, and a “foreign” drone was shot down over the Berzgale parish.

Berzgale is less than 20 miles from the nearest Russian border, and around 340 miles from the closest Ukrainian border, with Belarus, a close Moscow ally, separating Latvia and Ukraine.

NATO’s Baltic Air Policing mission has safeguarded the airspace of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania since the three countries joined the alliance in 2004. Because the Baltic states do not maintain fighter fleets capable of continuous air-defense duties, allied nations rotate detachments of combat aircraft to bases in Lithuania and Estonia, where they remain on quick-reaction alert around the clock.

The mission routinely scrambles fighters to identify and intercept Russian military aircraft operating near NATO airspace, particularly flights to and from Russia’s heavily militarized Kaliningrad exclave that often occur without flight plans, radio contact, or active transponders.

Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, NATO expanded the mission with additional aircraft and operating locations, making Baltic Air Policing one of the alliance’s most visible peacetime deterrence operations on its eastern flank.

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the expanding drone war between the two countries has provided another layer of responsibility to the Baltic Air Policing mission.

For most of its history, Baltic Air Policing centered on scrambling fighters to identify Russian bombers, fighters, reconnaissance aircraft, and transports flying near NATO airspace. The war in Ukraine has seen the increasing proliferation of drones that can travel hundreds or even thousands of miles, creating a new challenge for NATO air defenses.

Since 2022, there have been several incidents, including drones and missile debris entering or crashing in NATO territory, including in Poland and Romania. Late last month, a Russian kamikaze drone strayed into Romanian airspace before striking a residential building, injuring civilians, in what appears to have been the first incident of its kind.

A russian drone carrying explosives, involved in the bombing of infrastructure in Ukraine crashed in Galați, Romania, causing a fire on the roof of a residential apartment building.

Two persons sustained minor injuries and several residents required medical attention, the… pic.twitter.com/P8jzYFrEEp

— Toiu Oana (@oana_toiu) May 29, 2026

We asked NATO for more details of today’s incident, including whether it could confirm reports citing the Latvian military that the drone had entered its airspace as a result of Russian electronic warfare. This is a threat that is by now commonplace in the Baltic region.

“While the circumstances surrounding this incident are still under review, jamming is known to occur in this region, and can pose serious safety risks, including to civil aviation,” a spokesperson for the alliance told us.

In recent days, Ukraine has carried out a number of high-profile drone attacks against Russian targets in and around the Baltic region.

In the last week, Ukrainian drones appear to have hit the St. Petersburg oil terminal, the Baltic Fleet base at Kronstadt, and a weapons factory in the Tambov region.

As we observed in our previous reporting, there have been very few confirmed Ukrainian attacks of any kind against the Baltic Fleet. However, satellite and other imagery that emerged in the wake of the recent drone strike reveals extensive damage inflicted on the  Steregushchiy class corvette Boikiy.

Footage of the Russian Navy Baltic Sea Fleet corvette Boikiy burning in its Kronstadt drydock after a Ukrainian drone strike yesterday. pic.twitter.com/9CHz4aLdY8

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) June 4, 2026

Another satellite image of the Russian corvette Boikiy following yesterday's Ukrainian strike. What is interesting here is that the active fire was captured before firefighting crews managed to extinguish it. @planet image taken on June 3 at 16:30 local time. It burned for hours. pic.twitter.com/PzcHxoSxGk

— Mark Krutov (@kromark) June 4, 2026

Today’s incident provides visual evidence of advanced NATO fighters used to shoot down drones over alliance territory. While effective on this occasion, this kind of interception can be inefficient due to the mismatch in cost between the drone and missile. It is notable that the French Ministry of Defense has plans to introduce a lower-cost counter-drone capability on the Rafale by the summer. Trials of a pod loaded with 68mm laser-guided rockets have already begun.

Un Rafale équipé de roquettes guidées laser aperçu à Istres. Les essais ont donc enfin démarré. Ici une nacelle Thalès JF12, donc 24 roquettes 68mm au total. Une corde de plus à l'arc du Rafale, la chasse au Shahed est OUVERTE ! pic.twitter.com/6v0xSMkUJ1

— bruno aviation (@Bruno_Aviation) April 16, 2026

As a result, NATO has accelerated work on layered defenses that include short-range ground-based air defenses, electronic warfare, and other counter-drone technologies.

Fighters, however, will always remain a critical last-resort option, especially when a drone poses an immediate threat or when a visual identification is required.

Today’s video not only illustrates the changing face of the Baltic Air Policing mission due to the Russian war in Ukraine, but highlights the growing threat posed by drones and cruise missiles that can cross borders with little warning, whether deliberately or not.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Video Captures Rafale Fighter’s Drone Kill Over Baltic appeared first on The War Zone.

The U.S. Air Force Weapons School at Nellis Air Force Base, in Nevada, recently completed its final weapons instructor course for the A-10 Warthog. Despite an extension in service for three A-10 squadrons to 2030, and recent combat operations in the Middle East, the Weapons School has shuttered its elite training course in line with USAF divestment plans for the type, which were previously set for the end of 2026.

TWZ’s Jamie Hunter recently visited the 66th Weapons Squadron (WPS) and got a detailed cockpit and walk-around tour of an A-10C with “Trippin,” an experienced instructor pilot attached to the unit.

A full episode that goes in-depth with the A-10 Weapons School will kick-off TWZ’s first season of Special Access on YouTube soon, so stay tuned!

The post A-10 Cockpit And Walk-Around Tour With A Warthog Weapons Instructor appeared first on The War Zone.

The Air Force will seek new ways to accomplish the missions of the A-10C attack jet, under an amendment added to the House Armed Services Committee’s version of the National Defense Authorization bill. While the Air Force has long campaigned for the Warthog’s retirement, the recent demand for the jet in conflicts in the Middle East has seen it earn a reprieve, with its standdown now scheduled for 2030.

Some of the numerous amendments to the bill come from Abe Hamadeh, the Republican representative for Arizona. He calls for the Secretary of the Air Force to keep supporting A-10 training, testing, experimentation, maintenance, and sustainment efforts through to the planned retirement date, as well as preserving lessons learned and operational expertise from A-10 missions to help shape future replacement systems. This would include keeping a formal training unit to teach pilots until the retirement. This is especially notable, since the unit in question, the 357th Fighter Squadron, graduated the last class of A-10 student pilots at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, back in April.

Meanwhile, the Air Force officially concluded A-10 depot-level maintenance in February of this year, with the deactivation of the 571st Aircraft Maintenance Squadron at Hill Air Force Base, Utah, and the A-10 Weapons School is due to be shuttered this year.

In terms of “preserving operational expertise,” Hamadeh points directly to the A-10’s recent combat record in the Middle East, including its role in providing close air support during the recovery of two downed F-15E aircrew from Iran during Operation Epic Fury, and its work securing the Strait of Hormuz, a critical maritime chokepoint.

As part of this, the amendment also requests a report on the A-10’s “combat employment, recent operational relevance, lessons for future force design, and modernization options that could improve the return on continued sustainment of the program.”

Hamadeh lists a range of recent modernization efforts for the jet that “could improve the operational return on continued sustainment of the A-10 program.” These include electronic warfare capabilities, decoy or stand-in effects delivery, digital communications, sensor integration, precision weapons integration, survivability improvements, open-systems architecture, and human-machine teaming applications. The amendment also refers to the A-10’s recent “aerial refueling enhancements,” referring to the rapid introduction of a nose-mounted aerial refueling probe, which you can read more about here.

At the same time, while preparing to retire the Warthog, the amendment calls for “a competitive experimentation plan for autonomous and non-traditional capabilities relevant to the A-10 mission set” — something that is far from new. According to the wording of the amended bill, this should “encourage autonomous replacement and modernization of the A-10, while also prioritizing participation of non-traditional defense firms.”

The amendment specifies that “autonomous, semi-autonomous, artificial intelligence-enabled, and adjunct aircraft capabilities” should all be investigated for carrying out future A-10-type mission sets.

The plan should include ways to ensure operational experiments are done “in a manner consistent with meaningful human command and control, by a qualified military aviator,” the amendment added. That should include mission-critical functions such as target engagement, weapons release, and decisions to abort a mission.

To help with the development of emerging technologies that could replace, or partly replace, the A-10, the amendment also proposes that a limited number of the jets should be used to support these studies.

As part of accelerating this initiative, the study could involve nontraditional or venture-backed defense companies, commercial technology firms, or other companies that could rapidly develop the required hardware, software, autonomy, sensing, communication, or mission system capabilities.

This amendment raises the possibility that new technologies may ultimately provide an effective replacement for many A-10 mission sets, rather than a direct one-for-one crewed aircraft successor.

Drone-wise, the current lack of a follow-on to the MQ-9 Reaper, envisaged under a program dubbed MQ-Next, is a problem. The Air Force is now trying to replace the MQ-9 again, as you can read about here, but it remains unclear if the drone that emerges could stand in for a significant part of the A-10 mission. At the same time, the lack of a true uncrewed air combat vehicle (UCAV) program, one that would have emerged out of MQ-Next or otherwise, is also a hindrance in terms of a more survivable drone-based A-10 successor.

While not mentioned specifically, other options could include Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA), AI-enabled uncrewed systems that can deliver weapons, conduct reconnaissance, perform electronic warfare, identify and track targets, and operate either independently or with crewed platforms. However, while CCAs could be part of the solution, the A-10 mission has traditionally been seen as better suited to UCAVs.

Advances in autonomy also promise future networks of expendable or attritable drones that can maintain persistent surveillance over the battlefield, rapidly share targeting information, and deliver precision effects while reducing risk to pilots. In such a model, the traditional A-10 mission would not be replaced by one aircraft but by a distributed system of sensors, shooters, and autonomous collaborators. Of course, this is of particular relevance in the kinds of contested environments where a low-flying attack aircraft would be increasingly vulnerable.

Once the A-10s are retired, the amendment directs the Secretary of Defense to evaluate the potential transfer of the jets “to another military department” — presumably, within the U.S. military. While this is a topic that has sometimes come up among the enthusiast community, there is no realistic possibility of either the Marine Corps or the Army getting hand-me-down Warthogs. In the case of the Army, this service has long agreed not to operate fixed-wing crewed combat aircraft. For their part, the Marines have no capacity or funding to take on a whole different tactical platform, especially while winding down the F/A-18 Hornet fleet to standardize the F-35B/C as its tactical fixed-wing jet.

The idea of considering transferring retired A-10s to an ally or partner’s military has come up in the past, however, having been included in the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). As well as Jordan, which was named in the 2024 NDAA, Colombia and Ukraine are also known to have expressed interest in acquiring A-10s in the past.

More immediately, the amendment authorizes the reconstitution of an A-10 demonstration team. This would support “public outreach, recruiting, heritage, airshows, military ceremonies, and commemorative events, including those tied to the 250th anniversary of the founding of the United States.”

For more than four decades, the A-10C Demonstration Team performed dramatic displays around the world, but it ceased operations at the end of the 2024 season. At the time, the 355th Wing at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base said the decision was a part of the Air Force’s divestment of the Warthog.

Of course, it should be noted that all of these amendments don’t necessarily preclude the Air Force giving up the A-10. Provided the service can prove that it can retain the knowledge base, as well as plug any capability gaps, the path to letting the Warthog go would remain open.

As we have highlighted many times in the past, the A-10’s combination of capabilities remains difficult to replicate in a single aircraft. It was designed from the ground up for close air support, with significant battle damage tolerance, making it ideal for operating close to friendly forces, providing persistent, highly responsive fire support.

However, with the requirements of modern warfare shifting toward survivability in heavily defended airspace, the F-35A, as the A-10’s designated replacement, offers capabilities the older jet cannot match, including stealth, advanced sensor fusion, networked targeting, and the ability to strike from greater standoff distances. While the effort to replace the A-10 with the F-35 has been a controversial one, regardless of their respective merits, it’s clear that the Air Force needs combat mass, providing more ammunition for the Warthog’s proponents.

In the meantime, the Air Force has also moved away from the idea of having the F-35 as a direct successor to the A-10, reflected in the fact that one former Warthog unit, at Selfridge Air National Guard Base in Michigan, has been chosen to receive a squadron of F-15EX Eagle IIs. The balance of capabilities offered by the F-15EX means that it is now being eyed for other units, too, in line with an increased fleet size.

As for the current timeline for the A-10’s withdrawal, Craig McKee, of Phoenix, Arizona-based news channel ABC15, received an outline of the plan from Air Combat Command.

For Fiscal Year 2026, which runs through September 30, 2026, the 357th Fighter Squadron at Davis-Monthan inactivates, and the formal training pipeline ends. Meanwhile, at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, the A-10 Weapons School transitions to other types, and the 422nd Test and Evaluation Squadron stands down.

For Fiscal Years 2027 and 2028, Moody Air Force Base, Georgia, is scheduled to retain two active-duty A-10 squadrons, while Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, will keep one Air Force Reserve squadron. At this point, the total A-10 inventory is set to be 63 aircraft, with 42 in the active-duty inventory.

In Fiscal Year 2029, Moody Air Force Base is set to lose one squadron, while the total A-10 inventory drops to 42 aircraft.

Finally, Fiscal Year 2030 is planned to see the full divestment of the A-10 fleet.

All of this is in line with Air Force demands for the A-10’s career to come to a close by the end of the decade, the culmination of a long push to retire the jets, primarily due to concerns over the aircraft’s survivability.

At the same time, the special capabilities of the Warthog are clearly still in high demand, including in the Middle East.

Previously, it seemed like the lawmakers’ efforts to retain the A-10 might have come to an end, especially when it lost two of its most vocal supporters. Namely, after the death of Arizona’s Senator John McCain, followed by Republican Representative Martha McSally losing her bid for the Arizona Senate.

Now, with the A-10’s performance in Epic Fury, as well as a brief extension to its service, it looks like a new fight to save the Warthog might be emerging.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Congress Throws A-10 Warthog Another Lifeline appeared first on The War Zone.

Modularity is a key area of interest as the U.S. Air Force formulates its latest set of requirements for a successor to the MQ-9 Reaper, according to Gen. John Lamontagne, the service’s Vice Chief of Staff. A modular design, both in terms of hardware and software, would help make the chosen platform more flexible and adaptable to different mission sets. Earlier this year, the Air Force did lay out other prospective requirements for a relevant-sounding MQ-9 replacement, including a design that is easier to produce, lower-cost, and that can be more freely sent into higher-risk environments, as we have previously reported.

Gen. Lamontagne talked about what he termed “MQ-9 Next” during a virtual talk hosted by the Air & Space Forces Association’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies earlier today. His comments came in response to a question about the Reaper performance in the latest conflict with Iran, where the drones have played a critical role, but have also suffered major losses. The latter point is a key factor in this discussion that we will come back to later on. Last month, the Air Force had also confirmed it was in the early phases of putting together a new set of requirements for an MQ-9 replacement. This follows several abortive Air Force attempts in the past to devise a successor to the Reaper.

“As we look forward in [sic] having something that is more MQ-9-like – I would characterize it as ‘MQ-9 Next’ – I think what we’d like to have is something that’s perhaps got more range, perhaps a lot more modularity,” Lamontagne explained. “We could hang ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] sensors, we could hang weapons, we could hang fuel – something that we could line-in/ line-out, very modular.”

The Air Force’s number two officer made clear that his view of modularity in this extends from the hardware side to “very simple software that we own, and we could change, so it’s almost like an iPhone.”

“We have it for several years, and we could change it, and put whatever kind of apps on it, and change the speed of warfare, change the speed of need,” he continued. “We own it, we control it, and we can also change it very quickly.”

Greater control over intellectual property, and software in particular, has emerged as a major guiding principle for the U.S. military, in general, in recent years. This makes it easier to avoid the pitfalls of being locked into a single vendor. Being able to have companies compete for follow-on contracts creates opportunities to lower costs and diversifies supply chains. This diversification in the supplier base, in turn, can be beneficial when it comes to scaling up production of key subcomponents and complete systems.

All of this feeds back into the modularity equation, with the ability to readily integrate new capability and functionality helping keep doors wide open to new possibilities down the road. This is all on top of the more immediate flexibility that modular systems and architectures offer.

For MQ-9 Next, this could translate to more adaptability when it comes to “hey, do we need more ISR? Do we need more strike? Or a combination thereof?” Gen. Lamontagne said.

The general also described the current MQ-9 replacement requirements as “probably less defined” compared to where the service is right now on future Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) drones. “We’re just going through some early work, our Air Force Futures team, to figure out exactly how we want to tackle that going forward [on MQ-9 Next].”

Lamontagne’s remarks today are in line with testimony from Lt. Gen. Christopher Niemi, the acting head of Air Force Futures, at a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee last month. At that time, Niemi talked about an MQ-9 replacement that would be “more flexible” by leveraging open architectures, easier and cheaper to produce “in mass numbers,” and usable “in a more attritable way.”

Attritable is generally taken to mean a system that is sufficiently low-cost to be sent out on higher-risk missions where it could be lost, but also capable enough to be relevant for those same missions. It is a term that has been increasingly in disuse by the Air Force in recent years.

In April, the Air Force had also used the term in a contracting notice seeking information about prospective designs for a new ISR drone. Though the MQ-9 was not explicitly mentioned in that notice, the specific details do align with the remarks from Niemi and now Lamontagne about new plans for a Reaper replacement, as you can read more about here.

As we previously wrote:

“The latest statements from the service describe a drone with increased flexibility achieved through open architecture, rather than building bespoke batches of drones for particular requirements. Previous statements from the service outlined an aspiration to have its new drone capable of accommodating rapidly reconfigurable payloads, something that open architecture would expedite.”

“Above all else, the MQ-9 successor will still have to operate in contested environments.”

…

“The Pentagon has long worked on the basis that a future conflict with a peer rival, and especially with China in the Pacific, would see it facing highly robust anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) scenarios. With that in mind, previous Reaper replacement studies had suggested that low observability would need to be incorporated into the design.”

“The latest thinking seems to reject that, or at least reorient the program toward a lower-cost platform of the kind that the Air Force would be able to field in mass, as well as to absorb the anticipated attrition in a high-end conflict. This does not preclude this airframe from featuring low-observable elements. In fact, it most likely will. But those would be more aggressively balanced against cost.”

There remains a question of when the MQ-9 Next requirement might actually be finalized, as well as what the acquisition strategy (and timeline) might be for the drones. As already mentioned, the Air Force has tried multiple times to develop a Reaper replacement without success. As we highlighted in our past report:

“Since MQ-Next, the U.S. drone landscape has changed considerably in terms of manufacturers. A few years ago, Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, and General Atomics would have been seen as the front-runners for the MQ-9 replacement. Now, there are more contenders, often with a founding focus on rapidly scaling up production at low cost. Still, these firms have much to prove, especially considering the risk in replacing an aircraft as important as the MQ-9. At the same time, in the more advanced drone space, the legacy defense “prime” contractors are also making major progress in leveraging new technologies to reduce production costs and migrating away from exquisite, very expensive drones as their default offerings.”

All of this is made more pressing by the worrisome impacts from losses of dozens of MQ-9s just in the past year or so as a result of operations targeting Iranian-backed Houthi militants in Yemen and, more recently, the conflict directly with Iran. The Air Force itself described this attrition as concerning, but there increasingly looks to be limited options for securing any immediate replacements. The Reaper, more formally known as the MQ-9A, is out of production. The company that developed the drone, General Atomics, has moved on to the MQ-9B, an evolved design with significant differences from its predecessor. Any new Air Force purchases of drones in this broader family would have to be of the B model and worked into the existing production schedule.

General Atomics, the maker of the MQ-9 and a pioneer in the uncrewed marketplace, seems to have pushed back on some of the ideas the USAF now wants in a Reaper replacement.

“Some say we need cheaper, disposable aircraft, so that we can use them and throw them away, or lose them and not feel bad about it. No one is talking about actual capability, ready today,” C. Mark Brinkley, a spokesperson for the company, recently told TWZ. “No one is talking about all of the hard lessons, already learned, about icing and weather and weapons integration. No one is talking about the multiple survivability upgrades available for the existing platforms and the lack of investment in those.”

“These make-believe weapons that don’t exist have the luxury of being anything you imagine them to be,” Brinkely added. “Unscratched lottery tickets, promising all of the win and none of the lose [sic].”

In the meantime, operational demands for MQ-9s remain high, and Lamontagne lauded their contributions in the latest conflict with Iran during his talk today. He also said that he sees Reaper’s performance as validating his service’s broader plans for new uncrewed platforms, including CCAs, as well as MQ-9 Next.

“I think it affirms the path that we’re on with Collaborative Combat Aircraft,” he said. “Collaborative Combat Aircraft, different [from MQ-9], much more autonomous,” but “still controlled by a man or a woman, and a fighter that is going to direct them to do what they need to do.”

A “very loyal wingman” and “not quite as intensive from a manpower perspective – true both in the air and on the ground,” he continued. “So, I think it very much affirms that’s the right path. And we’re going down that road, and we’re spending really good money on CCAs, and we’re excited about what kind of capability that’s going to deliver.”

“I think we’ve learned a lot of lessons, both with CCAs and MQ-9 Next, to take us into the future.”

When it comes to MQ-9 Next, the requirements are still very much evolving. It remains to be seen when and if this attempt at a Reaper replacement will come to fruition, unlike the various preceding attempts.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post USAF Wants “MQ-9 Next” Reaper Replacement To Be Modular, Cheap appeared first on The War Zone.

A French-made Mirage 2000-5F, streaking low over Ukraine in a newly emerged video, provides a relatively rare glimpse of the fighter in Ukrainian Air Force service. Compared with the more numerous F-16 fleet, Ukrainian Mirage operations are much less widely seen. Until now, accounts and imagery have shown the delta-wing fighters being used for air-to-air missions, primarily in the fight against Russian long-range attack drones and cruise missiles. The latest footage may suggest that they now have started to embark on air-to-ground sorties, too.

Some of the first footage of a French-supplied Mirage 2000-5F in Ukrainian service conducting a strike mission on the eastern frontline.

Seen here screaming just a few dozen feet over the ground before tossing its load of bombs (likely French AASMs) at a Russian target. pic.twitter.com/EEHgNxIxUg

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) June 2, 2026

The footage, taken from a ground position possibly close to the front lines, shows a Mirage flying at a very low-level along a tree line, before pulling up into a steep climb. Potentially, the jet was engaged in an air defense patrol before pulling up to transit outside of the ground-based air defense threat ‘umbrella,’ but this exact maneuver is one we have frequently seen for air-to-ground weapons releases from other platforms.

While the moment of weapons release is not visible, the flight profile is consistent with toss bombing attacks. In particular, the French-made AASM-250 Hammer rocket-boosted munition, associated with the Mirage, has often been seen delivered by other platforms using this technique, which is exactly how the weapon was designed to be used, among other modes of delivery.

Footage reportedly showing Ukrainian MiG-29 fighter jet firing French-supplied AASM-250 Hammer guided bombs at a target in Belgorod Oblast of Russia.

Notice the very low altitude from which the munitions are being launched.

Geolocated impact point: Nekhoteevka border crossing,… pic.twitter.com/mGGuqRAmyK

— Status-6 (War & Military News) (@Archer83Able) June 27, 2024

A video of the moment of release of two French-supplied AASM-250 Hammer guided bombs from a Ukrainian MiG-29 fighter jet.

The pilot of this particular airframe, 27-year-old Captain Oleksandr Myhulia, perished while performing a combat mission on August 12, 2024.… pic.twitter.com/yNEbbaFUPt

— Status-6 (War & Military News) (@Archer83Able) August 14, 2024

After all, toss bombing is a key way to help mitigate the risks to combat jets over the battlefield, specifically ground-based air defenses. Russia’s surface-to-air missile umbrella is well layered and penetrates far beyond the front lines.

“Obviously, the lower you are, and the further away from the surface-to-air missiles that can detect you because of the curvature of the Earth” affect how far the bomb can travel, U.S. Air Force Gen. James Hecker, head of U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE), as well as NATO’s Allied Air Command and U.S. Air Forces Africa (AFAFRICA), explained back in 2023. Hecker was speaking about Ukraine’s use of unpowered JDAM-ER glide bombs, but the same applies to Hammer. “There are tactics where you can go in low and do some things… and get back,” Hecker added.

The toss/lofted technique does not reduce the accuracy of the Hammer or the U.S.-supplied JDAM-ER, which both come as standard with GPS-assisted inertial navigation system (INS) guidance packages that allow them to zero in on set coordinates even when employed indirectly.

Additionally, the Hammer can offer multi-mode guidance options with either imaging infrared or semi-active laser homing added in, which enables the engagement of moving targets and helps improve overall accuracy. This also offers alternative guidance options in GPS-degraded environments against some targets. So far, however, only the GPS/INS version has been positively identified in Ukrainian service.

Hammers come in a variety of sizes, but Ukraine is understood to have received 250-kilogram (551-pound) class types, also sometimes referred to as AASM-250s.

To date, the Hammer has been seen in use on Ukrainian Air Force MiG-29 Fulcrums, which appear to be the service’s primary launch platform for the munitions, at least so far. Ukraine has also integrated the French-made bombs onto its Su-25 Frogfoot attack jets.

Low pass by a Ukrainian Air Force MiG-29, armed with a French-supplied AASM 250 HAMMER extended-range guided bomb. pic.twitter.com/FlibJ9VZfm

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) March 15, 2024

Hammer’s solid-fuel rocket booster also gives the bomb unique benefits. The manufacturer, Safran, says the AASM-250 version can still hit targets at least up to nine miles away (15 kilometers) when released from low altitude. This can increase to around 43 miles (70 kilometers) when launched from higher altitude.

In its original form, the Mirage 2000-5F was not cleared to use the Hammer, reflecting the fighter’s primary air defense mission in French service. However, in March of last year, France confirmed that the Mirages being transferred to Ukraine would have Hammer compatibility. In the past, the Mirage has been tested in France with a six-Hammer load-out.

Today, France confirmed that Ukrainian Air Force Mirage 2000-5Fs will be outfitted with AASM extended-range guided bombs, giving Ukraine another capable strike platform.

Previously, a French Mirage 2000-5F was tested with a massive loadout of up to 6 AASM-250s. https://t.co/qSPdQ5GLHR pic.twitter.com/g2mB8WEpVr

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) March 10, 2025

Earlier this year, the Ukrainian Air Force published a video including brief interviews with a Mirage pilot, as well as two members of the ground crew. The unnamed Mirage 2000 fighter pilot came to the delta-wing jet after serving on the Soviet-era Su-27 Flanker.

“Now I pilot the Mirage 2000, and my impressions of this aircraft are extremely positive,” he explained. “I trained in the French Republic together with French fighter pilots for about six months. I learned to fly and employ weapons on the twin-seat Mirage 2000B. Later, we transitioned to the single-seat version, the very aircraft I am flying now.”

Two Ukrainian Air Force fighter jet technicians, David and Dmytro, shared their experiences of day-to-day combat operations with the Mirage.

“Right now, we’re at a forward operating airfield, our third one this week,” David pointed out, indicating the missile-armed Mirage behind him. “The enemy constantly tries to destroy our aircraft and equipment. Our forward team keeps relocating from site to site.”

Ukraine’s F-16s also routinely operate from dispersed locations around the country, supported, among others, by a fleet of vehicles dedicated to helping maintain them, as you can read about here. Moreover, these kinds of operations, and the challenges of generating air combat power under the constant threat of Russian attack, are something that is being keenly felt in the U.S. military. After all, the Pentagon is planning to operate crewed and uncrewed aircraft from distributed forward locations in future high-end fights, such as one against China in the Pacific. These concepts of operations would also be relevant in the event of a major conflict elsewhere in Europe.

Dmytro added: “During our last combat mission, we came under fire [from Shahed-series long-range one-way attack drones] and missiles, but fortunately, we managed to evacuate the aircraft and save our lives.”

The pilot and technicians praised the Magic 2 infrared-guided air-to-air missile that appears to be the primary air-to-air armament of the Ukrainian Mirage.

“It has performed exceptionally well,” one technician said, before claiming that it has a kill probability of “practically 100 percent.”

The pilot further added that the kill probability against enemy drones and cruise missiles stands at 98 percent. No mention was made of the Mirage’s twin onboard 30mm cannons, although these are shown in detail in the video.

As regards air-to-air kills, the particular Mirage seen in the video from earlier this year is marked with six silhouettes denoting Russian Kh-101 air-launched cruise missiles.

However, as the ground crew points out, another six still needed to be added to the same jet.

The prosaic reason behind this: “We don’t always have stencils with us at forward airfields… Sometimes we simply don’t have the time to apply all the markings.”

The reason the Mirage is less frequently seen in Ukrainian hands is chiefly due to numbers.

It’s unclear exactly how many Mirages have now been pledged to Ukraine by France. At first, France offered six, but last October, French President Emmanuel Macron said he would offer more. At least one has so far been lost in Ukrainian service.

On the subject of improving the combat potential of the Ukrainian Air Force, the pilot made a call for continued development, including “more modern aircraft [and] more modern weapons to counter the horde threatening us.” The appearance of the Hammer would provide evidence that this aspiration is being, to some extent, met.

As regards the particular deficiencies of the Mirage, the pilot said: “In my opinion, and in the opinion of my fellow pilots, this aircraft lacks longer-range air-to-air weapons.” He called for a weapon that represents “something in the middle ground between efficiency and cost so that we can engage the massive number of enemy aerial threats we face.”

It’s unclear if the pilot in question was including the more modern and capable MICA air-to-air missile within this assessment.

The first imagery of Ukrainian Mirages showed the jets exclusively armed with a pair of Magic 2 missiles, broadly analogous to the AIM-9L Sidewinder, rather than the MICA that the aircraft can also carry. At the start of this year, however, the MICA also began to appear on the fighters.

Ukrainian Mirage 2000 fighters have been equipped with French MICA medium-range air-to-air missiles to counter Russian air targets. https://t.co/AuliNF5G7i pic.twitter.com/y5zXa9vgKQ

— Special Kherson Cat (@bayraktar_1love) January 5, 2026

Unusual for a modern Western beyond-visual-range AAM, the MICA can be fitted with either an active radar seeker or an infrared seeker head. When using the latter option, the seeker can act as a ‘poor man’s’ infrared search and track system and provide target detection indication in the pilot’s head-up display (HUD).

The MICA uses a thrust-vectoring motor for improved agility and has a reported maximum range of around 37 miles, far superior to the roughly nine-mile range of the Magic 2.

Despite the arrival of Western-supplied equipment, Ukraine continues to rely heavily on its Soviet-era fighters. The entirety of its combat fleet — Mirages and F-16s included — is in the latter stages of its service life and needs to be replaced before too long. With that in mind, Kyiv is planning to bolster its air force with more modern equipment.

“If I had the opportunity to transition to another aircraft superior to the Mirage, I would probably choose the Rafale,” the pilot continued. “It’s from the same country, and retraining for the Rafale would be much faster than transitioning to aircraft from other nations. The Rafale can also carry the Meteor, a missile with very long reach.”

Thanks to its ramjet motor, the Meteor’s all-important ‘no-escape zone’ is much larger than for comparable weapons. This means the enemy’s chance of evading the missile at the endgame of the engagement, using high-energy maneuvering, is considerably reduced. Another advantage of being able to throttle the motor is that the Meteor’s autopilot can calculate the most efficient route to the target for very long-range shots. Ukraine now looks set to receive the Meteor to arm its first Gripen C/D fighters, now scheduled to arrive next year.

Last November, Ukraine signed a letter of intent to buy up to 100 Rafale F4 multirole fighters from France over the next 10 years. The agreement came less than a month after Sweden and Ukraine unveiled a plan to export as many as 150 Gripen E fighters to Kyiv — last week, it was confirmed that Kyiv plans to buy an initial batch of 20 of the new-generation Gripens.

While the Rafale and Gripen E/F would be the most advanced combat aircraft in Ukraine’s inventory, there remain glaring questions about whether the acquisition of one of these aircraft types, let alone two, is actually feasible, especially in such numbers, as we discussed at the time.

Today marks a significant moment, truly historic for both our nations – France and Ukraine. Together with Emmanuel Macron, we signed a Declaration of Intent on Cooperation in the Acquisition of Defense Equipment for Ukraine. This document enables Ukraine to procure military… pic.twitter.com/0qzG41IsnP

— Volodymyr Zelenskyy / Володимир Зеленський (@ZelenskyyUa) November 17, 2025

At the same time, the Mirage pilot would be happy to get his hands on any kind of modern Western-made equipment.

“If I were offered something like the F-35, Rafale, or Gripen, I would gladly, without hesitation, transition to that platform.”

The possibility of Ukraine using Mirage 2000-5F fighters in an air-to-ground strike role would mark an important expansion of their combat role. If the aircraft are now contributing to both defensive and offensive operations, they will be further enhancing Ukraine’s steadily growing Western-origin air capabilities.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Are Ukrainian Mirage 2000s Now Flying Air-To-Ground Strike Missions? appeared first on The War Zone.

The U.S. Air Force is already moving to lay groundwork for fielding the replacement of its GBU-57/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) bunker buster bomb. In the process, it has also revealed that the follow-on Next Generation Penetrator (NGP) has now been designated as the GBU-76/B. The service also has plans to continue upgrading the MOP, which became a household name after the first-ever combat use of the bombs against deeply buried Iranian nuclear facilities during Operation Midnight Hammer last year.

“The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Armament Directorate, Attack Division (AFLCMC/EBD) is conducting market research for an industry analysis of capabilities,” according to a contracting notice posted online yesterday. “AFLCMC/EBD is seeking to award a Multiple Award Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contract to support all aspects of research & development, production, testing, and delivery of the Next Generation Penetrator (NGP), GBU-76/B weapon system.”

“All interested vendors shall submit a response demonstrating their capability to support the design, production, testing, and bed down of components and specific activities related to the development, performance and sustainment of the GBU-76/B weapon system,” the notice adds. It also stresses that information is only being gathered currently for “planning purposes.”

The notice lists a wide range of “tasks that may be pertinent to this effort.” This includes fuze development and production, the development and testing of the explosive filler, the design and integration of an “Alternate Navigation System” to help guide the bomb to its target, and integration of all components into complete bombs. The full list is reproduced below.

As TWZ regularly notes, fuzing is a critical element of the design of deep-penetrating munitions. These weapons are designed to be employed against targets that are underground or otherwise present inherent challenges when it comes to establishing their exact location and layout. As such, advanced fuzes that ‘count’ floors to determine depth and/or sense the ‘voids’ of underground mission spaces help maximize the damage from a weapon like MOP or NGP. These fuzes also just need to be highly reliable in order to function after impacting very hard surfaces at high speeds and then drilling even further down into them.

The Air Force has also said in past NGP contracting notices that it “will consider novel, demonstrated, or fielded Guidance, Navigation & Control (GNC) technologies with viability for integration into a warhead guidance system design that can achieve repeatable, high accuracy performance in GPS aided, degraded, and/or denied environments.” The MOP uses a GPS-assisted inertial navigation system (INS) guidance package contained within its tail unit.

Being able to reliably hit a very specific impact point is also essential for bunker buster bombs, especially ones designed for very deep penetration. During Operation Midnight Hammer, Air Force B-2 bombers dropped six MOPs in rapid succession on each of two ventilation shafts – 12 bombs in total – at Iran’s Fordow nuclear site in order to drill down into the facility below.

Many details about the planned design of the NGP remain unknown, including its expected total weight. The Air Force has previously said that the bomb’s “warhead” is set to tip the scales at around 22,000 pounds, but the complete weapon could be heavier. The contracting notice from yesterday says prospective vendors need to show general understanding of “tasks associated with the lifecycle of Large Penetrator Warhead Systems weighing approximately 20,000 to 30,000 lbs.” The MOP is a 30,000-pound-class bomb that includes a BLU-127/B warhead with a nominal weight of approximately 27,125 pounds.

The GBU-76/B could incorporate other advanced or novel features. The Air Force has raised the possibility of a powered design offering extended reach in past discussions about MOP replacements. An add-on rocket booster could also help further improve the weapon’s penetration characteristics.

As an aside, the B-2 is the only aircraft currently certified to employ MOPs operationally, and each of the bombers can carry just two of the bombs at a time. Making the GBU-76/B lighter and/or smaller than MOP could be beneficial for future integration on the B-21 Raider. The Raider is smaller than the B-2, and is only expected to be able to carry a single MOP at a time. The smaller payload capacity of each B-21, in general, is also set to be offset by a far larger fleet size of at least 100 bombers, and likely more. Only 21 B-2s were ever built, and 19 of them remain in service today.

In line with evolving plans to actually field the new bunker busters, the NGP contracting notice the Air Force put out yesterday also asks prospective vendors to outline their ability to provide other related support. This includes supplying mission planning and weaponeering software, training assets and procedures to go along with them, and just the means of getting the bombs from point A to point B and then into waiting aircraft. The Air Force already has specialized equipment to train ground personnel on the movement and loading of MOPs on B-2 bombers, including a full-size mock bomb bay.

When the Air Force expects to start fielding its first operational GBU-76/Bs is unclear. The Air Force’s 2027 Fiscal Year budget request says that “Next Generation Penetrator Prototype Demonstration including Modeling and Simulation, Design, Product Development, and Test” is set to wrap up at the end of Fiscal Year 2028. It also says, unsurprisingly, that the goal of current prototyping efforts is to demonstrate an “Air to Ground penetrator with equivalent or better MOP performance.”

In September 2025, Applied Research Associates, Inc. (ARA) announced it had received a contract for work on NGP to include the production and delivery of full-scale prototypes. ARA also said at that time that “Boeing will drive tail kit development and support all-up-round integration.” Boeing is the prime contractor behind the MOP.

The start of fielding of the GBU-76/B is also unlikely to lead to the immediate retirement of GBU-57/B, and the Air Force is continuing to work on improving that bomb’s capabilities in the interim. The service’s 2027 Fiscal Year budget proposal outlines plans for additional upgrades to the MOP’s tail kit and fuze. After Operation Midnight Hammer, the Pentagon also moved to help the Air Force replenish and potentially expand its stockpile of GBU-57/Bs. How many MOPs have been procured to date is unknown. Boeing has reportedly expanded its capacity to make the bombs in the past, but total production is still understood to be relatively limited.

The budget documents also note that MOP funding has been supporting the construction of a new test target, referred to as MS-34, further details about which are not provided. While significant weaponeering work can be done today in the virtual space, testing against real-world targets continues to be an important aspect of the development of munitions, in general. They are especially important for validating the capabilities of highly specialized weapons like the MOP and NGP. You can read more about this in the context of the development of MOP here.

The ability to defeat very deeply buried and otherwise hardened targets continues to be a top priority for the U.S. military, broadly speaking. Though successfully executed, Operation Midnight Hammer underscored challenges just in holding relevant targets in Iran at risk. There have been reports in the past that some Iranian nuclear facilities might be beyond the reach even of MOP.

Other U.S. competitors and adversaries globally, including China, Russia, and North Korea, already have extensive subterranean and other hardened military infrastructure, including underground naval and air bases, as well as missile silos and command and control bunkers. Those target sets are only continuing to expand, particularly in China, where there has been major work to construct vast new fields of silos for intercontinental ballistic missiles and hardened command and control facilities in recent years.

This is also driving U.S. development of a new deep-penetrating nuclear bunker buster bomb, currently referred to as the Nuclear Deterrent System-Air-delivered (NDS-A). The Air Force’s stockpile of MOPs currently offers the only real conventional alternative to those weapons in many cases. A nuclear weapon would still be required to realistically destroy certain especially deeply buried facilities.

Fielding the NGP bunker buster, now designated GBU-76/B, in the coming years will give commanders a new conventional option for prosecuting strikes on hardened facilities very deep underground.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Next Generation Penetrator Bomb Slated To Replace MOP Has Been Designated GBU-76 appeared first on The War Zone.

Turkey’s new electronic warfare jet appears to be moving closer to operational status, with by far the clearest imagery yet of the aircraft emerging in an anniversary video for the Turkish Air Force. The platform is loosely similar to Western standoff electronic attack platforms such as the U.S. Air Force’s EA-37B Compass Call and once again underscores the widening spectrum of defense aerospace products, crewed and uncrewed, as well as weapons and sensors, that Turkey is now producing.

A very brief clip of the HAVA SOJ (Airborne Standoff Jammer) appears in a video published today on the official X account of the Turkish Ministry of Defense. The video was prepared to mark the 115th anniversary of the foundation of the Turkish Air Force and features various other types, either operated by the service or under development. The footage is embedded below, with the HAVA SOJ appearing at around the 1:39 mark.

115 yıldır Türk milletinin gökyüzündeki sarsılmaz gücü, Gök Vatan’ın yılmaz bekçisiyiz!

Şanlı tarihi, üstün fedakârlığı ve kahraman personeliyle milletimizin gururu olan Hava Kuvvetleri Komutanlığımızın kuruluşunun 115’inci yıl dönümünü kutluyor; görev başındaki tüm… pic.twitter.com/ktxuhgy2jk

— T.C. Millî Savunma Bakanlığı (@tcsavunma) June 1, 2026

The new image shows the HAVA SOJ with its external fairings and antennas, but still unpainted. The aircraft is trailing a cable from the top of its vertical stabilizer, which is likely a trailing cone that is often used for early flight tests of new aircraft configurations. An air-data probe, a temporary fixture associated with test work, is fitted to the nose.

A first, very poor quality image of the HAVA SOJ on March 1 of this year, when the aircraft was making a test flight out of the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) facility in Ankara.

Simultaneously conducted land and air platform based radar and jammer projects

Air SOJ
MIT Intelligence Aircraft
IHA-SOJ (ASOJ-234U)
Kara-SOJ 1 (Koral-1)
Kara-SOJ 2 (Koral-2)
AEW-C (ALP-200A)
IHA AEW-C (Baykar-S band early warning radar) https://t.co/pfcATqqKWq pic.twitter.com/rv1sqF5Lt6

— TR_tech (@T_Nblty) March 1, 2026

Previously, two examples of the aircraft had been noted flying on February 20, with their test sorties appearing on publicly available flight-tracking websites.

Türk Hava Kuvvetlerine ait iki adet yerli HAVA SOJ uçağı Ankara'da uçuş gerçekleştirdi. pic.twitter.com/kYJIlfrhGL

— THS Haber (@thshaber) February 19, 2026

Around the late 2000s, Turkey and Aselsan began scheming a homegrown replacement for the Turkish Air Force’s existing standoff jamming capability, based on the Transall C-160 turboprop transport, as seen in the photo embedded below.

Einsatz stationärer wie auch fliegender Jammer C-160 Milkar 2U. pic.twitter.com/JcH0PkuPSk

— MASA (@MASAOMORITR) May 30, 2021

With the program taking longer than anticipated, thought was given to fielding an interim aerial standoff jammer, under a program known as Golge (shadow). This would have provided an urgent operational capability with two Global Express-based systems and would have integrated equipment from local and international companies. Negotiations made no progress and the Golge program was terminated in 2017.

The first Canadian-made Bombardier Global 6000 airframes for the HAVA SOJ program were delivered to TAI facilities back in 2019. Ultimately, four conversions are planned. Interestingly, some early graphics associated with the program had depicted the system installed on a Gulfstream platform.

The Global 6000 airframes are receiving mission payloads from Aselsan, which are integrated by TAI. Several official images of the aircraft had appeared before the integration system had taken place, but, since then, the aircraft has been notably camera-shy.

The Turkish Defense Industry Agency (SSB), a government body that manages defense industry in Turkey, and which runs this program, describes the role of the HAVA SOJ as follows:

“Standoff Jamming (SOJ) platforms are high-value assets that suppress adversary air defense radars, disrupt command and control cycles, and interfere with communications by conducting deception and noise jamming from long ranges without entering hostile airspace. By doing so, they create corridors through which friendly air forces can penetrate enemy airspace. The effective employment of these platforms has become an undeniable reality of modern warfare, acting as a force multiplier and generating powerful asymmetric effects.”

As well as jamming systems, the HAVA SOJ will also have a surveillance capability, with electronic support measures (ESM) equipment, and there are also accounts of an onboard radar.

Most of this equipment is housed within large sensor fairings around the fuselage.

As to the specifics of the equipment, few details have been released, but it is known to be based on Aselsan’s Koral/Kara SOJ land-based electronic support/attack suite that is mounted on two heavy-duty vehicles. All of the systems for the jets are being developed in-country.

We know that the primary stated mission for the HAVA SOJ is electronic attack, in the form of both deception and jamming. For this purpose, the aircraft is likely fitted with powerful active electronically scanned array (AESA) antennas, like those used in the land-based Koral/Kara SOJ. These could be used to send out highly focused beams of electromagnetic energy to jam the radars and other radio frequency sensors and emitters in the air, on land, and at sea. This is a capability we have talked about before in relation to the U.S. Air Force’s EA-37B electronic warfare jet. Additionally, these same AESA antennas could be used to trigger cyber attacks, a capability you can read more about here.

Another parallel is found in Australia’s MC-55A Peregrine airborne intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare (AISREW) jet, based on the Gulfstream G550 business jet airframe. As we have discussed in the past, the Peregrine is likely a multi-role platform, providing both intelligence collection and electronic attack functions. 

In practice, the HAVA SOJ would use its ESM equipment to detect and track enemy radio-frequency emissions. After detecting and geolocating the hostile emitter, its frequency value would be determined. Then, the electronic attack element would be activated, sending out its own emissions to electronically attack that emitter, whether it be via jamming or spoofing. Using its AESAs, with its fast-scanning capability, the jet would be able to make pinpoint attacks, not just barrage jamming, and also execute these attacks against multiple emitters of different types and at various ranges simultaneously.

This kind of capability has a clear application against air defense systems and command and control nodes, as the SSB points to. However, it is also able to degrade, deny, and disrupt some kinds of adversary communications, causing havoc in the enemy’s data-sharing architecture and command-and-control system, and reducing adversary commanders’ ability to make effective decisions and share them. And, in peacetime, the aircraft would be able to conduct surveillance intelligence work, helping to build up an electronic order of battle (EOB) on opposing forces, which would be of high value to NATO.

Interestingly, the wingtip pods on the HAVA SOJ look a lot like those found on the EA-18G Growler, as part of its AN/ALQ-218 Tactical Jamming System Receiver system, which includes radar warning receiver (RWR), electronic support measures (ESM), and electronic intelligence (ELINT) functionality.

While designed to work from outside hostile airspace, there have been increasing questions about the ability of specialized aircraft like these to survive against more capable air defenses, with the threat of long-range anti-air missile systems only set to grow.

With regard to the long ‘canoe’ fairing under the fuselage, these are similar to that which appears on the U.S. Army’s ME-11B HADES and the Royal Air Force’s now-retired Sentinel R1s, both also based on the Bombardier Global Express. In these applications, the ‘canoe’ houses a synthetic aperture radar/ground moving target indicator (SAR/GMTI) radar. SAR imagery consists of highly detailed ground maps, while GMTI functionality can spot and track moving vehicles on the ground, regardless of cloud cover, smoke, dust, or other obscurants. If a similar radar was installed in the HAVA SOJ, it would confer a powerful intelligence-gathering capability, but we cannot say for sure. It is also possible that AESA arrays on the jet that are primarily used to support the electronic attack mission can also perform some SAR/GMTI and other radar functions. It’s also worth noting this aircraft actually has two ventral fairings, which could feature separate arrays.

Finally, the aircraft features two large dorsal SATCOM enclosures on its spine. This would allow for the data this aircraft collects to be distributed anywhere in near-real time. In addition, the aircraft will clearly feature an impressive communications suite for supporting line-of-sight communications and data sharing as well, which will be critical for working as a force multiplier for the Turkish Air Force.

When Aselsan was awarded the contract for its part of the HAVA SOJ program in 2018, it was planned that the first would be delivered to the Turkish Air Force in 2023. That deadline has clearly been missed, hardly uncommon for a program of this technological complexity.

Bearing in mind Turkey’s success in finding customers for its defence products, the HAVA SOJ could also attract substantial foreign interest, with Pakistan having been identified as a possible opportunity in the past.

Aselsan has also entered a joint venture with Taqnia in Saudi Arabia, with the aim of promoting a version of the HAVA SOJ known as Kasih.

For export customers, the mission suite installed in the HAVA SOJ, like other Turkish military equipment, would not be subject to the restrictions imposed by the U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) guidelines, which can limit the transfer of defense and military technologies and services — especially the more sensitive ones — to certain countries. Even among NATO operators in Europe, the HAVA SOJ will likely provide an unmatched set of capabilities. With air defenses becoming more capable, even among lower-end foes, the need for high-end electronic attack capabilities is only growing.

While many questions remain about the exact capabilities of the HAVA SOJ, the aircraft’s increasingly frequent appearances suggest the long-delayed program is entering a more mature phase. As Turkey continues to invest heavily in indigenous technologies, the HAVA SOJ is set to become one of the more significant force multipliers in the Turkish Air Force’s inventory, providing a valuable standoff capability, including against modern integrated air defense networks.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Turkey’s Secretive Electronic Warfare Jet Appears In New Imagery appeared first on The War Zone.