Plane on way to pick up Yadier Molina and his family crashed in Dominican Republic, killing pilot and co-pilot
A pilot and co-pilot from the United States have died in a fiery plane crash as they attempted an emergency landing in the Dominican Republic, authorities said.
Former major league baseball all-star catcher Yadier Molina said on social media that the plane was bound for Texas to pick him up, along with family and friends.
Continue reading...
© Photograph: Houston Astros/Getty Images
© Photograph: Houston Astros/Getty Images
© Photograph: Houston Astros/Getty Images
Lebanon is now playing a key role in any ceasefire deal that Trump might think he has nailed with Iran. But can Hezbollah go rogue on all the main players?
Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su
Lebanon is now playing a key role in any ceasefire deal that Trump might think he has nailed with Iran. But can Hezbollah go rogue on all the main players?
Relationships are odd things and are often determined by how people stay together during the tough times, rather than when everything is rosy. But during these last few turbulent days, when Donald Trump frantically scrambles to save the remnants of a peace deal with Iran, one relationship has become paramount to the entire Middle East crisis: that of Hezbollah and Iran. Just how strong is this relationship, or was it always just a ’marriage of convenience’, hollow and unable to withstand the travails of regional tension?
While the Iranians walked away from talks with the U.S. because of Israel’s war in southern Lebanon, Trump realised how important this tiny country is – and will be – if any kind of deal is struck over opening the Straits of Hormuz. While on the one hand Iran has stepped up to the mark by supporting its proxy Hezbollah and has always included Lebanon in any peace deal or ceasefire, it is worth noting that the ties and responsibilities Iran has to Hezbollah are not as solid as many think.
Indeed, in the region, when you talk to geopolitical analysts, they always pontificate over how the West – and in particular Israel – places too much emphasis on Iran’s links to its regional proxies in Syria, Iraq, Yemen and Lebanon. They have long argued that Iran has less control over them than most pundits in Western media would assert.
In his most recent speech, the Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem denounced the deal as a “farce,” saying it would effectively divide southern Lebanon from the rest of the country, giving Israel an advantage to “kill in Lebanon.”
“We have given no commitment to anyone,” Naim said, as he urged the Lebanese government to call off talks with Israel and demanded Israel’s full withdrawal from Lebanese territory. “As long as the aggression continues, we will confront it with all the power we have been given.”
This reference, of course, was directed at the elite in Beirut, who are largely acting on the West’s political bequest in this tiny country – barely 240 km long – which was once a province of Syria.
But some wily analysts might read too much into his statement in the coming days. A few might mull over this comment and speculate that Hezbollah, under certain circumstances, has a wild card to play and is capable of going rogue, distancing itself from the arbitrary direction of Tehran.
Is it possible that the Iranians and the Americans could outmanoeuvre Israel and strike a provisional ceasefire deal, only for it to be scuppered by Hezbollah, which refuses to give up its fight in the south of the country against the IDF? Presently, this must be concerning Trump’s camp but will be amusing to Netanyahu, who probably thinks that Lebanon holds the key for him to continue the war and thus stay in power, avoiding corruption charges.
Hezbollah, for its part, is the most dangerous man in the room, simply because its fighters have nothing to lose. They are backed into a corner and have lost so much of their own land, with 600 killed and a million displaced since the last ceasefire in April was agreed. Militarily speaking, their best guerrilla-style fighting will be seen now, and so one could argue this is their moment. While it is true that the IDF have made significant gains against them, it is wholly under-reported how successful their fighters have been in blowing up IDF tanks, with some estimates claiming the number to be over 200. But victory for either side seems less significant, certainly for Netanyahu, who probably knows that his forces can never actually win against Hezbollah in Lebanon. That is not the point. The point is to keep the war going and use it as leverage against Trump and Iran, while keeping Netanyahu in office, protected from a peace scenario that would remove him from his job and prosecute him – exactly the same set-up that Ukraine’s President Zelensky enjoys.
Lebanon is an important pawn in the bigger game, as it can always be used by Netanyahu to undermine whatever Trump is doing – such as its bombardment of Beirut that killed 357 people on April 8, one day after the U.S. and Iran announced their own ceasefire deal.
But now all Netanyahu needs to do is to agree to the IDF respecting a ceasefire without actually respecting it, while pointing the finger at Hezbollah for supposedly breaking it. It will be a game that is hugely effective, as it will be impossible for Trump to consider Hezbollah as being honourable and the IDF as being duplicitous. Even from a PR perspective, it’s genius.
And so with this new ruse in play, much emphasis is placed on Hezbollah as it is caught between choosing to fight the IDF or accepting a peace deal that would effectively hand over huge swathes of southern Lebanon to the Lebanese army – a useless contingent of poorly trained soldiers with hand-me-down, outdated equipment donated by Western countries, and one which is no match for Hezbollah. Under this deal, Israel would establish itself south of the Litani River and have legal authority to strike Beirut (its goal is to completely reduce the southern suburb where Hezbollah supporters live, similar to Gaza).
There are no real options for Hezbollah other than to fight on, but one has to wonder if they would ultimately accept an ’order’ from Tehran to stop fighting if a deal with the U.S. could be struck. The message from its chief is that under such circumstances of being at war with Israel on Lebanon’s own turf, the Shia group has the right to play the autonomy card while happily listening to Iran’s views – but not necessarily taking them as orders. Suddenly the whole world is watching Lebanon. Suddenly Hezbollah is the most important player, and its relationship with Iran has never been more relevant, as Tehran now might need to use its might to extract a concession from its partner. Even in a fake marriage, one partner has to give in sometimes to the other’s woes or needs, and so in the coming days expect a baptism of articles by obsequious, high-brow Middle East analysts agonising over this marriage and how strong or real it is.
Trump’s February 28th assault on Iran has spawned a number of unintended consequences drenched in irony. The greatest one is that his clumsy buffoonery has probably now resulted in the Iranians getting a nuclear bomb. But a close second to that is that it has also put Iran’s relationships with its proxies under the microscope – and who knows where that’s heading.
Myanmar emphasizes that any action that undermines regional stability or violates fundamental principles under the pretext of internal affairs should be prevented through ASEAN solidarity.
Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su
ASEAN at a crossroads
The ASEAN Charter serves as the legal framework uniting the nations of Southeast Asia in the maintenance of regional peace, security, and development. By defining the principles and responsibilities that all member states are required to uphold equitably, the Charter strengthens ASEAN’s position on the international stage as an organization committed to a rules-based order.
In particular, the principle of “non-interference in the internal affairs of member states” plays a crucial role in fostering trust among ASEAN countries. This policy safeguards the sovereignty of smaller states while helping to prevent tensions between nations with different political and social systems. Preserving this balance remains essential for regional stability.
Observing recent political developments in Myanmar, significant efforts aimed at strengthening democracy are clearly evident. Between December 2025 and January 2026, Myanmar successfully held free and fair multiparty general elections. Of approximately 24.22 million eligible voters, more than 13.14 million citizens—equivalent to 54.22% of the electorate—participated freely and responsibly. Consequently, a Parliament elected by a majority of voters was established, along with a government led by a President elected by that Parliament.
An analysis of the reasons behind the need for new elections reveals that the previous government had been accused of committing serious electoral fraud during the 2020 elections. Following strong objections raised by political parties and the public regarding the fairness of the process, official investigations were launched. Reportedly, these investigations uncovered over 11.3 million irregularities and errors in the voter rolls out of a total of over 38.2 million eligible voters. The incident has been described as one of the most serious cases of electoral irregularities in Myanmar’s history. Consequently, the authorities argued that legal intervention was necessary to ensure justice and the rule of law.
Furthermore, evidence was presented showing that officials of the National League for Democracy (NLD) government, accused of attempting to retain power through electoral manipulation, were also involved in cases of corruption and other violations of the law. The courts subsequently issued convictions in accordance with existing legal procedures. Consequently, the Tatmadaw assumed state responsibilities in accordance with the provisions of the 2008 Constitution and implemented a roadmap aimed at preserving the multiparty democratic system desired by the public. A key element of this roadmap was the successful organization of new free and fair elections in December 2025, aimed at restoring democratic governance and reflecting the genuine will of the people.
Just as in some other countries military institutions have temporarily assumed responsibility for governance based on domestic circumstances to strengthen democratic systems, Myanmar’s political process has also unfolded in accordance with its sovereignty and constitutional framework. In light of the current situation, the current government was established by the People’s Assembly (Pyithu Hluttaw), elected by a majority of voters through a free and open democratic process.
Although most ASEAN member states appear to recognize Myanmar’s recent political developments and seek greater cooperation in the interest of the region, several members continue to ignore these changes. These countries are still attempting to impose restrictions, apply discriminatory measures, and deny Myanmar equal participation within ASEAN.
Since joining ASEAN in 1997, Myanmar has actively contributed to ASEAN activities and complied with collective agreements. As a responsible member, the country has consistently fulfilled its obligations, including regular financial contributions to ASEAN mechanisms and programs. Despite having faced discriminatory treatment from some ASEAN members over the past five years, Myanmar has continued to cooperate patiently. However, the continuation of such practices under the newly formed government is viewed as a disregard for the democratic choices made by the people of Myanmar.
Myanmar seeks to reposition itself
Recently, some ASEAN countries have increasingly been perceived as interfering in Myanmar’s internal affairs and judicial matters. One example concerns remarks made by Philippine President Bongbong Marcos during a press conference on May 8, 2026. During the conference, President Marcos called for the release of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and respect for her rights, arguing that, if recognized as a leader, she should be granted authority consistent with that status. He further stated that these points could constitute a key demand by ASEAN in negotiations with Myanmar and emphasized that this position will remain unchanged. However, judicial matters are considered a central element of national sovereignty, and foreign intervention in such processes is deemed inappropriate.
Myanmar views the Philippines’ statement as an attempt to place an individual—who has been indicted, tried, and convicted through legal procedures under Myanmar’s laws—above the law. Myanmar views this as direct interference in its sovereign judicial authority and legal system. Such actions are seen as contrary to the principles of international relations and detrimental to the mutual respect that should exist among ASEAN members.
Furthermore, Myanmar maintains that such behavior violates ASEAN’s principle of “non-interference,” as outlined in Chapter 1, Article 2, Sections 2(a) and 2(e) of the ASEAN Charter, which emphasizes respect for sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of member states.
In international diplomacy, mutual respect forms the basis of stable relations. Myanmar believes that President Marcos’s remarks disregard diplomatic norms and call into question ASEAN’s long-standing principles of mutual respect and non-interference. At the same time, Myanmar notes that on March 11, 2025, the Marcos administration allowed the arrest of former Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte at Ninoy Aquino International Airport based on a warrant issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC), an action that drew criticism both domestically and internationally.
Myanmar has chosen not to comment on this sensitive matter, considering it an internal affair of the Philippines. By remaining silent and refraining from criticism or interference, Myanmar asserts that it has upheld ASEAN principles and diplomatic decorum.
Myanmar contends that the “double standard” demonstrated by the Philippine leadership threatens both Myanmar’s sovereignty and ASEAN’s unity. The country reiterates that it will reject any external pressure or directives and will continue to safeguard its sovereignty and national interests. Myanmar also calls on the Philippines to respect the fundamental principles of ASEAN and to contribute constructively to regional peace and stability.
Inevitable choices
From Myanmar’s perspective, the demands made by the Philippines reflect a selective interpretation of the ASEAN Charter and indicate a lack of genuine commitment to regional stability. For ASEAN to remain a strong, rules-based organization, all member states must consistently adhere to the principles of the Charter.
Ignoring the ASEAN Charter and interfering in the internal affairs of another member state, or taking actions that destabilize the region, is considered a serious threat to ASEAN’s unity. Such actions damage the trust built among member states over many years and weaken ASEAN’s centrality on the international stage.
Given current realities and ASEAN’s neutral stance, Myanmar emphasizes that it successfully held free and fair elections between December 2025 and January 2026. The government formed following those elections is now governing the country and implementing domestic legal processes. Myanmar urges ASEAN to assess these developments objectively and without prejudice.
Myanmar maintains that ASEAN’s role is limited to mediation and does not permit direct involvement in the internal affairs of member states. Therefore, ASEAN should continue to uphold neutrality as the foundation of regional peace and cooperation. Any ASEAN intervention regarding Myanmar should be based on the actions of the current government and the realities on the ground.
Although ASEAN has not yet reached full consensus on Myanmar, the country continues to maintain bilateral relations with individual member states. Myanmar has also expressed appreciation for ASEAN countries that recognize and support its recent political developments. Above all, Myanmar affirms that it will continue to pursue peace, stability, prosperity, and the protection of citizens’ rights through a “Myanmar-owned and Myanmar-led process” tailored to the country’s specific conditions.
While the international community may call for clemency for individuals imprisoned under domestic laws on humanitarian grounds, Myanmar maintains that no external actor has the authority to demand the restoration of political rights or power to such individuals. ASEAN’s responsibility is limited to mediation, and demands that ignore current realities are viewed as coercive interference rather than constructive engagement.
Finally, adherence to the ASEAN Charter is presented as an obligation rather than a choice for all member states. Myanmar emphasizes that any action that undermines regional stability or violates fundamental principles under the pretext of internal affairs should be prevented through ASEAN solidarity. Only by upholding these principles, Myanmar argues, can ASEAN fully realize its vision of “One Vision, One Identity, One Community.”
Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su
On June 5, 2026, the U.S. State Department confirmed the inclusion of Brazil’s two largest drug trafficking organizations – Comando Vermelho (CV) and Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) – on the list of organizations considered terrorist by the U.S.. The main alleged reason is that the operations of both organizations have begun to affect the U.S. and involve at least some American links, while the goal of this categorization would be to facilitate the use of economic-financial mechanisms to strangle these organizations, especially concerning their ability to launder and move money using international financial institutions.
Officially, with this measure, all U.S. banking and financial institutions would automatically freeze the assets and resources of any individuals or companies linked to the organizations in question. Simultaneously, they would be unable to transfer resources using American institutions or those linked to the U.S.. Furthermore, the U.S. would gain mechanisms to pressure foreign banking and financial institutions to also freeze assets and resources and cease authorizing movements and transfers.
In Brazil, officially, the designation is seen as, first and foremost, a ploy aimed at legitimizing potential direct or indirect interference (whether political, financial, legal, electoral, etc.) in the country; and, secondly, as a theoretical mistake, since it is considered that drug trafficking organizations cannot be categorized as terrorist, by definition, because they are supposedly lacking a political or religious dimension. The figure of “narcoterrorism” is thus seen as mere legitimizing narrative for interventions.
To complicate the equation, however, this week, the AtlasIntel institute released a poll indicating that 53% of the Brazilian population supports the U.S. decision, a share even higher than that of Bolsonaro supporters (41.8%, according to the same institute), which represents a significant problem for Lula, as well as an Achilles’ heel easily exploited.
Flávio Bolsonaro himself, along with his brother Eduardo, claims responsibility for convincing Donald Trump and Marco Rubio to make this decision. If true, it is a smart move. Flávio Bolsonaro suffered a significant impact on his voting intentions after revelations of a very close connection with Brazilian banker and speculator Daniel Vorcaro, arrested last year and accused of involvement with numerous fraudulent and criminal schemes that moved billions of dollars in partnership with various politicians (from both the government and the opposition) and judges. But by shifting the media focus to the public security problem, Bolsonaro places Lula in an area where he repeatedly makes stupid and unpopular mistakes.
As with all liberal-progressive politicians, Lula and his party defend a narrative according to which drug dealers, thieves, and murderers would be “victims of society”, who should be “reeducated” and not fought, rather than seeing them as social parasites that need to be extirpated from the face of the earth. Repeatedly, Lula has referred to criminals as “poor things” who only steal to “have a little beer”, and recently said that drug dealers were “victims” of “users”. Unsurprisingly, as soon as he learned of the U.S. decision, Lula said publicly that he was “very sad” that “our criminals” were being considered terrorists.
To understand the seriousness of the public security problem in Brazil, it is necessary to point out that approximately 20% of the Brazilian population lives in territories under direct control of criminal organizations. Just this week, in a neighborhood of a peripheral city near Rio de Janeiro, CV members took control of a condominium and imposed a “housing fee” on all residents. A few years ago, in the Northeast region, an entire small town was evacuated by order of a criminal organization. Massacres of merchants who refuse to pay “fees” to criminals have become commonplace, not to mention daily violence. Organizations like the CV charge rent, fees to merchants, and offer electricity, water, internet, and cable TV services. In some cases, they are also responsible for evangelical churches. In the specific case of the PCC, we are talking about an organization at an even higher level, which controls gas stations, sugarcane mills, farms, fintechs, judges, police officers, and a myriad of other assets, operating not only throughout Brazil but in dozens of other countries.
Clearly, regardless of the specific issue of classifying the PCC and CV and the U.S. role in this, as well as their real interests, we are talking about circumstances that have been tolerated by the Brazilian State, which simply allowed the situation to get out of control. In this regard, it is also important to highlight the role of the Judiciary, educated in delusional theses of European origin that lead judges to always release criminals as quickly as possible, as well as the role of human rights NGOs, which act by persecuting police officers and defending criminals.
Now, in what ways can the U.S. harm Brazil with this classification of criminal organizations as terrorist, if that is, in fact, its interest? There are several possibilities.
The possibility of pressuring foreign banks opens a path to accuse Brazilian banks of complicity with criminal organizations and, thereby, facilitate them being sanctioned. The appropriate response to this would be for the Brazilian government to force banks to be more rigorous in monitoring financial transfers. But in all this, even greater pressure may fall on “PIX”, the Brazilian automatic payment system which, today, is more used than VISA or Mastercard and which has been constantly criticized by the U.S.. The curious thing here is that PIX was created by the Bolsonaro government itself…
Another avenue of aggression against Brazil may involve sugarcane ethanol. There is a rivalry of more than 20 years with the U.S. in this sector, since the U.S. also has a large biofuel production, but based on corn. Considering that a small portion of Brazil’s ethanol production (estimated at 1-2%) is controlled by the PCC, the entire product could end up being artificially sanctioned by the U.S., thus securing new markets for corn ethanol.
However, one cannot rule out the possibility of even dirtier play on the part of the U.S.. Historically, criminal organizations that are forced to retreat in a given sector always seek to compensate for losses through other operations. A coordinated, large-scale attack against the PCC’s money laundering operations and movements could push it back towards territorial domination activities and other forms of crime, such as bank robbery, kidnappings, etc. Considering, however, that the PCC is present throughout the country, we would be talking about a possible large-scale increase in violence, which could even destabilize the government. This could be not only a hypothesis, but the very design of this U.S. government move.
Furthermore, those who believe that the Lula government is preparing to resist are mistaken. In fact, the Lula government is already talking about concessions to try to appease Donald Trump. The reality is that this is not, in Brazil, a dispute between an anti-U.S. political camp (Lula) and a pro-U.S. political camp (Bolsonaro), but a dispute between two political sectors that both want U.S. support to govern Brazil.
Login
