NASA is moving to hire a contractor to assess whether or not a Boeing 737-73W can meet its needs for a new reduced-gravity testbed aircraft. The use of planes modified for this role is now new, and they are often called “Vomit Comets” because of the extreme maneuvers they perform to simulate zero-G environments and the physical side effects this often induces. However, there’s an unusual twist here with the specific plane that NASA is now eyeing: it currently belongs to the U.S. Air Force and is part of a “classified military program.” There is a strong possibility that the aircraft in question is a mysterious 737 that the service acquired in 2020, and that has been the subject of much speculation as to its purpose ever since.

NASA’s Armstrong Flight Research Center posted a contracting notice yesterday justifying a planned sole-source contract to Denmar Technical Services, Inc. in relation to “Reduced Gravity Modification” of the 737-73W aircraft. Earlier this year, signs had already emerged that NASA might be in line to get a heavily modified and highly secretive 737 from the Air Force, designated the NT-43A and commonly referred to by the callsign RAT55. However, yesterday’s notice does not appear to refer to the NT-43A, long used as an airborne signature measurement platform and described in the past as the world’s most secretive 737, which is based on a much older 200-series airframe. We will come back to this later on.

What NASA wants now

“NASA requires Denmar Technical Services, Inc. to conduct a feasibility assessment to determine the Boeing 737-73W’s suitability to perform the NASA reduced gravity mission; modify the aircraft cabin, if required, to support reduced gravity operations; perform overdue maintenance and inspections, perform airworthiness restoration tasks, and paint the aircraft exterior with NASA identifiers,” the contracting notice NASA released yesterday explains.

The notice adds that the aircraft, if modified, would be used, at least most immediately, “for the Reduced Gravity Test Bed Project in support of the agency [sic] need for performing validation testing on Space Suits in support of the Artemis program.”

Artemis is NASA’s current effort to return U.S. astronauts to the lunar surface. The Artemis II mission, conducted in April, involved the first fly-by of the Moon by a crewed spacecraft since the end of the Apollo program in the early 1970s. However, the spacecraft did not touch down on the surface. The goal now is for a crewed lunar landing to come in 2028. RAT55 was notably used to support the launch of the Artemis II mission and the subsequent recovery of the capsule after its return to Earth.

Back in January, NASA had put out a separate contracting notice calling for information about new options to provide “parabolic flight services” to simulate “reduced gravity environments, including microgravity” for testing and scientific research purposes. The Florida-based Zero-G corporation is currently the primary provider of these services to NASA, using a retrofitted Boeing 727-200 dubbed ‘G-Force One.’ You can read more about NASA’s general use of Vomit Comets in the context of that notice here.

The Boeing 737-73W under consideration to be turned into a Vomit Comet “is owned by the United States Air Force (USAF). Denmar Technical Services, Inc. has specialized knowledge of this Boeing 737-73W aircraft as they are currently contracted by the USAF to modify the aircraft under a classified military program,” the contracting notice NASA released yesterday adds. “NASA does not have a ‘need to know’ regarding the details of the current modifications being made under the USAF contract and therefore is unable to provide modification details to another contractor or provide another contractor with access to the aircraft. The USAF will transfer ownership of the aircraft to NASA upon completion of the closeout tasks.”

“Denmar Technical Services, Inc. is uniquely positioned to close out work under their existing obligations while performing the feasibility assessment, maintenance, and any modifications required under this action,” the notice continues. “Additionally, due to the constrained timeline for the NASA Extravehicular Activity and Human Surface Mobility Program’s space suit testing for Artemis, NASA requires the assessment and overdue maintenance to be performed immediately upon contract award and any subsequent aircraft modifications to be complete no later than October 1, 2026. The timeline can only be supported if this requirement is fulfilled concurrently with the USAF closeout tasks.”

Denmar is a small aviation firm headquartered in Reno, Nevada. At the time of writing, its website lists a wide array of specialized design, modification, flight testing, and other work among its portfolios. This includes “advanced customized mission system development” that “encompasses the design of unique airborne operator interfaces, specialized emitters and sensors, system integration, and post-mission analytics and processing.” The company also describes itself as the “Nation’s leading experts on IR [infrared] and RF [radiofrequency] survivability, signature modeling, [and] agile software development for analysis and real-world operational assessments.”

In line with all this, Denmar is understood to have been the prime contractor behind the extensive modifications to RAT55. In April, the Air Force confirmed to TWZ that the NT-43A was “being transitioned to start the next phase of its career,” as reflected by its involvement in the Artemis II mission, “after decades of flights supporting the Air Force in various roles.” The aircraft, which is understood to have long called the secretive and remote Tonopah Test Range Airport (TTR) in Nevada home, has been seen much more publicly since then.

Best views of RAT55 yet. Dorsal sensor pod (EO ball) seen in detail here. Also shot inside. I wonder if this is going to be ported in full to a contractor (it is currently operated by a contractor) https://t.co/XoE1zGFN78

— Tyler Rogoway (@Aviation_Intel) April 4, 2026

However, as NASA’s recent contracting notice makes clear, the 737 it is now looking at as a potential Vomit Comet is a much newer 700-series model. TWZ has reached out to the Air Force and NASA for more information.

The curious case of N712JM

As mentioned, it is very possible, if not highly probable, that the 737 NASA is now considering turning into a Vomit Comet is one that the Air Force acquired in 2020, which TWZ explored in-depth at the time. That aircraft, which is a -73W model, is still officially on the U.S. civil register, with the registration code N712JM. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) records show that the preceding owner of this aircraft was Denmar, which acquired it in 2019. The plane’s history before that is murky, with Boeing delivering it in 2013 to East West Bank via a trusteeship with Wells Fargo Bank, per the FAA’s records.

N712JM had drawn particular attention in 2020 not just because of its transfer to the Air Force, but also because it emerged at that time wearing a green protective coating and otherwise looking like it had just rolled off the production line. It also had some unusual external features that raised questions about its role, as we explored at the time.

In 2020, Jon Ostrower, long-time aviation journalist and editor-in-chief of The Air Current, told TWZ the following:

“This is definitely an airplane that never made it to a formal finish you’d expect from a commercial airplane. The green finish is a protective coating applied to fuselages during manufacturing to protect from scratches and other damage. It is dissolved during painting. You can also still see the manufacturing (line) number as well. That’s from its original trip down the assembly line. There’s also quite a bit of instrumentation visible with sensor wiring leading into the cabin through the passenger windows. This type of arrangement points to a flight test setup of some kind.”

In 2020, N712JM conducted many test flights in U.S. military ranges off the coast of Southern California, flying various flight profiles, some of them quite unusual. The aircraft flew those sorties from Santa Maria Airport in California, and used the callsign STING 38.

The 'mysterious' USAF Boeing 737-700 N712JM is just back to Santa Maria, Ca. after another 3+ hour flight as 'Sting 38'. https://t.co/3sxMyligwM

Seven years old yet still in 'greenie' primer, lots of sensors in odd places… Article: https://t.co/erZf3MMSwi @thewarzonewire pic.twitter.com/ivs2WQFkt4

— Airport Webcams (@AirportWebcams) June 15, 2020

What the Air Force has been using N712JM for to date is unknown. Per FAA, the aircraft has been and continues to be registered to an address at Bolling Air Force Base (technically now part of Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling) in Washington, D.C., which looks to belong to the Air Force’s Rapid Capabilities Office (RCO). The RCO has headed up multiple cutting-edge, high-priority programs over the years, including the development of the B-21 Raider stealth bomber and the X-37B reusable spaceplane. A 737-based platform could be configured to support an array of different research and development and test evaluation activities that would fall under the purview of RCO, as well as other stakeholders that this office might engage with.

There has also been some speculation over the years that N712JM might have transformed into an Air Force 737 with the serial number 21-0024, but this appears to still be unconfirmed. The 21-0024 serial has more recently become associated with other shadowy 737s tied to the U.S. military, which have civilian-style paint schemes and may also be on the U.S. civil register. One of them was notably spotted in 2025 at a U.S. forward operating location in El Salvador, sitting directly alongside an Air Force AC-130J Ghostrider gunship and a U.S. Navy P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol plane. This, in turn, raised questions about its involvement in the ongoing U.S. campaign of strikes on alleged drug smuggling boats in the Caribbean and the Eastern Pacific Ocean, as TWZ previously explored in detail.

21-0024, for reference. When I spotted it, FR24 was indeed calling it N712JM, though ADSBx had the BuNo and a different hex. https://t.co/3WwV3kxBC4

— Volgowrath (@volgowrath) April 27, 2023

Sightings and flight tracking data have also pointed to N712JM being a resident at the Sierra Nevada Corporation’s (SNC) facility at Colorado Springs Airport, in the Colorado city of the same name, over the years. SNC is well known for highly specialized and unique aircraft modification work, especially for the U.S. military, but its exact connection to this 737 is unclear.

Interestingly, there have been several online flight tracking data ‘pings’ suggesting new activity related to N712JM at Colorado Springs Airport since at least February of this year. However, there do not appear to be any confirmed flights by the aircraft from there in that same timeframe. This airport notably sits adjacent to Peterson Space Force Base.

N712JM was on again today, this time thing ping is outside the hangar but that may not be accurate https://t.co/ijkrCDLmUh pic.twitter.com/mCdJbY5OOI

— 𝗦𝗥_𝗣𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗲𝘀𝗽𝗼𝘁𝘁𝗲𝗿 (@SR_Planespotter) April 8, 2026

Are we seeing the revival of N712JM? Last ping about 2 hours ago. What will it look like? https://t.co/vnFH9W6Afw pic.twitter.com/MZSLhkwXv8

— 𝗦𝗥_𝗣𝗹𝗮𝗻𝗲𝘀𝗽𝗼𝘁𝘁𝗲𝗿 (@SR_Planespotter) March 25, 2026

There is still a possibility that NASA could be looking at a different Air Force 737-73W for possible conversion into a Vomit Comet. As the contracting notice makes clear, the aircraft in question is currently in the classified realm. At the same time, this seems far less likely to be the case given everything that is known (and still unknown) about N712JM.

A separate question does exist now as to what effort the Air Force might be in the process of closing out that would allow it to transfer any classified 737 to NASA. TWZ has previously raised tangential questions about how the Air Force might fill the resulting gaps left by the highly-specialized RAT55 moving on to the next stage of its career. It is certainly interesting in its own right that NASA seems to be focused heavily at the moment on leveraging some of the most secretive 737s in existence today to support its much less sensitive needs.

More details may emerge if Denmar deems the “classified” Air Force 737 to be a suitable starting place to create a new Vomit Comet to support NASA’s reduced gravity training needs and the Artemis program.

Update: 3:45 PM EST –

In immediate response to our queries, NASA has directed us to an additional notice about the award of the sole-source contract, valued at $8.4 million, to Denmar Technical Services back on June 1.

“The contractor will modify a Boeing 737-700 aircraft to perform lunar-gravity parabolic flights to test NASA space equipment. Once modifications are complete, NASA Armstrong will own the aircraft and oversee aircraft operations out of NASA Johnson,” the notice says. “The aircraft will be used to validate astronaut lunar suits and associated crew systems required to support Artemis mission objectives. This can be done with the modified 737 aircraft in an operationally relevant, reduced-gravity environment prior to lunar mission execution.”

No mention is made here about the sourcing of the aircraft from the Air Force or its classified mission work, as outlined in the sole-source justification that was released yesterday.

Update: 6/11/2026 –

The U.S. Air Force has provided TWZ with a brief statement about the 737-73W aircraft in question.

“The Boeing 737-73W aircraft was originally procured to serve as a flying testbed,” a spokesperson for the service said. “The program ended and [the] USAF is transitioning the aircraft to NASA.”

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Is This Secretive Air Force 737 About To Become NASA’s Next ‘Vomit Comet’? (Updated) appeared first on The War Zone.

A novel kind of drone-based air defense system has been shown for the first time by German weapon manufacturer Diehl Defence. The Cobra 600, which has not previously been seen in public, combines a jet-powered drone platform with a missile rail armed with one of the company’s IRIS-T missiles, a weapon already used in short-range air defense systems and air-to-air applications. The new system immediately recalls recent Russian developments, which add short-range air defense missiles to its versions of the Shahed-136 long-range one-way attack drone, known locally as the Geran.

Cobra 600 is being presented at the ILA Berlin airshow, taking place this week in the German capital. The Cobra 600 is also known as the Airborne Launching and Attack System (AirLAS), and the program was launched last year.

The concept behind the Cobra 600 is that of a ‘missile taxi,’ in which the drone platform carries the IRIS-T missile over a considerable distance. All the while, the drone is meshed with a ground-based air defense system. Typically, this would be one of Diehl’s IRIS-T SLM or IRIS-T SLS systems. Of these, the IRIS-T SLS employs the same missile as the air-to-air variant — and therefore the same missile as the Cobra 600. The physical interface between the drone and the missile is a standard pylon as used on the Eurofighter jet.

As for the drone platform, this is provided by another German firm, the Polaris Raumflugzeuge aerospace start-up. It has a similar kind of efficient delta planform as the Shahed-136, with a modified flying-wing-like design. On the wingtips are mounted endplate vertical stabilizers. As displayed, the drone is powered by a pair of JetCat-P1000-PRO micro turbojet engines, each of which provides a maximum thrust just shy of 250 pounds. However, the drone has intake ports for another two engines. It’s not clear if these are only intended to be fitted if heavier payloads are being carried, but it’s certainly a possibility. Concept artwork released by Polaris, as seen at the top of this story, shows a four-engine configuration, with the turbojets buried in the airframe and fed by much longer intakes, helping to shield them from detection.

Polaris Raumflugzeuge has already built a variety of drones in the same configuration, and the company eventually aims to scale this up to produce a spaceplane.

Drawing on its design heritage, the Cobra 600 drone has retractable wheeled tricycle landing gear, meaning that it can be reused in some scenarios. The drone therefore takes off and lands from runways, although it is also able to operate from suitable shorter airstrips, such as stretches of highway. It’s also intended to be cheap enough that commanders will also be willing to risk losing it in combat, or after it runs out of fuel.

The concept of operations has the Cobra 600 serving as an adjunct to a ground-based air defense system, extending its range considerably.

With the missile fitted, the Cobra 600 has a range of around 250 miles. This compares to around 25 miles for the ground-launched missile used in the IRIS-T SLM, or approximately eight miles for the missile used in the IRIS-T SLS.

As such, the Cobra 600 has the potential to turn the ground-based IRIS-T into something a little closer to a long-range surface-to-air missile, in terms of the distance it can cover. Of course, this is only true in terms of absolute range, with the speed and maneuverability of the drone being far inferior to a long-range missile. Unless the target is nearby, or the Cobra 600 has been pre-positioned based on known target vectors, the reaction time it offers is strictly limited. The missile itself is also able to tackle a more limited range of potential targets than a dedicated long-range surface-to-air missile, some of which offer an anti-ballistic missile capability, for example.

On the other hand, the Cobra 600 offers the distinct advantage of being able to loiter in a given area, waiting for threats to emerge, or to perform combat air patrols to screen certain sectors. It is best viewed as a forward-positioned additional launcher for the ground-based IRIS-T, and is also entirely reliant upon that system (or a similar one) for its effectiveness. At the same time, leveraging existing ground-based air defense systems as a force multiplier is a clear advantage. Another possible operational scenario would involve setting the Cobra 600s up as interceptors on a runway, sitting ready for launch on a runway to defend against lower-end threats.

In its current form, the Cobra 600 has no onboard sensors to detect targets other than the imaging infrared seeker head that’s integral to the standard IRIS-T missile.

In an operational scenario, a target for the Cobra 600 would be detected and identified by the ground-based air defense system to which it is ‘tethered.’ Connected via datalink, the ground-based system would vector the drone to the appropriate location. Using its own seeker, the IRIS-T would lock onto the target and be commanded to launch by the operator of the ground-based system. Of course, this presupposes that the datalink is not compromised by hostile interference or due to line-of-sight limitations, although SATCOM capability, like Starlink, would help keep redundant control over the drone beyond line-of-sight.

At this point, the mode of engagement is not dissimilar to the ground-based IRIS-T SLS, which features a lock-on-after-launch (LOAL) capability. This means it can fire missiles without first establishing the weapon’s lock on the target. After receiving target information in the form of three-dimensional coordinates, the missile uses inertial guidance during the initial stage of flight. Upon reaching the designated engagement altitude, its imaging infrared seeker activates and begins searching the predicted target area.

Another conceivable option would be to add some kind of sensor, such as an infrared camera, to the Cobra 600 drone platform, meaning that a ‘person in the loop’ could establish that the missile had locked onto the correct target.

A further option could be to ‘uncage’ the missile seeker and let it search across its field of view only when the Cobra 600 is in a designated ‘kill box,’ within which it would have authority to engage any target it acquires, reactively, and autonomously. Issues such as this clearly need to be addressed, based on combat requirements and ethical concerns.

As well as operating the Cobra 600 in conjunction with the IRIS-T SLM/SLS, it could also be integrated with other ground-based air defenses. According to Polaris, it could also be embedded with aircraft or in a maritime environment.

The Cobra 600 has already completed its first flight tests, with a dummy IRIS-T missile fitted. Currently, the development effort is mainly funded by the company, but there has also been investment from at least one interested nation.

With the IRIS-T SLM/SLS combat-proven in Ukraine, experiences from this conflict have almost certainly helped inform the development of the Cobra 600.

The war in Ukraine also provides an interesting parallel to the Cobra 600, in Russia’s missile-armed adaptations of its Shahed/Geran drones.

Russian developments have seen the fielding of these drones carrying either a single R-60 air-to-air missile, a much older and less capable equivalent to the IRIS-T, or man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS).

Interception of the Russian Shahed kamikaze drone with an installed R-60 air-to-air missile.

It was intercepted by Darknode unit of the @usf_army, using STING anti-Shahed drone developed by the @wilendhornets and funded by @sternenkofund. https://t.co/XHEjuCP31F pic.twitter.com/oje4VOXTbz

— Special Kherson Cat (@bayraktar_1love) December 1, 2025

According to Ukrainian accounts, as well as the rail-mounted missile on the top, these drones are equipped with a camera and a radio-frequency modem.

Russian forces are mounting Igla MANPADS on Shahed drones to target Ukrainian helicopters that intercept them. The drones carry a camera and radio modem, and the missile is launched remotely by an operator in Russian territory. pic.twitter.com/T5TKPHyhVu

— WarTranslated (@wartranslated) January 4, 2026

However, the concept of operations for the missile-armed Russian drones is very different. While it gives the drones a means to engage Ukrainian fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, it works more as a deterrent than as a genuinely useful tactical application. As we have noted in the past, the difficulty in obtaining a high degree of situational awareness and the limited agility of the drone raises questions about the effectiveness of these solutions. On the other hand, Russia has been working on a man-in-the-loop (MITL) control capability for the Shahed/Geran, which could potentially be used to operate the missile.

Considerably larger than the Shahed-136 design, the Cobra 600 will provide a higher performance delta overall. It is also jet-powered, and, with up to four engines, this would give more impressive response times and maneuverability than the Russian system.

It should be noted that there are other previous precedents for arming drones with air-to-air missiles. In at least one instance from 2002, a U.S. Air Force MQ-1 Predator drone fired a Stinger heat-seeking anti-air missile at an Iraqi MiG-25 Foxbat fighter that was trying to shoot it down, which can be seen in the video below.

The fast pace of development of the Cobra 600 reflects a growing need for ground-based air defenses more generally, after decades of neglect. There is also a need for less-expensive, less-exquisite solutions in this area, something that the Cobra 600 also addresses, with a price point that is significantly lower than a long-range surface-to-air missile (although with the various disadvantages outlined above). At the same time, the Cobra 600 may well end up being used against even lower-cost drones, for which the IRIS-T is still a very expensive solution.

The Cobra 600 reflects a broader shift in air defense thinking driven by the lessons of recent conflicts, particularly in Ukraine and the Middle East, where persistent drone threats, as well as cruise missiles, have exposed the limitations of traditional ground-based air defense architectures.

By combining the endurance and flexibility of a drone with the proven, off-the-shelf IRIS-T interceptor, the Cobra 600 offers a potentially cost-effective way to extend defensive coverage over greater distances and to put ‘shooters’ into contested areas that crewed systems would not be able to venture. While some questions remain about how the Cobra 600 would be integrated with existing operational doctrine, the concept highlights the growing demand for innovative, layered, and resilient air defenses as militaries seek to counter increasingly varied and numerous aerial threats.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Germany’s Cobra 600 Is A Jet Powered Interceptor Drone That Slings An IRIS-T Missile appeared first on The War Zone.

Over the past several weeks, news began emerging about Ukraine’s use of modified, AI-enhanced kamikaze drones to target Russian cargo trucks, fuel tankers, railroad cars and even vessels as far as 150 miles behind the front lines. Dubbed the mid-range strike campaign by Kyiv, this effort is having a devastating effect on Russian logistics, cutting off key highways to Crimea, helping to halt Moscow’s gains and pave the way for Ukrainian advances.

To learn more about this campaign, we reached out to one of the soldiers leading this effort from the unit that created it. In an exclusive interview, an Unmanned Systems Department Officer for the First Corps Azov of the National Guard of Ukraine offered us unique insights into how the program began, how it’s going, where it is headed and how AI is helping to identify and hit targets deep behind the lines. It’s a capability we described in great detail — about how it was rapidly gestating and would arrive on the battlefield around now. The officer spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss operational details.

Some of the questions and answers have been edited for clarity.

Azov patrols the border areas around Mariupol.

Ukrainian territory must be free of Russian forces. The surest path to achieving this is pushing the "sanitization zone" for enemy logistics closer to Russia itself and occupied Crimea.

Pilots of the First Corps Azov of the… pic.twitter.com/qJLfZljIks

— First Corps Azov of the National Guard of Ukraine (@azov_media) May 25, 2026

Q: Walk me through the genesis of the mid-range strike campaign.

A: I will first of all start with answering the question of why. So the reason why we are currently conducting this campaign is to hunt enemy logistics capabilities, and currently we have a lot of quite cheap assets that can strike enemy targets at quite a deep range. So the overall meaning, the overall sense of this campaign is to strike enemy concentrations of cargo in the places where this concentration is the highest and the protection of those enemy logistical assets is at the lowest level.

So, if we’re talking about enemy logistics very close to the front line, to the line of contact, we are mostly talking about a person with a backpack. Then, if we are moving deeper into the enemy controlled area, further from the front line, then we’re talking about cars. Then even deeper we’re talking about trucks. Even deeper we’re talking about long haulers with trailers, so a higher concentration of cargo. Even deeper into the enemy controlled area, we’re talking about the railroads, the trains that are carrying supplies. So the deeper we go from the line of contact, the higher is the concentration of enemy cargo.

Russian rail logistics are now also the target of Midstrike drones, with lines to Crimea being particularly affected. pic.twitter.com/K1BFd0QVov

— Sergio (@SergioCentaurus) June 5, 2026

The other part of answering this question is basically about how the enemy protects their logistical assets. So the deeper we go from the line of contact, not only is the distance larger, but also the areas that the enemy needs to protect. So just simple mathematical calculations show us that the distance of 50 kilometers deep from the line of contact is usually the most concentrated area the enemy has to defend against our strike assets. But if we go to the depths of 300 kilometers, then the areas that the enemy should protect are much larger, and it’s basically impossible to saturate that area with all the necessary protection assets that the enemy needs to strike down our drones.

The point I would like to make is that we conduct those strike operations at deeper ranges with basically the same assets that we use for the tactical depths, for example, at the depths of 50 kilometers. That means we do not increase the cost of our assets. We just introduced some technical modifications, and we can use the same assets to strike in the deep area.

Q: What drones are you using to carry out these attacks and how are you increasing the ranges?

A: Basically, we’re using fixed-wing kamikaze drones with some modifications in terms of communication systems. We’ve installed Starlink systems on those drones, and we have also introduced a number of modifications in terms of the engine of the drones – in terms of the overall propelling unit. And this allowed us to increase the range of the assets that we used previously for the range up to 50 kilometers, with some modifications for longer distances.

Q: What kinds of drones are you using?

A: Just the simple fixed-wing chemical drones, such as Hornet systems, such as the Darts systems, and also some other assets that, for now, we prefer not to mention.

Q: Can you provide additional details about the modifications you have made to these drones and what is their maximum range?

A: Well, I would say that these are quite technical things, and I wouldn’t want to disclose those, because I would want to avoid the situation where the enemy is going to do the same modifications.

Q: Are you reaching as far as 100 kilometers?

A: From what we can say now, we can cover distances of up to 250 kilometers, but as you might understand, with time we will cover longer and longer distances.

Q: Can you describe how these attacks work? Do you operate these as first-person view drones through a video feed? Do they have a terminal seeker? 

A: The process is really simple. So, for example, we select a section of the road, or the road as a whole and we distribute that road or the sections among our units. And I would like to mention that this is an all Ukrainian operation. It’s not a task for just one single unit, and basically each unit has its own area of responsibility and its own section of the road. 

And then we just send drones there in hunting mode, and I cannot disclose how this works from the standpoint of intelligence, but the overall principle is that the intelligence just gives us the priorities for the targets. For example, they say that you need to target this type of vehicle with these types of cargo.

And in terms of the targeting, I remember that you were also asking the question about how the targets are selected. For this we use both the AI tools and also the operator himself, so we’re using both methods for that.

A Ukrainian “Hornet” mid-range strike UAV patrols the highway from Mariupol to Melitopol on the land bridge to Crimea.
It is looking for trucks and especially fuel tankers. https://t.co/Mtcxq4L6rj pic.twitter.com/NMkVdbf8rs

— Roy (@GrandpaRoy2) June 6, 2026

Q: I want to get back to AI in a bit, but what area of operations do you cover?

A: Our area of interest and area of responsibility is related to all the roads that the enemy is using to bring in supplies to the area of operations of our corps, which is roughly in the area of the town of Dobropillia in eastern Ukraine, and for example, this may be the route from Rostov that goes to Mariupol and then goes to Donetsk, and this could be any other route that the enemy might use to bring military cargo to the area of operations of our corps.

Q: What were some of the more successful mid-range drone strike missions you carried out?

A: That’s basically an easy principle. When I said that we are hunting the enemy’s logistics, I mean that this is a daily process. This is a continuous process, and this is not about one standalone mission, when we fly somewhere, when we hit a target and the mission is over.

Last night, Ukraine expanded its mid-range strike campaign to the Sea of Azov, hitting at least 5 vessels carrying Russian cargo.

At least two of the cargo vessels were hit at the occupied ports of Berdyansk and Mariupol, as Ukrainian forces seek to cut off Russian logistics. pic.twitter.com/NoXeAO7Ca6

— OSINTtechnical (@Osinttechnical) June 5, 2026

Q: How are these mid-range strikes on Russian logistics affecting their ability to fight?

A: This is causing shortages of fuel for the enemy. This was already commented on by our media, and also the media resources of the enemy, and now we understand that this is true, not only for Crimea, where there is a severe shortage of fuel now, but also this is true about the other Russian-controlled territories. And basically, when we are striking enemy logistical supplies of fuel, this affects the overall situation, because what is fuel? Fuel is basically the blood of war, which is necessary to fuel the generators that the enemy is using for the FPV operations. The fuel is used for the vehicles that basically bring in those FPVs to the combat zone.

I’d like to add an additional explanation of how this works. If we destroy a car that brings fuel to the line of contact, then we’re talking about destroying like two canisters, so that’s approximately 40 liters of fuel. But if we strike a fuel tank and a tank vehicle, which is bringing fuel to the overall area, so then we can talk about several tons of materials.

Gas stations across Russian-occupied Crimea are facing worsening fuel shortages, with long queues, rationing, and voucher-based distribution reported by residents. Some locals say fuel has become so scarce that it is treated as a luxury, while Moscow insists there is no cause for… pic.twitter.com/0LSYWEqiDH

— Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (@RFERL) June 5, 2026

Q: Is this setting the stage for a Ukrainian advance in the east or Zaporizhia?

A: I would say that blocking the logistical supplies to the Zaporizhia Oblast and also to Crimea is a byproduct of our attacks aimed at cutting enemy logistics to our area of operations. Because we’re targeting the roads that go through Mariupol, also to Crimea, to supply the Zaporizhia region, and as well our area of operations. But as for the most strategic aspect of this question of whether this might influence some counter-offensive capabilities of the Ukrainian Defense Forces, I think that is not the question within my scope of responsibility, because I’m an officer responsible for the UAS component of the corps, and I think that this is more of a question that should be directed to the general staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Ukraine continues to launch an important number of mid-range strike, targeting Russian logistics in occupied territories

Since early may, more than 270 trucks have been hit, together with multiple fuel depots and trains.

THREAD1/14 pic.twitter.com/YnisZf2kJ6

— Clément Molin (@clement_molin) June 4, 2026

Q: Tell me how you came to use the U.S.-made Hornet drones.

A: I would say that this is also a question that should be directed at one level up from my level. We get those drones, we deploy those drones, but the questions of how we get them and what are the specifics of their supply, this is not a question that I can answer.

Q: When did you start getting them?

A: We have been receiving these drones for almost a year.

Q: When you got the Hornet drones, were you given any instructions on what missions to accomplish with them or what targets to pursue?

A: I think that the principle thing to explain here is that the Hornet drone is a tactical level UAV system. It can be used at the maximum range of 50 kilometers – the maximum range of the basic configuration of this drone. The drones we are currently using are the modification of the Hornet drone, but the basic configuration of this drone is only a tactical-level UAV. This is why our mid-strike operations, which have started only recently, are using modified drones.

I think that it is important to add that these modifications are conducted by the units themselves.

The First Corps Azov of the National Guard of Ukraine maintains control over enemy logistics near Donetsk.

Strike UAV pilots are targeting Russian logistics deep in the operational rear. Drone units maintain constant surveillance and fire control over all supply routes around… pic.twitter.com/i4TYOWJBg4

— First Corps Azov of the National Guard of Ukraine (@azov_media) April 16, 2026

Q: When did you begin to make the modifications and was the mid-range strike concept something that Azov developed?

A: Yeah, I would say that basically that was Azov development. So the first tests of these new modifications started in early winter. After approximately a month of testing, we started combat deployment of those drones approximately in January or February of this year. And we use those new modifications to ensure our middle strike operations. In terms of the tactics, I would also like to say that Azov developed new tactics of the deployment of middle strike drones, because the previous tactics they were mostly concentrated on the use of very expensive assets, which are available in limited numbers, so the targeting cycle was different, which is why we needed to develop new tactics and change this targeting cycle.

Q: What systems were you using before that were so expensive?

A: Well I’m not really talking about some specific assets here. I’m mostly talking about the overall tactics and the targeting cycle. So, the tactics of middle strikes were developed for expensive assets that the Corps didn’t have at the moment. So, this is basically why we started developing our own assets that could ensure that we have those middle strike capabilities, and we can also engage targets at the operational level.

Magyar claims a reduction from 3,800 cargo journeys to 1,100 cargo journey (71.05%) along the E-58 Mariupol -Berdiansk – Melitopol – Simferopol highway in the past two weeks

He makes it clear that doesn't mean they've destroyed 2,700 trucks, nor that they have total fire control… https://t.co/O3K2Iz53Xg pic.twitter.com/VTPn3ghZcD

— Ukraine Control Map (@UAControlMap) June 9, 2026

Q: When you added Starlink, did you have to seek permission from SpaceX to use their system for these weapons?

A: The first thing that I would like to say is that we do not use only Starlink. It is just one of the possible communication systems and communication solutions that we’re using. And the second thing that I would like to add is that all the international issues, international cooperation questions, are the issues that should be dealt with at the level of our ministries and at the level of our central government, so once again, this is not a question that I can answer.

Una parte vital de la efectividad de los drones Hornet con los que Ucrania está atacando las rutas logísticas rusas entre 80 y 120km del frente es la recopilacion de datos para que el algoritmo aprenda. Por eso algunos modelos llevan grandes terminales Starlink. https://t.co/yGePjoPo2K pic.twitter.com/iWu2bLrwq5

— Martin Tuitero (@TuiteroMartin) June 2, 2026

Q: Can you tell me what other communications systems you use?

A: No, this information is still secret, because none of those assets have been taken by the enemy, so the enemy doesn’t know yet that we’re using those. But I think that in some time we will be able to go public with those assets and tell more about what we use, apart from Starlink.

Q: Are you using Starlink and the other systems on the Darts drones as well, or just Hornet?

A: Yes, we are using Darts for those middle strike attacks. So, basically, the overall tactics of those mid-strike attacks with small UAV systems, it can use any fixed wing kamikaze drones with modifications which is why we are using Hornets, we are using Darts and also the other types of drones.

While the Ukrainian “Hornet” strike UAV is receiving a lot of attention recently, the “Darts” UAV remains a workhorse for mid-range strike.
It, too, has AI terminal targeting and control capabilities to defeat Russian jamming. https://t.co/cNcQytap1D pic.twitter.com/C8nYJ20Uer

— Roy (@GrandpaRoy2) June 6, 2026

Q: Can you talk about the other types of drones? 

A: Unfortunately, no. The enemy has not yet got hold of those assets, and if one of them will be shot down, or if one of them will be captured by the enemy, then I think that we will be able to go public with those assets.

Q: Can you talk more about how you are using AI for the Hornets and Darts?

A: The AI is used for the so-called last-mile system. I’m talking about the terminal guidance here, and also the AI can also be used to identify the targets, especially when the drone is flying in the autonomous mode. It can recognize the type of the target and it can automatically engage the target. So all of these processes can happen without the involvement of the operator. This allows us to launch several drones at the same time, and this also allows us to ensure a higher level of coordination for those attacks.

I think that one of the examples of these attacks was captured by one of our videos that you might have seen when one fixed-wing drone is observing the target and the other drone is actually hitting it. 

Q: Is there a man in the loop or a man on the loop during the terminal phase of the attack or is it fully autonomous?

A: Since we are trying to control the whole process, usually it is the person who takes the final decision and actually makes this decision to strike the target, because we do not want to over rely on the artificial intelligence. If necessary, this whole process can also happen without human involvement, but as I have already mentioned, our policy is that the decision should be made exclusively by the operator.

Q: So this is man in the loop?

A: Yes, so technically men can be out of this loop, but in our case we involve humans in this system, so that’s man in the loop.

Visual look of Hornet UI. Not much new, can mark soldiers individually. Seems aiming is done by either by lock a target (red) or manually aiming by continusly clicking (green) https://t.co/d2LGtV2aON

— Tommy Lund (@TommyLundn) June 6, 2026

Q: Have the Russians developed countermeasures for this effort?

A: Since the overall intent was to go to the massive deployment of those drones against the enemy logistics at once, as for now, the enemy has not yet had enough time to adapt to these tactics of ours. And now they’re desperately trying to find some countermeasures to find some ways to react to this. 

They are putting on anti-drone nets deep into their controlled territory. They are placing people armed with shotguns every 50 meters of their critical roads, but basically, as for now, there is no Russian tactic that would be effective in protecting their logistics. I do not say that they will not come up with this tactic in a month or so, but as for now, they do not have an effective countermeasure for that.

The only thing that I would like to add is that we approximately know the direction in which the enemy is moving to ensure counter measures to this tactic of ours, and we already have countermeasures for their countermeasures.

The current Ukrainian superiority in mid-range drone warfare is a brilliant advantage that comes with an expiration date.

Failing to prepare for the day Russia matches this capability guarantees a catastrophic collapse of front line logistics for Ukraine.

Ukraine is rightfully… pic.twitter.com/RI1NWLNYUc

— Joni Askola (@joni_askola) June 8, 2026

Q: Is the AI enhancement helping to mitigate Russian jamming and electronic warfare measures?

A: Well, I would like to say that EW is not the only way to counter UAVs. So, in addition to EW assets, there are other counter drone methods. Nets can be used. Air observation posts can be used. The drones can be shot down with enemy interceptor drones, and also there are hundreds and hundreds of people armed with shotguns who can also try to shoot the drones down. So the EW systems are just a small part of this overall system of drone countermeasures, and it is a general misconception that all anti-drone efforts are from the EW system. I would say that EW accounts for approximately 10% of overall counter drone efforts.

The main idea of the use of the AI systems is not only to help operators to counter enemy drone countermeasures, but the AI also helps the operator with navigation, with orientation, with the identification of the targets. So this is a complex system that helps the operator with many tasks.

Here: strike by the Ukrainian-American "Hornet" drone on occupier positions. Two Russians confirmed as "gruz 200" (KIA).
Interestingly, the Russians call this drone "Martian-2" because its capabilities seem "out of this world" to them.

High Autonomy: Operates with AI (autonomous… pic.twitter.com/Ao0MAiCqUp

— Takeshi Kovacs (@PrzemekShura) May 12, 2026

Q: What are the lessons that the U.S. can learn from your mid-range drone strike campaign, given the importance of logistics everywhere.

A: Well, I would say that the main lesson that the U.S. can learn from our experience is that drones in their basic configuration, right out of the box, is not something that can work, and this is not something that can bring you the best results at once. This is why every unit should have their own drone laboratory that can reconfigure those drones and modify them, and I’m not only talking about reconfiguring tactical level drones to turn them into middle strike capacities. I’m talking about all warfare in general.

Assets become obsolete very quickly and in three months everything can change, starting from the navigation systems and ending with the control systems. For example, today the GPS signal works, in a month it doesn’t work anymore. Today we use this set of frequency ranges, and in a month all those frequency ranges are jammed by the enemy. So I’m saying this for you to understand that for example, if the U.S. government purchases Hornet drones for their units, then the units are going to have good tactical level drones. But if you want to squeeze all of the possible benefits from those drones, then you will need to modify the structure of your units and include the departments, include the sections that will deal with the modification and reconfiguration of those drones to ensure the most efficient results that can be achieved.

From what I see now, the U.S. is mostly just giving the unit some assets, but they are not thinking about re-configuring or repurposing those drones.

Q: Is there anything I haven’t asked you that you would like to address?

A: I think that we have covered all the topics. The only thing that I would like to add is that I would like your audience to see that Ukraine introduces new innovations that can basically change the battlefield, and this is why trying to forecast the outcome of the war based on the number of tanks or aircraft or bombs that would be incorrect, so the victory will belong to the side capable of adapting faster and not to the side that has more resources.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post Inside Ukraine’s AI-Enabled Drone Campaign Targeting Russian Logistics Deep Behind The Lines appeared first on The War Zone.

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