Ukraine at war; weapons from all over the world (Flickr)

Half way through the fifth year of the war in Ukraine it is reasonable to ask why it has lasted so long. Why has Russia not crushed Ukraine quickly as expected, it is after all a much bigger country with a far greater population and industry to call on?

By Robert Harneis

It is standard for the Western Media to talk of deadlock and to say that the Russians are not advancing because their armies are incompetent, when they are not drunk or poorly equipped. At regular intervals Western media announces that the Russian side is running out of ammunition, missiles, drones, tanks or even men. In short they are not advancing in overwhelming force to capture Kiev because they are incapable of doing so. The latest fantasy in the US, UK and European media, is that the Russian economy is crumbling in the face of the problems created by the war and sanctions.

Russia’s self-imposed restrictions

President Putin imposed severe constraints on his generals from the start. They are, to an extent, fighting with one hand tied behind their backs. Contrary to the endless claims by the Western media, the Russian forces do everything they can to avoid civilian casualties. This in borne out by their low level throughout the war. In a recent massive attack involving 1500 missiles and drones right across Ukraine, only six civilians were reported killed. It is only natural that this should be so. Russia regards Ukrainians as brother Slavs. Approximately one fifth of Russian families have close relatives in Ukraine. The brother of the Ukrainian Commander in Chief is a colonel in the Russian army. They have no interest in killing them, if it can be avoided, especially as they will have to live with them after the war.
The second restriction is the requirement to avoid heavy casualties amongst their own forces. Wars are lost on the home front when the body bags start coming home in big numbers. The constant allegations in the Western media that Russians launch human wave attacks and suffer heavy casualties doing so, are false. This desire to restrict losses is reinforced by Russia’s demographic problems. Lives are precious.
The third restriction that Putin has imposed on his generals and ministers is that the war will not stop Russian economic progress, vital for political stability. Of course it goes without saying that it is not possible to fight a major war without financial and budgetary stress. An example is the necessity of delaying the naval building program as a result of which only sixteen corvettes have been built out of the forty planned. This has made it more difficult for Russia to protect its merchant fleet and stop the current harassment of oil tankers. On the other hand the management of the economy has been a classic case of successful military Keynesianism as with the United States in World War II. Throughout the war real wages have risen and economic growth has been maintained. Unemployment is at record low levels.

Tactical considerations

There are other less obvious reasons for hastening slowly. If Moscow’s war aims are denazification and demilitarization then the longer the fighting goes on the more of the Ukrainian military is eliminated, especially the elite ultra-nationalists who are Ukraine’s most committed soldiers. The effect of the manpower attrition is obvious from the many videos appearing on social media showing Ukrainian press gangs snatching citizens from the street, often with violent resistance.
Further by keeping the fighting in the Donbass, the invading Russians have short lines of communications, whilst Kiev’s main bases are over a thousand kilometers away in Poland, with supplies at risk of constant air attack on their way to the front. Paradoxically then, the invading force has better lines of communications than the defenders in their own country.
The wish to avoid destruction is another explanation for Russian circumspection. It is obvious that the retreating Ukrainian army is indifferent to the damage it causes to the cities it loses. The greater the area of the fighting the greater the destruction that Russia will likely have to rebuild after the war. Better to ground away the Ukrainian ability to resist and if an advance into the rest of the country is needed, to wait until effective military resistance has collapsed.
However an undoubted factor in the slow Russian progress is the nature of the great Donbas urban area, which was massively fortified with NATO assistance over eight years after the 2014 coup d’état when Ukraine moved definitively into the Western camp. Whatever plans the Russian government may have for the rest of Ukraine, especially the Black Sea Coast, the source of many missile attacks on Russia, they will not wish to make any major moves until the Donbass is firmly in their hands. Two important fortified towns remain to be captured Kramatorsk and Slavyansk. Russian forces are already approaching them. It remains to be seen how long it will take to break their resistance.
We cannot know what President Putin and the Russian High Command are thinking but it is also obvious that by not committing to a major offensive Russia not only avoids casualties but retains the strategic initiative. Hundreds of thousands of Russian troops are held in reserve. Uncommitted forces are a potential threat as well as being available for defense elsewhere if needed.
The Russians will also have learnt the bitter lessons of the US army that quickly smashed its way into Afghanistan and Iraq but was unable hold the territory conquered in the face of tough local resistance. Already, at the beginning of the war in March 2022, the Washington Post published an article that assumed a quick Russian advance and talked about the planned guerilla resistance. There is every reason for Russia to move gradually and consolidate as it goes.

The diplomatic front

There is also the diplomatic aspect, which is of vital importance to Russia. Moscow views the struggle in Ukraine as part of a world confrontation. It has been clear from the start of the war that whilst the West and Kiev worry about public opinion to get support for the war, Russia is concerned about what he world’s diplomats think. Good relations with India and BRICS countries and especially China dictate moderation at all times. A shock and awe approach, whilst it might get quicker results, would have offended much international opinion and unfavorably reminded the world’s diplomats of the Soviet Union, something Putin wishes to avoid at all costs. Similarly Russia is very patient with small countries on its borders that indulge in vexatious provocations, notably the Baltic States… so far. The contrast with the brazen bullying of Venezuela, Cuba, Greenland and Iran by the United States is striking and has had an effect on world public opinion. The recent humiliation of Merz’s new militaristic Germany in the recent United Nations General Assembly vote is a striking example of the success of this softly softly approach, as is Russia’ success in expanding its influence in Africa from Mali to Madagascar.
Also on the diplomatic front, with a long war, the Black Sea remains closed to the warships of outside countries under the Montreux Convention of 1936, which governs traffic through the Dardanelles strait. The convention allows Turkey to close the straits to all warships in times of war and to permit merchant ships free passage. This suits the Russians as NATO likes to flex its muscles by bringing warships into the Black Sea in times of international tension. For four and a half years they have not been able to do this. Once the war ends, Turkey will have to let them through again. Another reason why the Russian forces have taken their time.

The change in the nature of war

Every war is different and brings its surprises. The drone revolution has transformed this one. The omnipresence of drones is all the more deadly, given the absolute impossibility for both sides, of hiding concentrations of troops, thanks to satellites that see pretty much everything happening on the ground. So now advances are made by small groups of infantry that infiltrate defenses that are then taken out by artillery, drones and missiles. Slow work if casualties are to be kept to a minimum.

NATO intervention

NATO intervention, with a huge supply of arms, finance and electronic intelligence, after sabotaging the peace talks, has increased Russian difficulties in defeating the Ukrainian army,. It is this that definitively imposed the choice of a long slow war of attrition on the Russians – a war that Russia is clearly winning. Not only have Ukraine’s forces been degraded in this process but NATO’s as well. One reason the United States has reduced arms supplies to Kiev is that they are running short. This became very obvious when Washington’s priority turned to the defense of Israel. The Pentagon has had to search the globe, asking allies as far apart as South Korea and Germany to hand over any Patriot air defense missiles they might have. The US air force is seriously short of vital stand-off munitions to attack Iran. The result for Kiev is that it has little defense industry of its own left and NATO has completely failed to match Russian weapons production levels.

Russian rearmament

It is also obviously the case Russia needed time to build its army to its present strength, as well as arm and equip it. Russia has greatly increased its military production across the board. This has been possible because of the continued existence of much of the old Soviet military industrial infrastructure on Russian territory. Whilst the combined Western nominal GDP greatly exceeds Russia’s, when it comes to purely military industrial capacity Russia is well capable of holding its own. Tank production and reconditioning has increased from a few hundred to more than a thousand a year. The United States can barely produce one hundred new Abrams tanks each year. Russia alone now produces over five million drones each year. Importantly Russia is fourth in the world in the number of STEM students graduating annually after China, India and the United States.

Irreconcilable differences block peace talks

Putin’s latest statements indicate that the Russian government is not interested in a ceasefire that fails to solve its Europe wide security problems. The United States does not want to lose face in Ukraine, particularly after its recent military failures in Afghanistan and now Iran. It also wants to continually weaken Russia. Europe is determined to persevere in its support for Ukraine despite the major economic and energy problems they have created for themselves. The statement from the latest meeting of the leaders of France, Germany and the United Kingdom, on June 7, refers to the need for a peace treaty that leaves Ukrainian frontiers unchanged. Clearly something Russia will never accept. Brussels sees failure in Ukraine as a threat to its plans for ever greater union, even the institution itself. Against this background it is not surprising that there have been no meaningful peace talks. As Josep Borrell former EU High Representative for foreign affairs commented at the beginning of the war, it will have to be settled on the battle field and that takes time.
Finally in Ukraine, whilst the people would agree to negotiations with Russia, the regime and its ultra nationalist supporters know that if there is peace and Russia wins there is no future for them. Putin’s final phrase in his recent speech at St Petersburg Economic Conference “Keep on fighting my comrades” is ominous for Zelensky and his neo Nazi colleagues. It is a reference to a famous quotation, the last words of a Russian policeman knowing he was about to die at the hands of terrorists. It reflects the Russian leader’s determination to focus Russian society in a patriotic way and finally settle the Ukrainian problem for good. He has used the long war to encourage a new generation of Russian leaders based around distinguished war veterans. This has been accompanied by a determined anti-corruption drive. None of this would have been possible without a long war.

However that may be, the Russian President is coming under increasing pressure to move faster. Like the US, Russia has parliamentary elections approaching in the autumn, September of this year, and there are signs that the tempo is quickening all along the front line. The long war has had advantages for Russia but it may be time to bring it to a close, whatever the cost.

L’article Ukraine: Why the long war? est apparu en premier sur FrenchDailyNews.

Justice (Pixabay)

The disappearance and subsequent death of 11-year-old Lyhanna, whose body was found on June 4 in an agricultural silo in the Gers region of southwestern France, has triggered an unprecedented institutional crisis in France. Politicians are shifting blame onto judges, who are doing what they can with the resources available to them.

France’s judicial institution is facing both genuine operational failures and unacceptable political exploitation. By offloading their own responsibilities onto judges and prosecutors, neither Justice Minister Gérald Darmanin nor Interior Minister Laurent Nuñez is likely to emerge from this ordeal with enhanced credibility.

A troubling case file

The facts currently known in the Lyhanna case are undeniably damaging to the judicial system. The primary suspect, a 41-year-old man and the father of one of Lyhanna’s classmates, had an extensive judicial and administrative record before being formally charged with kidnapping and unlawful confinement of a minor under the age of 15.
Several complaints and reports had already been brought to the attention of the relevant authorities. One of the most sensitive aspects of the case involves a complaint filed on August 22, 2025, by the mother of a child alleging repeated sexual assaults. On September 11, a medical report reportedly identified findings described as consistent with the child’s statements. Yet the suspect was never interviewed before Lyhanna disappeared on May 29.
This timeline raises a fundamental question: why did a complaint alleging the rape of a minor, supported by medical evidence, fail to result in an interview of the suspect before the tragedy occurred? This question goes beyond the understandable public emotion surrounding the case and requires examination of how criminal investigations are actually processed.

The justice inspectorate faces major questions

Justice Minister Gérald Darmanin has ordered a systematic review of 70,000 complaints involving children by July 14. A general administrative inspection is currently underway to determine whether delays, errors, or procedural failures occurred in the handling of cases involving the suspect.
This directive from the Ministry of Justice responds to both political and moral urgency. Its purpose is to ensure that no comparable case is sitting unattended in an investigative unit or prosecutor’s office, particularly those involving rape or sexual abuse allegations. At the same time, it reflects a clear lack of confidence in the ordinary functioning of France’s criminal justice system.
The major challenge following this review will be actually processing those complaints: interviewing suspects, verifying testimony, prioritizing investigative actions, and making the necessary judicial decisions. Without additional operational resources, the scope of the problem may be revealed without being solved.

Judges and prosecutors thrown to the wolves

Frédéric Chevallier, Chief Prosecutor of Chartres and president of the National Conference of Public Prosecutors, has spoken out in defense of prosecutors while acknowledging that the case demands answers. His comments reflect the intense pressure currently weighing on the judicial institution.
On one hand, he rejects the idea that “judges and prosecutors should be thrown to the wolves” in response to public outrage. He stresses the need to avoid premature conclusions before inspections are completed, urging public officials to “keep a cool head.” His central argument is that no serious conclusions can be drawn before the entire chain of events has been reconstructed.
On the other hand, Chevallier has not ruled out individual responsibility, noting that “judges are not beyond accountability.” This cautious approach is intended to prevent the Lyhanna case from becoming a public trial of an individual magistrate or prosecutor’s office before investigators have completed their work.
Yet this institutional defense remains fragile. Explaining that the courts are overloaded, that investigative services are overwhelmed, and that prosecutors constantly triage competing emergencies only partially addresses families’ concerns. When a child dies and prior warnings existed, the judicial system must be able to explain why certain procedures moved so slowly and whether individual decisions contributed to an identified risk.

The impossible equation of priorities

Prosecutors point out that they are managing enormous backlogs of cases. Chevallier referenced not only the 70,000 complaints involving minors now under review, but also millions of cases of all types awaiting action within investigative services.
This argument reveals an institution that is clearly overwhelmed, at times buried beneath mountains of case files. It highlights a criminal justice system confronting systemic saturation. Yet it does not end the legitimate debate over how cases are prioritized. If everything is considered urgent, then nothing truly is. The Lyhanna case compels the judicial system to explain precisely how complaints are prioritized, especially when they involve sexual violence against children.
This issue connects to a structural problem that judges’ unions have denounced for decades: chronic underfunding. The Judicial Magistrates’ Union (USM), which has been highly visible in the media since the tragedy, argues that judges should not serve as lightning rods for the state’s failure to provide adequate judicial resources.

Political exploitation and death threats

The USM has condemned what it sees as unacceptable political exploitation of the tragedy. It points to statements by President Emmanuel Macron dismissing resource-related concerns from the outset, threats of sanctions raised by the Justice Minister before the inspectorate had reached any conclusions, and proposals by political figures to create a special disciplinary court for judges.
This political escalation has been accompanied by serious consequences. The Chief Prosecutor of Auch has been targeted with death threats circulating on social media. The Ministry of Justice has filed a criminal complaint, marking a dangerous turning point: public anger is being transformed into personal targeting and threats against judges and prosecutors themselves.
This is precisely the danger prosecutors fear. Judicial unions have significantly increased their media presence, with senior officials speaking publicly. Their coordinated effort is intended to give voice to rank-and-file judges and prosecutors facing what they view as opportunistic attacks.

Restoring public trust

The prosecutors’ calls for caution regarding the administrative investigation will only be heard if the judicial institution provides complete and transparent answers to the legitimate questions raised by families, advocacy groups, and the broader public.
The central challenge is reconciling two seemingly conflicting imperatives: protecting judicial independence from political interference while acknowledging that the public deserves explanations when a child dies and previous warnings may have been overlooked.
This case reveals that the French judicial system is facing a profound crisis of confidence. Families, citizens, and the public need to understand how the criminal justice process actually works, what priorities genuinely guide the handling of complaints involving minors, and how insufficient resources concretely affect child protection.
Without restoring public trust through transparency and meaningful operational reforms, the Lyhanna case will leave a lasting mark on the relationship between the justice system and French society. The inspectorate may establish the facts, but only clear and responsible institutional communication can help ease the current tensions.

L’article The Lyhanna case: open season on judges est apparu en premier sur FrenchDailyNews.