Ukrainian drones struck the Dzhankoi checkpoint, a railway bridge, a Russian pontoon crossing, and trucks at Chonhar overnight on 13 June, hitting four targets along the only land corridor between Russian-occupied Crimea and the southern front. Traffic toward the Dzhankoi checkpoint was halted, Russia's installed head of occupied Kherson Oblast Vladimir Saldo said on Telegram, claiming Russian air defenses shot down 25 Ukrainian drones overnight.

The strike marks a stated change in Ukrainian operational concept. The 1st Separate Assault Regiment named after Dmytro Kotsiubailo, which led the operation jointly with the 475th Separate Assault Regiment "CODE 9.2," announced it is moving from one-off attacks on the bridges themselves to sustained patrol of the entire logistics route. "We are transitioning to patrolling enemy logistics from temporarily occupied Crimea and blocking attempts to restore crossings," the regiment said in a statement posted to Facebook. "Pontoon throughput is low. Trucks accumulate in queues, becoming ready targets for us." Russian fuel and ammunition supplying Russia's southern front pass through this corridor.

What was hit

The Dzhankoi checkpoint controls the main road between northern Crimea and the Kherson Oblast mainland and serves as the busiest highway and rail junction in occupied Crimea. Saldo also said a bridge between Henichesk and the Arabat Spit, an alternative crossing point Ukraine first struck on 10 June, was attacked again overnight. Ukrainian forces did not confirm Saldo's air defense claim.

The Chonhar bridge — the main highway link between Crimea and occupied Kherson Oblast — was first hit on 7 June by the joint Falanga multidomain operations center of the two regiments, using Fire Point company drones and long-range "Behemoth" UAVs. Traffic was rerouted, then halted again after a second strike on 9 June. Four vehicular bridges at Crimea's northwestern entrance near Armiansk were struck on 11 June, Euromaidan Press reported. The overnight strike on the Dzhankoi checkpoint extends the pattern — and signals the campaign has moved from the bridges to the trucks themselves.

The logistics spine

The corridor Ukraine is now patrolling carries the supplies that sustain Russian operations across Ukraine's south. Russian fuel for the Huliaipole direction is shipped by ferry to Crimea and then trucked across the peninsula to the front, regiment commander Dmytro Filatov, call sign Perun, told Ukrainska Pravda earlier this week. Russian cargo, he said, does not move across the Kerch Bridge — its railway link has not been restored since the October 2022 explosion. Cyber intelligence inside Russian military networks now allows Ukrainian planners to target specific units waiting for fuel, Filatov added. The 37th Motor Rifle Brigade was the target of the 7 June Chonhar strike, he said. Trucks ordered for that brigade had still not arrived at the time of his interview.

A multiplying problem for Russian logistics

The interdiction campaign confronts Russia with a layered constraint. Pontoons replace damaged bridges, but they throttle throughput and concentrate trucks in queues — the conditions the 1st Assault Regiment now describes as "ready targets." Rerouting through Armiansk and Perekop runs into the bridges hit on 11 June. Ferrying fuel from Krasnodar Krai bypasses the corridor entirely but cannot scale to replace road transport on the timeframes Russian units in southern Ukraine need.

Filatov said on 10 June that the Chonhar bridge had sustained critical damage and that the occupation forces were searching for new logistics routes for ammunition and fuel.

What changes

The announcement is what makes this strike news rather than another item in a logistics campaign. Until now, the Crimea land corridor functioned — slowly, under pressure, but it functioned. As of overnight on 13 June, the regiment that led the bridge strikes is declaring the corridor a sustained engagement zone. Not a target struck once. A route to be patrolled.

"We bleed the enemy to advance forward," the unit said. "This is not the end.

At least 200 Russian soldiers aged 18 have been confirmed killed in Ukraine, according to a new joint investigation by BBC Russian and independent Russian outlet Mediazona, which has identified 226,055 Russian military deaths since the start of the full-scale invasion in 2022.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been defined by exceptionally high and sustained casualty rates across all phases of the war, driven by large-scale frontal assaults, prolonged artillery duels, and the expanding use of drone warfare that has widened the lethal “kill zone” across much of the frontline. 

At least 200 confirmed 18-year-old soldiers among Russia’s war dead

The youngest confirmed casualty in the latest update was born in 2008, marking the first recorded 18-year-old in the dataset. Researchers say the overall figure includes more than 200 teenagers aged 18, underscoring the scale of young recruits being sent into combat.

One case highlighted in the report is that of 18-year-old Alisher Svirin, who died on 1 May 2026 and was buried later that month in Moscow Oblast. He had signed a contract and served in a motor rifle brigade as a machine gunner. According to the investigation, he could not have spent more than a few months in service before being killed.

Regional patterns show disproportionate burden in poorer Russian republics

Regional data also highlights a consistent imbalance in casualty distribution, with poorer regions such as Bashkortostan, Tatarstan, and Tuva showing significantly higher per-capita losses than Russia’s largest cities. 

Researchers attribute this gap to recruitment patterns that rely more heavily on economically disadvantaged areas, where military service offers relatively higher financial incentives.

At the same time, major urban centres such as Moscow remain underrepresented in the casualty lists, reflecting both demographic differences in recruitment and uneven exposure to frontline deployments.

Open-source records show limits of confirmed casualty tracking

The database is compiled from publicly available sources, including obituaries, official regional announcements, social media posts, and burial records. Analysts say it likely captures only a portion of total losses.

The report notes that more than half of confirmed deaths now come from volunteers, mobilised personnel, and convicts recruited from penal colonies, reflecting Russia’s reliance on short-training pipeline forces for frontline deployments.

Battlefield drone warfare is reshaping how deaths are recorded and counted

Researchers also say the structure of the battlefield has changed the visibility of losses. Widespread drone warfare has expanded the “kill zone” across large sections of the front, making recovery of bodies difficult and delaying official confirmation of deaths, sometimes for months or years.

Based on current estimates, analysts suggest Russia’s real death toll could be significantly higher than identified figures, potentially reaching between 347,000 and 502,000 when accounting for incomplete data coverage.