The U.S. Air Force Weapons School at Nellis Air Force Base, in Nevada, recently completed its final weapons instructor course for the A-10 Warthog. Despite an extension in service for three A-10 squadrons to 2030, and recent combat operations in the Middle East, the Weapons School has shuttered its elite training course in line with USAF divestment plans for the type, which were previously set for the end of 2026.

TWZ’s Jamie Hunter recently visited the 66th Weapons Squadron (WPS) and got a detailed cockpit and walk-around tour of an A-10C with “Trippin,” an experienced instructor pilot attached to the unit.

A full episode that goes in-depth with the A-10 Weapons School will kick-off TWZ’s first season of Special Access on YouTube soon, so stay tuned!

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The Air Force will seek new ways to accomplish the missions of the A-10C attack jet, under an amendment added to the House Armed Services Committee’s version of the National Defense Authorization bill. While the Air Force has long campaigned for the Warthog’s retirement, the recent demand for the jet in conflicts in the Middle East has seen it earn a reprieve, with its standdown now scheduled for 2030.

Some of the numerous amendments to the bill come from Abe Hamadeh, the Republican representative for Arizona. He calls for the Secretary of the Air Force to keep supporting A-10 training, testing, experimentation, maintenance, and sustainment efforts through to the planned retirement date, as well as preserving lessons learned and operational expertise from A-10 missions to help shape future replacement systems. This would include keeping a formal training unit to teach pilots until the retirement. This is especially notable, since the unit in question, the 357th Fighter Squadron, graduated the last class of A-10 student pilots at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona, back in April.

Meanwhile, the Air Force officially concluded A-10 depot-level maintenance in February of this year, with the deactivation of the 571st Aircraft Maintenance Squadron at Hill Air Force Base, Utah, and the A-10 Weapons School is due to be shuttered this year.

In terms of “preserving operational expertise,” Hamadeh points directly to the A-10’s recent combat record in the Middle East, including its role in providing close air support during the recovery of two downed F-15E aircrew from Iran during Operation Epic Fury, and its work securing the Strait of Hormuz, a critical maritime chokepoint.

As part of this, the amendment also requests a report on the A-10’s “combat employment, recent operational relevance, lessons for future force design, and modernization options that could improve the return on continued sustainment of the program.”

Hamadeh lists a range of recent modernization efforts for the jet that “could improve the operational return on continued sustainment of the A-10 program.” These include electronic warfare capabilities, decoy or stand-in effects delivery, digital communications, sensor integration, precision weapons integration, survivability improvements, open-systems architecture, and human-machine teaming applications. The amendment also refers to the A-10’s recent “aerial refueling enhancements,” referring to the rapid introduction of a nose-mounted aerial refueling probe, which you can read more about here.

At the same time, while preparing to retire the Warthog, the amendment calls for “a competitive experimentation plan for autonomous and non-traditional capabilities relevant to the A-10 mission set” — something that is far from new. According to the wording of the amended bill, this should “encourage autonomous replacement and modernization of the A-10, while also prioritizing participation of non-traditional defense firms.”

The amendment specifies that “autonomous, semi-autonomous, artificial intelligence-enabled, and adjunct aircraft capabilities” should all be investigated for carrying out future A-10-type mission sets.

The plan should include ways to ensure operational experiments are done “in a manner consistent with meaningful human command and control, by a qualified military aviator,” the amendment added. That should include mission-critical functions such as target engagement, weapons release, and decisions to abort a mission.

To help with the development of emerging technologies that could replace, or partly replace, the A-10, the amendment also proposes that a limited number of the jets should be used to support these studies.

As part of accelerating this initiative, the study could involve nontraditional or venture-backed defense companies, commercial technology firms, or other companies that could rapidly develop the required hardware, software, autonomy, sensing, communication, or mission system capabilities.

This amendment raises the possibility that new technologies may ultimately provide an effective replacement for many A-10 mission sets, rather than a direct one-for-one crewed aircraft successor.

Drone-wise, the current lack of a follow-on to the MQ-9 Reaper, envisaged under a program dubbed MQ-Next, is a problem. The Air Force is now trying to replace the MQ-9 again, as you can read about here, but it remains unclear if the drone that emerges could stand in for a significant part of the A-10 mission. At the same time, the lack of a true uncrewed air combat vehicle (UCAV) program, one that would have emerged out of MQ-Next or otherwise, is also a hindrance in terms of a more survivable drone-based A-10 successor.

While not mentioned specifically, other options could include Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA), AI-enabled uncrewed systems that can deliver weapons, conduct reconnaissance, perform electronic warfare, identify and track targets, and operate either independently or with crewed platforms. However, while CCAs could be part of the solution, the A-10 mission has traditionally been seen as better suited to UCAVs.

Advances in autonomy also promise future networks of expendable or attritable drones that can maintain persistent surveillance over the battlefield, rapidly share targeting information, and deliver precision effects while reducing risk to pilots. In such a model, the traditional A-10 mission would not be replaced by one aircraft but by a distributed system of sensors, shooters, and autonomous collaborators. Of course, this is of particular relevance in the kinds of contested environments where a low-flying attack aircraft would be increasingly vulnerable.

Once the A-10s are retired, the amendment directs the Secretary of Defense to evaluate the potential transfer of the jets “to another military department” — presumably, within the U.S. military. While this is a topic that has sometimes come up among the enthusiast community, there is no realistic possibility of either the Marine Corps or the Army getting hand-me-down Warthogs. In the case of the Army, this service has long agreed not to operate fixed-wing crewed combat aircraft. For their part, the Marines have no capacity or funding to take on a whole different tactical platform, especially while winding down the F/A-18 Hornet fleet to standardize the F-35B/C as its tactical fixed-wing jet.

The idea of considering transferring retired A-10s to an ally or partner’s military has come up in the past, however, having been included in the 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). As well as Jordan, which was named in the 2024 NDAA, Colombia and Ukraine are also known to have expressed interest in acquiring A-10s in the past.

More immediately, the amendment authorizes the reconstitution of an A-10 demonstration team. This would support “public outreach, recruiting, heritage, airshows, military ceremonies, and commemorative events, including those tied to the 250th anniversary of the founding of the United States.”

For more than four decades, the A-10C Demonstration Team performed dramatic displays around the world, but it ceased operations at the end of the 2024 season. At the time, the 355th Wing at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base said the decision was a part of the Air Force’s divestment of the Warthog.

Of course, it should be noted that all of these amendments don’t necessarily preclude the Air Force giving up the A-10. Provided the service can prove that it can retain the knowledge base, as well as plug any capability gaps, the path to letting the Warthog go would remain open.

As we have highlighted many times in the past, the A-10’s combination of capabilities remains difficult to replicate in a single aircraft. It was designed from the ground up for close air support, with significant battle damage tolerance, making it ideal for operating close to friendly forces, providing persistent, highly responsive fire support.

However, with the requirements of modern warfare shifting toward survivability in heavily defended airspace, the F-35A, as the A-10’s designated replacement, offers capabilities the older jet cannot match, including stealth, advanced sensor fusion, networked targeting, and the ability to strike from greater standoff distances. While the effort to replace the A-10 with the F-35 has been a controversial one, regardless of their respective merits, it’s clear that the Air Force needs combat mass, providing more ammunition for the Warthog’s proponents.

In the meantime, the Air Force has also moved away from the idea of having the F-35 as a direct successor to the A-10, reflected in the fact that one former Warthog unit, at Selfridge Air National Guard Base in Michigan, has been chosen to receive a squadron of F-15EX Eagle IIs. The balance of capabilities offered by the F-15EX means that it is now being eyed for other units, too, in line with an increased fleet size.

As for the current timeline for the A-10’s withdrawal, Craig McKee, of Phoenix, Arizona-based news channel ABC15, received an outline of the plan from Air Combat Command.

For Fiscal Year 2026, which runs through September 30, 2026, the 357th Fighter Squadron at Davis-Monthan inactivates, and the formal training pipeline ends. Meanwhile, at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, the A-10 Weapons School transitions to other types, and the 422nd Test and Evaluation Squadron stands down.

For Fiscal Years 2027 and 2028, Moody Air Force Base, Georgia, is scheduled to retain two active-duty A-10 squadrons, while Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, will keep one Air Force Reserve squadron. At this point, the total A-10 inventory is set to be 63 aircraft, with 42 in the active-duty inventory.

In Fiscal Year 2029, Moody Air Force Base is set to lose one squadron, while the total A-10 inventory drops to 42 aircraft.

Finally, Fiscal Year 2030 is planned to see the full divestment of the A-10 fleet.

All of this is in line with Air Force demands for the A-10’s career to come to a close by the end of the decade, the culmination of a long push to retire the jets, primarily due to concerns over the aircraft’s survivability.

At the same time, the special capabilities of the Warthog are clearly still in high demand, including in the Middle East.

Previously, it seemed like the lawmakers’ efforts to retain the A-10 might have come to an end, especially when it lost two of its most vocal supporters. Namely, after the death of Arizona’s Senator John McCain, followed by Republican Representative Martha McSally losing her bid for the Arizona Senate.

Now, with the A-10’s performance in Epic Fury, as well as a brief extension to its service, it looks like a new fight to save the Warthog might be emerging.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

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Modularity is a key area of interest as the U.S. Air Force formulates its latest set of requirements for a successor to the MQ-9 Reaper, according to Gen. John Lamontagne, the service’s Vice Chief of Staff. A modular design, both in terms of hardware and software, would help make the chosen platform more flexible and adaptable to different mission sets. Earlier this year, the Air Force did lay out other prospective requirements for a relevant-sounding MQ-9 replacement, including a design that is easier to produce, lower-cost, and that can be more freely sent into higher-risk environments, as we have previously reported.

Gen. Lamontagne talked about what he termed “MQ-9 Next” during a virtual talk hosted by the Air & Space Forces Association’s Mitchell Institute for Aerospace Studies earlier today. His comments came in response to a question about the Reaper performance in the latest conflict with Iran, where the drones have played a critical role, but have also suffered major losses. The latter point is a key factor in this discussion that we will come back to later on. Last month, the Air Force had also confirmed it was in the early phases of putting together a new set of requirements for an MQ-9 replacement. This follows several abortive Air Force attempts in the past to devise a successor to the Reaper.

“As we look forward in [sic] having something that is more MQ-9-like – I would characterize it as ‘MQ-9 Next’ – I think what we’d like to have is something that’s perhaps got more range, perhaps a lot more modularity,” Lamontagne explained. “We could hang ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] sensors, we could hang weapons, we could hang fuel – something that we could line-in/ line-out, very modular.”

The Air Force’s number two officer made clear that his view of modularity in this extends from the hardware side to “very simple software that we own, and we could change, so it’s almost like an iPhone.”

“We have it for several years, and we could change it, and put whatever kind of apps on it, and change the speed of warfare, change the speed of need,” he continued. “We own it, we control it, and we can also change it very quickly.”

Greater control over intellectual property, and software in particular, has emerged as a major guiding principle for the U.S. military, in general, in recent years. This makes it easier to avoid the pitfalls of being locked into a single vendor. Being able to have companies compete for follow-on contracts creates opportunities to lower costs and diversifies supply chains. This diversification in the supplier base, in turn, can be beneficial when it comes to scaling up production of key subcomponents and complete systems.

All of this feeds back into the modularity equation, with the ability to readily integrate new capability and functionality helping keep doors wide open to new possibilities down the road. This is all on top of the more immediate flexibility that modular systems and architectures offer.

For MQ-9 Next, this could translate to more adaptability when it comes to “hey, do we need more ISR? Do we need more strike? Or a combination thereof?” Gen. Lamontagne said.

The general also described the current MQ-9 replacement requirements as “probably less defined” compared to where the service is right now on future Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) drones. “We’re just going through some early work, our Air Force Futures team, to figure out exactly how we want to tackle that going forward [on MQ-9 Next].”

Lamontagne’s remarks today are in line with testimony from Lt. Gen. Christopher Niemi, the acting head of Air Force Futures, at a hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee last month. At that time, Niemi talked about an MQ-9 replacement that would be “more flexible” by leveraging open architectures, easier and cheaper to produce “in mass numbers,” and usable “in a more attritable way.”

Attritable is generally taken to mean a system that is sufficiently low-cost to be sent out on higher-risk missions where it could be lost, but also capable enough to be relevant for those same missions. It is a term that has been increasingly in disuse by the Air Force in recent years.

In April, the Air Force had also used the term in a contracting notice seeking information about prospective designs for a new ISR drone. Though the MQ-9 was not explicitly mentioned in that notice, the specific details do align with the remarks from Niemi and now Lamontagne about new plans for a Reaper replacement, as you can read more about here.

As we previously wrote:

“The latest statements from the service describe a drone with increased flexibility achieved through open architecture, rather than building bespoke batches of drones for particular requirements. Previous statements from the service outlined an aspiration to have its new drone capable of accommodating rapidly reconfigurable payloads, something that open architecture would expedite.”

“Above all else, the MQ-9 successor will still have to operate in contested environments.”

…

“The Pentagon has long worked on the basis that a future conflict with a peer rival, and especially with China in the Pacific, would see it facing highly robust anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) scenarios. With that in mind, previous Reaper replacement studies had suggested that low observability would need to be incorporated into the design.”

“The latest thinking seems to reject that, or at least reorient the program toward a lower-cost platform of the kind that the Air Force would be able to field in mass, as well as to absorb the anticipated attrition in a high-end conflict. This does not preclude this airframe from featuring low-observable elements. In fact, it most likely will. But those would be more aggressively balanced against cost.”

There remains a question of when the MQ-9 Next requirement might actually be finalized, as well as what the acquisition strategy (and timeline) might be for the drones. As already mentioned, the Air Force has tried multiple times to develop a Reaper replacement without success. As we highlighted in our past report:

“Since MQ-Next, the U.S. drone landscape has changed considerably in terms of manufacturers. A few years ago, Northrop Grumman, Lockheed Martin, and General Atomics would have been seen as the front-runners for the MQ-9 replacement. Now, there are more contenders, often with a founding focus on rapidly scaling up production at low cost. Still, these firms have much to prove, especially considering the risk in replacing an aircraft as important as the MQ-9. At the same time, in the more advanced drone space, the legacy defense “prime” contractors are also making major progress in leveraging new technologies to reduce production costs and migrating away from exquisite, very expensive drones as their default offerings.”

All of this is made more pressing by the worrisome impacts from losses of dozens of MQ-9s just in the past year or so as a result of operations targeting Iranian-backed Houthi militants in Yemen and, more recently, the conflict directly with Iran. The Air Force itself described this attrition as concerning, but there increasingly looks to be limited options for securing any immediate replacements. The Reaper, more formally known as the MQ-9A, is out of production. The company that developed the drone, General Atomics, has moved on to the MQ-9B, an evolved design with significant differences from its predecessor. Any new Air Force purchases of drones in this broader family would have to be of the B model and worked into the existing production schedule.

General Atomics, the maker of the MQ-9 and a pioneer in the uncrewed marketplace, seems to have pushed back on some of the ideas the USAF now wants in a Reaper replacement.

“Some say we need cheaper, disposable aircraft, so that we can use them and throw them away, or lose them and not feel bad about it. No one is talking about actual capability, ready today,” C. Mark Brinkley, a spokesperson for the company, recently told TWZ. “No one is talking about all of the hard lessons, already learned, about icing and weather and weapons integration. No one is talking about the multiple survivability upgrades available for the existing platforms and the lack of investment in those.”

“These make-believe weapons that don’t exist have the luxury of being anything you imagine them to be,” Brinkely added. “Unscratched lottery tickets, promising all of the win and none of the lose [sic].”

In the meantime, operational demands for MQ-9s remain high, and Lamontagne lauded their contributions in the latest conflict with Iran during his talk today. He also said that he sees Reaper’s performance as validating his service’s broader plans for new uncrewed platforms, including CCAs, as well as MQ-9 Next.

“I think it affirms the path that we’re on with Collaborative Combat Aircraft,” he said. “Collaborative Combat Aircraft, different [from MQ-9], much more autonomous,” but “still controlled by a man or a woman, and a fighter that is going to direct them to do what they need to do.”

A “very loyal wingman” and “not quite as intensive from a manpower perspective – true both in the air and on the ground,” he continued. “So, I think it very much affirms that’s the right path. And we’re going down that road, and we’re spending really good money on CCAs, and we’re excited about what kind of capability that’s going to deliver.”

“I think we’ve learned a lot of lessons, both with CCAs and MQ-9 Next, to take us into the future.”

When it comes to MQ-9 Next, the requirements are still very much evolving. It remains to be seen when and if this attempt at a Reaper replacement will come to fruition, unlike the various preceding attempts.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

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The U.S. Air Force is already moving to lay groundwork for fielding the replacement of its GBU-57/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) bunker buster bomb. In the process, it has also revealed that the follow-on Next Generation Penetrator (NGP) has now been designated as the GBU-76/B. The service also has plans to continue upgrading the MOP, which became a household name after the first-ever combat use of the bombs against deeply buried Iranian nuclear facilities during Operation Midnight Hammer last year.

“The Air Force Life Cycle Management Center, Armament Directorate, Attack Division (AFLCMC/EBD) is conducting market research for an industry analysis of capabilities,” according to a contracting notice posted online yesterday. “AFLCMC/EBD is seeking to award a Multiple Award Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contract to support all aspects of research & development, production, testing, and delivery of the Next Generation Penetrator (NGP), GBU-76/B weapon system.”

“All interested vendors shall submit a response demonstrating their capability to support the design, production, testing, and bed down of components and specific activities related to the development, performance and sustainment of the GBU-76/B weapon system,” the notice adds. It also stresses that information is only being gathered currently for “planning purposes.”

The notice lists a wide range of “tasks that may be pertinent to this effort.” This includes fuze development and production, the development and testing of the explosive filler, the design and integration of an “Alternate Navigation System” to help guide the bomb to its target, and integration of all components into complete bombs. The full list is reproduced below.

As TWZ regularly notes, fuzing is a critical element of the design of deep-penetrating munitions. These weapons are designed to be employed against targets that are underground or otherwise present inherent challenges when it comes to establishing their exact location and layout. As such, advanced fuzes that ‘count’ floors to determine depth and/or sense the ‘voids’ of underground mission spaces help maximize the damage from a weapon like MOP or NGP. These fuzes also just need to be highly reliable in order to function after impacting very hard surfaces at high speeds and then drilling even further down into them.

The Air Force has also said in past NGP contracting notices that it “will consider novel, demonstrated, or fielded Guidance, Navigation & Control (GNC) technologies with viability for integration into a warhead guidance system design that can achieve repeatable, high accuracy performance in GPS aided, degraded, and/or denied environments.” The MOP uses a GPS-assisted inertial navigation system (INS) guidance package contained within its tail unit.

Being able to reliably hit a very specific impact point is also essential for bunker buster bombs, especially ones designed for very deep penetration. During Operation Midnight Hammer, Air Force B-2 bombers dropped six MOPs in rapid succession on each of two ventilation shafts – 12 bombs in total – at Iran’s Fordow nuclear site in order to drill down into the facility below.

Many details about the planned design of the NGP remain unknown, including its expected total weight. The Air Force has previously said that the bomb’s “warhead” is set to tip the scales at around 22,000 pounds, but the complete weapon could be heavier. The contracting notice from yesterday says prospective vendors need to show general understanding of “tasks associated with the lifecycle of Large Penetrator Warhead Systems weighing approximately 20,000 to 30,000 lbs.” The MOP is a 30,000-pound-class bomb that includes a BLU-127/B warhead with a nominal weight of approximately 27,125 pounds.

The GBU-76/B could incorporate other advanced or novel features. The Air Force has raised the possibility of a powered design offering extended reach in past discussions about MOP replacements. An add-on rocket booster could also help further improve the weapon’s penetration characteristics.

As an aside, the B-2 is the only aircraft currently certified to employ MOPs operationally, and each of the bombers can carry just two of the bombs at a time. Making the GBU-76/B lighter and/or smaller than MOP could be beneficial for future integration on the B-21 Raider. The Raider is smaller than the B-2, and is only expected to be able to carry a single MOP at a time. The smaller payload capacity of each B-21, in general, is also set to be offset by a far larger fleet size of at least 100 bombers, and likely more. Only 21 B-2s were ever built, and 19 of them remain in service today.

In line with evolving plans to actually field the new bunker busters, the NGP contracting notice the Air Force put out yesterday also asks prospective vendors to outline their ability to provide other related support. This includes supplying mission planning and weaponeering software, training assets and procedures to go along with them, and just the means of getting the bombs from point A to point B and then into waiting aircraft. The Air Force already has specialized equipment to train ground personnel on the movement and loading of MOPs on B-2 bombers, including a full-size mock bomb bay.

When the Air Force expects to start fielding its first operational GBU-76/Bs is unclear. The Air Force’s 2027 Fiscal Year budget request says that “Next Generation Penetrator Prototype Demonstration including Modeling and Simulation, Design, Product Development, and Test” is set to wrap up at the end of Fiscal Year 2028. It also says, unsurprisingly, that the goal of current prototyping efforts is to demonstrate an “Air to Ground penetrator with equivalent or better MOP performance.”

In September 2025, Applied Research Associates, Inc. (ARA) announced it had received a contract for work on NGP to include the production and delivery of full-scale prototypes. ARA also said at that time that “Boeing will drive tail kit development and support all-up-round integration.” Boeing is the prime contractor behind the MOP.

The start of fielding of the GBU-76/B is also unlikely to lead to the immediate retirement of GBU-57/B, and the Air Force is continuing to work on improving that bomb’s capabilities in the interim. The service’s 2027 Fiscal Year budget proposal outlines plans for additional upgrades to the MOP’s tail kit and fuze. After Operation Midnight Hammer, the Pentagon also moved to help the Air Force replenish and potentially expand its stockpile of GBU-57/Bs. How many MOPs have been procured to date is unknown. Boeing has reportedly expanded its capacity to make the bombs in the past, but total production is still understood to be relatively limited.

The budget documents also note that MOP funding has been supporting the construction of a new test target, referred to as MS-34, further details about which are not provided. While significant weaponeering work can be done today in the virtual space, testing against real-world targets continues to be an important aspect of the development of munitions, in general. They are especially important for validating the capabilities of highly specialized weapons like the MOP and NGP. You can read more about this in the context of the development of MOP here.

The ability to defeat very deeply buried and otherwise hardened targets continues to be a top priority for the U.S. military, broadly speaking. Though successfully executed, Operation Midnight Hammer underscored challenges just in holding relevant targets in Iran at risk. There have been reports in the past that some Iranian nuclear facilities might be beyond the reach even of MOP.

Other U.S. competitors and adversaries globally, including China, Russia, and North Korea, already have extensive subterranean and other hardened military infrastructure, including underground naval and air bases, as well as missile silos and command and control bunkers. Those target sets are only continuing to expand, particularly in China, where there has been major work to construct vast new fields of silos for intercontinental ballistic missiles and hardened command and control facilities in recent years.

This is also driving U.S. development of a new deep-penetrating nuclear bunker buster bomb, currently referred to as the Nuclear Deterrent System-Air-delivered (NDS-A). The Air Force’s stockpile of MOPs currently offers the only real conventional alternative to those weapons in many cases. A nuclear weapon would still be required to realistically destroy certain especially deeply buried facilities.

Fielding the NGP bunker buster, now designated GBU-76/B, in the coming years will give commanders a new conventional option for prosecuting strikes on hardened facilities very deep underground.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

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