During U.S. President Donald Trump’s visit to China in May 2026, Chinese President Xi Jinping emphasized the importance of avoiding what he called the “Thucydides Trap.” This concept underscores the need for the U.S. and China to prevent tensions escalating into a military confrontation.
Some analysts believe that the era of direct confrontations between great powers has ended, and that problems between China, Russia, and the U.S. could be managed in the near future. Others regard the current geopolitical tensions as merely the suspension of an inevitable major conflict between China and the U.S.
Whatever the state of the international system, the “Theodosian Trap” appears to be looming on the regional stage, particularly in the Middle East, between Iran and its Arab neighbors.
If Trump and Netanyahu decide to re-escalate their military operations against Iran, the conflict will likely be between Iran, a powerful military and ideological power seeking regional hegemony, and its economically ambitious Arab neighbors, especially the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, which oppose Iranian influence in the region.
During the second round of the Iran war, in retaliation for U.S. and Israeli actions, Iran targeted, besides American military bases in the neighboring countries, civilian and economic infrastructure, including airports, ports, oil refineries, power and water facilities, as well as residential and government complexes. Such targeting extends beyond military objectives and encompasses key economic and civilian sectors. Iran has launched at least 5,200 missiles and drones, with the United Arab Emirates bearing the brunt of these airstrikes. The ensuing hostility between UAE and Iran became especially evident in the diplomatic tensions during the recent BRICS foreign ministers’ meeting in New Delhi.
Iran’s resilience in countering the Israeli-U.S. aggression launched by Trump and Netanyahu in anticipation of Tehran’s rapid collapse, has placed it in two strategic traps deliberately set by Israel and the U.S.
The primary trap was to provoke Tehran to attack neighboring states. Iran responded to U.S attacks extensively, targeting Azerbaijan, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, and several Gulf Cooperation Council states—Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait. These tactics have undermined Iran’s regional standing: it is no longer perceived as a victim, but rather as an aggressor. This transformation has led to increased hostility from regional actors that are not directly involved in the conflict, fueling appeals to establish a regional security architecture where Iran is portrayed as the primary adversary.
The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) may view strikes against Gulf states as tactically advantageous, but they have proven strategically unfavorable, as the costs exceed the gains.
Iran has lost important regional neighbors and alienated them. Moreover, in some cases it has acted like Israel, targeting perceived threats without direct intervention. By drawing Iran into these attacks, Israel may have sought to embroil the Gulf states in the conflict. However, they have largely avoided direct confrontation.
The U.S. and Israel exerted maximum pressure on Iran to push it into this move, aiming to provoke international outrage against Tehran. As a result, Iran is perceived as an aggressor in terms of international maritime security. According to international law and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, all commercial vessels have the right of “innocent passage,” which coastal states are prohibited from obstructing or suspending, even during times of armed conflict. So, Iran has no legal right to completely close the Strait of Hormuz or obstruct international navigation. NATO now considers sending warships should a peace deal is not secured between Trump and Tehran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz.
These scenarios shed light on U.S. and Israeli decision to assassinate the Iranian Supreme Leader and other senior officials in the early days of the war. They likely anticipated Iran’s reaction to the loss of its symbolic leadership, as well as a hostile response extending to Iran’s neighboring countries.
Escalating the conflict was surely not in Iran’s interests, but eventually it left it surrounded with more adversaries—a development that aligns with U.S. and Israeli strategic goals.
Another predicament Iran may face during negotiations could be termed the “trap of stubbornness.” Iran has demonstrated resilience in countering Israeli aggression and has succeeded in striking deep in its territory. Such resilience has revived hope among its allies for a revitalization of its regional axis.
However, excessive optimism risks clashing with stark geopolitical realities. Syria’s case provides a good lesson. After 2018, the Assad regime confidently declared victory over all local, regional, and international actors seeking its overthrow. Notably, in 2024, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad rejected Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s offer for reconciliation and negotiations. Ultimately, the Assad regime failed to maintain internal stability. Since 2018, the year of its supposed victory, Syria had suffered the consequences of a comprehensive economic blockade, which exacerbated a severe humanitarian and economic crisis. The Assad regime was unable to pay the salaries of the Syrian army personnel, support the martyrs’ families or the wounded. Discontent grew even among its supporters, fueled by complaints about the deteriorating economic situation, the increasing influence of Iran and Hezbollah, rampant corruption, and skyrocketing prices. Although Bashar al-Assad ultimately managed to retain power, life in Syria became unbearable due to the sanctions, blockade, and pervasive corruption.
There are concerns that Iran might fall into this trap during negotiations, especially given its difficult economic situation. In this context, Russia’s role as an ally, mediator, and facilitator becomes crucial.
It might also be beneficial for Russia to explore the possibility of establishing a secondary negotiating track between Iran and the Gulf states, parallel to the Iran-U.S. negotiations. This track could facilitate reaching mutual understanding and guarantees. Such a move would reassure the Gulf states and open a back channel for dialogue with the U.S. and consequently, with Israel.
However, a fundamental dilemma remains: both sides are inclined to claim victory, and the victor will be unwilling to compromise. The negotiations could falter and come to a mutual deadlock, threatening a renewed round of war with increased regional and international involvement. In this context, it is worth recalling King Pyrrhus of Epirus, who after achieving victory in the first two battles against the advancing Romans and realizing the heavy losses these victories bore, famously said: “One more such victory, and all is lost.” Subsequently, Pyrrhus’s army lost momentum and was defeated by the Romans in the final, decisive battle.
Iran and Israel have reached what could be considered the most difficult stage of the conflict—a state of attrition leading to a state of neither peace nor war. In this situation new actors are likely to emerge, capable of tipping the scales in favor of one side or the other. These third parties may be internal rather than external.
Perhaps the most insidious harm an adversary can receive is self-harm—like shooting oneself in the foot. In the aftermath of Hamas’s attacks on Israel the 7 October 2023, Netanyahu adopted a policy of collective punishment, committing acts of aggression against civilians in Gaza and attacks against neighboring Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. This approach resulted in a significant loss of international public support and advanced the Palestinian cause more effectively than the Palestinians themselves could have. Similarly, in the case of Iran, if revenge supersedes pragmatic considerations of national interest and future stability, even a legitimate cause would be compromised. (However, this comparison is grounded on the action-response analysis only, and it is essential to recognize the fundamental differences between Israel and Iran.)
In the absence of a prompt negotiated settlement, the third phase of the Iran war is likely to be catastrophic and have repercussions for the entire region. But even if Iran avoids it and instead faces a comprehensive embargo, economic sanctions, and international isolation, they will not serve the interests of the Iranian people or their leadership. This will inevitably lead to further escalation—an outcome that neither Iran nor the region can afford, given the existing crises and conflicts.
This situation raises a fundamental question: Who truly benefits from Iran becoming a failed, fragmented, or isolated state? Some might argue that this scenario serves Israel’s interests, but I do not see it that way. The IRGC, the Basij, and armed factions within Iran, as well as in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, could operate with impunity in the region, exploiting porous borders to export crises and destabilize neighboring countries and even Israel itself.
The only viable path forward is dialogue—negotiations, reassurances, and guarantees for the neighboring and Gulf states—leading to a potential agreement with the U.S. Time is of the essence. Nations must adapt and progress—even if it requires making difficult, albeit temporary, choices—to bridge the gap with global development and progress. Failing to prioritize the national interest and clinging to past grievances will inevitably bring nations to instability and failure.
Now that the conflict in Ukraine has entered its fifth year, Western media’s attention is largely focused on the military operations on the ground. With verifiable information remaining limited and filtered by the war of narratives, the main lens through which the Western media sees the EU’s confrontation with Russia is its aid to Ukraine and the extensive use of drones as the primary military assets.
However, the interpretation of Russia’s policy and actions through the Ukraine conflict diverts attention from the internal dynamics that reveal much of Moscow’s strategic orientation, including on the front. Three recent developments are indicative of a possible aggravation of Russia’s confrontation with the EU, beyond the current Ukrainian border.
The first sign is of regulatory and institutional nature.
On 13 May 2026, the State Duma adopted a provision that authorizes the Russian President to deploy the armed forces extraterritorially to protect Russian citizens abroad. Formally, the law concerns individuals subject to criminal proceedings by foreign or international courts not recognized by Moscow, but essentially it implies a significant expansion of the President’s powers.
Specifically, it provides for a broader institutional framework for protecting Russian citizens and Russian-speaking populations in the post-Soviet countries—a political justification that has already been used by the Kremlin in various crises, including the Ukraine one, and opens the door to actions against other countries, above all the Baltic states, which Moscow sees as broadly discriminating Russian-speaking minorities.
The West, which often reduces the Russian political system to a caricature of Vladimir Putin’s personal power, has largely ignored this novelty. Meanwhile, it provides solid institutional support to the Kremlin’s usual practice of legally substantiating the implementation of its political decisions.
The point is that for the Kremlin, defense of Russian citizens and ethnic Russians living abroad is now a strategic priority that requires structural integration of Russia’s foreign policy and direct military action.
The second sign is of geopolitical nature. Almost the same day, on 15 May, Putin signed a decree granting fast-track Russian citizenship to Transnistria residents. Formally part of Moldova, this break-away territory, inhabited by around 400,000 people and de facto controlled by structures close to Moscow, is the site of a frozen conflict since 1992, with around 1,500 Russian troops still present in the area.
Facilitating access to Russian citizenship (waiving standard legal requirements—a five-year residency in Russia, language proficiency, and civic testing) for people permanently residing in one of the most sensitive post-Soviet territories, this decree, backed up by the law on Russia’s extraterritorial defense of Russian citizens, echoes the precedent of the Donbass, where the granting of citizenship to Russian-speaking people gave Moscow formal grounds to claim its right to protect them and subsequently justify its intervention.
This may have direct geopolitical implications: any territorial link between Russia-controlled areas and Transnistria would necessarily pass through southern Ukraine, which brings to the fore the issue of Odessa and control of the Black Sea (the objectives now discussed in the circles far beyond Russian radical patriots).
On the Moldovan front, the strengthening of Russia’s presence in Transnistria would inevitably lead to confrontation with the pro-European leadership of Moldovan President Maia Sandu, who is openly supported by the EU, Germany, the UK, and France. In a country already deeply divided between pro-Russian and pro-European factions, Moldova may become fertile ground for a new proxy war between Russia and Europe.
The third sign is of socio-political nature.
In Russia’s Belgorod region, which borders Ukraine and is exposed to the war, General Alexander Shuvaev, a decorated veteran of the Ukraine conflict, has been appointed acting governor (following Vyacheslav Gladkov’s resignation). Hero of the Russian Federation, General Shuvaev has been appointed to this post through the presidential program Vremya geroev (The Time of Heroes), which promotes veterans and people who distinguished themselves in the Ukraine war, to positions in the state apparatus, regional administration, public companies.
This episode is emblematic of the formation of a new military intelligentsia, uniting figures that have war experience, enjoy public recognition, and are integrated in the political and institutional circles. This is a basically new important development in Russian society, where the military, intellectuals, and administration people have traditionally formed separate strata.
Today, a cohort of people, who distinguished themselves in the Ukraine conflict, are gaining access to social and political channels, primarily through training at elite institutions supported by privileged access and quotas reserved for the veterans.
The veterans’ social mobility, which is also political and institutional, demonstrates how war experience is becoming a new source of legitimacy for gaining government roles. This is likely to create a political system built around more rigid patriotic values, and lead to Russia’s more radical position in the current and future conflicts. More generally, it may lead to the institutionalization of a state of permanent confrontation with Europe.
The U.S. empire is in a state of apparent relative but terminal decline. Some say this is a good thing and the world shall not necessarily be less safe. Others argue that the demise of Pax Americana will cause global upheaval and chaos: the removal of the U.S. as the central actor in the global economy, ‘guarantor of democracy’, and military superpower will create disorder until a new hegemonic power or a group of powers emerges and engineers a new order. Thus, the post-Pax Americana geopolitical order is now being contested in an increasingly tumultuous international relations environment.
Historians’ approach to defining the eras of relative stability achieved through imperial hegemony in the IR hierarchy as ‘Pax’—Pax Romana, Pax Britannica and, currently, Pax Americana—has generated a deceptive perception that these were periods of peace and prosperity. However, this begs two questions: Whose peace was it? and Who paid the price for it? A closer look at the facts and lessons of history uncovers the thin veneer of the “benevolence.” The Century of Humiliation during Pax Britannica weakened the Chinese civilization by the devastating effects of the British drug trade and the spread of its “civilizational values.” The native American Indians paid a high price by their blood and soil to live in Pax Americana, the peoples of the Philippines endured decades of repressive rule as the U.S. empire replaced the Spanish empire after the Spanish-American War, and Pax Americana’s insidious tool of warfare—economic warfare designed to turn subjects of international relations into powerless objects of U.S. geopolitics—has resulted in the deaths of millions of people around the globe.
Pax Americana is a systemic branding used to legitimize the exercise of brutal power in the name of the empire and a cognitive definition defying its dystopian realities. The power it wields is both hard and soft: the hard power is used to expand the empire and impose its geopolitical will, and the soft power helps consolidate Pax Americana by legitimizing those of its aspects that cannot be explained away rationally.
One of the most noticeable tell-tale signs of a declining empire is the degradation of its political and military leadership that becomes unable to inspire, prime, and mobilize its people internally, and to impose its will on external audiences by fear and respect. Once the veneer of imperial power collapses in people’s minds, the empire begins to decay physically. In the 21st-century, Pax Americana’s relative decline is rapidly picking up pace as the wars of choice, originally born of the hegemon’s arrogance and now driven by its desperation and unwillingness to see the consequences of its actions, persist and lead to an imperial overstretch in the political, economic, and military spheres. The U.S. political and military leadership’s inability to comprehend and adapt to the transforming global geopolitical environment speeds up its decline. A clear symptom is its arrogant political assessments of the global objective processes and forces that are actively resisting Pax Americana and promoting an alternative model of international interactions.
President Donald Trump is sometimes seen as a reaction to the U.S. empire’s stagnation brought about by the lack of transparency and accountability of its heavily politicized bureaucracy unable to understand, let alone work towards its own self-interest and preservation. However, I would argue that he is not a reaction, but rather a symptom of America’s imperial stagnation. Despite his initial rhetoric and the MAGA catchphrase—now mostly meaningless slogans—Trump’s current actions show that he is doubling down on the pursuit of the geostrategic imperative of preserving the empire as identified by Brzezinski in 1997. The difference between Trump and his predecessors lies not in the end goal of upholding Pax Americana, but in the tactics used to achieve it. Henry Kissinger’s keen observation “To be an enemy of America can be dangerous, but to be a friend is fatal” remains as pertinent as ever now that Pax Americana is going off the stage. This is what the European Union, the Gulf States, and other U.S. vassals and client states have recently found to their frustration, even if some are unwilling to admit it.
Preserving what remains of the once uncontested absolute global hegemony requires that the U.S. exercise total control of its client and vassal states, and prevent the rise of independent powers that can challenge its dominance. This was clearly articulated by Brzezinski in a set of three geostrategic imperatives (which are not only an academic premise, but a real-world geopolitical practice). At the inflection point of 2020, choices were between accepting Pax Americana’s decline or challenging it. The decision was made in favor of the latter, and today Trump continues to uphold this geopolitical choice. Importantly, as the desperation and anxiety about Pax Americana continues to rise, the room for smaller powers in the IR system is shrinking, challenging their national interests and security. The situation is equivalent to the phenomenon well described by the theory of relativity: “For every action there is an equal and opposite reaction.” The decline of Pax Americana has set in motion a counteraction in a manner that increases the risk and insecurity for all IR actors.
An empire that is confident of its power does not need to impose its will in absolute terms, whereas an empire in decline is anything but confident. Classical Pax Americana permitted vassal powers to exercise—within certain boundaries—hedging in international relations because this ensured that they would remain pliant to the empire’s will.
In the current iteration of Pax Americana, the empire’s rampant practice of wedging and subverting other actors, whether client, vassal or independent, is aimed at creating a binary global system consisting of IR objects and independent IR subjects, i.e. a system of micromanaging and regulating the correlation of power and influence stacked in favor of the hegemon and against other states’ national sovereignty and dignity. Meanwhile, in the 21st-century geopolitical environment it is crucial for states to remain independent subjects in international relations in order to maintain self-interest and security and not to become expendable pawns in the geopolitical games of major powers. Today, Pax Americana’s great global geopolitical game is aimed at obstructing foreign policy goals of the Global South, which reflects the Global North’s lack of competitiveness as an attractive center of power and influence. Rather than changing its attitude and behavior, the U.S. empire continues to display arrogance and unipolar impulses, trying to prevent the rise of independent powers from realizing their potential.
The Global South (a name that defies its absolute physical form) is far from being a unitary and homogenous network of international actors and intentions. It is a system of non-Western centric powers in a multipolar constellation. They differ vastly in terms of size, hard and soft power projection, foreign policy intentions, and political and philosophical tangible (physical) and intangible (informational and cognitive) forms. Also, there is a clear line of delineation between the Global South nation-states and civilization-states.
To enforce its geostrategic imperatives, the U.S. and its vassal and client states seek to break the unity of the Global South as a center of growing influence and power. Brazen acts of aggression—waged or threatened—against Venezuela, Iran, Nigeria, and Cuba are aimed at discouraging other countries from aligning more tightly with the Global South.
There are three powers in three key global geopolitical regions that the Global North covets the most to contain and weaken as they are central in engineering a viable alternative to Pax Americana. These are China in the Indo-Pacific region, Iran in West Asia, and Russia in Europe.
These key pillars of the Global South are civilization-states insofar as they are multi-ethnic, multicultural and/or multi-confessional, and have a long history of being independent subjects in international relations. They tend to think strategically over longer periods of time than their counterparts in the Global North.
Taken as a total sum of the parts, these actors have a powerful potential for making Greater Eurasia a sovereign and independent subject in international relations, free from the toxic and subversive effects of Pax Americana. This explains the Global North’s decades-long obsession with the desire to simultaneously subvert China, Iran, and Russia and prevent them from realizing their intentions.
The Global North approaches international relations in a very transactional manner, which is ideologically messianic and results in zero-sum outcomes that are disadvantageous for its counterparties’ interests and security. Its aim is to generate IR objects that would sacrifice their own interests and security for the ‘greater good’ of Pax Americana. It is also highly West-centric and unipolar in nature. The Global South, on the other hand, is very different in terms of approach and intended outcomes. The Global South countries are driven not by ideological messianism but by pragmatic pursuits and national interests. Their interaction with other powers is based on reciprocity and win-win outcomes, where differences are understood and respected rather than used for division and subversion.
This is evident in the geo-economic goals of the Belt Road Initiative, BRICS+, and the Greater Eurasian Partnership. These projects are based on relational reciprocity between powers as partners and equals, not on the desire to monopolize key economic resources and transportation routes, which marks the U.S.’s economic warfare objectives and myopic focus on keeping other powers from realizing their potential. These basically different approaches prompt some useful conclusions.
Perhaps, first and foremost is that ideology is unable to adapt to a global geopolitical environment that is in a state of transformation. The way to solve Rodrik’s trilemma is to enact: 1) a re-globalization of the world order that supports the principles and spirit of the Global South; 2) a principled and pragmatic approach to politics to regulate and manage the international system; and 3) the upholding of national sovereignty and dignity in international relations.
Pax Americana, now intensively and rashly upheld and mismanaged by Trump, is reactive and non-sustainable. It requires submission of the will of IR actors and world resources to maintain a degenerate and dying empire.
The inconsistencies of U.S. foreign policy reveal its short-term and situational tactics intended to take a spontaneous advantage of situations as they emerge or are engineered. These tactics are aligned in the broadest and most vague terms with the three geostrategic imperatives of maintaining Pax Americana, but the defeats in Ukraine and Iran have demonstrated its limits and deficiency. Pax Americana client and vassal states have learned through hard experience that having U.S. military bases on their soil is not a security guarantee; on the contrary, it is a guarantee of insecurity. Therefore, these desperate, risky, and inconsistent tactics, in the absence of a coherent and viable strategy, are the noise that comes before the strategic defeat and collapse of Pax Americana.
The UK has had eight Prime Minister’s this century, with most serving after Brexit and for an average of two years. Sir Keir Starmer is deeply unpopular and the public (and some in his party) want him to resign.
This is not the first challenge to Starmer, but Labour’s slump in recent local elections—to English councils, the Scottish Parliament, and Welsh Assembly—is especially bruising.
For the first time ever, Labour lost control of Wales, one of its traditional heartlands. Despite finishing joint second with Reform in Scotland, it was Labour’s worst ever result north of the border. In England, Labour lost almost 1,500 councillors in different parts of the country to parties on the left and right.
Calls for Starmer to resign intensified ahead The King’s Speech to reopen Parliament. A relatively unknown MP, Sarah West, offered to challenge Starmer if nobody else would. She ultimately backed down from her pledge, but around 90 of Labour’s 400 MPs called for Starmer to go or begin a leadership transition. Yet over100 MPs publicly backed him.
So far, no leadership challenge has materialized, but potential rivals have made their moves. Wes Streeting has resigned as health secretary and, having no support to challenge Starmer himself, is now backing Andy Burnham, the Mayor of Manchester, who is planning to run for Parliament again. One MP voluntarily has given up his seat for Burnham to do so. More quietly, former Deputy Prime Minister Angela Rayner has also hinted at a challenge, and Labour’s left are urging former party leader Ed Miliband to run.
But why is Starmer surviving and why do Britons feel the urge to keep replacing their leaders? A few factors are important here.
First, there is no obvious alternative to Starmer within the Labour Party. Andy Burnham would lose an election to Parliament. Wes Streeting, on the party’s right, would lose a membership vote. Angela Rayner is not popular with the broader British electorate, and Ed Miliband has already lost an election as leader (with the British press incredibly harsh on him and his family).
The elections’ stubborn arithmetic is also illustrative. Beyond the headlines, Labour’s health is much better than it seems.
The Green Party, challenging Labour from the left, underperformed in these elections. Much of that had to do with recent antisemitism within the party and its controversial leader, Zack Polanski. Although the separatists won in Scotland and Wales, it was not due to any appetite for independence. The SNP remains deeply unpopular in Scotland (perhaps more so than Labour), but the unionist party votes were very split.
On the right, Reform also underperformed and appear to have peaked. Whilst Reform won the most councillors and came second in Wales, its vote share was down from last year’s elections. Also, increased voter turnout seemed to work against Nigel Farage’s party. Reform only won in places that voted for Brexit and is yet to attract any new voters. In other parts of the country, their vote never reached above 10%.
Translated to a General Election, Reform would fall far short of a majority. Some estimates show that it would need to increase its vote share by 22 points to win any sort of governing majority. For that to happen, either the Conservatives or Labour (or both) would have to see their vote collapse, or voter fragmentation would need to be rife across the board.
Thus far, the Conservative vote has proven remarkably stubborn, as has the Liberal Democrats’. Labour is also clinging onto around 20% of the electorate, depending on the poll. As for the Greens, they did well primarily among students—a small slice of the electorate—and urban-based women.
On top of that, Farage is not popular with the British electorate. In every single head-to-head poll with Starmer—and all the other party leaders—Farage lost. Britons do not directly elect the Prime Minister, but cast votes for who will be living at 10 Downing Street. So, whilst Reform has led the polls for over a year now, it is losing support and Farage is a turn-off.
That brings us to Britons themselves. Why, indeed, are Britons so impatient with their leadership this century? Their appetite for regicide is greatly misunderstood.
It is worth remembering that a hundred years ago, from 1900-1926, Britain also went through eight Prime Ministers in quick succession (from three different parties). There are some parallels, even though the times were very different. As Winston Churchill famously quipped about the early 20th century, “the market was free, slaves were free, and conscience was free. But hunger, squalor, and the cold were also free, and people wanted something more than liberty.”
In Britain today, people want something more. After the 2008 financial crash, austerity, Brexit, COVID-19, and recent cost of living crisis, the British public is tired and impatient.
But unlike then, there is no new intellectual thinking to tackle today’s economic problems (mostly generated by Brexit). Instead, there are demagogues and populists, shouting their empty promises and muddying the waters.
Starmer might be unpopular, but the sad truth is anyone else would be. Britain is close to going ungovernable because the population are too impatient. They are desperate to see government working in earnest, as Starmer promised it would.
Britain needs to have an honest conversation with itself about where it is going and how it will get there. To unite the kingdom, Britons need something more than the Football World Cup and the Amandaland TV show.
In 2025, Russia became India’s top supplier of crude oil, accounting for about 32.3 percent of imports, with the bilateral trade reaching $68.7 billion (~₽ 74.45), following a sharp rise over the recent years. These figures reflect not a temporary spike, but a structural shift. The supplies of energy, fertilizers, and industrial goods are increasing. Yet the negotiation and execution of transactions are far from easy-going. Contracts sometimes take too long to conclude; payments are overdue because of excessive scrutiny, and shipments are delayed for reasons that are rarely disclosed in official reports. Today the need for aligning the countries’ legal systems has become urgent than never.
Several issues require a thorough consideration and prompt solution.
Firstly, the lack of a centralized legal coordination interface continues to hinder contract formation and enforcement. The negotiating parties often have different expectations of each other’s core legal concepts. In addition, since 2022 contract performance has been seriously challenged by sanctions. In Russian legal practice, sanctions are often treated as a valid force majeure reason for transactions’ disruption. Meanwhile, the Doctrine of Frustration, enshrined under Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act,1872, specifies whether disruption of contract performance has become objectively impossible rather than commercially difficult. Thus, a supplier may consider itself excused for disruption, while the buyer sees it as a breach. This difference affects risk-based pricing, definition of contract obligations, and resolution of disputes.
Without a shared interpretation baseline, every contract involves a negotiation not only of terms, but of the legal meaning. A standing bilateral interface, even with non-binding guidance, would help reduce this uncertainty if it clarifies sanctions-related force majeure and aligns the relevant governing law and enforcement practices.
Secondly, the absence of sector-specific mutual recognition frameworks continues to influence costs. A pharmaceutical product approved in India still undergoes additional conformity checks in Russia, including registration and quality evaluation under Russian State Pharmacopoeia requirements. Engineering equipment certified under Russian standards often requires additional testing in India through the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) for compliance with Indian Standards (IS) specifications. Each repetition extends timelines and raises costs. Pharmaceuticals, energy equipment, agricultural products, and heavy engineering products form a large share of bilateral trade. Targeted recognition in these sectors would not require full harmonization, but should involve identifying areas where standards already align and formalizing that recognition. Even limited agreements could significantly reduce duplication.
Thirdly, in customs and trade documentation, even small differences can create major disruptions. Disparities in rules of origin, inconsistencies in Harmonized System classification, and differing documentation formats lead to repeated queries at ports. Traders handling processed goods or mixed consignments are especially affected. The lost time translates directly into costs through demurrage, storage, or missed deadlines. Both countries have invested in digital customs systems. India’s GST and and Russia’s EDO systems already operate at scale domestically, but interoperability gaps remain. Digital invoices and electronic bills of lading are not always recognized by the systems and force manual checks, despite efforts to enforce interoperability of the national payment systems. Mutual recognition of digital formats and alignment of documentation standards would remove much of this disfunction.
Fourthly, the sanctions restrictions have caused legal ambiguity that affects decisions at every level. Companies must decide on contract structure, payment routing, shipment insurance, and risk allocation. However, legal boundaries often allow differing interpretations, which causes a cautious response. Even legally permissible transactions face delays because the cost of error is high. This cautious overcompliance may not appear in trade data, but it continues to influence commercial activity.
A coordinated, sanctions-aware framework would not remove risks, but would define them more clearly. Standard clauses, model structures, and clearer allocation of responsibilities would allow businesses to proceed with greater confidence.
Fifthly, an equally important challenge is banking and transactional legal interoperability. Russian banks, such as Sberbank and VTB, now operate actively in India, while Indian banks have enabled trade through special vostro accounts approved by the Reserve Bank of India for rupee-based settlements. These mechanisms have kept transactions moving. Yet uncertainty persists around non-SWIFT systems, particularly concerning the legal moment of settlement and applicable compliance requirements. In practice, Indian public sector banks have increasingly assumed a quasi-regulatory role, sometimes imposing excessive requirements, including confirmation of non-SDN status from Russian parties that are often not in a legal position to provide such assurances. This creates operational deadlocks; a delayed or disputed payment can disrupt entire supply chains.
Russia is tightening oversight of the financial flows, including stricter regulation of cryptocurrency-related activity. A bilateral protocol clarifying settlement finality, recognition of alternative messaging systems, and compliance norms would make existing channels more reliable. Another practical step could involve joint working groups between the Russian and Indian Ministries of Finance tasked with issuing operational clarifications for categories of market participants and commodity classes.
Sixthly, investment and corporate law complexity continues to limit deeper engagement. While Russia-India trade has grown, long-term investments remain modest. Companies are cautious as they face layered regulation, ownership restrictions in some sectors, taxation ambiguity, and repatriation and exit uncertainty. The India–Russia Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement, in force since 1998, already provides a framework to avoid double taxation through tax credits and rules on permanent establishment. However, parts of it remain under-used. More consistent application of permanent establishment thresholds and faster use of mutual agreement procedures could reduce disputes, improve tax certainty, and support investment. The issue is less about formal openness and more about clarity in application.
Finally, the burden of legal complexity falls most heavily on small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Larger firms can manage regulatory differences through dedicated teams. SMEs often cannot. Many depend on intermediaries, raising costs and reducing control. The absence of standardized contracts, limited familiarity with international commercial terms, and complex customs procedures create barriers. Practical steps can help. Bilingual contract templates for common transactions would provide a clear starting point. Clear guidance on Incoterms and simplified customs procedures for smaller consignments would lower entry barriers. Faster, lower-cost dispute resolution would ensure that smaller firms are not excluded due to legal costs.
In all these areas, the core issue is effective coordination.
Russia and India have established national legal systems of their own strength. The challenge arises when these systems interact without a shared framework. Businesses do not need identical laws; they need predictability. They need to know how a clause will be interpreted, how a shipment will be processed, and how a payment will be settled.
Russia-India economic engagement has moved from exploratory trade into a sustained cooperation at scale. Legal alignment will determine whether this cooperation continues smoothly or face limits. The task is to reduce uncertainty where it matters most. When contracts are clearer, certifications are recognized, documents move smoothly, payments settle with confidence, and smaller firms can participate without excessive burden, the relationship becomes easier to sustain.
The opportunity is already vivid in the performance figures. The next step is to ensure that the legal framework supports this progress. Without institutional and regulatory coordination, the difficulties will persist. One practical starting point could be a bilateral model contract approved by both countries’ ministries of justice, which would cover sanctions-related force majeure, governing law, and streamlined arbitration, while leaving technical implementation issues to working groups rather than political summits.
Is it possible to create a new reserve currency as an alternative to the U.S. dollar? The topic is controversial. Some believe that it is not, others think that it is even undesirable. I am one of the few who believe that it is not only desirable and possible, but perhaps indispensable.
I first wrote about the need for a new reserve currency in August 2023[1], and since then has elaborated the idea in detail[2]. In this article, I will outline some of its main points. As an innovative alternative, it certainly needs improvement and is open to criticism.
In modern history, the role of international currencies has usually been played by national currencies, and only few were specially designed to serve this function (issued and managed by a national central bank, or by a regional bank, like the euro). Since the issuing country’s objectives do not usually coincide with others’, the international currency can rarely serve the interests of other nations.
Today, we need to create a new international currency that would not perform national functions. Before discussing its characteristics, let me show why there are no efficient ready-made alternatives.
The options now available are either inconvenient or unlikely.
One would be to continue living in a world dominated globally by the U.S. dollar (and, regionally, by the euro). However, the U.S. dollar system is inefficient, unreliable, and even dangerous. It has become an instrument of blackmail and sanctions. The precariousness of the monetary, fiscal, and financial foundations of the U.S. economy is becoming increasingly clear. This does not suit the emerging economies of the Global South.
Can the U.S. dollar be replaced, at least partly, by some other national or regional currency of the Global North? This scenario is not feasible on a large scale. The euro, compromised as an instrument of sanctions, suffers from the same problems as the U.S. dollar. Europe’s economic situation is even more problematic than that of the U.S.
The Japanese yen has similar problems: the Japanese economy is not doing well and does not inspire confidence. Besides, the yen has never played a major international role. Other national currencies of the Global North are either too small (e.g., the Swiss franc, the Canadian or Australian dollar) or suffer from the country’s economic weakness (the British pound sterling).
As for gold, it can replace the U.S. dollar only partially, as a reserve asset for central banks and other economic agents. However, its high price volatility, caused by the widespread nervousness about the U.S. dollar, makes this option unreliable.
There are two preconditions for the renminbi’s internationalization: free convertibility and China’s willingness to allow a large exchange rate appreciation. The Chinese government is hesitant on both—and rightly so. In the Chinese case, free convertibility would essentially mean removing capital controls—a central element of China’s economic policy in recent decades that has greatly contributed to its stability. The renminbi’s external appreciation would threaten the competitiveness of exports, one of the main factors of the Chinese economy’s dynamism. Moreover, in recent years China has seen deflation in wholesale prices and close-to-zero inflation in consumer prices, so a sharp rise of the renminbi may put the economy in a deflationary trap and at associated risk of recession.
There also remains the question of whether other countries of the Global South would want the renminbi, just another national currency, to replace the U.S. dollar and the People’s Bank of China, another national central bank, to replace the U.S. Federal Reserve. With China issuing an international reserve asset on a large scale, the rest of the world would continue to experience, albeit perhaps in a milder way, the same problems it now has with the U.S. dollar.
In any case (and there are more possible options), creation of a new reserve currency faces challenges—geopolitical (fundamentally, the U.S.’s resistance) and technical (building a trustworthy monetary institutional and operational structure is no easy task). But we need to address this task, not least because we cannot rule out a major financial crisis of the Western capital markets in the coming years, e.g., associated with artificial intelligence and technology companies. If this happens, the decline of the U.S. economy and dollar, will accelerate. Everyone will be scrambling for a solution. So, we’d better look for it today.
Theoretically, one way would be to back the new currency with gold, as suggested by Russian economists. However, they have so far not solved the main problem this alternative entails: how to ensure a new currency’s stability while supporting it with an eminently unstable asset. If there is a solution, it is beyond my knowledge.
It seems more appropriate to back the new currency in the way I briefly discuss below.
The first question to address is who would create the new currency. In the current international circumstances, there seems to be only one possibility—a group of 15 to 20 Global South countries, including BRICS members and other middle-income countries. Yet none of them can accomplish this mission reliably by delegating the issuance of a new reserve currency to an existing financial institution.
Thus, a new international financial institution—an issuing bank—must be established with the sole and exclusive function of issuing the new currency and putting it in circulation. This bank would not replace national central banks, and its currency would circulate in parallel with the national currencies of the sponsoring countries and other national and regional currencies. Its operations would include international transactions only, excluding domestic ones. Contrary to what is often suggested, it cannot be a euro-type currency, i.e., a single currency issued by a single central bank which replaced national currencies (Deutsche Mark, French franc, Italian lira, etc.).
There are other questions, too. How can we ensure the success of a new international currency? What would make it widely used? The essential thing is to ensure confidence, and this depends on how the new monetary arrangement will be constructed institutionally.
The way that seems most viable to me should be based, among other things, on five legal guarantees: 1) the currency’s stability in terms of value; 2) its non-use as an instrument of sanctions or pressure; 3) operational autonomy of the issuing bank; 4) maximum limit for its issuance; and 5) backing by a basket of the sponsoring countries’ government bonds.
Let me briefly describe these five points.
First, the currency should be based on a weighted basket of the participating countries’ currencies, with its fluctuations following the changes in these currencies. Since all currencies in the basket would be floating or flexible, the new currency would also be a floating currency. The weights in the basket would be determined by the share of each country’s PPP GDP in the total GDP of the sponsor group.
The new reserve currency’s exchange rate is expected to be relatively stable since China accounts for at least 40-45% of the total (depending on the exact composition of the group). The renminbi’s relative weight in the basket would provide certain stability, given the stability of the Chinese currency. Another endogenous factor of its stability is that the basket would be formed by currencies of both exporters and importers of commodities, i.e., countries standing at the opposite sides of the commodity price cycle. These factors could be further reinforced by establishing a weighted, geometrically and symmetrically trimmed, average. Currencies with large fluctuations, beyond pre-established limits, would be temporarily excluded from the basket.
Second, the participating countries would make an explicit commitment to non-use of sanctions. This would contrast with the insecurity caused the abusive use of the U.S. dollar and the euro for punishment and blackmail. This legal guarantee would be reinforced by the issuing bank’s operational autonomy.
Third, to ensure the bank’s operational autonomy and avoid political interference and diplomatic maneuvering by its founders, its president and vice-presidents should be granted long terms (e.g., five years). This kind of guaranteed autonomy, typical of international financial organizations, does not fully protect the bank from interference, but it has its advantages.
The institution’s management could be overseen by and accountable to the Board of Governors and on the Board of Directors designated by the sponsoring countries. The oversight and accountability should be implemented through normal institutional channels, not through the president and vice presidents’ individual pressure.
Fourth, a limit should be set to the amount of the new currency circulated by the bank as a safeguard against excessive issuance. The new international currency would thus have a constraint that the U.S. dollar does not have. Yet this ceiling is secondary to the most important instrument—back-up of the new currency.
Fifth, therefore, is the importance of defining a proper procedure for creating a basket of national bonds of the founding countries and those that will join later. The issuing bank would issue the new reserve currency (NRC) and new reserve bonds (NRB), whose interest rates would be attractive as they would reflect the interest rates on the bonds of the participating nations, all of which are higher than the rates on the bonds in the U.S. dollars and euros. The NRC would be fully convertible into NRBs. The high weight of the Chinese currency, issued by a country with a solid economy, would raise confidence in the NRC’s backing and help stabilize the new currency’s average exchange rate.
The proposal has its vulnerabilities, discussed in detail in [2]. Here let me just note the most significant one: the initiative may provoke negative reactions from the West, which can resort to threats and sanctions. This risk is real: today the declining West is more violent than ever before.
Yet we must decide now whether we are going to live indefinitely with the Western increasingly dysfunctional monetary system used as a geopolitical tool, or we will gather economic, political, and intellectual efforts to get out of this trap.
The next few years will tell whether Global South countries are up to this challenge.
Russia and India have an extraordinary opportunity to convert the traditional trade framework into a comprehensive development alliance spanning infrastructure, tourism, industry, energy, education, and scientific research.
This opportunity is rooted in Russia’s substantial balances in Indian rupees accumulated through energy exports, currently underutilized. What may appear at first glance as a financial constraint is, in fact, a latent investment resource that can be used to transform bilateral cooperation into a long-term strategic framework generating real economic value.
The mechanism underpinning Russia–India trade today is not unprecedented. It echoes a model previously employed by India in its energy trade with Iran under sanctions. India continued purchasing Iranian oil while settling payments in local currency, thereby preserving trade flows despite external limitations. However, the effectiveness of that model depended on relative trade balance. Iran was able to utilize accumulated funds by importing Indian goods—particularly pharmaceuticals, food products, and agricultural commodities—and even re-exporting them regionally. Financial flows remained dynamic, circulating within a broader economic ecosystem.
Russia–India trade is structurally different.
While Russia’s energy exports to India have expanded significantly, its imports from India remain modest, resulting in a steady accumulation of rupee balances. This imbalance is not a flaw in strategic judgment, but the countries’ intent to preserve economic cooperation under tough external constraints.
Today, however, this model can be changed to generate more significant economic benefits by transforming accumulated rupees into direct investment in Russia’s real economy, implemented through Indian industrial and infrastructure capabilities.
Rather than remaining idle, rupee balances can be mobilized to finance large-scale development projects across Russia. Funded by existing export revenues, these projects would be Russia-owned, but executed by Indian companies with proven project delivery capacity.
This approach offers multiple opportunities: it unlocks trapped liquidity, creates productive assets, and generates future revenues in convertible currencies, thereby reinforcing economic resilience. India’s industrial and engineering sector offers precisely the capabilities required for such transformation. Indian Tata Projects, Larsen & Toubro (L&T), Reliance Infrastructure, and Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL) have demonstrated consistent excellence in executing large-scale complex developments.
An illustrative example of India’s ability to deliver high-quality, large-scale projects with exceptional speed and coordination is Aerocity in New Delhi, developed adjacent to Indira Gandhi International Airport. Completed within a remarkably short time, it integrates hotels, commercial spaces, and urban infrastructure into a cohesive ecosystem.
This competence can be directly transferred to Russian territory, transforming financial balances into visible functional and revenue-generating infrastructure. DLF CyberHub in Gurugram city in New Delhi demonstrates how commercial, social, and business environments can be combined into vibrant urban hubs. Similarly, Ambience Mall showcases large-scale retail ecosystems hosting hundreds of brands in fashion, electronics, food, and lifestyle sectors. Replicating such models in Russia would introduce modern commercial ecosystems and expand bilateral trade beyond raw commodities into consumer and cultural markets.
No large-scale economic transformation can succeed without efficient connectivity. Airport infrastructure plays a central role in linking regions to global flows of tourism, investment, and commerce.
India’s experience in developing airport-adjacent zones—most notably through Aerocity—demonstrates how aviation infrastructure can become the core of integrated economic zones. Applying this model across Russian regions would enhance accessibility, stimulate tourism, and support logistics, turning regional centers into international entry points for capital and movement.
Russia’s geographic diversity offers a rare opportunity for implementing development projects across multiple climatic, cultural, and economic zones within a single national framework. The country presents a spectrum of complementary development pathways—from Adygea’s wellness and ecological appeal to Sochi’s winter sports attractions, to the Black Sea coastal opportunities, to the North Caucasian republics’ cultural richness, and to Siberia’s industrial depth. These regions can be approached as part of a coherent national strategy, where development emerges as a networked system with investment assets, derived from accumulated rupee balances, allocated according to the regions’ comparative advantages.
An equally important advantage of this model is its financial architecture. By utilizing existing rupee balances, projects can proceed without reliance on external financing mechanisms.
This approach eliminates exposure to high international banking commissions and restrictive guarantee systems, reducing costs while enhancing operational security. Insulated from external pressures, project execution remains stable, which ensures continuity and raises the participating stakeholders’ confidence.
Furthermore, linking financial balances to real assets contributes to currency stability, supporting both the Indian rupee and the Russian ruble through tangible economic backing.
Importantly, this model creates a self-reinforcing economic cycle. As investment projects expand, demand for Russian energy exports to India is likely to grow further, strengthening the mechanism that generates financial flows. Thus, accumulation of rupees becomes part of a circular system where trade generates investment which sustains and expands trade. These dynamics transform a temporary imbalance into a long-term structural advantage.
A critical dimension of this model is mobilization of Indian labor for supporting Russia’s expanding development agenda. Russia has taken the first steps in this direction, but real efficiency of this approach emerges when labor mobility is directly embedded in the broader model. Instead of recruiting individual workers and expecting them to adapt independently to the new environment, Indian labor can arrive in Russia as part of organized project ecosystems led by their companies. In this case, Indian workers could more easily accommodate themselves with familiar institutional structures, under established management systems, together with colleagues from similar professional and cultural backgrounds.
Besides significantly reducing challenges, typically associated with relocation (cultural adaptation, administrative complexity, and social integration), this model enhances productivity and coordination. Workers emerge as part of cohesive operational units aligned with project goals and execution standards.
For Russia, this ensures reliable workforce, improved quality control, and faster project implementation. For India, it provides a structured avenue to alleviate employment pressures while enabling its workforce to gain international experience under stable and secure conditions.
Equally important is the contribution of Indian experts and technical professionals, whose experience in large-scale infrastructure, railway, shipbuilding, energy, and digital technologies projects can accelerate knowledge transfer and strengthen local capabilities.
In this integrated model, labor mobility becomes more than a supplementary measure: it evolves into the key component of a development strategy that aligns human capital with financial resources and reinforces Russia-India long-term strategic partnership.
The transformation of Russia–India economic cooperation into a comprehensive development partnership reflects a broader global shift. It is not merely a response to external constraints, but a deliberate repositioning towards markets that offer long-term growth, flexibility, and strategic alignment.
This trajectory resonates with President Vladimir Putin’s emphasis that Russia should increase oil and natural gas supplies to reliable partners. In this context, the deepening of Russia–India ties—anchored in energy, investment, and human capital—emerges not as a temporary adjustment, but as part of a lasting reconfiguration of the global economy.
By converting financial balances into tangible assets, integrating industrial capabilities, and fostering human and cultural connections, Russia and India are not only addressing immediate challenges, but also laying the foundation for a new model of partnership—one defined by resilience, mutual benefit, and a shared vision of the future.
What initially started as a pragmatic response to external economic pressures now has the potential to develop into a comprehensive transformation framework—one that integrates infrastructure, industry, tourism, and human connections into a unified vision of prosperity. This transformation offers more than just a solution to financial challenges; it provides a mechanism to turn what was once called the ‘Rupee Trap’ into a catalyst for laying the foundation of a new era in Russia–India partnership.
The global energy system has entered a period of profound structural transformation. As the escalating war in the Middle East continues to disrupt traditional energy supply routes, and the global geoeconomic fragmentation is reshaping trade patterns, a new Eurasian energy architecture is emerging with three pivotal actors—Russia, China, and India—forming its basis.
What initially appeared as a temporary adjustment to Western sanctions and market volatility is evolving into a deeper supply chain linking the world’s largest hydrocarbon exporter with its two fastest-growing economies.
Iran’s de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, a critical chokepoint of the global energy transportation system, has vividly underlined the urgent need for such realignment. The blockade of this vital maritime corridor, accounting for 20% of the world’s oil flows and a large volume of liquefied natural gas transportation, has triggered an unprecedent hike in oil prices, pushing Brent crude above $110 per barrel and forcing governments across Asia to reassess their energy security strategies.
For Russia, the new Middle East crisis has highlighted the strategic expediency of its ‘Turn to Asia’. For decades, Russian oil and gas flowed primarily westward to European markets, yet Moscow long foresaw the shift of the global energy demand towards Asian markets.
Speaking at the final plenary session of the 11th Valdai International Discussion Club, President Vladimir Putin underscored this logic: “…as a large part of our country is geographically in Asia, [w]hy should we not make use of our competitive advantages in this area? It would be extremely shortsighted not to do so.” The eastward reorientation of Russian trade, which began back in the late 1990s, gradually advanced through the 2000s, and accelerated after the beginning of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, has produced tangible economic results. Today, a growing share of Russian oil and gas exports has moved eastward across Eurasia.
Most of Russian hydrocarbon exports redirected from Europe have been taken over by China and India: in early 2026, China accounted for about 48% of Russia’s crude exports, and India, for around 37%, which makes them by far the largest buyers of Russian oil. These figures indicate a profound structural shift.
The reorientation of supplies is supported by expanding infrastructure—from the Power of Siberia gas pipeline delivering Russian gas to China to the rapidly growing tanker routes connecting Russian Arctic and Pacific terminals with Asian refineries.
China’s role in this transformation is central. As the world’s largest energy importer, Beijing always sought to diversify supply sources to secure its growing economy from geopolitical shocks. Russian crude has become a crucial component of that strategy. In 2026, China remains the largest buyer of Russian fossil fuels, accounting for more than half of export revenues among Russia’s top five customers.
China has also taken precautionary measures to mitigate the risks posed by the Middle East conflict. Beijing has curbed fuel exports, and the National Development and Reform Commission has ordered refiners to prioritize domestic supplies amid external disruptions. This points to China’s concern that prolonged disruptions in the Gulf oil shipping may tighten Asian markets.
India’s position is equally significant. India is the world’s third-largest oil consumer, and its energy demand continues to expand rapidly alongside economic growth. Russian crude remains the country’s largest source of imported oil, with deliveries exceeding 1.5 million barrels per day in early 2026.
New Delhi sees the diversification of supplies not merely as a matter of commerce but also a factor of national security. Indian officials repeatedly emphasize that ensuring reliable energy supplies for more than 1.4 billion citizens is a key national priority. In this context, Russian oil—often offered under flexible pricing and transported along diversified routes—provides a valuable hedge against the Middle Eastern market volatility.
The military escalation in the Gulf has sharply reduced tanker traffic and disrupted LNG flows through the Strait of Hormuz, tightening supply across Asian markets that depend heavily on Gulf producers. Analysts warn that Asia is particularly exposed to such disruptions because of its dependence on maritime energy imports from the region. The emerging Russia–India–China energy triangle is a pragmatic response to the systemic risks.
From the Russian perspective, the logic is clear. Moscow benefits from stable long-term demand for its hydrocarbons and from Asian export routes that reduce its vulnerability to Western political pressure.
Russia’s vast reserves—among the largest in the world—require sustained investment and predictable markets. Asian consumers provide precisely that combination of scale and growth.
For China, Russian supplies offer geographic and strategic advantages. Unlike Middle Eastern cargoes that must transit vulnerable maritime chokepoints, Russian energy can reach China through pipelines, Arctic shipping lanes, and relatively short maritime routes from Pacific ports. This diversification strengthens Beijing’s energy security at a time when geopolitical tensions increasingly affect global trade routes.
India’s strategy reflects similar considerations. While the Gulf will remain a key supplier, overreliance on a single region may expose India to supply shocks and price volatility.
Expanding purchases from Russia—along with growing cooperation in refining, petrochemicals, and LNG—help balance that risk while ensuring competitive pricing for Indian refiners.
Along with transforming energy flows, the energy triangle is reshaping the financial and institutional landscape of Eurasian commerce. Within BRICS, Russia, India and China have explored mechanisms for conducting energy trade in national currencies and building alternative payment systems. These initiatives reflect a broader effort to create financial infrastructure for sustained large-scale trade that could withstand global market disruptions, even during geopolitical crises.
The implications extend beyond hydrocarbons. Stable energy flows underpin industrial growth and economic stability across Eurasia, and as demand shifts towards Asia, the integration of Russian resources with Chinese and Indian markets is set to become a new normal in the 21st-century energy order.
This policy does not diminish the importance of imports from Gulf producers, but it mitigates the risk of overreliance on a single region or transit route.
What is emerging is not replacement, but rebalancing. Russian energy is increasingly complementing Middle Eastern supplies, giving China and India greater resilience against external shocks.
For Moscow, Beijing, and New Delhi, the message is clear: amid global geopolitical and geoeconomic fragmentation, exacerbated by the U.S. and its allies’ hostile but faltering policies and internal contradictions, building diversified and resilient energy linkages is no longer optional but strategically critical.
In all times, writers and columnists tend to complain about the lack of motivating subject matter to write about. Dostoevsky, for one, noted the banality of everyday life and the effort it requires to say “a new word.” If the Russian genius faced this problem, imagine the difficulty of adding something original that modest columnists like me have.
However, today, with the outbreak of the war against Iran launched by the delinquent superpower, the United States, and the genocidal state, Israel, we can hardly complain of the lack of thrilling events. And the ancient curse “May you live in interesting times” appears extremely relevant (even if worn out by overuse).
Dostoevsky, who believed in God, wrote that children’s suffering discloses the absurdity of all historical reality. In my recent book, Estilhaços, I say that “the suffering of children not only belies the existence of God but proves that of the Devil.” The atrocious bombing of a girls’ school in Iran, which killed more than 160 people, is a clear proof of it.
These days, the Devil is personified by Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu. Or would it be better to reverse the order and write “Netanyahu and Trump”? Since at the helm of this aggression are clearly Israel and the powerful Zionist lobby in Washington and New York. U.S. Foreign Minister Marco Rubio has clumsily revealed it.
To justify the aggression against Iran, he said: “There was an imminent threat to the U.S.… We knew that if Iran was attacked by Israel, they would immediately attack us.” According to Rubio, by attacking Iran, the Trump administration acted “proactively” and “defensively.” And Israel, defining the timing, is the one calling the shots.
Time will tell, but today it seems that the diabolical duo made a huge miscalculation.
The U.S. seeks domination in the Middle East. But Iran is a tough nut to crack. It is not defenseless Palestine subjected to Israeli destruction and massacre. Nor is it Lebanon equally defenseless against Israeli attacks. Nor is it Syria torn apart by U.S., Israeli and Turkish aggression. Nor is it Libya and Iraq. And nor is it Venezuela easily subdued by the U.S.
Iran is a military power that is able to impose heavy losses on the aggressors, including the U.S.’s satellites and allies in the Persian Gulf.
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain, hosting American military bases on their territory from where attacks are made on Iran, have become a legitimate target for the Iranians.
Tehran has also used these states’ economic dependence on the passage through the Strait of Hormuz to transport their oil and natural gas exports (of the five mentioned, only Saudi Arabia has other channels). Iran has surgically closed this strait for shipping, except for its strategic allies—Russia and, above all, China. All other countries’ ships trying to pass the strait are bombed.
Iran is an ancient and peaceful civilization, a great country proud of its traditions. It was never a colony, although at certain periods it was subjected to semi-colonial relationships with by foreign powers, most notably with Britan and the U.S. The last foreign invasion of Iran was in the 18th century.
One should not disregard Iran’s size. There are more than 90 million Iranians, living in a territory larger than the combined territories of France, Spain, Germany, and Italy. Compare it with tiny Palestine, with a population of less than 6 million, a victim of Israel’s genocide and ethnic cleansing. Iran will not be wiped off the map.
The Iranians had no intention to attack anyone. On the contrary, they tried to find a negotiated solution with the U.S., but were stabbed in the back.
The Iranians have been preparing for such confrontation for decades. Despite more than 40 years of Westen sanctions, Iran has accumulated a great capability for retaliation, as we can now see. Tehran became fully aware that such preparations were necessary back in 1980, when Iran was attacked by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, encouraged and armed by the U.S. and Israel. Iran was taken by surprise then, and it realized that it was militarily vulnerable. And it has learned the lesson, transforming itself into a strong military power.
The U.S. and Israel’s appalling and stupid decision to assassinate Ayatollah Khamenei has only strengthened the Iranian nation’s resistance and unity. Its extraordinary national leader has become a martyr and symbol of Iranian resistance to the existential threat facing the country. He behaved like a hero and will never be forgotten.
The truth is that the U.S. and Israel are profoundly sick societies, with Trump and Netanyahu’s actions clearly manifesting the disease. The U.S. is trying to escape the decline and the Western civilization’s shipwreck by forcibly regaining its increasingly contested world hegemony. The ultimate target is China, “the most powerful country relative to us since the 19th century,” as stated in U.S. National Defense Strategy released in January. Israel, for its part, is seeking to gain dominance in the Middle East. Only two major countries oppose it—Iran and Turkey. If Iran succumbs, Turkey is likely to be the next victim.
But we must all realize that the U.S. and Israel’s criminal aggression against Iran is a brazen violation of the international law and, hence, a threat to all of us.
Due to a misunderstanding of the US legal system (under which the Constitution is supreme) and a misreading of certain laws, some confusion has arisen within the Russian expert community regarding the legality, under US law, of Trump’s attack on Iran. I would like to take the opportunity to clarify that the attack is manifestly illegal.
The US Constitution (which in theory still matters and, indeed, takes precedent over all other law in the US) provides Congress with the authority “to declare war”. It does not provide the President with similar authority. Accordingly, the US may conduct hostilities – or at least initiate war against another state – only with Congressional authorization.
Obviously, going to war with another state, without actually declaring war, does not allow the President to avert this clause. It merely means that the action is now not only unconstitutional, but also a violation of international custom/norms. One of several such violations, given Khomeini’s assassination (a violation of the norm against targeting leaders), the murder of Iranian schoolgirls and other civilians (who, amongst Iranian casualties, so far appear to outnumber legitimate military targets – incidentally, in the same way that civilians have been the vast majority of Israeli victims in Gaza), etc.
Note the specification above: (1) initiation (2) of war (3) against another state – that is definitely the authority of Congress. Gray areas do exist around (1) waging a war that has been started by an adversary, (2) deploying forces into a context and/or for purposes that may develop into combat, and (3) using force against non-state actors. The War Powers Resolution was intended to address these and perhaps other gray areas; it constrained the President’s authority within such situations, and certainly did not expand his authority beyond such contexts.
The law explicitly reads that nothing in it “is intended to alter the constitutional authority of the Congress or of the President”, and nothing in it “shall be construed as granting any authority to the President” that the President did not already possess.
In particular, the War Powers Resolution requires that, if the President deploys forces for combat (or potential combat) – in a manner that is permissible under the constitution, e.g. in response to attack, or for ‘combat-adjacent’ purposes (e.g. ‘advisors’ to South Vietnam, or forces in Saudi Arabia to deter a continued Iraqi offensive in 1990), or against a non-state actor like al-Qaeda[1] – then the President must receive authorization from Congress within 90 days.
Again, this is not an expansion of the President’s authority, but a narrowing of it. It was intended to prevent a repeat of the US’s slide into the Vietnam War. It does nothing (and could do nothing, given Constitutional supremacy) to alter Congress’s exclusive authority to initiate war against other states. The Resolution explicitly states this in its third paragraph: “The constitutional powers of the President…to introduce [US forces] into hostilities, or into situations where [hostilities are likely], are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3)…attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.”
In order to legally/constitutionally attack Iran, Trump would either need a declaration of war (from Congress), a law more or less directly authorizing such a war (also from Congress), or an attack by Iran upon the US.
He has none of those things. The attacks, therefore, are unconstitutional and illegal under US law. If the rule of law still existed within the US, the US military would have refused to obey the orders (given that they are illegal and thus invalid), and the President would be impeached for high crimes and misdemeanors.
Actually, he really should have been impeached during his first term, for the almost-as-clearly-illegal airstrikes against Syria. Unfortunately, such strikes were one of Trump’s few actions that Democrats actually supported. Democrats were, if anything, mostly concerned that Trump was not hawkish *enough* in his first term, inventing the Russiagate hoax and impeaching Trump for the ‘high crime’ of not supporting Kiev with sufficient enthusiasm. And, indeed, Obama also violated the Constitution with his attacks on Libya. (Although they – like Trump’s airstrikes on Syria – were not quite as blatantly illegal as Trump’s attacks on Iran and Venezuela, since Libya and Syria were riven by civil wars and thus *conceivably* their governments could be viewed as illegitimate.) So these new attacks are probably best seen less as a specifically Trumpian or Republican failure, and more as a manifestation of the US’s general slide from the rule of law into Caesarism (not the fun kind).
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