Hybrid threats span both hardware and politics, said Colonel Sönke Marahrens. The list of methods includes overflights, the cutting of undersea cables, and a concerted disinformation campaign. It also reaches into political and judicial systems, including what he called the "disposable agent" model —civilians recruited online for one-off sabotage or surveillance. As a model for how the state should respond, Colonel Marahrens pointed to Finland. Authorities there detained a suspected sabotage vessel within an hour of Baltic Sea cable damage.
Recognition had arrived slowly, Marahrens told the New Age Defence forum in Berlin on 8 June, Ukrinform reported. "Germany recognized rather late that we are being attacked by such hybrid methods," the colonel said. "But I would say that in the last year and a half to two years, we see a shift at the political level as well."
The colonel heads a department at the Bundeswehr's Center for Digitalization and Capability Development. The center reports to the Cyber and Information Domain Command in Bonn. German intelligence services and state institutions are increasingly informing citizens of the changing security environment, he said.
Russian pressure now reaches beyond physical sabotage, Marahrens said. "It's not just drones and not just undersea cables, it's also disinformation within our society. It's the use of the political and judicial systems, the concept of 'disposable agents,'" he said.
Unidentified drones over European critical infrastructure, including German sites, had a primarily psychological effect, the colonel said. The impact was not military. Germany's National Security Council should receive real powers for rapid decision-making, he argued. The colonel cited Finland's response time of less than an hour after the Baltic Sea cable damage.
"Creating societal resilience is something we in Germany have yet to learn." — Col. Sönke Marahrens, Bundeswehr Center for Digitalization and Capability Development
Germany draws on Ukrainian wartime experience through financing, joint training, and front-line exchanges, Marahrens said. "We support Ukraine financially," he said. "We also adopt the experience gained from the battlefield. We provide training for them, and we also adopt experience from them during joint exercises at our training grounds."
The most important Ukrainian lesson, the colonel said, is societal resilience under wartime conditions. "Creating societal resilience is something we in Germany have yet to learn," Marahrens said. The Kremlin coordinates large-scale hybrid operations across Europe, the agency added. These campaigns aim to discredit Kyiv and inflame internal conflicts in EU states amid Russia's war on Ukraine.
A novel kind of drone-based air defense system has been shown for the first time by German weapon manufacturer Diehl Defence. The Cobra 600, which has not previously been seen in public, combines a jet-powered drone platform with a missile rail armed with one of the company’s IRIS-T missiles, a weapon already used in short-range air defense systems and air-to-air applications. The new system immediately recalls recent Russian developments, which add short-range air defense missiles to its versions of the Shahed-136 long-range one-way attack drone, known locally as the Geran.
Cobra 600 is being presented at the ILA Berlin airshow, taking place this week in the German capital. The Cobra 600 is also known as the Airborne Launching and Attack System (AirLAS), and the program was launched last year.
The concept behind the Cobra 600 is that of a ‘missile taxi,’ in which the drone platform carries the IRIS-T missile over a considerable distance. All the while, the drone is meshed with a ground-based air defense system. Typically, this would be one of Diehl’s IRIS-T SLM or IRIS-T SLS systems. Of these, the IRIS-T SLS employs the same missile as the air-to-air variant — and therefore the same missile as the Cobra 600. The physical interface between the drone and the missile is a standard pylon as used on the Eurofighter jet.
As for the drone platform, this is provided by another German firm, the Polaris Raumflugzeuge aerospace start-up. It has a similar kind of efficient delta planform as the Shahed-136, with a modified flying-wing-like design. On the wingtips are mounted endplate vertical stabilizers. As displayed, the drone is powered by a pair of JetCat-P1000-PRO micro turbojet engines, each of which provides a maximum thrust just shy of 250 pounds. However, the drone has intake ports for another two engines. It’s not clear if these are only intended to be fitted if heavier payloads are being carried, but it’s certainly a possibility. Concept artwork released by Polaris, as seen at the top of this story, shows a four-engine configuration, with the turbojets buried in the airframe and fed by much longer intakes, helping to shield them from detection.
Polaris Raumflugzeuge has already built a variety of drones in the same configuration, and the company eventually aims to scale this up to produce a spaceplane.
Drawing on its design heritage, the Cobra 600 drone has retractable wheeled tricycle landing gear, meaning that it can be reused in some scenarios. The drone therefore takes off and lands from runways, although it is also able to operate from suitable shorter airstrips, such as stretches of highway. It’s also intended to be cheap enough that commanders will also be willing to risk losing it in combat, or after it runs out of fuel.
The concept of operations has the Cobra 600 serving as an adjunct to a ground-based air defense system, extending its range considerably.
With the missile fitted, the Cobra 600 has a range of around 250 miles. This compares to around 25 miles for the ground-launched missile used in the IRIS-T SLM, or approximately eight miles for the missile used in the IRIS-T SLS.
As such, the Cobra 600 has the potential to turn the ground-based IRIS-T into something a little closer to a long-range surface-to-air missile, in terms of the distance it can cover. Of course, this is only true in terms of absolute range, with the speed and maneuverability of the drone being far inferior to a long-range missile. Unless the target is nearby, or the Cobra 600 has been pre-positioned based on known target vectors, the reaction time it offers is strictly limited. The missile itself is also able to tackle a more limited range of potential targets than a dedicated long-range surface-to-air missile, some of which offer an anti-ballistic missile capability, for example.
On the other hand, the Cobra 600 offers the distinct advantage of being able to loiter in a given area, waiting for threats to emerge, or to perform combat air patrols to screen certain sectors. It is best viewed as a forward-positioned additional launcher for the ground-based IRIS-T, and is also entirely reliant upon that system (or a similar one) for its effectiveness. At the same time, leveraging existing ground-based air defense systems as a force multiplier is a clear advantage. Another possible operational scenario would involve setting the Cobra 600s up as interceptors on a runway, sitting ready for launch on a runway to defend against lower-end threats.
In its current form, the Cobra 600 has no onboard sensors to detect targets other than the imaging infrared seeker head that’s integral to the standard IRIS-T missile.
In an operational scenario, a target for the Cobra 600 would be detected and identified by the ground-based air defense system to which it is ‘tethered.’ Connected via datalink, the ground-based system would vector the drone to the appropriate location. Using its own seeker, the IRIS-T would lock onto the target and be commanded to launch by the operator of the ground-based system. Of course, this presupposes that the datalink is not compromised by hostile interference or due to line-of-sight limitations, although SATCOM capability, like Starlink, would help keep redundant control over the drone beyond line-of-sight.
At this point, the mode of engagement is not dissimilar to the ground-based IRIS-T SLS, which features a lock-on-after-launch (LOAL) capability. This means it can fire missiles without first establishing the weapon’s lock on the target. After receiving target information in the form of three-dimensional coordinates, the missile uses inertial guidance during the initial stage of flight. Upon reaching the designated engagement altitude, its imaging infrared seeker activates and begins searching the predicted target area.
Another conceivable option would be to add some kind of sensor, such as an infrared camera, to the Cobra 600 drone platform, meaning that a ‘person in the loop’ could establish that the missile had locked onto the correct target.
A further option could be to ‘uncage’ the missile seeker and let it search across its field of view only when the Cobra 600 is in a designated ‘kill box,’ within which it would have authority to engage any target it acquires, reactively, and autonomously. Issues such as this clearly need to be addressed, based on combat requirements and ethical concerns.
As well as operating the Cobra 600 in conjunction with the IRIS-T SLM/SLS, it could also be integrated with other ground-based air defenses. According to Polaris, it could also be embedded with aircraft or in a maritime environment.
The Cobra 600 has already completed its first flight tests, with a dummy IRIS-T missile fitted. Currently, the development effort is mainly funded by the company, but there has also been investment from at least one interested nation.
With the IRIS-T SLM/SLS combat-proven in Ukraine, experiences from this conflict have almost certainly helped inform the development of the Cobra 600.
The war in Ukraine also provides an interesting parallel to the Cobra 600, in Russia’s missile-armed adaptations of its Shahed/Geran drones.
Russian developments have seen the fielding of these drones carrying either a single R-60 air-to-air missile, a much older and less capable equivalent to the IRIS-T, or man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS).
Interception of the Russian Shahed kamikaze drone with an installed R-60 air-to-air missile.
— Special Kherson Cat
It was intercepted by Darknode unit of the @usf_army, using STING anti-Shahed drone developed by the @wilendhornets and funded by @sternenkofund. https://t.co/XHEjuCP31F pic.twitter.com/oje4VOXTbz(@bayraktar_1love) December 1, 2025
According to Ukrainian accounts, as well as the rail-mounted missile on the top, these drones are equipped with a camera and a radio-frequency modem.
Russian forces are mounting Igla MANPADS on Shahed drones to target Ukrainian helicopters that intercept them. The drones carry a camera and radio modem, and the missile is launched remotely by an operator in Russian territory. pic.twitter.com/T5TKPHyhVu
— WarTranslated (@wartranslated) January 4, 2026
However, the concept of operations for the missile-armed Russian drones is very different. While it gives the drones a means to engage Ukrainian fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, it works more as a deterrent than as a genuinely useful tactical application. As we have noted in the past, the difficulty in obtaining a high degree of situational awareness and the limited agility of the drone raises questions about the effectiveness of these solutions. On the other hand, Russia has been working on a man-in-the-loop (MITL) control capability for the Shahed/Geran, which could potentially be used to operate the missile.
Considerably larger than the Shahed-136 design, the Cobra 600 will provide a higher performance delta overall. It is also jet-powered, and, with up to four engines, this would give more impressive response times and maneuverability than the Russian system.
It should be noted that there are other previous precedents for arming drones with air-to-air missiles. In at least one instance from 2002, a U.S. Air Force MQ-1 Predator drone fired a Stinger heat-seeking anti-air missile at an Iraqi MiG-25 Foxbat fighter that was trying to shoot it down, which can be seen in the video below.
The fast pace of development of the Cobra 600 reflects a growing need for ground-based air defenses more generally, after decades of neglect. There is also a need for less-expensive, less-exquisite solutions in this area, something that the Cobra 600 also addresses, with a price point that is significantly lower than a long-range surface-to-air missile (although with the various disadvantages outlined above). At the same time, the Cobra 600 may well end up being used against even lower-cost drones, for which the IRIS-T is still a very expensive solution.
The Cobra 600 reflects a broader shift in air defense thinking driven by the lessons of recent conflicts, particularly in Ukraine and the Middle East, where persistent drone threats, as well as cruise missiles, have exposed the limitations of traditional ground-based air defense architectures.
By combining the endurance and flexibility of a drone with the proven, off-the-shelf IRIS-T interceptor, the Cobra 600 offers a potentially cost-effective way to extend defensive coverage over greater distances and to put ‘shooters’ into contested areas that crewed systems would not be able to venture. While some questions remain about how the Cobra 600 would be integrated with existing operational doctrine, the concept highlights the growing demand for innovative, layered, and resilient air defenses as militaries seek to counter increasingly varied and numerous aerial threats.
Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com
The post Germany’s Cobra 600 Is A Jet Powered Interceptor Drone That Slings An IRIS-T Missile appeared first on The War Zone.
By Hélène de LAUNZUN
Contact us: info@strategic-culture.su
Franco-German combat aircraft programme collapses after years of disputes, showcasing the difficulty with military cooperation within the EU.
Rumours had been circulating for many months, but it was confirmed on Monday, June 8th: France and Germany have decided to abandon the core joint fighter plane component of their joint Future Combat Aircraft System (FCAS) project. With it goes a project that symbolised ambitions for deeper military cooperation between the two countries.
The project was launched in 2017 on the initiative of French President Emmanuel Macron and then-German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Its aim was to replace, by 2040, the French Rafale and the German-Spanish Eurofighter. After months of stalled progress, Chancellor Friedrich Merz and President Macron agreed that the main industrial partners involved in the project—Dassault Aviation on the French side and Airbus Defence and Space on the German-Spanish side—were clearly unable to work together because of diverging interests.
It was one of Europe’s largest military programmes, with an estimated total cost of €100 billion. The technological ambition was highly advanced: more than just a fighter jet, the system was to integrate combat drones, connected sensors and a next-generation digital network, thereby forming what was described as a ‘combat cloud.’
Disagreements between the industrial parties have multiplied in recent months, centring on the sharing of industrial responsibilities, intellectual property, and the governance of the project. In the spring, Macron was still insisting he believed in it, but progress remained elusive.
For defence expert Jean-Dominique Merchet, the programme had in fact been “on life support” for several months, and the German decision to formalise the end merely confirmed a shared recognition of irreconcilable industry positions rather than a unilateral move. The fact that the announcement came from Berlin—without a joint statement from partner countries France and Spain—confirms the major political setback for Macron, who has been the project’s main champion since its launch in 2017. According to Merchet, the announcement definitively confirms the now insurmountable disagreements between Dassault Aviation and Airbus over the development of the fighter plane intended to form the core of the programme. The analyst is now questioning the future of the other components of the FCAS, notably the combat cloud, the engines, and the support drones. This failure could undermine another major Franco-German project, the future European battle tank, which is itself already facing numerous difficulties.
Similar frictions have affected other joint efforts in recent years. In some cases, one side has withdrawn or scaled back its commitment—as in the case of the Tiger helicopter, where Germany backed out, or the Eurodrone, where France is currently discussing exit terms; in others, like the MAWS maritime patrol programme and the CIFS future artillery system, it’s due to delays, differing priorities, and mutual strain.
For both countries, the failure tests their ability to advance next-generation capabilities.
For France, the failure of the FCAS will test the national defence industry’s ability to bounce back. France must now consider the possibility of a new-generation programme that it would lead alone or in cooperation with other potential partners such as Sweden, Italy, India or the United Arab Emirates. Germany is expected to consider options including additional F-35 acquisitions or interest in alternative collaborative frameworks.
The failure of the FCAS is highly symbolic at a time when, under American pressure, Europe was seeking to assert its strategic autonomy. The programme, which symbolised Europe’s ability to carry out its major armaments projects autonomously in the face of the United States and China, illustrates above all the persistent difficulties European states face in effectively coordinating their industrial, strategic, and national interests.
Original article: europeanconservative.com
German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius announced an additional €300 million ($345 million) for the Czech-led ammunition initiative for Ukraine on 9 June 2026. The funds will purchase roughly 50,000 rounds of long-range ammunition, Pistorius said after meeting new Czech Defense Minister Jaromír Zůna in Berlin.
The pledge keeps Germany positioned as the initiative's largest foreign backer at a moment when donor numbers are thinning and Prague's new government has retreated on several other Ukraine fronts. The Czech-led channel has delivered 4.4 million large-caliber shells since early 2024 — more than half of all such ammunition Ukraine has received over that period, according to Czech President Petr Pavel.
The new commitment lifts Germany's total share of the initiative past €1.2 billion, building on roughly €900 million already disbursed. Pistorius called the Czech channel an essential contribution to Ukraine's ammunition supply and said Berlin would continue to back it.
"Germany will contribute an additional €300 million to this initiative — that's approximately 50,000 rounds of long-range ammunition," Pistorius said.
The Berlin session was Pistorius's first in-person meeting with Zůna, who took office in December 2025 as part of Andrej Babiš's coalition government. Zůna, a retired lieutenant general, was nominated for the post by the center-left SPD party.
Babiš has cut planned Czech defense spending for 2026 and secured a Czech opt-out from the European Union's €90 billion Ukraine funding package. The new government also put on ice a previously discussed transfer of L-159 combat aircraft to Ukraine.
The ammunition initiative is the major exception. Zůna confirmed in December that the channel would continue, and the Berlin meeting was his first public reaffirmation of that position to a NATO partner.
"Germany plays an important role as a supplier of military equipment and ammunition and, together with our defence industry, makes a significant contribution to European security," Zůna told reporters at the Bendlerblock.
The initiative needs €5 billion in 2026 but had raised only €1.4 billion by February, Reuters reported. Pavel said last month that the number of contributing countries has dropped.
The channel has firm contracts to deliver about 1 million rounds to Ukraine in 2026, the Czech Defense Ministry said — well below the 1.8 million delivered in 2025 and the 1.5 million in 2024. Russia continues replenishing its own stockpiles, including through North Korean deliveries that NATO officials estimate at 9 million rounds since 2023.
Login
