Now that the conflict in Ukraine has entered its fifth year, Western media’s attention is largely focused on the military operations on the ground. With verifiable information remaining limited and filtered by the war of narratives, the main lens through which the Western media sees the EU’s confrontation with Russia is its aid to Ukraine and the extensive use of drones as the primary military assets.

However, the interpretation of Russia’s policy and actions through the Ukraine conflict diverts attention from the internal dynamics that reveal much of Moscow’s strategic orientation, including on the front. Three recent developments are indicative of a possible aggravation of Russia’s confrontation with the EU, beyond the current Ukrainian border.

Foreign Policy vs Military Action

The first sign is of regulatory and institutional nature.

On 13 May 2026, the State Duma adopted a provision that authorizes the Russian President to deploy the armed forces extraterritorially to protect Russian citizens abroad. Formally, the law concerns individuals subject to criminal proceedings by foreign or international courts not recognized by Moscow, but essentially it implies a significant expansion of the President’s powers.

Specifically, it provides for a broader institutional framework for protecting Russian citizens and Russian-speaking populations in the post-Soviet countries—a political justification that has already been used by the Kremlin in various crises, including the Ukraine one, and opens the door to actions against other countries, above all the Baltic states, which Moscow sees as broadly discriminating Russian-speaking minorities.

The West, which often reduces the Russian political system to a caricature of Vladimir Putin’s personal power, has largely ignored this novelty. Meanwhile, it provides solid institutional support to the Kremlin’s usual practice of legally substantiating the implementation of its political decisions.

The point is that for the Kremlin, defense of Russian citizens and ethnic Russians living abroad is now a strategic priority that requires structural integration of Russia’s foreign policy and direct military action.

Russification of Transnistria

The second sign is of geopolitical nature. Almost the same day, on 15 May, Putin signed a decree granting fast-track Russian citizenship to Transnistria residents. Formally part of Moldova, this break-away territory, inhabited by around 400,000 people and de facto controlled by structures close to Moscow, is the site of a frozen conflict since 1992, with around 1,500 Russian troops still present in the area.

Facilitating access to Russian citizenship (waiving standard legal requirements—a five-year residency in Russia, language proficiency, and civic testing) for people permanently residing in one of the most sensitive post-Soviet territories, this decree, backed up by the law on Russia’s extraterritorial defense of Russian citizens, echoes the precedent of the Donbass, where the granting of citizenship to Russian-speaking people gave Moscow formal grounds to claim its right to protect them and subsequently justify its intervention.

This may have direct geopolitical implications: any territorial link between Russia-controlled areas and Transnistria would necessarily pass through southern Ukraine, which brings to the fore the issue of Odessa and control of the Black Sea (the objectives now discussed in the circles far beyond Russian radical patriots).

On the Moldovan front, the strengthening of Russia’s presence in Transnistria would inevitably lead to confrontation with the pro-European leadership of Moldovan President Maia Sandu, who is openly supported by the EU, Germany, the UK, and France. In a country already deeply divided between pro-Russian and pro-European factions, Moldova may become fertile ground for a new proxy war between Russia and Europe.

The New Military Intelligentsia

The third sign is of socio-political nature.

In Russia’s Belgorod region, which borders Ukraine and is exposed to the war, General Alexander Shuvaev, a decorated veteran of the Ukraine conflict, has been appointed acting governor (following Vyacheslav Gladkov’s resignation). Hero of the Russian Federation, General Shuvaev has been appointed to this post through the presidential program Vremya geroev (The Time of Heroes), which promotes veterans and people who distinguished themselves in the Ukraine war, to positions in the state apparatus, regional administration, public companies.

This episode is emblematic of the formation of a new military intelligentsia, uniting figures that have war experience, enjoy public recognition, and are integrated in the political and institutional circles. This is a basically new important development in Russian society, where the military, intellectuals, and administration people have traditionally formed separate strata.

Today, a cohort of people, who distinguished themselves in the Ukraine conflict, are gaining access to social and political channels, primarily through training at elite institutions supported by privileged access and quotas reserved for the veterans.

The veterans’ social mobility, which is also political and institutional, demonstrates how war experience is becoming a new source of legitimacy for gaining government roles. This is likely to create a political system built around more rigid patriotic values, and lead to Russia’s more radical position in the current and future conflicts. More generally, it may lead to the institutionalization of a state of permanent confrontation with Europe.

The U.S. empire is in a state of apparent relative but terminal decline. Some say this is a good thing and the world shall not necessarily be less safe. Others argue that the demise of Pax Americana will cause global upheaval and chaos: the removal of the U.S. as the central actor in the global economy, ‘guarantor of democracy’, and military superpower will create disorder until a new hegemonic power or a group of powers emerges and engineers a new order. Thus, the post-Pax Americana geopolitical order is now being contested in an increasingly tumultuous international relations environment.

Pax Americana, but Whose Peace?

Historians’ approach to defining the eras of relative stability achieved through imperial hegemony in the IR hierarchy as ‘Pax’—Pax Romana, Pax Britannica and, currently, Pax Americana—has generated a deceptive perception that these were periods of peace and prosperity. However, this begs two questions: Whose peace was it? and Who paid the price for it? A closer look at the facts and lessons of history uncovers the thin veneer of the “benevolence.” The Century of Humiliation during Pax Britannica weakened the Chinese civilization by the devastating effects of the British drug trade and the spread of its “civilizational values.” The native American Indians paid a high price by their blood and soil to live in Pax Americana, the peoples of the Philippines endured decades of repressive rule as the U.S. empire replaced the Spanish empire after the Spanish-American War, and Pax Americana’s insidious tool of warfare—economic warfare designed to turn subjects of international relations into powerless objects of U.S. geopolitics—has resulted in the deaths of millions of people around the globe.

Pax Americana is a systemic branding used to legitimize the exercise of brutal power in the name of the empire and a cognitive definition defying its dystopian realities. The power it wields is both hard and soft: the hard power is used to expand the empire and impose its geopolitical will, and the soft power helps consolidate Pax Americana by legitimizing those of its aspects that cannot be explained away rationally.

Trump as a Symptom of Pax Americana’s Decline

One of the most noticeable tell-tale signs of a declining empire is the degradation of its political and military leadership that becomes unable to inspire, prime, and mobilize its people internally, and to impose its will on external audiences by fear and respect. Once the veneer of imperial power collapses in people’s minds, the empire begins to decay physically. In the 21st-century, Pax Americana’s relative decline is rapidly picking up pace as the wars of choice, originally born of the hegemon’s arrogance and now driven by its desperation and unwillingness to see the consequences of its actions, persist and lead to an imperial overstretch in the political, economic, and military spheres. The U.S. political and military leadership’s inability to comprehend and adapt to the transforming global geopolitical environment speeds up its decline. A clear symptom is its arrogant political assessments of the global objective processes and forces that are actively resisting Pax Americana and promoting an alternative model of international interactions.

President Donald Trump is sometimes seen as a reaction to the U.S. empire’s stagnation brought about by the lack of transparency and accountability of its heavily politicized bureaucracy unable to understand, let alone work towards its own self-interest and preservation. However, I would argue that he is not a reaction, but rather a symptom of America’s imperial stagnation. Despite his initial rhetoric and the MAGA catchphrase—now mostly meaningless slogans—Trump’s current actions show that he is doubling down on the pursuit of the geostrategic imperative of preserving the empire as identified by Brzezinski in 1997. The difference between Trump and his predecessors lies not in the end goal of upholding Pax Americana, but in the tactics used to achieve it. Henry Kissinger’s keen observation “To be an enemy of America can be dangerous, but to be a friend is fatal” remains as pertinent as ever now that Pax Americana is going off the stage. This is what the European Union, the Gulf States, and other U.S. vassals and client states have recently found to their frustration, even if some are unwilling to admit it.

International Relations Without Nuance

Preserving what remains of the once uncontested absolute global hegemony requires that the U.S. exercise total control of its client and vassal states, and prevent the rise of independent powers that can challenge its dominance. This was clearly articulated by Brzezinski in a set of three geostrategic imperatives (which are not only an academic premise, but a real-world geopolitical practice). At the inflection point of 2020, choices were between accepting Pax Americana’s decline or challenging it. The decision was made in favor of the latter, and today Trump continues to uphold this geopolitical choice. Importantly, as the desperation and anxiety about Pax Americana continues to rise, the room for smaller powers in the IR system is shrinking, challenging their national interests and security. The situation is equivalent to the phenomenon well described by the theory of relativity: “For every action there is an equal and opposite reaction.” The decline of Pax Americana has set in motion a counteraction in a manner that increases the risk and insecurity for all IR actors.

An empire that is confident of its power does not need to impose its will in absolute terms, whereas an empire in decline is anything but confident. Classical Pax Americana permitted vassal powers to exercise—within certain boundaries—hedging in international relations because this ensured that they would remain pliant to the empire’s will.

In the current iteration of Pax Americana, the empire’s rampant practice of wedging and subverting other actors, whether client, vassal or independent, is aimed at creating a binary global system consisting of IR objects and independent IR subjects, i.e. a system of micromanaging and regulating the correlation of power and influence stacked in favor of the hegemon and against other states’ national sovereignty and dignity. Meanwhile, in the 21st-century geopolitical environment it is crucial for states to remain independent subjects in international relations in order to maintain self-interest and security and not to become expendable pawns in the geopolitical games of major powers. Today, Pax Americana’s great global geopolitical game is aimed at obstructing foreign policy goals of the Global South, which reflects the Global North’s lack of competitiveness as an attractive center of power and influence. Rather than changing its attitude and behavior, the U.S. empire continues to display arrogance and unipolar impulses, trying to prevent the rise of independent powers from realizing their potential.

Three Key Pillars of the Global South

The Global South (a name that defies its absolute physical form) is far from being a unitary and homogenous network of international actors and intentions. It is a system of non-Western centric powers in a multipolar constellation. They differ vastly in terms of size, hard and soft power projection, foreign policy intentions, and political and philosophical tangible (physical) and intangible (informational and cognitive) forms. Also, there is a clear line of delineation between the Global South nation-states and civilization-states.

To enforce its geostrategic imperatives, the U.S. and its vassal and client states seek to break the unity of the Global South as a center of growing influence and power. Brazen acts of aggression—waged or threatened—against Venezuela, Iran, Nigeria, and Cuba are aimed at discouraging other countries from aligning more tightly with the Global South.

There are three powers in three key global geopolitical regions that the Global North covets the most to contain and weaken as they are central in engineering a viable alternative to Pax Americana. These are China in the Indo-Pacific region, Iran in West Asia, and Russia in Europe.

These key pillars of the Global South are civilization-states insofar as they are multi-ethnic, multicultural and/or multi-confessional, and have a long history of being independent subjects in international relations. They tend to think strategically over longer periods of time than their counterparts in the Global North.

Taken as a total sum of the parts, these actors have a powerful potential for making Greater Eurasia a sovereign and independent subject in international relations, free from the toxic and subversive effects of Pax Americana. This explains the Global North’s decades-long obsession with the desire to simultaneously subvert China, Iran, and Russia and prevent them from realizing their intentions.

A Basically New Approach to World Order

The Global North approaches international relations in a very transactional manner, which is ideologically messianic and results in zero-sum outcomes that are disadvantageous for its counterparties’ interests and security. Its aim is to generate IR objects that would sacrifice their own interests and security for the ‘greater good’ of Pax Americana. It is also highly West-centric and unipolar in nature. The Global South, on the other hand, is very different in terms of approach and intended outcomes. The Global South countries are driven not by ideological messianism but by pragmatic pursuits and national interests. Their interaction with other powers is based on reciprocity and win-win outcomes, where differences are understood and respected rather than used for division and subversion.

This is evident in the geo-economic goals of the Belt Road Initiative, BRICS+, and the Greater Eurasian Partnership. These projects are based on relational reciprocity between powers as partners and equals, not on the desire to monopolize key economic resources and transportation routes, which marks the U.S.’s economic warfare objectives and myopic focus on keeping other powers from realizing their potential. These basically different approaches prompt some useful conclusions.

Perhaps, first and foremost is that ideology is unable to adapt to a global geopolitical environment that is in a state of transformation. The way to solve Rodrik’s trilemma is to enact: 1) a re-globalization of the world order that supports the principles and spirit of the Global South; 2) a principled and pragmatic approach to politics to regulate and manage the international system; and 3) the upholding of national sovereignty and dignity in international relations.

Pax Americana, now intensively and rashly upheld and mismanaged by Trump, is reactive and non-sustainable. It requires submission of the will of IR actors and world resources to maintain a degenerate and dying empire.

The inconsistencies of U.S. foreign policy reveal its short-term and situational tactics intended to take a spontaneous advantage of situations as they emerge or are engineered. These tactics are aligned in the broadest and most vague terms with the three geostrategic imperatives of maintaining Pax Americana, but the defeats in Ukraine and Iran have demonstrated its limits and deficiency. Pax Americana client and vassal states have learned through hard experience that having U.S. military bases on their soil is not a security guarantee; on the contrary, it is a guarantee of insecurity. Therefore, these desperate, risky, and inconsistent tactics, in the absence of a coherent and viable strategy, are the noise that comes before the strategic defeat and collapse of Pax Americana.

The UK has had eight Prime Minister’s this century, with most serving after Brexit and for an average of two years. Sir Keir Starmer is deeply unpopular and the public (and some in his party) want him to resign.

This is not the first challenge to Starmer, but Labour’s slump in recent local elections—to English councils, the Scottish Parliament, and Welsh Assembly—is especially bruising.

For the first time ever, Labour lost control of Wales, one of its traditional heartlands. Despite finishing joint second with Reform in Scotland, it was Labour’s worst ever result north of the border. In England, Labour lost almost 1,500 councillors in different parts of the country to parties on the left and right.

Calls for Starmer to resign intensified ahead The King’s Speech to reopen Parliament. A relatively unknown MP, Sarah West, offered to challenge Starmer if nobody else would. She ultimately backed down from her pledge, but around 90 of Labour’s 400 MPs called for Starmer to go or begin a leadership transition. Yet over100 MPs publicly backed him.

So far, no leadership challenge has materialized, but potential rivals have made their moves. Wes Streeting has resigned as health secretary and, having no support to challenge Starmer himself, is now backing Andy Burnham, the Mayor of Manchester, who is planning to run for Parliament again. One MP voluntarily has given up his seat for Burnham to do so. More quietly, former Deputy Prime Minister Angela Rayner has also hinted at a challenge, and Labour’s left are urging former party leader Ed Miliband to run.

But why is Starmer surviving and why do Britons feel the urge to keep replacing their leaders? A few factors are important here.

First, there is no obvious alternative to Starmer within the Labour Party. Andy Burnham would lose an election to Parliament. Wes Streeting, on the party’s right, would lose a membership vote. Angela Rayner is not popular with the broader British electorate, and Ed Miliband has already lost an election as leader (with the British press incredibly harsh on him and his family).

The elections’ stubborn arithmetic is also illustrative. Beyond the headlines, Labour’s health is much better than it seems.

The Green Party, challenging Labour from the left, underperformed in these elections. Much of that had to do with recent antisemitism within the party and its controversial leader, Zack Polanski. Although the separatists won in Scotland and Wales, it was not due to any appetite for independence. The SNP remains deeply unpopular in Scotland (perhaps more so than Labour), but the unionist party votes were very split.

On the right, Reform also underperformed and appear to have peaked. Whilst Reform won the most councillors and came second in Wales, its vote share was down from last year’s elections. Also, increased voter turnout seemed to work against Nigel Farage’s party. Reform only won in places that voted for Brexit and is yet to attract any new voters. In other parts of the country, their vote never reached above 10%.

Translated to a General Election, Reform would fall far short of a majority. Some estimates show that it would need to increase its vote share by 22 points to win any sort of governing majority. For that to happen, either the Conservatives or Labour (or both) would have to see their vote collapse, or voter fragmentation would need to be rife across the board.

Thus far, the Conservative vote has proven remarkably stubborn, as has the Liberal Democrats’. Labour is also clinging onto around 20% of the electorate, depending on the poll. As for the Greens, they did well primarily among students—a small slice of the electorate—and urban-based women.

On top of that, Farage is not popular with the British electorate. In every single head-to-head poll with Starmer—and all the other party leaders—Farage lost. Britons do not directly elect the Prime Minister, but cast votes for who will be living at 10 Downing Street. So, whilst Reform has led the polls for over a year now, it is losing support and Farage is a turn-off.

That brings us to Britons themselves. Why, indeed, are Britons so impatient with their leadership this century? Their appetite for regicide is greatly misunderstood.

It is worth remembering that a hundred years ago, from 1900-1926, Britain also went through eight Prime Ministers in quick succession (from three different parties). There are some parallels, even though the times were very different. As Winston Churchill famously quipped about the early 20th century, “the market was free, slaves were free, and conscience was free. But hunger, squalor, and the cold were also free, and people wanted something more than liberty.”

In Britain today, people want something more. After the 2008 financial crash, austerity, Brexit, COVID-19, and recent cost of living crisis, the British public is tired and impatient.

But unlike then, there is no new intellectual thinking to tackle today’s economic problems (mostly generated by Brexit). Instead, there are demagogues and populists, shouting their empty promises and muddying the waters.

Starmer might be unpopular, but the sad truth is anyone else would be. Britain is close to going ungovernable because the population are too impatient. They are desperate to see government working in earnest, as Starmer promised it would.

Britain needs to have an honest conversation with itself about where it is going and how it will get there. To unite the kingdom, Britons need something more than the Football World Cup and the Amandaland TV show.

In 2025, Russia became India’s top supplier of crude oil, accounting for about 32.3 percent of imports, with the bilateral trade reaching $68.7 billion (~₽ 74.45), following a sharp rise over the recent years. These figures reflect not a temporary spike, but a structural shift. The supplies of energy, fertilizers, and industrial goods are increasing. Yet the negotiation and execution of transactions are far from easy-going. Contracts sometimes take too long to conclude; payments are overdue because of excessive scrutiny, and shipments are delayed for reasons that are rarely disclosed in official reports. Today the need for aligning the countries’ legal systems has become urgent than never.

Several issues require a thorough consideration and prompt solution.

Firstly, the lack of a centralized legal coordination interface continues to hinder contract formation and enforcement. The negotiating parties often have different expectations of each other’s core legal concepts. In addition, since 2022 contract performance has been seriously challenged by sanctions. In Russian legal practice, sanctions are often treated as a valid force majeure reason for transactions’ disruption. Meanwhile, the Doctrine of Frustration, enshrined under Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act,1872, specifies whether disruption of contract performance has become objectively impossible rather than commercially difficult. Thus, a supplier may consider itself excused for disruption, while the buyer sees it as a breach. This difference affects risk-based pricing, definition of contract obligations, and resolution of disputes.

Without a shared interpretation baseline, every contract involves a negotiation not only of terms, but of the legal meaning. A standing bilateral interface, even with non-binding guidance, would help reduce this uncertainty if it clarifies sanctions-related force majeure and aligns the relevant governing law and enforcement practices.

Secondly, the absence of sector-specific mutual recognition frameworks continues to influence costs. A pharmaceutical product approved in India still undergoes additional conformity checks in Russia, including registration and quality evaluation under Russian State Pharmacopoeia requirements. Engineering equipment certified under Russian standards often requires additional testing in India through the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) for compliance with Indian Standards (IS) specifications. Each repetition extends timelines and raises costs. Pharmaceuticals, energy equipment, agricultural products, and heavy engineering products form a large share of bilateral trade. Targeted recognition in these sectors would not require full harmonization, but should involve identifying areas where standards already align and formalizing that recognition. Even limited agreements could significantly reduce duplication.

Thirdly, in customs and trade documentation, even small differences can create major disruptions. Disparities in rules of origin, inconsistencies in Harmonized System classification, and differing documentation formats lead to repeated queries at ports. Traders handling processed goods or mixed consignments are especially affected. The lost time translates directly into costs through demurrage, storage, or missed deadlines. Both countries have invested in digital customs systems. India’s GST and and Russia’s EDO systems already operate at scale domestically, but interoperability gaps remain. Digital invoices and electronic bills of lading are not always recognized by the systems and force manual checks, despite efforts to enforce interoperability of the national payment systems. Mutual recognition of digital formats and alignment of documentation standards would remove much of this disfunction.

Fourthly, the sanctions restrictions have caused legal ambiguity that affects decisions at every level. Companies must decide on contract structure, payment routing, shipment insurance, and risk allocation. However, legal boundaries often allow differing interpretations, which causes a cautious response. Even legally permissible transactions face delays because the cost of error is high. This cautious overcompliance may not appear in trade data, but it continues to influence commercial activity.

A coordinated, sanctions-aware framework would not remove risks, but would define them more clearly. Standard clauses, model structures, and clearer allocation of responsibilities would allow businesses to proceed with greater confidence.

Fifthly, an equally important challenge is banking and transactional legal interoperability. Russian banks, such as Sberbank and VTB, now operate actively in India, while Indian banks have enabled trade through special vostro accounts approved by the Reserve Bank of India for rupee-based settlements. These mechanisms have kept transactions moving. Yet uncertainty persists around non-SWIFT systems, particularly concerning the legal moment of settlement and applicable compliance requirements. In practice, Indian public sector banks have increasingly assumed a quasi-regulatory role, sometimes imposing excessive requirements, including confirmation of non-SDN status from Russian parties that are often not in a legal position to provide such assurances. This creates operational deadlocks; a delayed or disputed payment can disrupt entire supply chains.

Russia is tightening oversight of the financial flows, including stricter regulation of cryptocurrency-related activity. A bilateral protocol clarifying settlement finality, recognition of alternative messaging systems, and compliance norms would make existing channels more reliable. Another practical step could involve joint working groups between the Russian and Indian Ministries of Finance tasked with issuing operational clarifications for categories of market participants and commodity classes.

Sixthly, investment and corporate law complexity continues to limit deeper engagement. While Russia-India trade has grown, long-term investments remain modest. Companies are cautious as they face layered regulation, ownership restrictions in some sectors, taxation ambiguity, and repatriation and exit uncertainty. The India–Russia Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement, in force since 1998, already provides a framework to avoid double taxation through tax credits and rules on permanent establishment. However, parts of it remain under-used. More consistent application of permanent establishment thresholds and faster use of mutual agreement procedures could reduce disputes, improve tax certainty, and support investment. The issue is less about formal openness and more about clarity in application.

Finally, the burden of legal complexity falls most heavily on small and medium enterprises (SMEs). Larger firms can manage regulatory differences through dedicated teams. SMEs often cannot. Many depend on intermediaries, raising costs and reducing control. The absence of standardized contracts, limited familiarity with international commercial terms, and complex customs procedures create barriers. Practical steps can help. Bilingual contract templates for common transactions would provide a clear starting point. Clear guidance on Incoterms and simplified customs procedures for smaller consignments would lower entry barriers. Faster, lower-cost dispute resolution would ensure that smaller firms are not excluded due to legal costs.

In all these areas, the core issue is effective coordination.

Russia and India have established national legal systems of their own strength. The challenge arises when these systems interact without a shared framework. Businesses do not need identical laws; they need predictability. They need to know how a clause will be interpreted, how a shipment will be processed, and how a payment will be settled.

Russia-India economic engagement has moved from exploratory trade into a sustained cooperation at scale. Legal alignment will determine whether this cooperation continues smoothly or face limits. The task is to reduce uncertainty where it matters most. When contracts are clearer, certifications are recognized, documents move smoothly, payments settle with confidence, and smaller firms can participate without excessive burden, the relationship becomes easier to sustain.

The opportunity is already vivid in the performance figures. The next step is to ensure that the legal framework supports this progress. Without institutional and regulatory coordination, the difficulties will persist. One practical starting point could be a bilateral model contract approved by both countries’ ministries of justice, which would cover sanctions-related force majeure, governing law, and streamlined arbitration, while leaving technical implementation issues to working groups rather than political summits.

Is it possible to create a new reserve currency as an alternative to the U.S. dollar? The topic is controversial. Some believe that it is not, others think that it is even undesirable. I am one of the few who believe that it is not only desirable and possible, but perhaps indispensable.

I first wrote about the need for a new reserve currency in August 2023[1], and since then has elaborated the idea in detail[2]. In this article, I will outline some of its main points. As an innovative alternative, it certainly needs improvement and is open to criticism.

In modern history, the role of international currencies has usually been played by national currencies, and only few were specially designed to serve this function (issued and managed by a national central bank, or by a regional bank, like the euro). Since the issuing country’s objectives do not usually coincide with others’, the international currency can rarely serve the interests of other nations.

Today, we need to create a new international currency that would not perform national functions. Before discussing its characteristics, let me show why there are no efficient ready-made alternatives.

Discarding Options

The options now available are either inconvenient or unlikely.

One would be to continue living in a world dominated globally by the U.S. dollar (and, regionally, by the euro). However, the U.S. dollar system is inefficient, unreliable, and even dangerous. It has become an instrument of blackmail and sanctions. The precariousness of the monetary, fiscal, and financial foundations of the U.S. economy is becoming increasingly clear. This does not suit the emerging economies of the Global South.

Can the U.S. dollar be replaced, at least partly, by some other national or regional currency of the Global North? This scenario is not feasible on a large scale. The euro, compromised as an instrument of sanctions, suffers from the same problems as the U.S. dollar. Europe’s economic situation is even more problematic than that of the U.S.

The Japanese yen has similar problems: the Japanese economy is not doing well and does not inspire confidence. Besides, the yen has never played a major international role. Other national currencies of the Global North are either too small (e.g., the Swiss franc, the Canadian or Australian dollar) or suffer from the country’s economic weakness (the British pound sterling).

As for gold, it can replace the U.S. dollar only partially, as a reserve asset for central banks and other economic agents. However, its high price volatility, caused by the widespread nervousness about the U.S. dollar, makes this option unreliable.

There are two preconditions for the renminbi’s internationalization: free convertibility and China’s willingness to allow a large exchange rate appreciation. The Chinese government is hesitant on both—and rightly so. In the Chinese case, free convertibility would essentially mean removing capital controls—a central element of China’s economic policy in recent decades that has greatly contributed to its stability. The renminbi’s external appreciation would threaten the competitiveness of exports, one of the main factors of the Chinese economy’s dynamism. Moreover, in recent years China has seen deflation in wholesale prices and close-to-zero inflation in consumer prices, so a sharp rise of the renminbi may put the economy in a deflationary trap and at associated risk of recession.

There also remains the question of whether other countries of the Global South would want the renminbi, just another national currency, to replace the U.S. dollar and the People’s Bank of China, another national central bank, to replace the U.S. Federal Reserve. With China issuing an international reserve asset on a large scale, the rest of the world would continue to experience, albeit perhaps in a milder way, the same problems it now has with the U.S. dollar.

In any case (and there are more possible options), creation of a new reserve currency faces challenges—geopolitical (fundamentally, the U.S.’s resistance) and technical (building a trustworthy monetary institutional and operational structure is no easy task). But we need to address this task, not least because we cannot rule out a major financial crisis of the Western capital markets in the coming years, e.g., associated with artificial intelligence and technology companies. If this happens, the decline of the U.S. economy and dollar, will accelerate. Everyone will be scrambling for a solution. So, we’d better look for it today.

A Possible Path

Theoretically, one way would be to back the new currency with gold, as suggested by Russian economists. However, they have so far not solved the main problem this alternative entails: how to ensure a new currency’s stability while supporting it with an eminently unstable asset. If there is a solution, it is beyond my knowledge.

It seems more appropriate to back the new currency in the way I briefly discuss below.

The first question to address is who would create the new currency. In the current international circumstances, there seems to be only one possibility—a group of 15 to 20 Global South countries, including BRICS members and other middle-income countries. Yet none of them can accomplish this mission reliably by delegating the issuance of a new reserve currency to an existing financial institution.

Thus, a new international financial institution—an issuing bank—must be established with the sole and exclusive function of issuing the new currency and putting it in circulation. This bank would not replace national central banks, and its currency would circulate in parallel with the national currencies of the sponsoring countries and other national and regional currencies. Its operations would include international transactions only, excluding domestic ones. Contrary to what is often suggested, it cannot be a euro-type currency, i.e., a single currency issued by a single central bank which replaced national currencies (Deutsche Mark, French franc, Italian lira, etc.).

There are other questions, too. How can we ensure the success of a new international currency? What would make it widely used? The essential thing is to ensure confidence, and this depends on how the new monetary arrangement will be constructed institutionally.

The way that seems most viable to me should be based, among other things, on five legal guarantees: 1) the currency’s stability in terms of value; 2) its non-use as an instrument of sanctions or pressure; 3) operational autonomy of the issuing bank; 4) maximum limit for its issuance; and 5) backing by a basket of the sponsoring countries’ government bonds.

Let me briefly describe these five points.

First, the currency should be based on a weighted basket of the participating countries’ currencies, with its fluctuations following the changes in these currencies. Since all currencies in the basket would be floating or flexible, the new currency would also be a floating currency. The weights in the basket would be determined by the share of each country’s PPP GDP in the total GDP of the sponsor group.

The new reserve currency’s exchange rate is expected to be relatively stable since China accounts for at least 40-45% of the total (depending on the exact composition of the group). The renminbi’s relative weight in the basket would provide certain stability, given the stability of the Chinese currency. Another endogenous factor of its stability is that the basket would be formed by currencies of both exporters and importers of commodities, i.e., countries standing at the opposite sides of the commodity price cycle. These factors could be further reinforced by establishing a weighted, geometrically and symmetrically trimmed, average. Currencies with large fluctuations, beyond pre-established limits, would be temporarily excluded from the basket.

Second, the participating countries would make an explicit commitment to non-use of sanctions. This would contrast with the insecurity caused the abusive use of the U.S. dollar and the euro for punishment and blackmail. This legal guarantee would be reinforced by the issuing bank’s operational autonomy.

Third, to ensure the bank’s operational autonomy and avoid political interference and diplomatic maneuvering by its founders, its president and vice-presidents should be granted long terms (e.g., five years). This kind of guaranteed autonomy, typical of international financial organizations, does not fully protect the bank from interference, but it has its advantages.

The institution’s management could be overseen by and accountable to the Board of Governors and on the Board of Directors designated by the sponsoring countries. The oversight and accountability should be implemented through normal institutional channels, not through the president and vice presidents’ individual pressure.

Fourth, a limit should be set to the amount of the new currency circulated by the bank as a safeguard against excessive issuance. The new international currency would thus have a constraint that the U.S. dollar does not have. Yet this ceiling is secondary to the most important instrument—back-up of the new currency.

Fifth, therefore, is the importance of defining a proper procedure for creating a basket of national bonds of the founding countries and those that will join later. The issuing bank would issue the new reserve currency (NRC) and new reserve bonds (NRB), whose interest rates would be attractive as they would reflect the interest rates on the bonds of the participating nations, all of which are higher than the rates on the bonds in the U.S. dollars and euros. The NRC would be fully convertible into NRBs. The high weight of the Chinese currency, issued by a country with a solid economy, would raise confidence in the NRC’s backing and help stabilize the new currency’s average exchange rate.

The West’s Reaction

The proposal has its vulnerabilities, discussed in detail in [2]. Here let me just note the most significant one: the initiative may provoke negative reactions from the West, which can resort to threats and sanctions. This risk is real: today the declining West is more violent than ever before.

Yet we must decide now whether we are going to live indefinitely with the Western increasingly dysfunctional monetary system used as a geopolitical tool, or we will gather economic, political, and intellectual efforts to get out of this trap.

The next few years will tell whether Global South countries are up to this challenge.

Russia and India have an extraordinary opportunity to convert the traditional trade framework into a comprehensive development alliance spanning infrastructure, tourism, industry, energy, education, and scientific research.

This opportunity is rooted in Russia’s substantial balances in Indian rupees accumulated through energy exports, currently underutilized. What may appear at first glance as a financial constraint is, in fact, a latent investment resource that can be used to transform bilateral cooperation into a long-term strategic framework generating real economic value.

A Proven Model Revisited: From Constraint to Strategic Evolution

The mechanism underpinning Russia–India trade today is not unprecedented. It echoes a model previously employed by India in its energy trade with Iran under sanctions. India continued purchasing Iranian oil while settling payments in local currency, thereby preserving trade flows despite external limitations. However, the effectiveness of that  model depended on relative trade balance. Iran was able to utilize accumulated funds by importing Indian goods—particularly pharmaceuticals, food products, and agricultural commodities—and even re-exporting them regionally. Financial flows remained dynamic, circulating within a broader economic ecosystem.

Russia–India trade is structurally different.

While Russia’s energy exports to India have expanded significantly, its imports from India remain modest, resulting in a steady accumulation of rupee balances. This imbalance is not a flaw in strategic judgment, but the countries’ intent to preserve economic cooperation under tough external constraints.

Today, however, this model can be changed to generate more significant economic benefits by transforming accumulated rupees into direct investment in Russia’s real economy, implemented through Indian industrial and infrastructure capabilities.

From Financial Accumulation to Real Assets

Rather than remaining idle, rupee balances can be mobilized to finance large-scale development projects across Russia. Funded by existing export revenues, these projects would be Russia-owned, but executed by Indian companies with proven project delivery capacity.

This approach offers multiple opportunities: it unlocks trapped liquidity, creates productive assets, and generates future revenues in convertible currencies, thereby reinforcing economic resilience. India’s industrial and engineering sector offers precisely the capabilities required for such transformation. Indian Tata Projects, Larsen & Toubro (L&T), Reliance Infrastructure, and Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited (BHEL) have demonstrated consistent excellence in executing large-scale complex developments.

An illustrative example of India’s ability to deliver high-quality, large-scale projects with exceptional speed and coordination is Aerocity in New Delhi, developed adjacent to Indira Gandhi International Airport. Completed within a remarkably short time, it integrates hotels, commercial spaces, and urban infrastructure into a cohesive ecosystem.

This competence can be directly transferred to Russian territory, transforming financial balances into visible functional and revenue-generating infrastructure. DLF CyberHub in Gurugram city in New Delhi demonstrates how commercial, social, and business environments can be combined into vibrant urban hubs. Similarly, Ambience Mall showcases large-scale retail ecosystems hosting hundreds of brands in fashion, electronics, food, and lifestyle sectors. Replicating such models in Russia would introduce modern commercial ecosystems and expand bilateral trade beyond raw commodities into consumer and cultural markets.

Airports as Gateways to Development

No large-scale economic transformation can succeed without efficient connectivity. Airport infrastructure plays a central role in linking regions to global flows of tourism, investment, and commerce.

India’s experience in developing airport-adjacent zones—most notably through Aerocity—demonstrates how aviation infrastructure can become the core of integrated economic zones. Applying this model across Russian regions would enhance accessibility, stimulate tourism, and support logistics, turning regional centers into international entry points for capital and movement.

Russia’s geographic diversity offers a rare opportunity for implementing development projects across multiple climatic, cultural, and economic zones within a single national framework. The country presents a spectrum of complementary development pathways—from Adygea’s wellness and ecological appeal to Sochi’s winter sports attractions, to the Black Sea coastal opportunities, to the North Caucasian republics’ cultural richness, and to Siberia’s industrial depth. These regions can be approached as part of a coherent national strategy, where development emerges as a networked system with investment assets, derived from accumulated rupee balances, allocated according to the regions’ comparative advantages.  

Financial Efficiency and Strategic Autonomy

An equally important advantage of this model is its financial architecture. By utilizing existing rupee balances, projects can proceed without reliance on external financing mechanisms.

This approach eliminates exposure to high international banking commissions and restrictive guarantee systems, reducing costs while enhancing operational security. Insulated from external pressures, project execution remains stable, which ensures continuity and raises the participating stakeholders’ confidence.

Furthermore, linking financial balances to real assets contributes to currency stability, supporting both the Indian rupee and the Russian ruble through tangible economic backing.

Importantly, this model creates a self-reinforcing economic cycle. As investment projects expand, demand for Russian energy exports to India is likely to grow further, strengthening the mechanism that generates financial flows. Thus, accumulation of rupees becomes part of a circular system where trade generates investment which sustains and expands trade. These dynamics transform a temporary imbalance into a long-term structural advantage.

Indian Labor Mobility and Expertise as a Strategic Asset

A critical dimension of this model is mobilization of Indian labor for supporting Russia’s expanding development agenda. Russia has taken the first steps in this direction, but real efficiency of this approach emerges when labor mobility is directly embedded in the broader model. Instead of recruiting individual workers and expecting them to adapt independently to the new environment, Indian labor can arrive in Russia as part of organized project ecosystems led by their companies. In this case, Indian workers could more easily accommodate themselves with familiar institutional structures, under established management systems, together with colleagues from similar professional and cultural backgrounds.

Besides significantly reducing challenges, typically associated with relocation (cultural adaptation, administrative complexity, and social integration), this model enhances productivity and coordination. Workers emerge as part of cohesive operational units aligned with project goals and execution standards.

For Russia, this ensures reliable workforce, improved quality control, and faster project implementation. For India, it provides a structured avenue to alleviate employment pressures while enabling its workforce to gain international experience under stable and secure conditions.

Equally important is the contribution of Indian experts and technical professionals, whose experience in large-scale infrastructure, railway, shipbuilding, energy, and digital technologies projects can accelerate knowledge transfer and strengthen local capabilities.

In this integrated model, labor mobility becomes more than a supplementary measure: it evolves into the key component of a development strategy that aligns human capital with financial resources and reinforces Russia-India long-term strategic partnership.

The transformation of Russia–India economic cooperation into a comprehensive development partnership reflects a broader global shift. It is not merely a response to external constraints, but a deliberate repositioning towards markets that offer long-term growth, flexibility, and strategic alignment.

This trajectory resonates with President Vladimir Putin’s emphasis that Russia should increase oil and natural gas supplies to reliable partners. In this context, the deepening of Russia–India ties—anchored in energy, investment, and human capital—emerges not as a temporary adjustment, but as part of a lasting reconfiguration of the global economy.

By converting financial balances into tangible assets, integrating industrial capabilities, and fostering human and cultural connections, Russia and India are not only addressing immediate challenges, but also laying the foundation for a new model of partnership—one defined by resilience, mutual benefit, and a shared vision of the future.

What initially started as a pragmatic response to external economic pressures now has the potential to develop into a comprehensive transformation framework—one that integrates infrastructure, industry, tourism, and human connections into a unified vision of prosperity. This transformation offers more than just a solution to financial challenges; it provides a mechanism to turn what was once called the ‘Rupee Trap’ into a catalyst for laying the foundation of a new era in Russia–India partnership.

The global energy system has entered a period of  profound structural transformation. As the escalating war in the Middle East continues to disrupt traditional energy supply routes, and the global geoeconomic fragmentation is reshaping trade patterns, a new Eurasian energy architecture is emerging with three pivotal actors—Russia, China, and India—forming its basis.

What initially appeared as a temporary adjustment to Western sanctions and market volatility is evolving into a deeper supply chain linking the world’s largest hydrocarbon exporter with its two fastest-growing economies.

Iran’s de facto blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, a critical chokepoint of the global energy transportation system, has vividly underlined the urgent need for such realignment. The blockade of this vital maritime corridor, accounting for 20% of the world’s oil flows and a large volume of liquefied natural gas transportation, has triggered an unprecedent hike in oil prices, pushing Brent crude above $110 per barrel and forcing governments across Asia to reassess their energy security strategies.

For Russia, the new Middle East crisis has highlighted the strategic expediency of its ‘Turn to Asia’. For decades, Russian oil and gas flowed primarily westward to European markets, yet Moscow long foresaw the shift of the global energy demand towards Asian markets.

Speaking at the final plenary session of the 11th Valdai International Discussion Club, President Vladimir Putin underscored this logic: “…as a large part of our country is geographically in Asia, [w]hy should we not make use of our competitive advantages in this area? It would be extremely shortsighted not to do so.” The eastward reorientation of Russian trade, which began back in the late 1990s, gradually advanced through the 2000s, and accelerated after the beginning of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, has produced tangible economic results. Today, a growing share of Russian oil and gas exports has moved eastward across Eurasia.

Most of Russian hydrocarbon exports redirected from Europe have been taken over by China and India: in early 2026, China accounted for about 48% of Russia’s crude exports, and India, for around 37%, which makes them by far the largest buyers of Russian oil. These figures indicate a profound structural shift.

The reorientation of supplies is supported by expanding infrastructure—from the Power of Siberia gas pipeline delivering Russian gas to China to the rapidly growing tanker routes connecting Russian Arctic and Pacific terminals with Asian refineries.

China’s role in this transformation is central. As the world’s largest energy importer, Beijing always sought to diversify supply sources to secure its growing economy from geopolitical shocks. Russian crude has become a crucial component of that strategy. In 2026, China remains the largest buyer of Russian fossil fuels, accounting for more than half of export revenues among Russia’s top five customers.

China has also taken precautionary measures to mitigate the risks posed by the Middle East conflict. Beijing has curbed fuel exports, and the National Development and Reform Commission has ordered refiners to prioritize domestic supplies amid external disruptions. This points to China’s concern that prolonged disruptions in the Gulf oil shipping may tighten Asian markets.

India’s position is equally significant. India is the world’s third-largest oil consumer, and its energy demand continues to expand rapidly alongside economic growth. Russian crude remains the country’s largest source of imported oil, with deliveries exceeding 1.5 million barrels per day in early 2026.

New Delhi sees the diversification of supplies not merely as a matter of commerce but also a factor of national security. Indian officials repeatedly emphasize that ensuring reliable energy supplies for more than 1.4 billion citizens is a key national priority. In this context, Russian oil—often offered under flexible pricing and transported along diversified routes—provides a valuable hedge against the Middle Eastern market volatility.

The military escalation in the Gulf has sharply reduced tanker traffic and disrupted LNG flows through the Strait of Hormuz, tightening supply across Asian markets that depend heavily on Gulf producers. Analysts warn that Asia is particularly exposed to such disruptions because of its dependence on maritime energy imports from the region. The emerging Russia–India–China energy triangle is a pragmatic response to the systemic risks.

From the Russian perspective, the logic is clear. Moscow benefits from stable long-term demand for its hydrocarbons and from Asian export routes that reduce its vulnerability to Western political pressure.

Russia’s vast reserves—among the largest in the world—require sustained investment and predictable markets. Asian consumers provide precisely that combination of scale and growth.

For China, Russian supplies offer geographic and strategic advantages. Unlike Middle Eastern cargoes that must transit vulnerable maritime chokepoints, Russian energy can reach China through pipelines, Arctic shipping lanes, and relatively short maritime routes from Pacific ports. This diversification strengthens Beijing’s energy security at a time when geopolitical tensions increasingly affect global trade routes.

India’s strategy reflects similar considerations. While the Gulf will remain a key supplier, overreliance on a single region may expose India to supply shocks and price volatility.

Expanding purchases from Russia—along with growing cooperation in refining, petrochemicals, and LNG—help balance that risk while ensuring competitive pricing for Indian refiners.

Along with transforming energy flows, the energy triangle is reshaping the financial and institutional landscape of Eurasian commerce. Within BRICS, Russia, India and China have explored mechanisms for conducting energy trade in national currencies and building alternative payment systems. These initiatives reflect a broader effort to create financial infrastructure for sustained large-scale trade that could withstand global market disruptions, even during geopolitical crises.

The implications extend beyond hydrocarbons. Stable energy flows underpin industrial growth and economic stability across Eurasia, and as demand shifts towards Asia, the integration of Russian resources with Chinese and Indian markets is set to become a new normal in the 21st-century energy order.

This policy does not diminish the importance of imports from Gulf producers, but it mitigates the risk of overreliance on a single region or transit route.

What is emerging is not replacement, but rebalancing. Russian energy is increasingly complementing Middle Eastern supplies, giving China and India greater resilience against external shocks.

For Moscow, Beijing, and New Delhi, the message is clear: amid global geopolitical and geoeconomic fragmentation, exacerbated by the U.S. and its allies’ hostile but faltering policies and internal contradictions, building diversified and resilient energy linkages is no longer optional but strategically critical.

In all times, writers and columnists tend to complain about the lack of motivating subject matter to write about. Dostoevsky, for one, noted the banality of everyday life and the effort it requires to say “a new word.” If the Russian genius faced this problem, imagine the difficulty of adding something original that modest columnists like me have.

However, today, with the outbreak of the war against Iran launched by the delinquent superpower, the United States, and the genocidal state, Israel, we can hardly complain of the lack of thrilling events. And the ancient curse “May you live in interesting times” appears extremely relevant (even if worn out by overuse).

Dostoevsky, who believed in God, wrote that children’s suffering discloses the absurdity of all historical reality. In my recent book, Estilhaços, I say that “the suffering of children not only belies the existence of God but proves that of the Devil.”  The atrocious bombing of a girls’ school in Iran, which killed more than 160 people, is a clear proof of it.

These days, the Devil is personified by Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu. Or would it be better to reverse the order and write “Netanyahu and Trump”? Since at the helm of this aggression are clearly Israel and the powerful Zionist lobby in Washington and New York. U.S. Foreign Minister Marco Rubio has clumsily revealed it.

To justify the aggression against Iran, he said: “There was an imminent threat to the U.S.… We knew that if Iran was attacked by Israel, they would immediately attack us.” According to Rubio, by attacking Iran, the Trump administration acted “proactively” and “defensively.” And Israel, defining the timing, is the one calling the shots.

Time will tell, but today it seems that the diabolical duo made a huge miscalculation.

The U.S. seeks domination in the Middle East. But Iran is a tough nut to crack. It is not defenseless Palestine subjected to Israeli destruction and massacre. Nor is it Lebanon equally defenseless against Israeli attacks. Nor is it Syria torn apart by U.S., Israeli and Turkish aggression. Nor is it Libya and Iraq. And nor is it Venezuela easily subdued by the U.S.

Iran is a military power that is able to impose heavy losses on the aggressors, including the U.S.’s satellites and allies in the Persian Gulf.

Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain, hosting American military bases on their territory from where attacks are made on Iran, have become a legitimate target for the Iranians.

Tehran has also used these states’ economic dependence on the passage through the Strait of Hormuz to transport their oil and natural gas exports (of the five mentioned, only Saudi Arabia has other channels). Iran has surgically closed this strait for shipping, except for its strategic allies—Russia and, above all, China. All other countries’ ships trying to pass the strait are bombed.

Iran is an ancient and peaceful civilization, a great country proud of its traditions. It was never a colony, although at certain periods it was subjected to semi-colonial relationships with by foreign powers, most notably with Britan and the U.S. The last foreign invasion of Iran was in the 18th century.

One should not disregard Iran’s size. There are more than 90 million Iranians, living in a territory larger than the combined territories of France, Spain, Germany, and Italy. Compare it with tiny Palestine, with a population of less than 6 million, a victim of Israel’s genocide and ethnic cleansing. Iran will not be wiped off the map.

The Iranians had no intention to attack anyone. On the contrary, they tried to find a negotiated solution with the U.S., but were stabbed in the back.

The Iranians have been preparing for such confrontation for decades. Despite more than 40 years of Westen sanctions, Iran has accumulated a great capability for retaliation, as we can now see. Tehran became fully aware that such preparations were necessary back in 1980, when Iran was attacked by Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, encouraged and armed by the U.S. and Israel. Iran was taken by surprise then, and it realized that it was militarily vulnerable. And it has learned the lesson, transforming itself into a strong military power.

The U.S. and Israel’s appalling and stupid decision to assassinate Ayatollah Khamenei has only strengthened the Iranian nation’s resistance and unity. Its extraordinary national leader has become a martyr and symbol of Iranian resistance to the existential threat facing the country. He behaved like a hero and will never be forgotten.

The truth is that the U.S. and Israel are profoundly sick societies, with Trump and Netanyahu’s actions clearly manifesting the disease. The U.S. is trying to escape the decline and the Western civilization’s shipwreck by forcibly regaining its increasingly contested world hegemony. The ultimate target is China, “the most powerful country relative to us since the 19th century,” as stated in U.S. National Defense Strategy released in January. Israel, for its part, is seeking to gain dominance in the Middle East. Only two major countries oppose it—Iran and Turkey. If Iran succumbs, Turkey is likely to be the next victim.

But we must all realize that the U.S. and Israel’s criminal aggression against Iran is a brazen violation of the international law and, hence, a threat to all of us.

Due to a misunderstanding of the US legal system (under which the Constitution is supreme) and a misreading of certain laws, some confusion has arisen within the Russian expert community regarding the legality, under US law, of Trump’s attack on Iran. I would like to take the opportunity to clarify that the attack is manifestly illegal.

The US Constitution (which in theory still matters and, indeed, takes precedent over all other law in the US) provides Congress with the authority “to declare war”. It does not provide the President with similar authority. Accordingly, the US may conduct hostilities – or at least initiate war against another state – only with Congressional authorization.

Obviously, going to war with another state, without actually declaring war, does not allow the President to avert this clause. It merely means that the action is now not only unconstitutional, but also a violation of international custom/norms. One of several such violations, given Khomeini’s assassination (a violation of the norm against targeting leaders), the murder of Iranian schoolgirls and other civilians (who, amongst Iranian casualties, so far appear to outnumber legitimate military targets – incidentally, in the same way that civilians have been the vast majority of Israeli victims in Gaza), etc.

Note the specification above: (1) initiation (2) of war (3) against another state – that is definitely the authority of Congress. Gray areas do exist around (1) waging a war that has been started by an adversary, (2) deploying forces into a context and/or for purposes that may develop into combat, and (3) using force against non-state actors. The War Powers Resolution was intended to address these and perhaps other gray areas; it constrained the President’s authority within such situations, and certainly did not expand his authority beyond such contexts.

The law explicitly reads that nothing in it “is intended to alter the constitutional authority of the Congress or of the President”, and nothing in it “shall be construed as granting any authority to the President” that the President did not already possess.

In particular, the War Powers Resolution requires that, if the President deploys forces for combat (or potential combat) – in a manner that is permissible under the constitution, e.g. in response to attack, or for ‘combat-adjacent’ purposes (e.g. ‘advisors’ to South Vietnam, or forces in Saudi Arabia to deter a continued Iraqi offensive in 1990), or against a non-state actor like al-Qaeda[1] – then the President must receive authorization from Congress within 90 days.

Again, this is not an expansion of the President’s authority, but a narrowing of it. It was intended to prevent a repeat of the US’s slide into the Vietnam War. It does nothing (and could do nothing, given Constitutional supremacy) to alter Congress’s exclusive authority to initiate war against other states. The Resolution explicitly states this in its third paragraph: “The constitutional powers of the President…to introduce [US forces] into hostilities, or into situations where [hostilities are likely], are exercised only pursuant to (1) a declaration of war, (2) specific statutory authorization, or (3)…attack upon the United States, its territories or possessions, or its armed forces.”

In order to legally/constitutionally attack Iran, Trump would either need a declaration of war (from Congress), a law more or less directly authorizing such a war (also from Congress), or an attack by Iran upon the US.

He has none of those things. The attacks, therefore, are unconstitutional and illegal under US law. If the rule of law still existed within the US, the US military would have refused to obey the orders (given that they are illegal and thus invalid), and the President would be impeached for high crimes and misdemeanors.

Actually, he really should have been impeached during his first term, for the almost-as-clearly-illegal airstrikes against Syria. Unfortunately, such strikes were one of Trump’s few actions that Democrats actually supported. Democrats were, if anything, mostly concerned that Trump was not hawkish *enough* in his first term, inventing the Russiagate hoax and impeaching Trump for the ‘high crime’ of not supporting Kiev with sufficient enthusiasm. And, indeed, Obama also violated the Constitution with his attacks on Libya. (Although they – like Trump’s airstrikes on Syria – were not quite as blatantly illegal as Trump’s attacks on Iran and Venezuela, since Libya and Syria were riven by civil wars and thus *conceivably* their governments could be viewed as illegitimate.) So these new attacks are probably best seen less as a specifically Trumpian or Republican failure, and more as a manifestation of the US’s general slide from the rule of law into Caesarism (not the fun kind).

Following the drumbeats of war in the Middle East for weeks, the U.S.-Israeli missile strikes against Iran and the latter’s retaliation did not come as a surprise, but the survivability of the Iranian regime is now at question. Equally unsure is this whether this conflict will spread over the region and more countries might be dragged in. For the international community, this is not merely a regional concern but a global economic precipice. Nowhere are the apprehensions more acute than in Beijing monitoring the situation, which generates economic security concerns.

As the world’s largest oil importer, China’s energy security is intrinsically linked to the Persian Gulf stability. China is a primary customer of Iranian crude, purchasing over a million barrels per day. Any military confrontation that disrupts this flow, whether through direct strikes on Iranian facilities, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, or the imposition of stricter sanctions, will hamper China’s energy supplies.

Beijing maintains a robust contingency plan, including the diversification of its suppliers (Russia, Saudi Arabia, African and American nations), but a conflict-driven spike in oil prices would strain the Chinese economy, increase manufacturing costs, and fuel inflation.

Given these economic stakes, one might expect Beijing to exert heavy diplomatic pressure on Tehran to de-escalate. However, China’s foreign policy is firmly anchored in the principles of non-alignment and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. This doctrine inherently limits the scope of China’s reaction.

Unlike Western powers that condition aid to political change, China refrains from dictating policy to its partners. For Iran, this makes China a reliable, though sometimes restrained, partner in times of crisis. Сhina-Iran relationship is built on shared resistance to the U.S.’s unilateral global hegemony, but Tehran harbors no illusions that Beijing will enter a military pact or directly challenge Washington on its behalf. Under the current circumstances, Iran’s expectations of China are set around not its direct military involvement but sustained economic partnership and diplomatic backing-up in multilateral forums.

However, to say that China is passive would be to ignore the changing geopolitical architecture. The recent inclusion of Iran into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and BRICS is indicative of a significant geopolitical shift. Although these are not alliances in the traditional sense, they are a powerful framework for the states’ strategic alignment.

The significance was underscored by recent China-Russia-Iran joint naval exercises in the Gulf of Oman. While Beijing cautiously frames them as routine drills aimed at ensuring maritime security, the message did not miss observers. The exercises are a subtle but undeniable deterrent, signalling to the U.S. and its allies that Iran is not as isolated as it once was. Knowing that it has the support of the world’s two most powerful counterweights to U.S. hegemony gives Tehran certain strategic comfort.

The shift in the balance of power is further evidenced by the recent reactions of U.S. allies in the region. Saudi Arabia’s refusal to permit the U.S. military to use its airspace or bases for strikes on Iran is a sign of a profound transformation in the regional setup. This is not merely about the legacy of past disagreements; it is a forward-looking calculation.

The Gulf states pursue their own détente with Iran, championed by China’s recent diplomatic initiatives. Hedging against the U.S.’s possible withdrawal from the region and securing their own interests, they are unwilling to let their territories be used as launch-pads for a war that would inevitably destabilize their economies. This growing reluctance proves the diminishing, or at least contested, role of the U.S. as the sole security guarantor of the Middle East.

These events have shown the stark contrast between Western and Eastern policies in the region. The Western approach, often coming down to ultimatums, regime change, and military interventions, has left a trail of instability across the region. In contrast, China’s philosophy centers on economic development, mutual respect for sovereignty, and strategic patience.

While this philosophy may appear opaque or overly cautious to Western analysts accustomed to more muscular diplomacy, its rationale is becoming increasingly evident. By refusing to take sides in the sectarian and political rivalries of the Middle East, China has positioned itself as a trusted mediator, as has been evidence by the restoration of Saudi-Iranian ties.

Now that the war is ongoing, the international community may find that China’s insistence on dialogue and refusal to engage in the zero-sum game of great-power conflicts is not a weakness, but prudence. The path to peace in the Middle East may not lie through the barrel of a gun, but through non-interference that China continues to champion. The attraction and utility of this philosophy is increasingly recognized worldwide.

The strategic deterrence of new multilateral blocs, the refusal of U.S. traditional partners to participate in its military operations, and the growing appeal of a non-interventionist diplomatic policies indicate the beginning of the end of U.S. uncontested hegemony. The unipolar moment that followed the Cold War, when one power could dictate the terms of global security and intervene at will, is crumbling under the weight of its own contradictions and the rise of a truly multipolar world.

In this emerging order, global policing ambitions give way to regional coexistence. The signals sent by Saudi Arabia and other regional powers are a clear: they intend to manage their own neighbourhood themselves. This paves the way for a future where the U.S. will have to abandon its role of the guarantor of distant shores and refocus on its own home.

Such a realignment must not cause conflict, but usher in a more stable peace. For in a world where major powers respect distinct spheres of influence and prioritize internal development over external intervention, the rationale for confrontation diminishes. It will be a future where the U.S. will mind its own business, China will continue its rise through international cooperation, and the Middle East nations will enjoy sovereignty that they have long been denied. This will be a future of sustainable peaceful coexistence.

Unlike our American cousins, the UK dish out consequences to Jeffery Epstein’s associates. Damaging revelations from the Epstein Files showed a problematic friendship with Peter Mandelson, who briefly served as Britain’s Ambassador to the U.S. His former boss, Sir Keir Starmer, had a lot of explaining to do.

Calls for Starmer to go flooded in. Opposition parties, media of all colours, and the public thought he was done for—as did some of his own MPs. With Starmer’s personal favourability in the toilet and his party polling terribly, it seemed inevitable that Britain would have its fifth Prime Minister in five years.

The only silent voice was Reform UK’s leader Nigel Farage, whose party leads the polls. Farage appears 41 times in the redacted Epstein files as something he would like you to forget.

Yet the Labour Party rallied behind Starmer. His aides took the plunge, and Mandelson is now under police investigation. Starmer fought back and won, strengthening his position. At the Munich Security Conference that same week, he looked confident and comfortable. The way Starmer survived shows how he will again. He kept his job for three reasons that look unlikely to change.

First, there is no obvious successor. The pool of possibles all bring baggage. The most likely is former Labour leader and current Energy Secretary, Ed Miliband. He has proven to be the government’s most capable and efficient minister. Under his leadership of the Labour Party (2010-15), it remained united. But he lost the 2015 election and does not want the top job. 

Others include Wes Streeting and Angela Rayner and Andy Burnham. Burnham, the popular Mayor of Greater Manchester, is not a Member of Parliament. Streeting is the current Health Secretary, who has been ineffective and has close ties to Mandelson. Rayner had to resign as Deputy Prime Minister last year over a tax scandal (still in court). Her background is also a real problem. She is seen as ‘too working-class’ and ‘too common’.

The second reason Starmer survived has to do with Labour’s own political instincts. Unlike the Conservatives, Labour dislikes regicide. They are more loyal to leadership and the party cause, even when both are doomed to fail with voters. Just four men have led Labour to election victories; Starmer is one of them. That gives him immense political capital ahead of the next General Election.

Not due until 2029, Labour is likely to forgive Starmer if there is still no obvious successor and the economy is looking up (we will get to this shortly). Despite Labour polling terribly, the next election is a long way off, and voters will behave very differently when the time comes.

Reform UK indeed tops the polls, but its popularity appears to have peaked, hovering around 28%. This is not enough to win an election in the British voting system. Reform would need a collapse in the Tory vote, historically lower turnout, or immense vote splitting Andy Burnham. Reform will also have to defend its record running local councils, explain very questionable manifesto pledges, and put together a professional election machine.

Instead, Reform continues to be beset by scandals. It is also unclear if the party can survive without Farage. The Tories are not quite dead and are starting to show signs of life. Their voters have largely stayed home since 2024. Voter turnout at a General Election is typically around 66%, whereas in council and by-elections, which Reform won, it was between 20-30%. Tactical voting will likely play an outsized role—along with informal election pacts between the parties. This all puts Labour in a stronger electoral position than people expect.

The final reason Starmer hung on is what nobody says out loud. Though sluggish and unexciting, the UK economy is in pretty good shape. In fact, recent forecasts show that the UK economy might be about to boom.

On average, Britons are saving about 10% of their incomes, up from 3% in 2021. This level is rarely seen outside of recessions. Interest rates are coming down, and inflation is expected to fall sharply in the coming months to under 2%. Additionally, British household and national debts are lower than in most of the developed world. Elsewhere, ONS data shows that public and private investments are going up steadily and energy bills are set to come down in April.  

All of these are traditional signs of a healthy GDP and point to a long-awaited consumption boom in Britain. Getting rid of Starmer would have been a huge distraction for Labour, which will want to take credit for getting the economy off its knees.

There is also another important reason to think that Britons might be about forgive Starmer, and it concerns the fighting in Ukraine.

Polling by More in Common suggests that energy bills are the single most important measure voters will use when deciding whether to re-elect Labour. British electricity bills are so expensive because gas sets the prices—and Britain is disproportionately reliant on gas-powered stations. An end to the fighting would see sanctions relief, and a greater reduction in global energy costs—which would light a fire under the British economy.  

If the economy booms as expected, Starmer will survive the Parliament. If voters are feeling good and economically secure for the first time since the financial crash of 2008, rocking the boat in 2029 would be foolhardy. Changing leader also would not make sense unless Starmer has had enough (he will be nearly 70 then).

His survival has come at a political cost. Starmer is now hostage to the left of his party, something he sought to tame after Jeremy Corbyn’s disastrous leadership. The Labour left will want to use their influence and its massive parliamentary majority to enact progressive social change. Starmer must acquiesce as he starts to face reality on the global stage.  

The recent U.S. raid on Caracas has inevitably provoked extreme reactions, ranging sometimes from enthusiasm to—much more often—astonishment and indignation. True, over 80 years of the post-Yalta order the world has got accustomed to cautiously observing international law. Nevertheless, looking further back in time, this is certainly not the first case of the rules’ violation. History knows hordes of furious warriors sowing chaos in their wake—the barbarians who flooded Europe, such as the Vandals, or Eastern figures like Genghis Khan and Mamai. Yet, among such characters, the Vikings best match the present master of the White House.

Ironically, during Donald Trump’s first election campaign in 2016, Russian genealogist Alexey Nilogov asserted that Trump is a direct descendent of Rurik the Viking, a Scandinavian invited in 862 by the people of Novgorod to assume rule. The first Prince of Novgorod established the Russian proto-state that would later become Muscovy and the Russian Empire.

Whether this lineage[1] is physical or spiritual matters little; more important for us is its mere existence.

There is no better person to help us with our Viking quest than Regis Boyer, Professor of Scandinavian Languages and Civilizations, the author of numerous works on the northern kingdoms and translations of Viking stories, a scholar of immense erudition and knowledge of Old Icelandic, the language of the sagas. Boyer published a commented translation of The Saga of Harald the Ruthless, a 13th-century text in which one episode sounds strikingly up-to-date:

Hearts tremble with fear
A war fleet sails along the coasts (…)
We have cast anchor
In the Gordnarfjord
While the Gerd (women) dressed in linen
Rock their husbands with their songs.

Putting aside the similarity of this except with the Delta Force’s night intrusion that pulled President Maduro and his wife out of their bed, let us focus on basic features that Donald Trump has in common with the Vikings (keeping Régis Boyer’s insights^[2] in mind).

Vikings as raiders

The Vikings were masters of the lightning raid, or strandhögg, literally a very quick landing on the shore (strönd) to deliver a staggering blow (högg) on the enemy. The moment of surprise, often aided by on-site agents, was crucial to offset their small number and quickly escape with the loot. Usually, the main target of their plundering was the local population—the source of vast and lucrative slave trade.

The resemblance with Maduro’s capture by the Delta Force lies not only in the motto “Surprise, Speed and Violence in Action” but in the regular equipment: the Vikings’ boats simply took on the form of the helicopters in the operation Absolute Resolve.

Vikings as sailors

The American President shares with the Vikings their fascination with ships. As Régis Boyer points out, “the Viking is his boat’ (which, incidentally, was never called drakkar, but knörr or skeid). Owing to the omnipresence of water in their environment (the sea, rivers, and swamps) and the scattered settlements, the Vikings very early developed water transport “indispensable for survival,” as Boyer says.

This passion echoes Trump’s announcement made on 23 December last year about the plans to build the battleship that will bear his name, the Trump-class USS Defiant, which should become “the largest in history and in the world.”

The Vikings’ strong interest in ships is coupled with the zeal to give ships their own names—and thus open opportunities for profitable trading.

Vikings as traders

The Vikings were, above all, “remarkable traders,” Boyer emphasizes. The main reason is that, in the icy expanses of the North marked by long nights, the only source of income, besides forests and fishing, was trade. For centuries, and especially in the 9th-11th centuries, the merchants, primarily of luxury goods, conducted trade with the entire West, as well as with Arabs and Greeks. Archaeologists found the scales used by the Vikings to weigh chopped silver—currency for trade obtained as trophies during raids, and a wooden “compartment wallet” used to store different currencies in circulation in Europe at the time—a forerunner of Wall Street?

Trump’s entire career is a tribute to the Viking way of life. His appetite for building ships resembles a constant conquest of new territories, that of a Viking—no longer at sea but on land. In his seminal The Art of the Deal^[3] Trump unabashedly speaks of his morale: when you are in business, you must take revenge on anyone who hoodwinked you or brought harm. You must learn how to make your opponent go belly up—a genuine Viking business formula.

Trump’s Thing

Trump’s recently initiated Board of Peace has much in common with the thing in medieval Scandinavian society. The word appeared in Old Norse and might derive from proto-Indo-European -ten, meaning ‘stretch’ as in “a stretch of time for an assembly.” In the Viking Age, such were public assemblies of free men. They gathered chieftains and kings to solve disputes, serving as law courts; and to make political decisions, particularly concerning power display. An important feature is that they were not democratic but dominated by the heads of clans and wealthy families—a reminder of the one-billion-ticket required to secure a permanent seat on Trump’s Board of Peace.

Vikings as looters

The Vikings’ aim was to acquire wealth by any means possible: trade, plunder (if the balance of power was in their favor), or mercenary work. Trump’s announcement of the “takeover of Venezuela” and its vast oil reserves, fits perfectly into this logic of predation. Not to mention U.S. predatory instincts and experience accumulated since 1945, which have made it the world’s leading power.

In his speech before the UN Security Council convened in an emergency session on 5 January, renowned American economist Jeffrey Sachs counted a staggering 70 operations aimed at regime change between 1947 and 1989, involving the U.S.’s the use of force, subversive actions, and political manipulation.

This unfortunate habit was not abandoned with the end of the Cold War. Reminding the UN audience about the U.S.’s hegemonic excesses, Sachs warned about its inevitable anarchic repercussions around the world and called for the defense of the UN Charter and international law. But can this “old private,” a veteran since 1945, still be saved?

Warriors in the era of turbulence

Despite the sorrowful indictments of lawyers and state leaders against the blatant and unrestrained violation of international law, it is important to understand that the raid on Caracas is, essentially, beyond good and evil, beyond what is allowed and what is forbidden. Inscribed in history, it has adopted a mode made possible (Trump would say “necessary”) by the interlude we are experiencing now—an era of turbulence between two world orders, the Yalta order and the next one.

The Viking age, between 800 and 1050, also emerged due to weakened kingdoms (Boyer speaks of a ‘stunned West,’ a term that surprisingly suiting the European Union of 2026) before disappearing under the pressure of the Christianization of the Scandinavian countries and the rise of strong kings to power, forcing the ‘sea kings’ to pledge allegiance and pay taxes on their loot.

Getting outraged with U.S. behavior is pointless, as the legal and moral principles of 1945 have been whittled away. Grieving over this situation will bring nothing but endless whimper. Those who do it will just face a stiff challenge from the contemporary world, and risk remaining “extra” while the others continue to make history. “Nostalgia is not a strategy,” said Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney in his speech at Davos.

The consensus over the Vikings’ world

The important thing now is to understand what kind of a new world is emerging right now. Undoubtedly, its new principles will largely depend on the consensus, if any, reached between the three major world powers and, consequently, on the attitude of two rivals—China and Russia.

Remarkably, the latter have actually approved the Absolute Resolve operation, giving rise to situations that are incongruous and would be unthinkable just a few months ago: the Chinese state media Global Times congratulated the CIA for its military feat,^[4] while ever-sharp former Russian president Medvedev cheerfully suggested following the Americans’ lead by kidnapping the German Chancellor!^[5]

Furthermore, despite the Chinese government’s firm show of condemnation, it sees the threat of new U.S. tariffs (already approaching 50%) as more worrying than the loss of its ideological ally, especially since oil from Venezuela accounts for only 4% of China’s imports. The same attitude is seen in Russia, where reaching a compromise with Washington to end the war in Ukraine takes precedence over any other alliance.

Thus, the world is marching towards reorganizing the rules to a Monroe Doctrine of variable geometry—American, Chinese, or Russian—and towards dividing the world into major spheres of influence.

This trend has recently been revealed by Fiona Hill, Trump’s former Russia advisor, who said during her congressional hearing that Russian officials indicated in 2019 that the Kremlin would be willing to back off from its support for Nicolás Maduro in Venezuela in exchange for a free hand in Ukraine.^[6]

Moreover, over the past decades, an increasing number of countries have resorted to the Vikings’ methods by using private military companies (PMC) as an instrument of influence, particularly in Ukraine and Africa. Stealthy and effective, PMCs help the states to extend their sphere of influence by presenting the international community with a fait accompli, where the Old World’s bureaucracy would fail, hindered by internal contradictions and inertia. Thus, the Vikings have cut the Gordian knot of diplomacy. And Trump the Viking has no intention of stopping.

After Venezuela, Greenland

On the heels of the Venezuelan president’s detainment in the New York jail, the mastermind of his capture was challenging his next victims—the Cubans, who, he said, would “go down for the count,” and Greenlanders, who would have “only sled dogs to defend themselves.” Greenland’s Prime Minister Jens Frederik Nielssen can well shoot back Trump’s conquering remarks and say “It’s disrespectful” to Trump’s claim “we need Greenland,” but the Danes have a lot to worry about. For Greenland, the story, or the Saga of Trump the Ruthless, was written a long time ago:

The following year you raised
Troops in the beautiful land;
Waves crashed over the ships;
The magnificent fleet plowed the sea;
The good ships rode the blue waves;
The Danes were in bad shape;
They saw the ships
Loaded with warriors on the sea.

(The Saga of Harald the Ruthless, Сh. 32 “Harald’s Raid in Denmark”)

This is an edited version of the paper first published on 9 January 2026 in The Diplomat.

We are currently living in a world of immense risks. Never since the Second World War, the global geopolitical and military situation has been so dangerous.

The main source of instability, threats and aggression is well known. Yet it would be a mistake to attribute responsibility for all what is happening now to Donald Trump only. The ‘Trump factor’ is temporary, while the problem is essentially structural and will therefore be long-lasting.

The U.S.’s Imperial Tradition

The American Empire has always been interventionist and aggressive. Its contempt for international law is not new and has been manifested in various forms, including in the removal of sovereign states’ leaders and even international organizations’ CEOs (e.g., the first OPCW Director-General). The invasions of Iraq, Libya and Syria, among others, were based on trumped-up allegations and imposed on the rest of the world as truth.

It is noteworthy that abuses and violence also occurred during Democratic administrations—the American Empire does not give respite.  In 1961, Eisenhower denounced the menacing power of the military-industrial complex. More recently, the Deep State has come to designate the power structure that consists of the State Department, the Pentagon, the FBI, the CIA, the corporate media, and powerful financial groups. The Deep State acts under any U.S. administration and, in fact, maneuvered the helm of Clinton, Obama and Biden as much as that of Republican presidents. And even Trump’s MAGA seems unable to survive an empire based on such a powerful structure.

Before Trump, U.S. imperial aggressive policy was disguised in rhetoric and hypocrisy, which, as La Rochefoucauld wrote, is “the homage that vice pays to virtue.” Trump is against hypocrisy.

Attacking Venezuela, he said frankly that his goal was to indefinitely run its government and to control and exploit its oil reserves. Under previous governments, similar operations were justified by concerns about human rights and democracy.

With Trump, the imperial power has dropped all masks.

A Declining Superpower Is More Dangerous

The Trump phenomenon should be seen as the reaction of a declining superpower that can no longer maintain its global hegemony observing the rules of economic competition arranged in an orderly manner. The Trump administration is dismantling the international architecture that the U.S. itself built after World War II.

The recent attack on Venezuela is a radical violation of international law.

We should no longer deceive ourselves: possessing the greatest military power, the tottering hegemon intends to use it to crudely impose its will. It refuses to accommodate its interests in the internationally established legal framework. It is unwilling to accept a world that is becoming increasingly multipolar.

Gone is the Olympus on which the U.S. resided and ruled the world after the dismantling of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and when China was only starting its remarkable economic rise and displayed discreet presence. Accustomed to the benefits of the ‘unipolar moment,’ the U.S. fiercely resists adapting to the new reality. Woken up to a world in which China, Russia and the Global South make themselves heard, the hegemon is unmasking its real face and abandoning manners. With Trump’s brutal frankness, it loses credibility and multiplies resistance of other countries, including Europe. 

Challenges for Brazil

How will Brazil respond to this change? Maduro’s capture and U.S. plans for governing Venezuela raise, among other things, the fundamental issue of the absence of means of defense in South American countries, particularly in Brazil, which would allow to resist the Donroe Doctrine. The U.S.’s recent violent moves force us to reexamine our participation in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which we joined in 1998 without an in-depth analysis and public debate.

It is essential that we start, albeit with a dramatic delay, strengthening our Armed Forces and building, with the participation of the national business community and specialized personnel, a strong defense industrial base (perhaps on the model of the French DGA (Direction générale de l’armement).    

Furthermore, we should closely control our mineral resources and rare earths, as well as trade routes and flows—an issue of increasingly critical importance for the South Atlantic. The so-called South Atlantic Peace Zone must abandon rhetoric and become a forum for strategic dialogue among its members, in coordination with the BRICS. The Panama Canal can hardly be regarded today as a reliable bicontinental route. 

Finally, and no less urgent is the need for internal discussion of the legal situation around the Alcântara Base, kept curiously away from publicity, and for adoption of a policy aimed at preserving Fernando de Noronha (our Greenland?)—the topic of recent disturbing references. Nor should we lose sight of the U.S.’s recent military activities in Paraguay and the discomfort that the presence of our Arab/Palestinian population in the Triple Frontier between Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay can suddenly cause Washington.

It is sometimes said that Brazil has made an existential bet on peace. In the current troublesome world, the bet on peace can be suicidal.

In this context, the Roman motto remains valid: Si vis pacem, para bellum (If you want peace, prepare for war).

Brazil has lost sight of this basic principle. We are unprepared to face the immense challenges that await us. Our country is gigantic, with ample and varied natural resources, but if it is perceived as a giant with feet of clay, incapable of defending itself, it will inevitably be the object of foreign interventions.

Interventions may occur if foreign interests are imposed through local proxies. We have had a traumatic experience with President Bolsonaro. Today, several politicians of the same type have come up as candidates in the 2026 presidential election against President Lula. If any of them wins, Trump will have a vassal-president in Brasília. Without firing a shot, the U.S. will do whatever it wants in Brazil, just as it does in Milei’s Argentina.

The attack on Venezuela and the attempt to recolonize it should wake up Brazil and other countries, as it raises the essential question of deterrence power, which means having the capability of credibly indicating that any attack on the national territory will entail significant losses for the aggressor country.

The task of building up deterrence power is urgent. In fact, it should have started a long time ago. Now it is important to establish or deepen military cooperation with China, Russia, India, and France. At the moment, Brazil and its armed forces are intellectually disarmed, so it is crucial that   military school training be revised and mental colonization and subordination to U.S. doctrines be reversed.

Today, Brazil is the only major country that does not have nuclear weapons. And our conventional weapons are insufficient to defend the national territory and seacoasts.

Also, conventional weapons are largely supplied by the U.S., which is another factor of our military vulnerability.

The current situation requires that we take urgent, well panned and fearless actions to prevent a new Melian Dialogue.