During U.S. President Donald Trump’s visit to China in May 2026, Chinese President Xi Jinping emphasized the importance of avoiding what he called the “Thucydides Trap.” This concept underscores the need for the U.S. and China to prevent tensions escalating into a military confrontation.

Some analysts believe that the era of direct confrontations between great powers has ended, and that problems between China, Russia, and the U.S. could be managed in the near future. Others regard the current geopolitical tensions as merely the suspension of an inevitable major conflict between China and the U.S.

Whatever the state of the international system, the “Theodosian Trap” appears to be looming on the regional stage, particularly in the Middle East, between Iran and its Arab neighbors.

If Trump and Netanyahu decide to re-escalate their military operations against Iran, the conflict will likely be between Iran, a powerful military and ideological power seeking regional hegemony, and its economically ambitious Arab neighbors, especially the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, which oppose Iranian influence in the region.

During the second round of the Iran war, in retaliation for U.S. and Israeli actions, Iran targeted, besides American military bases in the neighboring countries, civilian and economic infrastructure, including airports, ports, oil refineries, power and water facilities, as well as residential and government complexes. Such targeting extends beyond military objectives and encompasses key economic and civilian sectors. Iran has launched at least 5,200 missiles and drones, with the United Arab Emirates bearing the brunt of these airstrikes. The ensuing hostility between UAE and Iran became especially evident in the diplomatic tensions during the recent BRICS foreign ministers’ meeting in New Delhi.

Iran’s resilience in countering the Israeli-U.S. aggression launched by Trump and Netanyahu in anticipation of Tehran’s rapid collapse, has placed it in two strategic traps deliberately set by Israel and the U.S.

Provoking Iran to attack its neighboring countries

The primary trap was to provoke Tehran to attack neighboring states. Iran responded to U.S attacks extensively, targeting Azerbaijan, Turkey, Jordan, Iraq, and several Gulf Cooperation Council states—Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait. These tactics have undermined Iran’s regional standing: it is no longer perceived as a victim, but rather as an aggressor. This transformation has led to increased hostility from regional actors that are not directly involved in the conflict, fueling appeals to establish a regional security architecture where Iran is portrayed as the primary adversary.

The Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) may view strikes against Gulf states as tactically advantageous, but they have proven strategically unfavorable, as the costs exceed the gains.

Iran has lost important regional neighbors and alienated them. Moreover, in some cases it has acted like Israel, targeting perceived threats without direct intervention. By drawing Iran into these attacks, Israel may have sought to embroil the Gulf states in the conflict. However, they have largely avoided direct confrontation.

Closing the Strait of Hormuz

The U.S. and Israel exerted maximum pressure on Iran to push it into this move, aiming to provoke international outrage against Tehran. As a result, Iran is perceived as an aggressor in terms of international maritime security. According to international law and the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, all commercial vessels have the right of “innocent passage,” which coastal states are prohibited from obstructing or suspending, even during times of armed conflict.  So, Iran has no legal right to completely close the Strait of Hormuz or obstruct international navigation. NATO now considers sending warships should a peace deal is not secured between Trump and Tehran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz.

These scenarios shed light on U.S. and Israeli decision to assassinate the Iranian Supreme Leader and other senior officials in the early days of the war. They likely anticipated Iran’s reaction to the loss of its symbolic leadership, as well as a hostile response extending to Iran’s neighboring countries.

Escalating the conflict was surely not in Iran’s interests, but eventually it left it surrounded with more adversaries—a development that aligns with U.S. and Israeli strategic goals.

Invoking Stubbornness

Another predicament Iran may face during negotiations could be termed the “trap of stubbornness.” Iran has demonstrated resilience in countering Israeli aggression and has succeeded in striking deep in its territory. Such resilience has revived hope among its allies for a revitalization of its regional axis.

However, excessive optimism risks clashing with stark geopolitical realities. Syria’s case provides a good lesson. After 2018, the Assad regime confidently declared victory over all local, regional, and international actors seeking its overthrow. Notably, in 2024, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad rejected Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s offer for reconciliation and negotiations. Ultimately, the Assad regime failed to maintain internal stability. Since 2018, the year of its supposed victory, Syria had suffered the consequences of a comprehensive economic blockade, which exacerbated a severe humanitarian and economic crisis. The Assad regime was unable to pay the salaries of the Syrian army personnel, support the martyrs’ families or the wounded. Discontent grew even among its supporters, fueled by complaints about the deteriorating economic situation, the increasing influence of Iran and Hezbollah, rampant corruption, and skyrocketing prices. Although Bashar al-Assad ultimately managed to retain power, life in Syria became unbearable due to the sanctions, blockade, and pervasive corruption.

There are concerns that Iran might fall into this trap during negotiations, especially given its difficult economic situation. In this context, Russia’s role as an ally, mediator, and facilitator becomes crucial.

It might also be beneficial for Russia to explore the possibility of establishing a secondary negotiating track between Iran and the Gulf states, parallel to the Iran-U.S. negotiations. This track could facilitate reaching mutual understanding and guarantees. Such a move would reassure the Gulf states and open a back channel for dialogue with the U.S. and consequently, with Israel.

However, a fundamental dilemma remains: both sides are inclined to claim victory, and the victor will be unwilling to compromise. The negotiations could falter and come to a mutual deadlock, threatening a renewed round of war with increased regional and international involvement. In this context, it is worth recalling King Pyrrhus of Epirus, who after achieving victory in the first two battles against the advancing Romans and realizing the heavy losses these victories bore, famously said: “One more such victory, and all is lost.” Subsequently, Pyrrhus’s army lost momentum and was defeated by the Romans in the final, decisive battle.

Iran and Israel have reached what could be considered the most difficult stage of the conflict—a state of attrition leading to a state of neither peace nor war. In this situation new actors are likely to emerge, capable of tipping the scales in favor of one side or the other. These third parties may be internal rather than external.

Perhaps the most insidious harm an adversary can receive is self-harm—like shooting oneself in the foot. In the aftermath of Hamas’s attacks on Israel the 7 October 2023, Netanyahu adopted a policy of collective punishment, committing acts of aggression against civilians in Gaza and attacks against neighboring Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen. This approach resulted in a significant loss of international public support and advanced the Palestinian cause more effectively than the Palestinians themselves could have. Similarly, in the case of Iran, if revenge supersedes pragmatic considerations of national interest and future stability, even a legitimate cause would be compromised. (However, this comparison is grounded on the action-response analysis only, and it is essential to recognize the fundamental differences between Israel and Iran.)

In the absence of a prompt negotiated settlement, the third phase of the Iran war is likely to be catastrophic and have repercussions for the entire region. But even if Iran avoids it and instead faces a comprehensive embargo, economic sanctions, and international isolation, they will not serve the interests of the Iranian people or their leadership. This will inevitably lead to further escalation—an outcome that neither Iran nor the region can afford, given the existing crises and conflicts.

This situation raises a fundamental question: Who truly benefits from Iran becoming a failed, fragmented, or isolated state? Some might argue that this scenario serves Israel’s interests, but I do not see it that way. The IRGC, the Basij, and armed factions within Iran, as well as in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, could operate with impunity in the region, exploiting porous borders to export crises and destabilize neighboring countries and even Israel itself.

The only viable path forward is dialogue—negotiations, reassurances, and guarantees for the neighboring and Gulf states—leading to a potential agreement with the U.S. Time is of the essence. Nations must adapt and progress—even if it requires making difficult, albeit temporary, choices—to bridge the gap with global development and progress. Failing to prioritize the national interest and clinging to past grievances will inevitably bring nations to instability and failure.