Oleg Terlyakov, a senior official at Roskomnadzor, Russia’s federal media regulator, said at a meeting with IT industry representatives that his agency had successfully blocked Telegram. When challenged, he dismissed the concern.
The details came from Ashmanov, an entrepreneur and developer. His wife, Natalya Kaspersky — a co-founder of Kaspersky Lab and president of the InfoWatch group of companies — had attended the meeting.
On June 9, Ashmanov published an unofficial transcript of the meeting on his Substack newsletter. According to the transcript, the following exchange took place between Terlyakov and Kaspersky:
Terlyakov: Whether people like us or not — that’s beside the point. We do our job. We have a task, and we’ll get it done. With or without you.
Kaspersky: And are there any results from the blocking? For example, did you block Telegram?
Terlyakov: Yes, of course.
Kaspersky: Colleagues, raise your hands — who is still using Telegram? [Everyone raises their hands.] Well?
Terlyakov: But then what are you worried about, if everything works for you? That means Roskomnadzor isn’t so bad after all.
Ashmanov later deleted the post and published a new one — also behind a paywall — under the headline: “Self-Censorship Again.”
In the deleted post, as the Russian business outlet The Bell reports, Ashmanov assessed the outcome of the meeting “skeptically.” He said Roskomnadzor refused to identify which agencies order the blockings (describing them only as “other agencies, whose identities everyone here understands”) and that it would continue its current course.
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Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said he achieved his goal by publishing an open letter to Vladimir Putin.
“I had a goal when I sent the letter to Putin. I think I got the result I needed,” the Ukrainian president said at a press conference after his meeting with Baltic leaders.
He clarified that he could not yet say what exactly that result entailed, but added that the letter was meant to show Ukraine’s allies who is ready for peace and who is not.
Zelensky also addressed a separate letter to Donald Trump. Commenting on it, the Ukrainian president explained that he had different goals. “For example, in addressing the United States, I really wanted to do everything possible to at least somewhat shift their attention from the Middle East to the situation in Ukraine,” Zelensky said, adding that the country needs “serious missile defense capabilities.”
On June 4, Zelensky published an open letter to Vladimir Putin in which he proposed ending the war “through direct dialogue” and a personal meeting. Russia’s president responded the following day during a plenary address at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. Putin described Zelensky’s letter as rude, claiming that he’s never refused meetings. He also repeated that the Ukrainian president is “welcome to come to Moscow.” Putin concluded his response with a message to Russian troops: “Get to work, brothers.”
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A district court in St. Petersburg banned three films: “Love, Simon,” “Kill Your Darlings,” and “Call Me by Your Name.”
The court ruled that the films carry a “destructive ideology” and “generate interest in non-traditional sexual relationships.” It further argued that the films aimed to shift “negative attitudes toward [non-traditional sexual relationships] to positive ones through the imposition of information.”
“Call Me by Your Name,” directed by Luca Guadagnino, was released in 2017, starring Timothee Chalamet, and won the Academy Award for Best Adapted Screenplay the following year. Based on Andre Aciman’s novel of the same name, the film follows 17-year-old Elio as he falls in love with his father’s research assistant, a young American scholar.
“Kill Your Darlings,” directed by John Krokidas, was released in 2013. It dramatizes a formative period in the lives of Beat Generation writers, including Allen Ginsberg, William S. Burroughs, and Jack Kerouac.
“Love, Simon,” directed by Greg Berlanti, was released in 2018. Based on Albertalli’s 2015 novel “Simon vs. the Homo Sapiens Agenda,” it follows an American high school student who keeps his homosexuality secret.
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Damir Davydov, head of the Main Missile and Artillery Directorate of Russia’s Defense Ministry, was killed by a car bomb in Balashikha, near Moscow, the Telegram channel VChK-OGPU and Ukrainian blogger Anatoly Shariy reported, without providing specific sources.
Meduza could not independently confirm this information.
According to Myrotvorets (an unofficial Ukrainian online database of people accused of colluding with Russia or participating in pro-Russian separatist movements), Davydov lived on Kozhedub Street in Balashikha. The street intersects with Koldunov Street, where the car exploded.
The explosion in Balashikha occurred around 5:30 a.m., just after Davydov got into his car and drove off. Kommersant, citing sources, reported that an explosive device containing the equivalent of up to 500 grams of TNT detonated beneath the vehicle. Russia’s Investigative Committee opened a criminal case, though no charge was specified.
In April 2025, Lieutenant General Yaroslav Moskalik, deputy chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the Russian Armed Forces General Staff, was killed in a car bombing in Balashikha. In November 2025, a court sentenced Ignat Kuzin to life in prison for planting an explosive in Moskalik’s car on Ukrainian intelligence’s orders, according to the FSB.
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Russia’s State Duma passed, on second and third readings, legislation that will fine website owners who allow users to log in using foreign services such as Google and Apple.
Individuals face fines of 10,000 to 20,000 rubles, company officials 30,000 to 50,000 rubles, and legal entities 500,000 to 700,000 rubles.
The law banning registration on Russian websites through foreign email accounts was enacted in 2023, but lawmakers had not set any fines for noncompliance.
Users who had registered on Russian websites using a foreign email address before the law took effect were permitted under the law to retain their existing login credentials.
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He won — with a caveat. Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party took 49.8% of the vote, enough to secure a parliamentary majority and form a government without coalition partners, but short of the supermajority needed to call a referendum on constitutional amendments. Pashinyan needs that referendum to sign a peace treaty with Azerbaijan: Baku is demanding that Yerevan strip its Constitution of all references to reunification with Nagorno-Karabakh. At 65% or above, Civil Contract could have called the vote unilaterally. Instead, the party will have to court allies among Armenia’s pro-Russian opposition that has no interest in holding such a vote.
Probably not. In the run-up to the vote, Moscow mounted a pressure campaign against Yerevan, accusing Pashinyan of moving closer to the West. Russian authorities banned imports of Armenian fruit, demanded a referendum on the choice between the EU and the Eurasian Economic Union, and threatened to raise gas prices and repeat the Ukrainian scenario. Pashinyan trolled Vladimir Putin but said he had no intention of choosing between Europe and Russia. After the election, he repeated that position, though in a more conciliatory tone. Analystsexpect him to continue building ties with the West while trying not to antagonize Moscow. Armenia’s economy is too dependent on Russia to risk that relationship for a still-nascent rapprochement with Europe.
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Russia’s Digital Development Ministry said in early June it had reached an agreement with Roblox on the conditions required to protect Russian users’ rights and interests.
“The corporation acknowledged that its existing technologies for protecting children from information harmful to their lives and health were ineffective,” the ministry said.
Roblox has committed to introducing a set of measures to better protect children from “harmful and dangerous information” and from unwanted behavior by other users, the ministry said. Starting in June, access to games will be restricted by age group. The platform will also work to combat the spread of content that “harms children’s health and development.”
The Digital Development Ministry and Roskomnadzor have asked the relevant law enforcement authorities to support lifting the restrictions on access to Roblox in Russia.
The gaming platform Roblox was blocked in early December 2025. Russia’s communications regulator, Roskomnadzor, said the move was due to the spread of “extremist” content and “LGBT propaganda.” The block affected millions of Russian gamers, and in some regions residents protested the restrictions.
Shortly afterward, Roskomnadzor said the platform’s management had expressed willingness to “gradually bring its operations into compliance with Russian law.”
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Russia’s State Duma passed a law tightening state oversight of people and organizations designated as “foreign agents” in Russia, approving it in both the second and third readings in a single session.
What the adopted amendments say:
Banks will be required to provide the Justice Ministry with information about the financial transactions, accounts, and deposits of “foreign agents” within three days of a request.
Social advertising is banned from the websites and platforms of “foreign agents,” who are also prohibited from commissioning it. Previously, the ban applied only to commercial advertising.
If authorities refuse to remove a “foreign agent” from the registry, that person or organization may not reapply until a year after the refusal. This does not apply to individuals being added to the registry for the first time.
“Foreign agents” will be required to submit reports to the Justice Ministry electronically rather than on paper, as is currently the case. The human rights project Department One notes that lawmakers still required one reporting form to be submitted in paper form.
“Foreign agents” have been stripped of the protections afforded by the law on mandatory requirements, which shields businesses, organizations, and individuals from surprise inspections and excessive government demands. Inspecting “foreign agents” will now be easier, Department One concludes.
As of 2026, more than 1,200 individuals and organizations have been added to Russia’s “foreign agents” list. According to OVD-Info, 178 individuals and 37 organizations were designated in 2025 alone.
According to Russia’s deputy justice minister Oleg Sviridenko, only 4% of those designated as “foreign agents” in 2025 were found to have received foreign funding. Since 2022, a law in Russia has allowed authorities to label anyone a “foreign agent” for being “under foreign influence,” even without receiving foreign funding.
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Georgia’s Interior Ministry has drafted legislation that would tighten the rules for granting temporary and permanent residency to foreign students and spouses of Georgian citizens.
Under the proposed changes, applicants and students would be required to submit a certificate showing they passed a language exam — in Georgian or a foreign language, depending on their program — or to take such an exam inside the country as a condition of enrollment. Educational institutions would face quotas on foreign students, and universities would be required to notify authorities promptly when a foreign student is expelled, under threat of fines or loss of accreditation.
Spouses of Georgian citizens would no longer be able to obtain permanent residency immediately, as is currently the case. They would first receive a temporary residence permit on the basis of marriage — a new ground for residency under the proposal — and a special commission would verify that the marriage is not fictitious before issuing the document.
Sham marriages entered into for the purpose of obtaining citizenship or another basis for staying in Georgia would become a criminal offense. Foreign nationals could face deportation and a ban on entering the country for two to 10 years, up to two years in prison, house arrest for one to two years, or a fine.
Georgia’s parliament will consider the package of amendments on an expedited basis on June 23, according to The Moscow Times.
In March 2026, Georgia introduced additional restrictions on the employment of foreign nationals, banning them from working without the appropriate visa or residence permit. Foreign sole proprietors registered in the country are now also required to obtain work permits.
The Georgian authorities say the tighter rules are aimed at combating illegal migration. By their estimates, around 20,000 people are living in the country without legal status. As Novaya Gazeta Europe reported in April, about 32,000 Russian citizens — mostly students — hold residence permits in Georgia. There are no precise figures on the total number of Russian nationals in the country, but it is believed to be at least 50,000.
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A member of the Social Protection Party’s supreme council urged St. Petersburg’s Legislative Assembly to petition Vladimir Putin to strike Ukraine with nuclear weapons.
The proposal came from Viktor Perov, who had been invited to address the assembly alongside other politicians not represented in the legislature.
Perov used his remarks to address the Russia–Ukraine war. In his view, “the criminal regime of Zelensky under the patronage of the European Union” had attacked Russia with the goal of “establishing a bandit Banderite neo-Nazi regime.” That is why Putin “was forced” to launch the ”SVO,” but “things did not go as planned,” he said.
That is why I believe that you, as deputies, must appeal to the president with a petition to begin using nuclear weapons and strike the supporters of Bandera and Shukhevych with them, which will bring Ukraine’s leadership to sign a peace agreement and end the SVO.
His microphone was cut off before he could finish, the Telegram channel Rotonda notes.
On June 3, the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, at the request of the Ministry of Justice, dissolved the Social Protection Party, founded in 2012. Perov joined the party in 2018; over the years he has been a member of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation and the Communists of Russia party.
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Anti-drone nets have been strung over truck parking areas in the Valdai district of Novgorod region. Oleg Kashin published photographs of the barriers June 7 in his Telegram channel, saying readers had sent him the images.
The independent Russian investigative outlet Agentstvo analyzed the photographs and concluded they were taken on a highway roughly 9 kilometers (5.6 miles) from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s residence at Valdai. Military analysts told Agentstvo that such nets are used at the front and can protect against small drones or munitions dropped from unmanned aerial vehicles.
Ruslan Leviev, founder of the investigative project Conflict Intelligence Team (CIT), suggested the nets “are not there to protect the trucks from drones — as at the front — but the other way around: to protect against the trucks.”
Leviev recalled that in Ukraine’s Spider Web operation, drones were concealed inside trucks. As the vehicles approached their targets — military airfields — the trucks’ roofs opened, the drones flew out, and struck.
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The Russian aerospace company Bureau 1440 has lost one of the 16 production satellites it launched into orbit in March 2026, according to spacecraft monitoring websites, the Russian business daily Kommersant reported.
Bureau 1440 confirmed the loss to the outlet, saying six experimental Rassvet-1 and Rassvet-2 spacecraft and 15 satellites from the first launch remain in low Earth orbit.
Journalist Anatoly Zak had reported the satellite loss as early as June 6.
On March 24, Bureau 1440 announced it had placed the first 16 production satellites of the Rassvet orbital communications constellation into orbit, calling the launch “a transition from experiments to building a communications service.”
Bureau 1440 is developing a low-Earth orbit satellite system — a Russian analogue to Starlink — for high-speed broadband data transmission. By the end of 2030, the constellation is expected to include 292 satellites, with a total of 383 planned for launch.
The project to build Russia’s broadband satellite network is being financed as part of the national “Data Economy” program. It is expected to receive 102 billion rubles from the federal budget and 329 billion rubles from the company’s own funds.
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Putin after meeting with foreign journalists at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. June 4, 2026
Vladimir Putin made noticeably more public appearances in April and May than he had in the first three months of 2026, according to the independent Russian political newsletter Faridaily, which reviewed Kremlin press service reports on the president’s participation in events.
Based on those reports, Putin took part in 60 public events in April and May, compared with just 55 in January through March — pre-recorded bilateral meetings and certain other sessions excluded. He also held two meetings with “ordinary people”: his former schoolteacher and a now-grown Chinese boy who had met the Russian president in 2000. Putin also traveled abroad in April and May, visiting China and Kazakhstan.
The surge in public activity, Faridaily writes, may reflect the Kremlin’s desire to shore up Putin’s image amid declining official approval ratings. Both the Public Opinion Foundation (FOM) and the Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) continue to record falling approval ratings for the Russian president. VTsIOM changed its polling methodology, but the adjustment did not produce a sustained rise in the ratings.
Putin almost never travels around Russia. From January through May inclusive, he officially left Moscow only twice — both times to St. Petersburg. In the same period last year, Putin made eight trips to the regions; in 2024, he made 14.
A Faridaily source close to the Kremlin said Putin stopped traveling to the regions for security reasons. Ensuring security from an infrastructure standpoint is easier in the capitals of China and Kazakhstan than in, say, Ryazan or Kemerovo, the source said. During his visit to Kazakhstan, Putin was accompanied by an armored vehicle with a spot for a gunner on the roof.
Faridaily and the independent Russian investigative outlet Agentstvo drew attention in March to the fact that Putin had been appearing in public far less frequently. Concerns about the Russian president’s security were believed to be behind the withdrawal.
In early May, the intelligence service of one of the European countries reported that Russia’s Federal Protective Service (FSO) had significantly stepped up measures to protect Vladimir Putin because he fears a possible assassination attempt. The media outlet “Mozhem obyasnit” reported that officials had been banned from wearing wristwatches to meetings with the Russian president.
In early June, the Financial Times reported that Russian security services had temporarily shut down a special surveillance system designed to protect Vladimir Putin and other senior officials following the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. Israeli intelligence services prepared a successful assassination of Khamenei by accessing data from road surveillance cameras.
At the same time, Faridaily’s sources said, Putin’s reduced public presence does not mean he has been working less. A source in the government who regularly attends events with Putin said the Russian president’s “priorities may have shifted.” Putin holds many private meetings with participants in the war with Ukraine and with the widows of those killed, “personally getting involved in the work of helping them adapt to civilian life,” the source said. Putin is also “very actively” holding meetings related to high technology and artificial intelligence, the source added. What exactly is discussed at such meetings was not specified.
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This year’s St. Petersburg Economic Forum turned from a showcase of Russian achievements into a mirror reflecting the problems the full-scale war has created for the country. Officials showed no signs of panic — aside from the usual controlled outbursts. On the contrary, Putin assuredinvestors that the economy was in fine shape and that the slowdown in growth was a deliberate, controlled process. Meanwhile, the budget has begun to feel the effects of the oil price spike and the VAT increase. But the gap in the treasury will still end up larger than the government planned by year’s end. And as the war continues, the economy’s structural problems will only deepen.
Budget update: the only good news is for the war machine
Russia’s federal budget deficit for January through May reached 6.01 trillion rubles — 2.6% of GDP and one and a half times the full-year target of 3.8 trillion rubles (1.6%). Even so, the pace at which the deficit expanded in May slowed sharply — the first positive trend the budget has shown since the start of the year.
Revenue grew year-on-year, lifted by higher oil prices driven by the war with Iran and a VAT hike to 22%.
Spending slowed in May for the first time since the start of the year, though overall expenditures for the first five months rose 17% year-on-year, reaching nearly half the annual plan — even though the federal budget calls for growth of just 4.2% in 2025.
The positive trend is unlikely to last: Russian authorities plan to increase spending this year. Finance Minister Anton Siluanov explained in an interview with the Russian business daily Kommersant that the increase reflects the need to concentrate additional resources on important priority areas.
In recent years, that has meant financing the war and its costs. Spending under the “National Defense” and “National Security” line items already accounts for nearly 40% of all expenditures approved in this year’s budget — 16.8 trillion out of 44.1 trillion rubles — just below the post-Soviet record of 41% set in the 2025 budget.
The spending increase will push the final 2026 deficit above the planned 1.6% of GDP. The government does not intend to cover the shortfall by expanding domestic borrowing — which Siluanov said will stay at 5.5 trillion rubles — or by drawing on the National Wealth Fund, which has shrunk by more than half from its level before the full-scale war. “Reserves are not infinite,” Siluanov acknowledged. The money will come from “budget carry-overs” and from “asset sales and so on,” the Finance Minister said.
“Spending in 2026 will be increased, but only modestly, and the draft budget for 2027–2029 will show a schedule of planned expenditures that does not fall in nominal terms but does fall in real terms over three years,” a leading economist at a Russian analytical center told Meduza. “The goal [facing the Finance Ministry] is probably to produce a [budget] plan that is workable both with the continuation of the war and with its end. With an [escalation of the war], I don’t think there are any scenarios.”
The Finance Ministry plans to lower the cutoff price in the budget rule starting in 2027, which will automatically reduce budget spending. Given the continuation of the war, civilian spending — unrelated to combat operations — will be cut first.
According to sources cited by the Russian business news outlet RBC, the government is discussing lowering the cutoff from the current $59 to $50 per barrel for Russian Urals crude — a move that would leave less oil revenue in the budget and channel more into National Wealth Fund reserves. Specific figures will not be available until the fall, when the draft budget package for 2027–2029 is submitted to the State Duma, the lower house of Russia’s parliament.
Economic update: authorities sacrifice growth to hold down prices — which the war keeps pushing up
The Economic Development Ministry cut its GDP growth forecast for Russia threefold — to 0.4% from the 1.3% projected as recently as September 2025. Growth came in at 0.2% year-on-year for January through April, according to the ministry’s estimate.
Speaking at the St. Petersburg forum, Vladimir Putin called the slowdown “deliberate,” saying the authorities were prioritizing the fight against rising prices: “We don’t want inflation, hyperinflation, to be at 60–70%, like in some countries. We are fighting for the health of the Russian economy as a whole.”
He did not mention that inflation is being driven by massive military spending, which has forced Russia’s central bank to keep its benchmark rate in double digits — currently 14.5%, with the regulator’s next rate-setting meeting scheduled for June 19. Credit remains expensive, and civilian sectors are the first to suffer. If the authorities’ real priority were the “health” of the economy, the obvious first step would be to end the war.
Annual inflation as of June 1 stands at 5.4%. The Economic Development Ministry expects the figure to come in at 5.2% for the full year — the same number Putin cited in St. Petersburg. Russia’s Central Bank, for its part, kept its 2026 inflation forecast in the range of 4.5–5.5% at its April meeting.
The latest industrial data show that growth is being sustained almost exclusively in war-related sectors, while civilian industries contract.
Output of construction materials and ferrous metals, according to estimates by CMASF, remains 10–20% below the average monthly level of 2024.
Automobile production in April was 18% below the average monthly level of 2024 and 37% below the 2021 level, before the full-scale war. Meanwhile, imports of Chinese vehicles rose 41% year-on-year in the first quarter, from $2.62 billion to $3.69 billion, according to data from China’s Customs Administration — Russia has classified its foreign trade statistics since 2022.
The planned increase in military spending will only widen the gap between the war economy and the civilian economy. The defense industry — producing shells, drones, semiconductors, radar equipment, and the like — is growing rapidly on the back of state defense orders. It is draining resources, including labor, from sectors not directly connected to the war by offering above-market pay, which pushes up wage figures across the country without any corresponding increase in labor productivity. Subsidized loans for defense enterprises are covered preferentially from the budget. Russian Railways prioritizes their freight.
And the demands on resources will only grow. The war machine will keep burning money taken from productive sectors of the economy. Where this dangerous experiment ultimately leads remains impossible to predict.
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Residents of Krasnodar Krai have begun reporting fuel shortages at gas stations, the outlet Govorit NeMoskva reported, citing posts in local Telegram channels.
In Krasnodar, residents say many stations have run out of AI-92 and AI-95 gasoline, with lines forming at some locations. Shortages have also been reported in Anapa, where locals say residents of occupied Crimea — where a fuel crisis continues — are traveling to fill up.
Krasnodar Governor Veniamin Kondratyev addressed the reports on the evening of June 8, attributing the situation to panic buying. Because of the “difficult situation” in neighboring regions, he said, “many people decided to stock up on gasoline, which created artificial panic buying.” He insisted there is no gasoline shortage in Krasnodar Krai.
“Temporary supply difficulties are being observed primarily at small private gas stations; fuel is available at most large chain stations. Given the spike in demand, suppliers are quickly optimizing logistics to prevent long-term supply disruptions. The situation is under control. I ask that you trust only official sources of information,” the governor said.
Since early June, residents in Moscow, St. Petersburg, and the Belgorod, Kursk, Leningrad, and Moscow regions, among others, have reported fuel shortages at gas stations. The disruptions have come amid Ukrainian drone strikes on oil refineries.
The most acute shortages in recent days have been reported in occupied Crimea. They began after Ukrainian forces targeted fuel trucks and other vehicles supplying the peninsula via the R-280 Novorossiya highway, which connects Crimea to Russia’s Rostov region. Cash purchases of gasoline have been completely banned on the peninsula.
On June 8, Russia’s Energy Ministry acknowledged that the supply disruptions were caused by Ukrainian drone attacks. “Recently, enterprises in the fuel and energy sector have been facing an increase in enemy air attacks, which has led to temporary difficulties with fuel deliveries in a number of southern regions,” the ministry said.
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Russian forces killed three people in Chuhuiv overnight on June 9 in a drone and missile strike on Ukraine’s Kharkiv region, Oleh Syniehubov, the head of the regional administration, reported. Six residents were wounded, according to Chuhuiv Mayor Halyna Minayeva, who reported the figures.
In Kharkiv, Russian drones struck the Shevchenkivskyi and Kholodnohirskyi districts, wounding 15 people, Mayor Ihor Terekhov reported. Residential buildings, administrative and industrial facilities, and dozens of vehicles were damaged.
Russian forces launched 166 drones of various types — including decoy drones — and two Kh-59/69 guided air-launched missiles against Ukraine overnight on June 9, the Ukrainian Air Force command reported. Ukrainian forces shot down 146 of the drones, military representatives said.
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In late May, the newspaper Kommersant published an article reporting on the “expansion of the list of data that telecom operators are required to collect and transmit to law enforcement agencies” through SORM.
The Sistema Operativno-Razysknykh Meropriyatiy (System for Operative Investigative Activities). It is a complex of hardware and software that gives Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) access to phone calls, SMS messages, internet traffic, and other data.
Physically, it takes the form of a server with a dedicated communication line that connects directly to FSB equipment. To prevent anyone from “tapping into” this line and intercepting transmitted data, the connection can be protected with a special VPN.
Journalists and the experts they consulted reached that conclusion after reviewing a recently published Digital Development Ministry order.
The story spread through the news media (Meduza included). It turns out, however, that this “expansion” won’t grant the FSB anything new about Russian telecom subscribers.
An expansion that adds nothing? How’s that possible?
Over the past few days, we looked more carefully at the Digital Development Ministry’s documents and found that telecom operators already transmit all the data journalists flagged to the FSB anyway:
passport and address data
taxpayer identification numbers (INN)
bank account details
IP addresses
domain names
login names
geolocations
organizational information
All of this can be found in another current ministry order, dated October 29, 2018, No. 573.
Why this new government order now?
The new rule goes further than traditional telecom carriers. It applies to any operator of a proprietary communications network holding its own block of IP addresses, known in networking as an autonomous system number.
An autonomous system number (ASN) is described in the order as the “unique identifier of a set of communication facilities and other technical devices” on the internet.
A regional internet registry assigns an ASN to a specific organization’s network, meaning a single organization can hold multiple autonomous system numbers. ASNs are used to route internet traffic between different networks: using its ASN, an organization announces its IP address ranges to other participants and indicates through which network those addresses can be accessed.
In addition to telecom operators, this category may include:
major IT companies (including social networks, messengers, and streaming services)
hosting providers and data centers
major corporations (like Gazprom)
banks
research institutes and universities
Russia’s 2019 “sovereign internet” law first brought these operators under FSB oversight. Amendments passed in 2023 raised the bar further, requiring companies to hold onto records of user interactions with their systems for three years.
So this new Ministry of Digital Development order basically widened the net on what data all these companies have to collect?
No. The order cannot, in this case, change the list of information transmitted to the FSB at all. That list was defined almost three years ago by a Russian government decree and has not changed since. It was approved at a higher level than any individual ministry, so the Digital Development Ministry can neither ignore it nor amend it independently.
Owners of technological communication networks are required to store and transmit for three years:
information about all paid services provided to users, and information about payment for those services
information about all user actions within the organization’s information system (such as registration, authorization, orders, and requests for reference information)
detailed information about users (from registration data to their location)
all information automatically transmitted during interaction between the organization’s information system and the user’s device (at the network protocol level)
Then it makes even less sense why the Digital Development Ministry issued this order at all!
We actually found an explanation: without the order, organizations lacked the technical procedures needed to transmit all required data to the FSB. That, at least, is the explanation set out in the summary report accompanying the draft order, published in spring 2024.
The document provides detailed specifications for server software that owners of technological communication networks are required to use in coordination with the FSB. Various intermediaries who develop and sell SORM hardware and software systems to businesses also use these specifications as a reference.
The order’s specifications are nearly identical, minor differences aside, to those in a 2023 Digital Development Ministry document on the installation of SORM equipment by hosting providers. They also match a 2026 Transportation Ministry draft order that would require freight forwarding companies to install data collection equipment.
Why would “freight forwarders” need to collect clients’ data?
We don’t know, but the requirement may be tied to the threat of wartime sabotage. Ukrainian intelligence used a long chain of intermediaries in the October 2022 bombing of the Crimean Bridge — people who said they had no knowledge of Kyiv’s plans — including Oleg Antipov, the owner of a logistics company, who was ultimately sentenced to life in prison along with other defendants in the case.
Does this mean every industry will now have to implement its own version of SORM?
Not yet. But beyond telecom operators, the following organizations now must — or will soon be required to — install their own technical systems for FSB access:
information dissemination organizers (social networks, messengers, etc.)
hosting providers
owners of technological communication networks with their own autonomous system numbers
freight forwarding companies
The same company may fall under several of these categories at once. A major social network, for example, is simultaneously considered both an information dissemination organizer and the owner of an autonomous system number. Many hosting providers and telecom operators also have their own IP address ranges.
It’s unclear whether such an organization would be required to install several different SORM systems. Based on the Digital Development Ministry’s response during discussions of the draft order, the final decision will rest with the FSB’s regional office, with which the organization must coordinate its SORM implementation plan.
Anton Nesterov, a researcher of internet censorship and mass surveillance, suggested in comments to Meduza that system duplication would most likely not occur, despite some differences in the requirements for telecom operators, hosting providers, and information dissemination organizers:
This can be handled with a software module, so they won’t install a separate box. By agreement with their [FSB] supervisor, all requirements simply need to be met.
But will everyone eventually be required to monitor their clients?
That remains unclear. The authorities may not take things to that extreme — especially since last year’s amendments to the FSB law already give the agency the power, as of April 1, 2026, to demand and obtain, at no cost, copies of any databases owned by organizations.
The only exception to this rule covers databases the FSB already receives through SORM.
Federal Security Service offices shall have the right to receive, free of charge, copies of databases (or portions thereof) belonging to organizations and containing information necessary to fulfill the obligations assigned to those offices. […] The provisions of this part shall not apply to databases accessed using equipment and software-technical means employed for the conducting by authorized state bodies — which carry out operative-investigative activities or ensure the security of the Russian Federation, in cases established by federal laws — of measures to fulfill the tasks assigned to them.
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